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Abstract 
 
This thesis examines Kant’s transcendental idealism. It argues that the key to 
understanding Kant’s idealism lies in appreciating how it is compatible with Kant’s 
empirical realism. It suggests against the so-called traditional view that transcendental 
idealism is not a distinction between illusion and reality, where appearances are how 
things merely seem to be to us in virtue of the nature of our minds, and where things in 
themselves are understood to be how things really are. Instead, it argues that 
transcendental idealism, when charitably interpreted, reveals how minds such as ours 
can have genuine cognitive access to reality, based on exploring the links between the 
conditions of experience, in terms of a priori forms of intuition and categories that the 
cognitive subject supplies to its experience, and the conditions of the possibility of the 
objects of experience, in terms of the necessary ontological structures that objects of 
experience must have in order to be representable through human forms of intuition 
(space and time). The thesis suggests that Kant uses his transcendental distinction 
between appearances and things in themselves in at least three ways and that unpacking 
these three uses helps us to get a better grasp on Kant’s idealism. The three senses of the 
transcendental distinction are: (1) the traditional phenomenalist conception, according to 
which appearances are ‘mere representations’ and things in themselves are the 
putatively ‘real’ things, (2) the notion that things in themselves are ‘objects of a pure 
understanding’ and (3) that appearances are conditioned phenomena while things in 
themselves are the unconditioned ground of phenomena. The thesis argues that senses 
(2) and (3) can be combined to yield transcendental idealism as empirical realism, while 
the arguments and passages that turn on sense (1) must be rejected.  
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Note on Abbreviations and References 
 
All references to the Critique of Pure Reason cite the standard A/B paginations and, 
unless otherwise stated, are to the Guyer-Wood Cambridge translation (1998). 
References to Kant’s other works employ the volume/page numbering of the Akademie 
Edition and refer to the relevant volumes of The Cambridge Edition of the Works of 
Immanuel Kant. I employ the following abbreviations:  
 
Cor – Kant’s philosophical correspondence in Correspondence  
CPJ – Critique of the Power of Judgment 
CPR – Critique of Practical Reason in Practical Philosophy 
Dis – On a Discovery Whereby Any New Critique of Pure Reason Is to be Made 
Superfluous by an Older One in Theoretical Philosophy after 1781  
DS – Concerning the Ultimate Ground of the Differentiation of Directions in Space in 
Theoretical Philosophy 1755-1770 
GM – Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals in Practical Philosophy  
ID – On the Form and Principles of the Sensible and Intellectual Worlds (Inaugural 
Dissertation) in Theoretical Philosophy 1755-1770 
JL – The Jäsche Logic in Lectures on Logic 
LM – Kant’s metaphysics lectures in Lectures on Metaphysics  
MFNS – Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science in Theoretical Philosophy after 
1781 
ND – A New Elucidation of the First Principles of Metaphysical Cognition (Nova 
Dilucidatio) in Theoretical Philosophy 1755-1770 
NM – Attempt to Introduce the Concept of Negative Magnitudes into Philosophy in 
Theoretical Philosophy 1755-1770  
PE – Inquiry Concerning the Distinctness of the Principles of Natural Theology and 
Morality (Prize Essay) in Theoretical Philosophy 1755-1770 
PM – The Employment in Natural Philosophy of Metaphysics Combined with Geometry, 
of which Sample I Contains the Physical Monadology in Theoretical Philosophy 1755-
1770 
Pro – Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics that Will Be Able to Come Forward as 
Science in Theoretical Philosophy after 1781 
  
6 
 
R – Kant’s Reflexionen in Notes and Fragments, unless stated otherwise 
 
Full details of the translations used are provided in the bibliography. All other 
references are given parenthetically in the text and cite the date of publication. When 
referring to a portion of the Critique I use capitalization, so ‘Transcendental Deduction’ 
refers to that part of the Critique, while ‘transcendental deduction’ refers to either the 
argument or the project itself. I use single quotation marks for direct quotation and 
double quotation marks for indirect quotation.  
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Introduction: Transcendental Idealism as Empirical Realism? 
 
1. An Introduction to the Problem and Aims of the Thesis 
  
Kant’s transcendental idealism is one of the most divisive topics in philosophical 
scholarship. The main question concerns how we should understand Kant’s 
transcendental distinction between appearances and things in themselves, and the 
corresponding limitation of our knowledge to appearances.
1
 Those such as Peter 
Strawson (1966), Paul Guyer (1987) and Kenneth Westphal (2004) understand 
transcendental idealism to be the negative thesis that we do not know how reality is 
(things in themselves), but only how it must seem to minds such as ours (appearances). 
Though it is not a position these philosophers endorse, they take Kant to have held this 
view, and they argue that there are strands of his thought that can be profitably 
separated from his much-maligned idealism.
2
 These philosophers can be termed 
‘Kantian anti-idealists’. Others, such as Karl Ameriks, assign a less real status to 
appearances than to things in themselves, but nonetheless take appearances, for Kant, to 
be genuinely ‘non-fraudulent’ (2003: esp. 35-38; 2011). Ameriks could be described as 
occupying the middle-ground, or as he often calls it, the ‘moderate’ position. Then there 
are those such as Henry Allison (1983; 1996; 2004; 2012; 2015a; 2015b), Paul Abela 
(2002), Arthur Collins (1999) and Lucy Allais (2004; 2007; 2011; 2015) who argue, 
albeit in very different ways, that Kant is not a traditional idealist, trapping us behind a 
veil of perception, but a philosopher with profound insights into the way we gain 
cognitive access to reality. One of the key problems – maybe even the key problem – 
for understanding and evaluating Kant’s transcendental idealism as a philosophical 
position is how to work out an interpretation of this idealism that is compatible with 
what Kant terms his empirical realism, for as Abela notes, ‘Realism with a wink’ is the 
best description of how even Kant’s allies have viewed his supposed combination of 
                                                 
1
 Throughout I often refer to Kant’s distinction between appearances and things in themselves as the 
‘transcendental distinction’.  
2
 For Strawson, this is the general notion of transcendental arguments. These are arguments that purport 
to demonstrate that one thing, e.g., the relative stability and uniformity of nature, is the necessary 
condition of the possibility of something else that is taken for granted, e.g., self-consciousness. For 
Guyer, building on this general idea, it is the thought that Kant has a legitimate ‘transcendental theory of 
experience’ contained in the Analogies of Experience and the Refutation of Idealism. Westphal contends 
that Kant’s arguments actually lead to unqualified realism, but that Kant erroneously adopted 
transcendental idealism.  
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transcendental idealism and empirical realism (2002: 1). Although it is an 
oversimplification of the above positions, they can all be broadly characterized by 
where they stand on the question of how much weight should be attributed to 
transcendental idealism vis-à-vis empirical realism. Guyer and Strawson place the 
emphasis on what they see as Kant’s misguided metaphysical idealism, taking the 
claimed empirical realism to be wholly incompatible with this idealism. By contrast, 
Allison, Abela and Allais could all be reasonably taken as emphasizing Kant’s 
(empirical) realism: even the title of Abela’s book reflects this position (Kant’s 
Empirical Realism), while Allison is emphatic that transcendental idealism cannot be 
understood as a distinction between appearance and reality (2004: 46-47, passim), as 
Guyer and Strawson would have it; Allais completely rejects the notion that Kant 
entertains phenomenalism or metaphysical idealism of any kind.
3
 The question falls to 
scholars on this side of the debate to set out what Kant’s idealism does consist in if it is 
not of the traditional variety. One possible response to this problem is that of Collins 
who goes even further by rejecting the idealist characterization of Kant’s position 
altogether (1999: ix-xvii, 3-7). Developing an adequate account that is not prima facie 
philosophically absurd and that manages to retain some sense of idealism – it is called 
transcendental idealism after all – while not allowing this idealism to render the claimed 
empirical realism vacuous has been aptly described as the ‘holy grail’ of Kant 
scholarship (Ameriks 2011, 29). I aim to present an interpretation of Kant’s 
transcendental idealism that retains an acceptable sense of idealism with a commitment 
to a genuinely robust empirical realism that is worthy of the ‘realism’ credential. This is 
my modest attempt to continue the quest for the grail. 
The approach adopted here shares a broad commitment to what has been termed 
the ‘one world’ reading of transcendental idealism. This is the view that, whatever else 
is to be said about it, Kant’s distinction between appearances and things in themselves 
should not be construed as one between two ontologically distinct types of objects, or as 
between representations and their objects in such a way that the representations are 
regarded as cutting us off from reality, pace Guyer and Strawson.
4
 But while I agree that 
                                                 
3
 Allais’ view could also be described as a ‘moderate interpretation’, and she draws attention to the 
similarity between her work and Ameriks’ (2015: 16), but I have characterized her position as 
emphasizing realism because of her insistence that Kant is a direct realist, or is best approached through 
the lens of direct realism (2015: 16). Although direct realism has no straightforward connection with 
Kantian empirical realism, it is clearly opposed to traditional idealism.  
4
 Allison, Allais, Abela, and Collins are all ‘one world’ readers who have influenced my current position, 
but the term suggests an overgenerous conception of how much interpretations under this label agree. As 
  
9 
 
this is the most charitable and philosophically rewarding way to read Kant, I also take 
seriously the overwhelming textual evidence that Kant often espouses a 
phenomenalistic idealism. As such, I present an account of what motivates Kant 
towards this extreme idealism and suggest how it can be corrected to accord with the 
genuine critical spirit that is prevalent throughout the Critique of Pure Reason. Central 
to this approach is the recognition that Kant does not present one single, clearly defined 
and unambiguous account of the distinction between appearances and things in 
themselves, but instead employs the distinction in a variety of interrelated ways.
5
 By 
being sensitive to the multifarious use of the distinction I think we can make progress in 
the quest for the grail. More specifically, I will argue that the distinction can be 
construed in (at least) three different ways and that two of these three ways can be 
combined to form a version of transcendental idealism that is both realist and idealist in 
acceptable senses:  
(1) as a distinction between appearance and reality, where appearances are 
mental representations, entities or constructions out of actual or possible mental 
representations, and things in themselves are the ‘real’ things behind the appearances – 
this is the metaphysical idealist aspect of Kant’s idealism, but it also encompasses less 
extreme ‘phenomenalist’ readings such as Van Cleve’s (1999) ‘qualified’ ‘two world’ 
view.
6
 (2) as a critical reflection on the conditions of experience, revealing that we have 
a tendency to view things as things in themselves, that is, to consider the objects of our 
experience as if they are objects of a pure understanding rather than as appearances, 
objects given through, and thus conditioned by, our forms of sensibility (space and 
time) – this aspect of Kant’s idealism is closely related to a ‘one world’ Allison-style 
deflationary reading. (3) appearances as conditioned phenomena and things in 
themselves as the unconditioned ground of phenomena – this aspect overlaps to some 
                                                                                                                                               
Dietmar Heidemann points out, these interpreters agree that Kant’s distinction is not between two worlds, 
but that is all that they agree on, for they disagree on just about everything else (2011: 201).   
5
 That there is no unambiguous account may seem obvious, but Allais maintains that it is possible to find 
an unambiguous account of appearances and things in themselves (2004: 665; 2015: 11). Others, such as 
Marcel Quarfood are much more sensitive to the flexibility in Kant’s employment of the distinction 
(2011: esp. 156-157).  
6
 Since this is by far the most familiar characterization of transcendental idealism, due to space 
constraints, I take it as given that it is hard to deny that Kant ever characterizes transcendental idealism in 
these terms. In Chapter 4 I argue that transcendental idealism operates as a phenomenalistic idealism in 
the resolution of the mathematical antinomies, but the reader will find additional analysis of some of the 
most phenomenalistic-sounding passages in the Appendix to this thesis. As will become clear, I think that 
transcendental idealism can be given an acceptable non-phenomenalistic reconstruction but doing so 
entails recognizing those areas where Kant (whether intentionally or not) relies on phenomenalistic 
idealism.  
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extent with the metaphysical ‘one world’ or ‘moderate’ interpretations of Ameriks and 
Allais. My overall aim is to show that Kant’s transcendental idealism, when charitably 
understood and reconstructed, does not cut us off from reality, but rather shows how we 
are able to experience an objective, genuinely real, publicly perceivable world in the 
first place. Based on an exploration of the three different senses of the 
appearances/things in themselves distinction I hope to separate a legitimate version of 
transcendental idealism, as a combination of senses (2) and (3), from the illegitimate, 
metaphysical idealist version of transcendental idealism that correlates with sense (1). In 
this way, I offer a detailed exegesis of the Kantian texts, while putting forward a 
philosophical position that I take to be in accord with the spirit, but perhaps not every 
letter, of the Kantian texts. Though I can do little more than gesture towards the 
plausibility of transcendental idealism, much less establish the truth of such a position, I 
hope to show that Kant’s novel account of the conditions of experience, and the 
corresponding limitation of our knowledge to appearances, should not be dismissed out 
of hand. Furthermore, before we can even give transcendental idealism a fair hearing we 
must understand just what is being proposed, and as years of debate will testify, no 
consensus has yet been reached.  
 
2. The Structure of the Thesis  
 
Above I have given a very brief survey of the different interpretations of 
transcendental idealism. The reader will find a detailed analysis of the different 
positions in the Appendix.
7
 In Chapters 1 and 2 I undertake a detailed analysis of the 
Transcendental Analytic in order to understand what Kant means by affirming both the 
transcendental ideality and empirical reality of empirical objects as ‘appearances’. I 
argue that Kant’s empirical realism consists in his demonstration in the Transcendental 
Deduction and the Analogies of Experience that the relational categories (substance, 
causality, and community) have objective validity and objective reality with respect to 
objects of possible experience.
8
 Briefly, I will argue that it is only through his 
                                                 
7
 This material was originally the first Chapter of the thesis, but since it is not essential to my positive 
argument it was relocated. 
8
 Of course, the full story of how the categories are conditions of possible experience would have to 
include his accounts of the applicability of the categories of quantity, quality and modality to 
appearances. This is well beyond the scope of this thesis. At any rate, it is the account of the relational 
categories to appearances as conditions of possible experience that is (a) most significant in Kant’s 
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transcendental idealism concerning the status of space and time as a priori forms of our 
intuition that Kant can affirm his empirical realism, that is, the objective validity and 
reality of the (relational) categories with respect to objects of possible experience.
9
 
Chapter 1 examines Kant’s argument in the Transcendental Deduction that the 
categories are conditions of possible experience because they are the a priori rules for 
bringing representations to the synthetic unity of apperception through rule-governed 
acts of synthesis. In Section 1 I explain and justify the distinction between the objective 
validity and objective reality of the categories. In Section 2 I argue that the objective 
validity of the categories rests on their indispensability for human understanding as 
conditions of experience, by being the conditions of the thought of objects in general. 
The question of objective validity is distinct from the question of objective reality, 
however, at least with respect to pure concepts, so this role of being rules for thinking 
objects in general is not enough to secure their objective reality. In transitioning from 
the objective validity to the reality of the categories I take seriously Kant’s claim in the 
B-Deduction that the categories are conditions of experience because they are also 
conditions of perception. This is the argument of Section 3. For the objective reality of 
the categories to be established it is a necessary (but not a sufficient) condition to 
demonstrate that they have a necessary connection with empirical intuition or 
perception, since if they are to hold of objects of experience, it follows that they must 
hold of objects of perception, since a fortiori anything that is to be experienced 
(cognized through a rule-governed connection of perceptions) must already be (directly 
or indirectly) perceivable; it must already count as an object in general for us. Kant’s 
strategy is to link the categories to the objects of perception by connecting them with 
the act of the mind (termed ‘figurative synthesis’) that provides the form of objects of 
perception. The figurative synthesis is what grounds the ‘original orderability’ of 
appearances, the means through which it can be guaranteed that anything that is given 
through our forms of intuition (space and time) can become an object of experience in 
virtue of it being given through these forms. Following recent work on the topic by 
Beatrice Longuenesse (1998; 2005) and Allison (2004; 2012; 2015a) I examine the 
contribution of the figurative synthesis to the possibility of experience at length. 
Specifically, I argue with Longuenesse against Allison that the figurative synthesis 
                                                                                                                                               
philosophy, (b) the most plausible philosophically, and (c), the most important for my purposes insofar as 
they shed the most light on the relationship between transcendental idealism and empirical realism.  
9
 See Section 3 below for a more detailed explanation of my interpretation of ‘empirical realism’.  
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generates space and time as formal intuitions, and thus as the spatiotemporal forms of 
empirical objects or appearances, but also with Allison against Longuenesse that the 
categories must be involved in some substantive way in the figurative synthesis if the 
second step of the Deduction is to succeed.
10
 Since the categories, on my reading, are at 
work in the figurative synthesis of the imagination, it follows that they have a necessary 
connection with the form of appearances, thus showing that appearances are formally 
amenable to our forms of thought, but this does not yet suffice to show their objective 
reality. In short, all this argument tells us is that it is necessary for us to use such 
concepts for thinking objects in general, such that they can then be conceptualized under 
empirical concepts in experience. If the second step succeeds then we also know that it 
is in principle impossible for appearances to be given that cannot be thought as an 
object through the categories, but we do not yet know that reality consists of substances 
that endure unperceived through time, that they are in causal interaction with each other, 
etc. Since Kant agrees with Hume that concepts like causality cannot be read off from 
the content of experience he sets out an alternative way of proving the reality of these 
concepts, namely by establishing that they function as rules of determining appearances 
in time. I pick up Kant’s move from objective validity to objective reality in Chapter 2 
by moving from the Transcendental Deduction to the Analogies of Experience.  
In Chapter 2 I explore how Kant continues his strategy in the Analogies of 
Experience. In Section 1 I explore the complicated relationship between the Deduction 
and the Analogies. In Section 2 I focus on the relational categories in more detail as 
conditions of perception of objects in general. In Section 3 I demonstrate that Kant’s 
empirical realism with respect to the categories consists in how the relational categories 
are related to empirical objects as the ontological conditions of their representability in 
time, i.e., empirical time-determination. In short, conformity to the relational categories 
of substance, causality and community are the necessary conditions that objects must 
meet if they are to be objects of possible experience for us, but it is only possible for us 
to know this, according to Kant, under the presupposition of transcendental idealism as a 
formal idealism of space and time. By the end of the Chapter I hope to have shown that 
Kant’s idealism, as the ‘original orderability’ of appearances, and his empirical realism, 
as the conformity of objects of experience to the mind’s way of representing objects as 
                                                 
10
 This step is the exorcism of the transcendental spectre that appearances might be constituted in such a 
way that they could appear to consciousness through the forms of intuition, but be unable to be thought 
through the categories.  
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unifiable in one temporally unified self-consciousness, go hand in hand, but this still 
leaves open the question of what Kant means when he claims that we cannot know 
things in themselves.  
In Chapters 3 and 4 I address this question directly. I examine what Kant means 
by denying that we can know things in themselves, and I also answer the related worry 
that my interpretation may seem to give us knowledge of things in themselves, which 
would be obviously inappropriate as a reading of Kant, even one that is only Kantian in 
spirit. In Chapter 3 I address the question of whether Kant is doing metaphysics; this is 
important because Kant is often taken to have rejected all metaphysical speculation, 
which, if true, would block the reading of empirical realism that I supplied. It is also 
significant because my proposed empirical realism may look to fall afoul of Kant’s 
repeated denial of knowledge of things in themselves. If our knowledge of appearances 
is ultimately knowledge of real, mind-independent, objects of experience then it would 
seem to be a gaping contradiction in Kant’s account if by ‘things in themselves’ he 
means ‘mind-independent things’ or something akin to that. To demonstrate that this is 
not the case I show in Section 1 that Kant takes himself to be doing a kind of 
metaphysics that is legitimate according to his philosophy, and that there is an 
acceptable and coherent sense of the transcendental distinction that allows us to 
understand why Kant affirms the applicability of the categories to appearances, while 
also denying their application to things in themselves. I also suggest that to see how 
Kant’s empirical realism and transcendental idealism hold together it is necessary to 
investigate further what it means for space and time to be empirically real vis-à-vis the 
categories. I argue that the sense in which the ideality of space and time allows for 
empirical realism is very different from the sense in which the categories entail 
empirical realism, and that recognizing this is crucial to formulating a coherent 
interpretation of Kant that is able to accommodate both the idealist and realist 
components of his thought.
11
 In Section 2 I introduce one of the three senses of the 
transcendental distinction, alluded to above, by focusing on the largely-
neglected/misunderstood Amphiboly of the Concepts of Reflection in the Critique. This 
is sense (2) of the transcendental distinction: things in themselves are things considered 
as ‘objects of a pure understanding’. I explain what this sense is and how it constitutes 
the first element in a version of transcendental idealism that encompasses empirical 
                                                 
11
 I motivate and explore this strategy of understanding the empirically real status of space and time as 
being different to the status of the (relational) categories in Section 3 below.   
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realism. In Chapter 4 I identify and explain the remaining two senses of the 
transcendental distinction.   
To examine the remaining two senses I turn to the Antinomy of Pure Reason and 
explore how Kant resolves the paradoxes that reason generates when we attempt to 
think the unconditioned as given in the spatiotemporal world. I argue that denying us 
knowledge of things in themselves is equivalent to denying us knowledge of the 
unconditioned ground of appearances, which is sense (3) of the distinction. However, I 
strive to separate this sense of the distinction from the disreputable phenomenalistic 
idealism that Kant, in my view, lapses into with his solution to the mathematical 
antinomies; this is the first sense of the transcendental distinction and is perhaps the one 
that is most familiar to readers. I show that current deflationary readings of the 
resolution of the mathematical antinomies rely upon the very kind of phenomenalistic 
idealism that proponents of this interpretation, such as Grier (2001) and Allison (2004; 
2012; 2015a; 2015b), repudiate as a reading of transcendental idealism, and that the 
recent ‘moderate’ and anti-deflationary attempt by Allais (2015) also fails to make sense 
of the resolution. I argue that Kant’s resolution of the mathematical antinomies turns on 
a metaphysical idealist reduction of objects to representations, but that his insights into 
the resolution of the dynamical antinomies can be extended across the board because 
these rely upon the acceptable version of transcendental idealism that I sketched out in 
Chapter 3. Bringing senses (2) and (3) of the transcendental distinction together, along 
with a rejection of passages and arguments that turn on sense (1), will allow us to arrive 
at a plausible, textually-grounded combination of transcendental idealism and empirical 
realism. I conclude this Chapter by relating my interpretation back to those positions 
that are the most similar to mine. I compare my view with Allison’s in some detail, in 
particular with respect to his strategy of approaching the conflict between 
transcendental realism and transcendental idealism as one between a theocentric 
conception of the standards and conditions of cognition and an anthropocentric one and 
conclude the thesis.  
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3. An Interpretative Puzzle and A Proposal: Understanding Kant’s 
Empirical Realism 
 
 Before beginning Chapter 1, I think it will prove helpful to establish further the 
main problem of understanding transcendental idealism as empirical realism and 
something about my overall solution to the problem, viz., the notion of the ‘original 
orderability’ of appearances. To do this I will approach the issue by comparing the 
accounts of Guyer (1987; 2007) and Allison (1996; 2004; 2007; 2012; 2015a; 2015b) on 
the question of the reality and ideality of space and time, which illuminates the problem. 
The main question is how Kant can coherently claim that space and time, and 
everything in them, are transcendentally ideal and simultaneously empirically real. This 
seems like the kind of question that one should be able to answer after a few weeks of 
lectures on Kant, but in my experience it does not take long for even bewildered 
undergraduates to spot a contradiction here.
12
 The point can be expressed very simply: 
do space, time and the objects that are in them exist independently of the human mind? 
If the answer is ‘yes’ then we can justifiably claim that space, time and spatiotemporal 
objects are ‘real’, and if the answer is ‘no’, then we can conclude that they are ‘ideal’. It 
is not immediately obvious what difference the additional qualifications of 
‘transcendental’ and ‘empirical’ should make. Sebastian Gardner explains that: ‘To say 
that space and time and spatiotemporal objects are empirically real is to say that they are 
real when considered from the human standpoint’ (1999: 90). But we can ask what this 
qualification – ‘when considered from the human standpoint’ – really means. To claim 
that something is real when considered only in a certain relation looks suspiciously like 
dodging the question, and this point is expressed when critics of the ‘one world’ view 
raise the objection that the same thing cannot be both spatiotemporal and non-
spatiotemporal: it must be one or the other and since appearances are spatiotemporal 
while things in themselves are not, the two cannot be numerically identical.
13
 We can 
make some progress with our question if we separate, for the time being, the question of 
                                                 
12
 Even professional Kant scholars struggle with this. Van Cleve humorously asks: ‘How can you eat your 
cake empirically and still have it transcendentally? I have always wondered how this can be anything but 
doublethink’. On a reductive or ontological phenomenalist interpretation such as Van Cleve’s, I think it is 
fair to say that it must be a case of Orwellian ‘doublethink’ (1999: 251). Similarly, Strawson suggests that 
Kant’s idealism is incoherent because it maintains that our representations necessarily have the character 
of being representations of things that enjoy mind-independent existence, while also holding that from the 
‘critical’ perspective such things are nothing but representations (1966: 56-57, esp. 241-263). 
13
 For example, see Walker (2010: 824-825).  
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the reality of space and time themselves from the question of the reality of objects that 
are in space and time.  
According to Guyer, Kant mistakenly moved from the ideality of space and time 
to the ideality of the objects (appearances) encountered in them (1987: 20-24). In his 
pre-Critical Inaugural Dissertation (1770), Kant held that space and time are not real 
independently of the mind, but, according to Guyer, Kant did not conclude that their 
objects are also ideal, and in fact Guyer maintains that there is only a puzzle about the 
relation of mind and world leftover from the Dissertation for Kant to solve if the objects 
that are to conform to the conditions of their representation are mind-independent 
(1987: 20-24). Guyer maintains, however, that due to ‘several very bad arguments’ Kant 
arrived in the first Critique at the metaphysical dogma that not only are space and time 
ideal, but so too are their objects, thus transferring spatiotemporal properties from the 
objects or things themselves over to our representations of things (appearances) (1987: 
342; 2007: 12-13). We can see from this that Guyer thinks that transcendental idealism 
(as he understands it) and empirical realism are incompatible. Indeed, Guyer’s main aim 
is to separate what he sees as a legitimate ‘transcendental theory of experience’ from the 
metaphysical thesis of transcendental idealism. Guyer argues that the theory of 
experience re-emerges in the Critique, primarily in the Analogies of Experience and 
Refutation of Idealism, and represents Kant’s return to realism. On Guyer’s reading, all 
that Kant is entitled to on the basis of his arguments in the Critique is the conditional 
necessity that if something is to be an object of experience for us then it must be in 
space and time (1987: 363-365); Guyer links this conditional necessity to what he terms 
the ‘restriction’ model of the mind. This is the idea that our cognitive capabilities are 
restricted by the kinds of objects that come before them. On the ‘restriction’ model the 
forms of intuition and categories act as gatekeepers that prevent us from experiencing 
objects that are incompatible with our conditions of experiences, and Guyer maintains 
that this is all that Kant can legitimately conclude (1987: 53-61, 69). However, Guyer 
thinks that Kant held an ‘imposition’ model of the mind in the rest of the Critique, 
according to which the mind imposes its forms and concepts on a formless material for 
cognition, and we know that this material does not really conform to these impositions. 
Guyer understands transcendental idealism on the ‘imposition’ model and argues that 
Kant reached it based on the assumption that genuine (synthetic) a priori cognition 
requires absolute necessity, which in turn requires ‘imposition’ to explain the de re 
unconditional necessity at issue.  
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 By contrast, Allison (1983; 1996; 2004; 2012; 2015a; 2015b) argues that Kant’s 
idealism about space and time is not an ontological thesis at all, but is rather about 
understanding space and time in terms of their epistemic functions rather than as 
‘realities’ of any kind (2004: 98). What Allison means by this is that space and time 
function as ‘objectivating conditions’ or ‘epistemic conditions’ by structuring our 
representations into representations of objects, rather than as being psychological 
(responsible for belief-acquisition) or ontological conditions (responsible for the 
existence of things) (2004: 11-12). For Allison, transcendental idealism is a standpoint 
that arises from the recognition that there are a priori epistemic conditions that serve to 
structure and make possible our experience of objects. Allison argues that Strawson 
(1966), Guyer (1987), Langton (1998), Ameriks (2003) and others are wrong to take 
transcendental idealism to be an ontological or metaphysical position:  
 
Nevertheless, things are not that simple, since a straightforwardly ontological 
reading of the sort that Ameriks (and many others) favor founders over the 
problem of empirical realism. As we have seen, once statements about things 
considered as they are in themselves are taken as claims about how they really 
are, it becomes difficult to avoid taking statements about appearances as claims 
about how they merely seem to us to be. And this, in turn, is hard to reconcile 
with any robust form of empirical realism. One obvious way of preserving this 
realism is Guyer’s proposal to jettison the idealism altogether. But this is to 
throw the baby out with the bath water. Short of that, however, there appears to 
be no solution available within the framework of Kant’s philosophy, save 
somehow deontologizing the transcendental distinction. Whatever it may be, it 
cannot be a distinction between how things seem to be to beings like us and how 
they really are. (Allison 2004, 46-47)   
  
Allison is right that if transcendental idealism is not to be construed as a distinction 
between appearance and reality – something that Kant specifically denies (B69) – then 
some way must be found to reconcile transcendental idealism and empirical realism.
14
 
                                                 
14
 This would appear to be denied by Gardner. Gardner sees it as being a fault with the ‘two conception’ 
view that it ‘detaches the contrast of appearances and things in themselves from that of appearance and 
reality: “thing in itself” no longer incorporates the sense, clearly intended by Kant, of having greater 
reality than appearances (of being “real per se”, Bxx) […] this account loses touch with Kant’s view of 
the inferior reality of appearances’ (1999: 294). This is surprising because Gardner also explicitly affirms 
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As Guyer points out, though, even Allison’s novel deontologization of space and time 
as ‘epistemic conditions’ still ultimately reduces to the claim that things as we 
experience them are not in space and time independently of our minds, which is clearly 
an ontological thesis of some description, even if it stops short of explaining exactly 
what kind of ontological status space and time have (2007: 14-16). Guyer attributes to 
Allison an ‘abstractionist’ reading of transcendental idealism, by which he means that 
Allison’s notion of considering a thing as a thing in itself is just to abstract the 
‘epistemic conditions’ that allow us to cognize the thing. In this way, since appearances 
and things in themselves are just two ways of considering things (as appearances, as 
things in themselves) on Allison’s reading it follows that things do have spatiotemporal 
properties, but in considering them in themselves we omit the ‘epistemic conditions’ 
from our concept of them (Guyer 2007, 12). And of course, the omission of predicates 
from a concept no more entails that objects exist that satisfy this description than it does 
that in abstracting a person’s gender for the purposes of a fair job interview entails that 
there are genderless people. So construed, Allison’s position looks trivially true on the 
abstractionist reading or, if it is construed metaphysically, to be an obvious ‘howler’ 
and, sure enough, Allison is quick to repudiate this reading of his position (2007: 32-
33). But Guyer’s misreading of Allison’s deflationary approach really highlights the 
main difficulty that I outlined above, viz., on Kant’s account are spatiotemporal 
properties ones that objects really have, or not?
15
 The question seems particularly 
important on a deflationary ‘one world’ account for it would seem to require that the 
same object both be spatiotemporal and non-spatiotemporal at the same time.
16
 
  Allison responds that Guyer and those who charge the ‘one world’ view with 
contradiction are approaching the issue through ‘transcendentally realistic lenses’: that 
                                                                                                                                               
that transcendental idealism cannot be understood without taking the claimed empirical realism seriously 
as inseparable from Kant’s idealism (1999: 89-92).  
In addition, it is not obvious why Allison thinks that transcendental idealism cannot have any 
metaphysical aspects if it is to avoid collapsing into an appearance/reality distinction; that simply does not 
follow. What does follow is that any satisfactory interpretation must reflect both a commitment to 
idealism and realism.   
15
 Guyer is not alone in misunderstanding Allison’s position. Hoke Robinson attributes a ‘filtration’ 
model to Allison (1983) on the basis that this is the only form of the relationship between object and 
representation that is coherent with Allison’s ‘two aspect’ commitments (1994: 424). However, Allison 
responds that it is a ‘great irony’ that Robinson should attribute to him a view which is best thought as 
belonging to Allison’s ‘staunchest critic’, i.e., Guyer (Allison 1996, 14-15). Nonetheless, commentators 
still read Allison as holding an ‘abstractionist’ position, despite his claims to the contrary. For example, 
see Allais (2015: 80-86). 
16
 Aquila (1979), Robinson (1994), Van Cleve (1999: 146-150), Walker (2010: 824-825), Schulting 
(2011a: 13-16) and Stang (2014) all take this threat of contradiction to be a serious objection to ‘one 
world’ positions in general.  
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is, that these critics take things in themselves to be the ‘real’ things. When things in 
themselves are viewed in this way, and appearances are treated as second-class, it is 
entirely natural to assume that spatiotemporal properties must properly belong to one or 
the other, and,  accordingly, their transference over from the ‘real’ things to ‘mere 
representations’ is surely a cause for concern. Allison objects that Kant’s idealism is not 
about such transference of properties, and that in fact Kant is offering an ‘alternative to 
ontology’, rather than a move within ontology (2007: 37). In other words, while this is 
not something that Allison spells out, Guyer and those like him are still assuming that 
space and time are properties (or relations or things), while Kant’s point is that space 
and time are none of these, but rather are forms of intuiting or knowing. As Allison 
explains, this means that: ‘their scope is limited to what falls within their purview, 
which in this case is what can be sensibly given’, and he explains that provided there is 
agreement on this point then he does not mind transcendental idealism being labelled an 
ontological thesis (ibid). Despite saying this, Allison remains wary of the terms 
‘ontological’ and ‘metaphysical’ for these immediately invite the worry that I am 
seeking to address. We seem to be forced to choose between two competing and 
unattractive alternatives. We can either say that things only appear or seem to be 
spatiotemporal while in reality they are not, which is scepticism, or we can say that 
appearances really are spatiotemporal but things in themselves are not, which is 
phenomenalism or metaphysical idealism. Neither is satisfactory (Allison 2007, 38). But 
we can also see that if we take seriously the claim that space and time are not properties 
(or relations or substances) then the difficulty disappears: for it makes no sense to ask of 
a mere form or way of perceiving things whether things really are that way unless the 
form in question is also taken to be a property that the things perceived can have (or not 
have). To ask the latter, as Guyer and many others do, is to surreptitiously assume that 
space and time are properties, such that they either belong or do not belong to things (in 
themselves). Still, this is very controversial, for a famous objection to transcendental 
idealism is repeatedly raised against the position; the so-called ‘neglected alternative’. 
 The objection grants that Kant may be right that space and time are a priori 
intuitions, and that it is true that everything that we can perceive (appearances) are in 
space and time, but it asks why it follows that space and time cannot also be properties 
of things in themselves. Kant appears to have neglected a third possibility: that space 
and time are forms of appearances and properties of things in themselves (Kemp Smith 
2003, 113). At the very least, does not the doctrine of noumenal ignorance mean that 
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Kant is overstepping his prescribed limits to metaphysics in claiming that we can know 
that things in themselves are not spatiotemporal?
17
 It should be clear that if Kant is right 
that space and time are not properties or relations or things, then this objection fails, but 
admittedly, everything turns here on the success of Kant’s arguments that space and 
time are only a priori forms of intuition, and evaluating the success of these arguments 
is not my concern.
18
 Notwithstanding the ‘neglected alternative’, there is another 
problem raised by the ideality of space and time on Allison’s account. It is raised by 
Allison’s contention that his account still leaves room for things that cannot be given to 
us through sensibility: (positive) noumena such as God, the soul, etc.  
Allison is clear that his notion of ‘epistemic conditions’ is not supposed to rule 
out the possibility of there being things that transcend these conditions, only the 
possibility of them being objects for us (2004: 12), but when combined with the claim 
that space and time are only forms of intuition (not properties, etc.,) this raises another 
puzzle: what separates things that can be given to us in sensibility (given as 
appearances) and things that ex hypothesi cannot be given to us through sensibility? The 
most obvious and natural answer would be to say that things can be given to our 
spatiotemporal intuition precisely because they are (in themselves) spatiotemporal. This 
answer is clearly not open to anyone who takes Kant’s idealism seriously, but as Allais 
also points out, nothing in Allison’s position that the ideality of space and time is to be 
understood in terms of them making an a priori contribution to the possibility of 
experience undermines the straightforward realist thought that these ‘epistemic 
conditions’ could also be true of the objects themselves, and that this is why we can 
experience them (2015: 81).
19
 In short, we seem to return to Guyer’s ‘restriction’ model, 
according to which it is plausible that we can know a priori that objects must have 
certain features if we are to experience them and that this knowledge only requires a 
conditional necessity (1987: 363).   
                                                 
17
 This appears to be Guyer’s complaint (1987: 334).  
18
 See Allison (2004: 128-134) for the objection and an excellent response to it. Allison runs through the 
different forms the objection can take and rejects each in turn. For an account that is more sympathetic to 
the objection but in the end decides against it having ‘philosophical significance’, see Gardner (1999: 
107-111).  
19
 Allais argues that Allison is only entitled to his conclusion that epistemic conditions reflect only the 
structure of the cognitive mind and not the structure of things in themselves if he conflates two separate 
notions of such conditions: namely, the notion that they reflect cognitive structure and the notion that 
such conditions are ‘objectivating’ (2015: 80-87). I have a good deal of sympathy for Allais’ criticism. 
Abela voices the concern that Allison’s (1983) account can look like ‘little more than a form of empirical 
idealism, fortified with formal features’ if we fail to give enough of a role to the empirical object itself in 
constraining our representation of it (2002: 39). Although aimed at the original account it seems to me 
that Allison’s later (2004) account is equally susceptible to this charge.  
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In his recent work Allison raises a powerful objection to Guyer’s ‘restriction’ 
model. Allison argues that if Kant did entertain the view that Guyer holds then ‘it is a 
good thing that he abandoned it’, since on the basis of Guyer’s account it would be 
impossible to affirm either the objective necessity that objects we perceive are spatial 
(and temporal) or that we can know a priori that they are (2015a: 452); Allison even 
suggests that Guyer’s ‘restriction’ model is irrelevant to the possession of a priori 
knowledge (2015a: 446). These are two serious criticisms, but they amount to the same 
overall objection that Kant cannot hold onto the empirical reality of space and time on 
Guyer’s account. To illustrate his point, Allison appeals to a possible scenario where 
our minds are structured so that we can perceive only green things. He readily admits 
that in such a scenario we could infer only the conditional necessity that: ‘necessarily, if 
something is perceived it is green’ and therefore it would be a contingent matter that we 
can only perceive green things, for if we were constituted differently then things could 
be a different colour for us or perhaps lack colour altogether. Nevertheless, we would 
not want to say that we know a priori that everything we perceive will be green (2015a: 
446). Leaving aside the issue of how we could know that things are green when we lack 
concepts of any other colours, the main issue here concerns the illusory nature of our 
perception of greenness:  
 
The major point, however, is that if this were the case, all that we would be 
entitled to claim is that things necessarily seem green to us in virtue of our 
sensory apparatus. Thus, far from yielding a priori knowledge of things, it would 
not provide even empirical knowledge of them, but at best of our sensory 
apparatus. In Kantian terms, it would yield a subjective but not an objective 
necessity. (Allison 2015a, 446)     
 
Allison’s criticism is well taken, and further we can see that if transcendental idealism is 
understood in terms of Allison’s scenario then any claim to empirical realism must be 
vacuous.
20
 However, several points are worth noting in response.  
                                                 
20
 Of course, transcendental idealism has often been compared with a scenario where we wear coloured-
glasses that we are unable to remove, so that things only appear to be a certain way in virtue of these 
irremovable spectacles. See Gardner (1999: 91-92) and Altman (2008: 111) for useful discussions of the 
‘glasses analogy’. Gardner focuses on space and time and Altman on the categories; both rightly reject the 
appropriateness of the analogy as a reading of transcendental idealism.  
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First, it must be pointed out that Allison takes as his chosen property one that is 
typically thought to be ‘ideal’ (in some sense), and one that for Kant is explicitly 
‘empirically ideal’ and so is not appropriate for modelling transcendental idealism 
(A29-130/B45). This means that Allison’s analogy might not disprove the ‘restriction’ 
model supplying us with any a priori knowledge. Second, if Guyer’s ‘restriction’ model 
can be charged with attaining cognition only of our sensory apparatus then this charge 
applies to Allison’s own model, because as Allison also points out, Kant does take the 
spatiotemporal nature of appearances to be a conditional necessity (2015a: 446, n.22), 
as Kant allows for other forms of sensible intuition (B72).
21
 But this means on Allison’s 
preferred alternative that the spatiotemporal form of appearances is still a contingent 
matter that is dependent on our cognitive capacities: if we had different forms of 
sensible intuition then we might not perceive things spatially and temporally. I am 
therefore confused as to why Allison raises this objection against Guyer when it seems 
it could apply to any form of transcendental idealism, including his own. The only way I 
can see of blocking the objection would be to supply an argument that space and time 
are the only forms of sensible intuition that are possible, but then it would still be the 
case that objects have these forms only because of our cognitive capacities.
22
 If space 
and time are to be coherently regarded as both empirically real and transcendentally 
ideal, then their ‘reality’ must consist in something more than their being grounded in 
our cognitive capacities; this ‘something more’ is their role as sensible conditions of the 
possibility of experience. But that alone does not help us with the preceding objection 
(that transcendental idealism cannot be combined with empirical realism); indeed, it 
makes the objection more urgent, for we are still left with an account that allows both 
for the (logical) possibility that there are things (‘noumena’ in the positive sense) that 
transcend our subjective ‘epistemic conditions’ and that also denies that we can give 
any ontological characterization or status to space and time an sich.
23
 But if we cannot 
give an ontological status to space and time then we have no way of explaining why 
some things can be given to us and why others cannot. This makes Allison’s account 
very vulnerable to the objection that he does not, and cannot, explain why only certain 
objects, viz., the objects of possible experience, can be given to sensibility. Or rather it 
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 Shaddock (2015) argues that Allison’s account of epistemic conditions is subjectivist, despite his 
explicit aim being to reject subjectivism.  
22
 Not only does Kant not supply such an argument it is unclear that he could even if he wanted to, for this 
would surely constitute a violation of the limits of legitimate metaphysics.  
23
 See for example Allison (2004: 132).  
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means that the natural answer to that question is completely unavailable to him, viz., 
that they can be experienced by us who perceive things spatially and temporally 
precisely because they are in space and time independently of us.
24
  
Third, even if Allison’s counter-analogy demonstrates the inadequacy of 
Guyer’s ‘restriction’ view, it does so only for very crude and simple arguments that 
attempt to establish that a particular property must be one that objects have if we are to 
experience them (i.e., their being green or their being perceivable by beings that can 
only detect objects that cause them to experience green-type sensations). As far as I can 
see, it leaves open the possibility of more sophisticated arguments that may even appeal 
to features of Allison’s own account to ground a priori knowledge of conditions that 
objects must satisfy in order to be objects for us. Furthermore, while it is clearly the 
case that one could not supply an argument that objects have spatiotemporal features, 
independently of us, while holding transcendental idealism, it could be argued that there 
are other features that objects must have to be objects of possible experience for us. 
Better still, it could be the case that these other features could be known to hold of 
objects of experience because of transcendental idealism. If that were the case, then 
given the transcendental nature of the latter, the former might be knowable a priori, too.  
 As already indicated, I do not think that there is one single, unified and 
unambiguous account of transcendental idealism presented in the Critique, but I do 
think that there are (at least) three prominent senses of the transcendental distinction 
between appearances and things in themselves, such that two of the three are compatible 
with a robust form of empirical realism, while one is not. I propose that just as there are 
multiple meanings of the transcendental distinction, so too are there multiple senses of 
‘empirical realism’. I argue that the sense in which space and time are empirically real 
(or objectively valid) for Kant is importantly distinct from the sense in which the 
categories are objectively valid, though the two are interdependent. I believe the key to 
making sense of the reality of space and time is their status as forms or ways of 
perceiving, whereas as for the categories the issue is considerably more complex and 
my account will focus primarily on the relational categories. I argue that their reality is 
best considered as consisting of being the conceptual and ontological conditions of 
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 In his response to Robinson (1994) Allison claims that ‘being representable in these disparate ways is a 
function of different modes of representing rather than of the nature of the things represented, it is not 
(except in a trivial sense) a property of the things themselves’ (1996: 15). I think it is far from trivial that 
some things are able to be objects for us because of our modes of representing and that conceptual room is 
left by (Allison’s) Kant for things that exist but cannot be objects for us: something more than just the 
modes of representing must ground this possibility.  
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time-determination. That is, the relational categories are not only the conditions of 
thinking objects in general – this they share with the other categories – but they also 
exhibit the features that things must have if they can be represented by us as objects. In 
order to be representable in time for beings that are equipped with space and time as 
their forms of perception these ‘objects’ must conform to the schematized relational 
categories, as set out by Kant in the Analogies of Experience. 
 The above points bring us to the notion of the ‘original orderability’ of 
appearances. I intend this notion to be a helpful expository device that illuminates his 
transcendental idealism, despite being a term that Kant himself never employed. The 
term originates with Allison (2004: 12-14) and highlights the idea that what Allison 
terms the ‘discursivity thesis’ entails that appearances are presented to the mind in 
sensible intuition in such a way that they are orderable by the operations of thought. The 
discursivity thesis is, on Allison’s account, essential for grounding Kant’s idealism. The 
discursivity thesis is basically the claim that human cognition contains two irreducible 
components: thought and sensible intuition (2004: 12-13). This is expressed by Kant in 
the famous slogan: ‘Thoughts without content are empty, intuitions without concepts 
are blind’ (A51/B76). Allison understands this thesis as the idea that human cognition 
always requires its object to be given to it from outside and that this is insufficient for 
cognition. An object is given to consciousness by intuition and is thought by means of 
the understanding. So far, one may wonder what this innocuous looking thesis has to do 
with Kantian idealism; as Allais asks (2015: 87), why can a realist not also accept 
discursivity? Of course a realist can accept discursivity, but this ignores what is implicit 
in acceptance of the discursivity thesis. This can be unpacked as follows:  
 
D1: Human cognition requires a matter to be given to it from outside the 
cognitive subject and a form for turning this matter into cognition. That is, 
human cognition requires both sensible intuitions and concepts (A50-51/B74-
75).  
D2: Intuitions and concepts are heterogeneous: the understanding cannot intuit 
and the senses cannot think. Their roles are irreducible (A51/B76).   
D3: Because of D1 and D2, for experience to be possible, it is necessary that the 
data provided by sensible intuition be formally amenable to conceptualization.  
E1: Experience (empirical cognition/objective representation) is possible.  
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D4: In virtue of D3 and E1 there must be some ‘original orderability’ that allows 
sensible intuitions to be conceptualized.  
 
For Allison, the ‘original orderability’ of appearances consists in the existence of the a 
priori forms of sensibility (space and time) that make possible the ordering of the 
sensible data by the understanding (2004: 14-15), but as I will show in Chapters 1 and 2 
below, I think that there is more to this notion that just the forms of sensibility. As I 
understand it, the notion of ‘original orderability’ must contain two conditions. First, the 
mind must be capable of ordering appearances, that is, appearances must be subjectively 
orderable. Second, appearances must be such so that in themselves they are constituted 
in a way that will allow the mind to order them, that is, they must be objectively 
orderable. Without further ado, let us start to analyse Kant’s argument for ‘original 
orderability’ by turning to the Transcendental Deduction.  
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1. ‘Original Orderability’: The Transcendental Deduction  
 
Introduction  
 
 In this Chapter I will argue that the discursivity of human cognition entails what 
Allison calls the ‘original orderability’ of appearances (2004: 12-14). This ‘original 
orderability’ provides the grounds for Kant’s idealism and his empirical realism. 
Although I analyse ‘empirically real’ more in Chapter 3, ‘empirically real’ can 
provisionally be understood as meaning that ‘something has a justified application to 
appearances or objects of experience’.25 I will argue that proving that subjective a priori 
conditions of experience (space, time and the categories) are empirically real requires 
demonstrating that these a priori components have both objective validity and objective 
reality.
26
 Kant thinks that ‘little effort’ is required to show this in the case of space and 
time, since only through these forms can something be presented to us in empirical 
intuition in the first place (A89/B121-122). The same is not the case with the categories, 
for these do not give us objects in intuition and, consequently, there could be a radical 
cognitive misfit between intuitions and concepts, such that appearances could be given 
to us without our attempts at conceptualizing them having any chance of success. 
Demonstrating that the categories are a priori conditions of possible objects of 
experience entails ruling out this epistemic situation by proving that the categories are 
not only required for experience (as conditions of thinking objects), but also 
demonstrating that appearances are not ‘so constituted that the understanding would not 
find them in accord with the conditions of its unity’ (A89-91/B122-123). I will refer to 
this situation of epistemic chaos as the ‘transcendental spectre’. Kant’s solution for 
legitimating the categories turns on the successful exorcism of this spectre, which in 
turn presupposes transcendental idealism (A101, A114, A129, B164). To exorcize the 
spectre Kant must show that appearances are received by sensibility in such a way that 
rules out the possibility that the understanding cannot order them. Kant must prove that 
appearances are ‘originally orderable’ which entails showing that, (1) appearances are 
orderable from the side of the subjective conditions of thought, so that we are able to 
think of them as orderable, and (2) that appearances themselves are constituted in ways 
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 This is in line with Kant’s own definition of empirical reality (of space) as meaning the objective 
validity (of space) ‘in regard to everything that can come before us externally as an object’ (A28/B44).  
26
 I explain this distinction in Section 1.  
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that allow them to be ordered by us.
27
 In more familiar Kantian terms, Kant must show 
that the conditions of the possibility of experience, viz., the subjective conditions of the 
thought of objects, are the conditions of the possibility of the objects of experience 
themselves (A111, A158/B197). This is a complex argument that occupies Kant for the 
majority of the Transcendental Analytic. As such, my analysis will be spread across this 
Chapter and the next. This Chapter concerns Kant’s argument in the Transcendental 
Deduction for (1) and the start of his argument for (2). While I will make substantial use 
of material from the A-Deduction I will focus on the B-Deduction. Chapter 2 will 
complete the analysis by examining Kant’s efforts in the Analogies of Experience to 
prove (2). Before describing the structure of this Chapter I shall outline my 
interpretation of the Deduction.  
 I follow the generally accepted claim that the B-Deduction consists of two 
steps.
28
 In the first step (§§15-20), I take Kant to argue that the categories have 
objective validity insofar as they are the subjective conditions of the thought of an 
object in general. The categories are concepts of an object in general, by means of 
which a manifold of intuition is determined with respect to the logical functions of 
judgement. The categories are the concepts operative in what Kant calls ‘intellectual 
synthesis’ and bring a manifold of intuition to the synthetic unity of apperception. Kant 
argues that the latter is equivalent to representing an object (in a ‘thin’, intentional 
sense). Having the representation of an object in this sense is necessary but not 
sufficient for having experience. The categories therefore have objective validity 
because the representation of an object in general is presupposed in representing 
particular objects in experience, but the transcendental spectre is still intact. Exorcizing 
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 These two points loosely correspond to what Kant calls the ‘subjective’ and ‘objective’ sides of the 
deduction in the Preface (Axvi-xvii). However, it should be noted that there he claims that what is said at 
A92-93 should be thought sufficient to persuade the reader of the objective deduction. Since Kant refers 
only to the categories having objective validity as subjective conditions of thought, I dispute Kant’s claim 
in the Preface that this is sufficient by itself.  
28
 See Henrich (1969), who argues that a successful interpretation of the B-Deduction must account for 
the fact that §20 and §26 contain significantly different conclusions and that only when they are taken 
together do they constitute a single proof (1969: 641-642). While Henrich’s specific interpretation of the 
Deduction has been criticized, the general ‘two-steps-in-one-proof’ interpretative criterion has rightly 
been recognized and my interpretation adheres to it. Briefly, Henrich argues that the first step 
demonstrates that the categories apply to intuitions that contain unity and that the second step removes 
this ‘restriction’ by showing that since space and time are unities, and all our intuitions are given in space 
and time, the categories necessarily apply to anything that can be intuited by us (1969: 645-646). See 
Allison (2015a: 327-328; 2004 161-162) for criticism of Henrich’s specific view, while accepting the 
‘two-steps-in-one-proof’ interpretative criterion. See Bird (2006: 310) for the worry that the second step 
is just a trivial inference from the genus (sensible intuition) to the species (our spatiotemporal intuition). 
Schulting, however, disputes the received wisdom of the ‘two step’ approach, arguing that §20 is not 
really a conclusion at all but only a transitionary moment along with §21 (2012: 277-278, n.5).  
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the spectre requires demonstrating that the categories can be used to cognize all objects 
of experience by demonstrating that these necessarily conform to the categories. In the 
second step of the Deduction (§§21-27), Kant attempts to show from the way that 
appearances are given in intuition that the categories must be applicable to them. His 
strategy is to show that since space and time are intuitions they must contain a manifold. 
Representing a manifold as a manifold presupposes a synthesis, which to function in 
cognition must be in accordance with the conditions of the unity of apperception. Since 
these conditions are the categories then space and time as intuitions are under the unity 
of apperception. Since any empirical intuition presupposes space and time as pure 
intuitions, it follows that empirical intuition must conform to the categories. Assuming 
that his arguments are sound, Kant has shown that the categories are required for 
representing an object in general, which means that they have objective validity, and he 
has demonstrated that insofar as things are given in intuition then they must conform to 
the categories. However, this does not show that the categories are fully justified, for 
Kant has yet to show that they have objective reality in the sense of being conditions of 
the objects of experience. While the second step of the Deduction makes considerable 
progress towards demonstrating the objective reality of the categories this is only a 
necessary (transitionary) step. In Chapter 2 I will argue that Kant completes his proof of 
the justified application of the categories to all objects of possible experience in the 
Analogies of Experience.
29
  
In Section 1 I introduce the distinction between ‘objective validity’ and 
‘objective reality’ and explain it in relation to the argument of the B-Deduction. In 
Section 2 I examine the first step of the Deduction, arguing that the categories are 
subjective conditions of the representation of an object in general. In Section 3 I 
examine the second step of the B-Deduction, focusing on the accounts of figurative 
synthesis (§24) and synthesis of apprehension (§26). In Section 3.1 I analyse the 
argument up to §26, focusing especially on §24 and the introduction of the ‘figurative 
synthesis’ as the means for showing that intuitions of space and time stand under the 
unity of apperception. In Section 3.2 I examine §26 and the notorious distinction 
between a ‘form of intuition’ and ‘formal intuition’. Despite being relegated to a 
footnote, the presence of this distinction in §26 indicates its central importance for 
understanding the proof of the deduction. Through the notion of figurative synthesis 
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 This is not to deny that Kant thinks he has completely legitimated the categories by the end of the 
Deduction.  
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Kant seeks to link the categories to the synthesis of apprehension as conditions of 
perception, and therefore as conditions of experience.
30
 The argument of §26 constitutes 
the very heart of Kant’s proof of ‘original orderability’, as it serves as his ace for 
exorcizing the transcendental spectre. My aim is to outline the different ways of 
understanding the second step and to shed light on the relationship between figurative 
synthesis and transcendental idealism. My discussion will focus on the recent accounts 
by Henry Allison (2004; 2012; 2015a) and Beatrice Longuenesse (1998; 2005), and I 
will argue for a position that sits between the two, but I do not pretend to have done full 
justice to these complex issues, which would require a much lengthier account.  
       
1. The Problem of the Transcendental Deduction: ‘Objective Validity’ and 
‘Objective Reality’  
 
Kant thinks that appearances must have a form that allows them to be ordered in 
relations and that this form cannot be a feature of the things (in) themselves (A20/B34, 
A86/B118). He quickly identifies this form with space and time (A22/B36). While this a 
priori form is taken by Kant to be necessary for experience (empirical cognition), it is 
insufficient as judgements are required and judgements require concepts (A50-52/B74-
76) – this much I take as uncontroversial.  Space and time are the sensible conditions of 
experience and the categories are the intellectual conditions of experience. For 
transcendental idealism to include empirical realism the application of these forms and 
concepts to objects must be shown to be justified. It is not enough to show merely that 
we have such a priori subjective components of experience – the so-called question of 
fact (quid facti) – but also that our employment of them is justified – the so-called 
question of lawfulness (quid juris) (A84-85/B116-118).
31
 As we will see in Chapter 3, 
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 Thus I do not take Kant to be a non-conceptualist. For better or worse, Kant seems to think that 
perception requires pure concepts. That said, given the substantially different role these concepts play 
compared to empirical concepts in perception, this leaves it unclear quite how Kant should be understood 
with reference to this contemporary debate. For non-conceptualist accounts of Kant, see Allais (2009; 
2015: Ch. 7, 11) and Hanna (2005; 2008). For conceptualist accounts, see McDowell (1996) and Land 
(2011). My present concern is not to enter into this debate, but I will make some points regarding it in 
Section 3.  
31
 Kant’s distinction between the quid juris and quid facti is often taken as signalling a ‘normative turn’, 
according to which Kant allegedly rejects the idea that determining a concept’s possession-conditions is 
enough to determine its deployment-conditions. Callanan (2011) convincingly argues that, at least with 
respect to the categories, Kant does not take such a turn, for the means by which the categories are 
‘originally acquired’ also reveals their deployment conditions. Nonetheless, Callanan also states that the 
deployment-conditions concern the legitimacy of the concepts – that if the concepts genuinely refer then 
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Kant thinks that it takes ‘little effort’ to make the objective validity or empirical reality 
of space and time comprehensible. Temporarily setting aside Kant’s misplacement of 
faith in the comprehensibility of his account of space and time, Kant thinks that it is 
considerably harder to establish the applicability of the categories to the objects of 
experience. He famously claims that he knows of ‘no investigations more important for 
getting to the bottom of that faculty we call the understanding’ in order to ‘make 
comprehensible the objective validity of its concepts a priori’ than his efforts in the 
Transcendental Deduction (Axvi). Indeed, the concern with the problem of the 
Transcendental Deduction haunted Kant from at least 1772, as indicated in the well-
known letter to Marcus Hertz (21
st
 February 1772) where he claimed to have found ‘the 
key to the whole secret of metaphysics’ in the form of the question: ‘What is the ground 
of the relation of that in us which we call “representation” to the object?’ (Cor, 10: 130). 
Kant picks up with that problem in his explanation of the strategy of the Transcendental 
Deduction. 
Since the categories are not conditions of the intuition of objects there is ‘a 
difficulty revealed here that we did not encounter in the field of sensibility, namely how 
subjective conditions of thinking should have objective validity, i.e., yield conditions 
of the possibility of all cognition of objects; for appearances can certainly be given in 
intuition without functions of the understanding’ (A89-90/B122). This leads Kant to 
envision a scenario where our a priori concepts fail to have content:  
 
For appearances could after all be so constituted that the understanding would 
not find them in accord with the conditions of its unity, and everything would 
then lie in such confusion that, e.g., in the succession of appearances nothing 
would offer itself that would furnish a rule of synthesis and thus correspond to 
the concept of cause and effect, so that this concept would therefore be entirely 
empty, nugatory, and without significance. Appearances would nonetheless offer 
objects to our intuition, for intuition by no means requires the functions of 
thinking. (A90-91/B122-123) 
 
The worry is that we may be presented with appearances that we are unable to 
conceptualize because our concepts, unlike space and time as the forms of appearances, 
                                                                                                                                               
‘one can infer the range of the extension from the possession-conditions’ – and not the question of 
whether the concepts are objectively real (2011: 17, 24, n.32). See Section 3 below. 
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are not necessary conditions of the objects being given in intuition. Kant’s description 
of the scenario contains one possible solution: the scenario will be impossible if the 
categories turn out to be conditions of intuition, but this possibility is ruled out by Kant 
twice in quick succession in the quoted passages: ‘intuition by no means requires the 
functions of thinking’ and ‘appearances can certainly be given in intuition without 
functions of the understanding’.32 Mirroring almost verbatim the content from the Hertz 
letter, Kant continues that there are only two cases where synthetic representation and 
its objects can be related to each other, namely where either the object makes the 
representation possible or the representation makes the object possible (A92/B124; Cor, 
10: 130-131). Neither of these two cases adequately describes how pure concepts could 
relate to objects. In the first case, the representations in question would be empirical 
because they would be attained through sensation. The second case elevates human 
intuition to the status of divine intuition, which is able to create its object merely 
through representing its existence (ibid). Kant maintains, however, that there is another 
way that representations can make the object possible, but not in terms of the existence 
of the object; rather, a representation can be ‘determinant of the object a priori if it is 
possible through it alone to cognize something as an object’ (ibid). There are two ways 
that a representation can make the cognition of an object possible, either by being the 
means through which the object is given in intuition or the means through which 
thought of the object is possible. Kant suggests that if it can be shown that experience 
requires the thought of an object in general, and that the categories are concepts of an 
object in general, then the objective validity of the categories will be secured because 
only through them will it be possible to think an object as corresponding to an intuition 
in experience (A92-93/B125-126).
33
 Before I begin to analyse Kant’s argument for the 
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 Some commentators have argued that this statement is the formulation of a possibility that Kant 
ultimately means to reject. See Guyer and Wood (1998: 725, n.17). However, Allais argues that Kant only 
intends to reject the possibility that appearances are not related to the functions of understanding, and not 
the claim that intuitions do not require the functions of thinking to be given (2015: 161-163). Others, such 
as Kemp Smith (2003) and Wolff (1963: 90-94) see this as either as a hangover from the pre-Critical 
theory of the Dissertation and/or as evidence for the ‘patchwork theory’. See Allison (2015a: 189-191) 
for helpful discussion. My own view is that neither is correct. Intuitions can be ‘given’ without the 
categories but since these contain a manifold of impressions, they cannot be represented as intuitions 
(singular representations) without being brought to the unity of apperception, which requires the 
production of synthetic unity through the categories in figurative synthesis/apprehension. I argue in detail 
for this reading in Section 3.  
33
 As Shaddock points out, Kant’s claim is ambiguous between the categories being the only way that we, 
as cognitive subjects, can have experience and the claim that they are necessary conditions of the 
cognition of objects (2015: 667). Shaddock argues that the latter captures Kant’s position that the 
categories are objectively valid, but he does not distinguish between objective validity and reality. 
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categories being the conditions of thinking in a possible experience, we need to 
establish that the distinction between ‘objective validity’ and ‘objective reality’ that 
underpins this analysis can be reasonably sustained.  
As the reader may have noticed, Kant refers persistently to the objective validity 
of the categories in these quotations; nowhere has he referred to the objective reality of 
the categories. Kant sets out to establish specifically their objective validity by showing 
that they are conditions of cognition insofar as they are required to think objects for 
intuitions. Similarly, Kant explains the empirical reality of space (and time) as 
consisting in their objective validity with respect to all external objects that can come 
before us in intuition (A28/B44). Why, then, should we force a distinction between 
objective validity and objective reality with respect to the categories on Kant when he 
himself thinks that it is enough to prove only their objective validity? I think there are 
several reasons for doing so.  
First, Kant is not very consistent with his own employment of the two terms. 
Sometimes he treats them as interchangeable and at other times he clearly understands 
there to be some substantial difference between them. For example, Kant speaks of 
cognition having objective reality when the cognition is related to an object, but that 
this requires that the object be given in actual or possible experience. To illustrate his 
point, Kant claims that space and time would lack objective validity ‘if their necessary 
use on the objects of experience were not shown’ and this is despite the fact that it is 
certain ‘that they are represented in the mind completely a priori’ (A155-156/B194-
195). Clearly, here Kant treats the terms as if they were interchangeable, but I would 
also suggest that his own argument prohibits them from being strictly identical, though 
due to the nature of the discussion I cannot prove this until Chapter 3. Nonetheless, to 
pre-empt the point: we saw above that in his explicit explanation of the Deduction, Kant 
argues that the categories will have objective validity if they are shown to be conditions 
of the thought of objects in general, but this, I contend, by itself does not show that the 
categories actually apply to objects. All it shows is that if we are to have experience 
then we must think objects through these concepts, but not that these concepts actually 
apply. In this sense, it is enough for us to treats things as if they were subject to the 
categories though in reality they are not. By contrast, on Kant’s account this is not 
possible with space and time because, as we will see in Chapter 3, due to their 
                                                                                                                                               
Consequently, I think the first claim captures the objective validity of the categories and the second claim 
captures their objective reality. I explain this further below.  
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ontological status as being nothing more than forms of representation, there is no gap 
between their objective validity and objective reality. This is because there is nothing 
more to things really being (empirically) in space and time than their being represented 
as being in space and time (A374-375). This is not the case with concepts (whether a 
priori or empirical). As indicated at A156, Kant holds space and time to lack objective 
validity if their application to objects is not shown even though it is certain that they are 
a priori representations in the mind. He states that if the object of the cognition is not 
able to be given in intuition then one has ‘to be sure, thought but not cognized anything 
through this thinking’ (A156/B195). This suggests that objective validity for space and 
time must consist in being more than a priori representations, but compare this with 
Kant’s statement of the validity of the categories as conditions of thought in the 
Deduction. There it seems to be possible in principle that the categories have objective 
validity (by being represented a priori in the mind, as the thought of an object in 
general) without being applicable to the actual objects of experience, so that they could 
be objectively valid while we nonetheless fail to cognize anything through thinking in 
accordance with them. Matters are complicated further because Kant immediately 
returns to discussing objective reality in the current passage. He claims that the 
‘possibility of experience’ is what ‘gives all of our cognitions a priori objective 
reality’, but then a few lines later claims that the possibility of experience is what gives 
‘objective validity’ to the synthesis contained in the categories (A156-158/B195-197). It 
is clear that here Kant sees no distinction between objective validity and objective 
reality. By contrast, after explicating all of the principles of understanding, Kant makes 
a different reference to ‘objective reality’. He says that ‘in order to understand the 
possibility of things in accordance with the categories, and thus to establish the 
objective reality of the latter, we do not merely need intuitions, but always outer 
intuitions’ (B291). This is significant because in the previous passage (which was taken 
from the introduction to the system of principles) there was no reference to the necessity 
of outer intuition, only that the object must be given in some indeterminate way for 
thought, which follows analytically from the discursivity thesis itself. After defending 
the individual principles, however, Kant claims that we need intuitions of matter in 
space in order for time-determination to be possible because time constantly flows 
while matter must be what persists and allows temporal determination to occur (ibid). In 
other words, the mere requirement that the categories serve as conditions of thought is 
no longer held to be enough to ground their legitimacy because what the Schematism 
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and, especially, the Analogies of Experience, have shown us by this point is that the 
categories must be both realized and restricted by the sensible conditions of experience 
(A146/B185-186, A217/B264, B291, A279/B335). Only through their relation to 
sensibility can the categories go from being merely objectively valid to securing 
objective reality. This is further exhibited in how Kant’s concern with ‘the possibility of 
things in accordance with the categories’ reflects the idea that conditions of experience 
must be conditions of the objects of experience. As such, even though Kant uses his 
terminology carelessly at times, there are hints of a genuine distinction between 
objective validity and objective reality that is of relevance to understanding Kant’s 
legitimation of the categories. For this reason, we should not be deterred from making 
use of this distinction in understanding Kant’s argument just because he was 
inconsistent in his own usage of the terms.
34
  
 Second, I am not the first to read the B-Deduction in terms of a move from 
objective validity to objective reality.
35
 Allison read the B-Deduction in these terms 
back in the first edition of Transcendental Idealism (1983) and argued that the first step 
of the Deduction was concerned with objective validity and the second step with 
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 After the Analytic of Principles Kant continues to claim that the categories have a justified application 
to objects only through their relation to sensibility, but now he often uses ‘objective validity’ to signify 
this conditional legitimacy of the categories (i.e., they are valid only if they are related to sensibility), 
rather than just as referring to the role they play in being subjective conditions of thought, as he did in the 
outset of the Deduction. See A245-246, A289/B345 and A254-255/B310. However, he also uses 
‘objective reality’ to refer to how the categories ‘constitute the intellectual form of all experience’ 
(A310/B367), which is what I have termed the ‘objective validity’ of the categories. However, he may 
also be referring to the second, conditional, sense for he continues by stating that because they constitute 
the intellectual form of experience ‘it must always be possible to show their application in experience’. At 
A95 Kant refers to the ‘objective reality’ of the categories as resting on nothing but being the a priori 
conditions of a possible experience, which again suggests that the two terms are interchangeable. Kant 
also uses ‘objective reality’ to designate whether a concept has a real object or not. At B412 he denies 
that the idea of the soul is objectively real, or at least claims that we cannot prove its reality, and in 
section eight of the Antinomy he claims that the idea of a finite or infinite series of conditions has no 
objective reality independently of the empirical synthesis through which such a series is given. Again, this 
means that the concept or idea has no objective reality because its object (a complete synthesis) cannot 
exist (A510/B538). The clearest example of this usage of the term is in the Ideal where Kant contrasts 
logical possibility and real possibility of a concept. A concept is logically possible if it is non-
contradictory, but it is really possible only ‘if the objective reality of the synthesis through which the 
concept is generated’ has been established (A596n/B624n). Kant also employs the terminology in relation 
to judgements, as meaning that they have the capacity to be either true or false, which I discuss below. In 
addition, in the Prolegomena he suggests that ‘objective validity’ is interchangeable with ‘necessary 
universal validity’ (4: 298). What all these different uses show is that Kant does not distinguish between 
objective validity and reality in any systematic way. 
35
 Bird is sympathetic towards Allison’s distinction and Henrich’s two-step interpretation, but he is 
concerned that if they are right then the ‘objective reality’ of the categories should be demonstrated one 
by one in the second step, though Bird concedes that perhaps no more is required than that the second 
step guides us towards the Principles (2006: 322-324).  
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objective reality.
36
 Corresponding to this distinction were two conceptions of an object, 
which Allison argued were mirrored by Kant’s employment of two separate words for 
‘object’. Corresponding to a concern with objective validity was the German ‘object’ or 
‘objekt’, an object taken in a very broad logical sense, and corresponding to the concern 
with objective reality in the second step was ‘Gegenstand’, an object in the strong sense 
(Allison 1983, 135-136). Allison was heavily criticized by Longuenesse (1998: 110-
111, n.14) and others who failed to see any worth in the distinction, and it was pointed 
out on philological grounds that there is a certain randomness to Kant’s employment of 
both the German words and the two kinds of objectivity. Indeed, we saw above that 
Kant frequently treats the two variations of objectivity as synonymous. Nonetheless, 
while ceasing to place any weight on the terminology, Allison continues to argue that 
the B-Deduction is concerned with two conceptions of an object and two kinds of 
objectivity.
37
 We will see that the B-Deduction’s two-step proof makes a great deal 
more sense when read as moving from objective validity to objective reality than it does 
when Kant is taken to show only the objective validity of the categories. Allison 
downplays the distinction between validity and reality, however, suggesting that if these 
terms are unwelcome by other commentators then the point can be expressed equally 
well by saying that the first part of the Deduction shows that the categories are 
conditions of the thought of objects, while the second part concerns their role in 
perception and experience (2004: 476, n.11).
38
 This is basically correct, but I will place 
additional weight on the distinction insofar as I do not take the objective reality of the 
categories to be properly ascertained until the Analogies of Experience.
39
 Now I will 
explain how I think this distinction bears on understanding Kant’s argument.  
Validity is generally taken to be a purely formal notion in logic that concerns 
whether an argument establishes its conclusion based on the truth of the premises. 
Where it is not possible for the premises to be true and for the conclusion to be false the 
argument is deemed valid; likewise, where the truth of the premises does not guarantee 
the truth of the conclusion it is invalid. Although Kant is not concerned with arguments 
in the Deduction but a priori concepts and cognitions, I suggest that the objective 
validity of the categories should also be understood in formal terms. I argue that the 
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 Buroker (2006: 116-135) also follows Allison’s interpretation.  
37
 See Allison (2004: 476, n.11; 2015a: 187-188, n.41, 380-383).  
38
 In his most recent work Allison (2015a: 380-383) again emphasizes that the B-Deduction concerns a 
difference between two conceptions of an object in relation to two kinds of objectivity.  
39
 At least with respect to the relational categories.  
  
36 
 
categories are objectively valid insofar as they relate to an object, but crucially, this 
‘object’ does not have be to an object in the strong sense of an object of experience. All 
that is required is that they relate to an object in a very broad sense in terms of 
representing something (a manifold) as (having or corresponding to) an object. This will 
be made clearer in Section 2. The objective reality of the categories consists in the 
reality of their objects, or at least their real possibility. That is, the concept of cause and 
effect, for example, will be objectively real just in case the objects to which it is applied 
really stand in real (rather than Leibnizian ideal) connections with each other and 
mutatis mutandis for the other concepts.
40
 As I understand Kant’s argument, the 
categories are objectively valid because they are concepts of an object in general, and 
all objects of experience, qua experienced, are grounded on the thought of an object in 
general, where this is to be understood as the unification of intuitions under the concept 
of an object that is represented as distinct from these intuitions (B137, A93, A109). 
Kant says that this would be a sufficient deduction of the categories were it not the case 
that thinking an object in general did not require that the faculty of understanding relate 
to the represented object (A97). It is therefore necessary to elucidate the possibility of 
the relation of the understanding to objects in order to determine whether the 
understanding has a ‘real use’, that is, a use that ‘brings a transcendental content into its 
representations’ through acts of synthesis (A79/B105). The ‘transcendental content’ 
introduced to intuition is the relating of representations to an object. Determining the 
latter, however, requires exorcizing the transcendental spectre for it must be the case 
that the understanding has a necessary relation to sensible intuition if its concepts are to 
really apply to the objects represented, that is, have objective reality. So, while I am 
arguing that Kant moves from proving their objective validity to objective reality in the 
B-Deduction, it could also plausibly be argued that he is only concerned with proving 
their objective validity; proving this in turn requires showing that the categories are 
necessarily connected to our sensible intuition and so are objectively valid.
41
 To put the 
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 As mentioned in the thesis Introduction, this claim is complicated considerably by the division between 
mathematical and dynamical principles. In particular, it is not obvious that this characterization will work 
for the modal categories and postulates. As was the case regarding space and time as forms of intuition, it 
is also arguable that there is no gap between the axioms and anticipations being objectively valid and 
objectively real since these also refer to syntheses of intuition as spatiotemporal magnitudes. Although I 
cannot defend these claims here, when I say that there is a gap between the two kinds of objectivity in 
relation to the categories this should be understood as applying primarily to the relational categories. See 
Chapter 3.  
41
 Allison suggests that when Kant claims that the categories can be legitimated by showing that they 
enable the thought of an object, he is really making the stronger claim concerning real possibility rather 
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point another way, the necessity and validity of the categories consists in their being 
conditions of possible experience, but their possibility and reality consists in being 
related to sensible intuition.  
Admittedly, my interpretation is controversial for it could be objected that 
Kant’s ‘Copernican Turn’ and Humean insights mean that the only way that the 
categories can be legitimated is by showing that they have a purely formal role as 
conditions of experience, and that nothing more than that can be proved or is required. I 
discuss and reject this objection in Chapter 3, but let us now turn directly to the B-
Deduction and Kant’s attempt to establish the objective validity of the categories as 
conditions of thought.  
 
2. The Categories as Conditions of Thought: ‘Objective Validity’ 
 
My analysis will closely follow the structure of the B-Deduction; however, I will 
often refer to material from the A-Deduction, usually in footnotes, both to elucidate or 
contrast certain features of the argument, and to show that there is no doctrinal change 
between the two editions. All of the relevant features to my interpretation of the 
argument are already in the A-Deduction, but their presentation is clearer and more 
systematic in the B-Deduction.
42
 I will discuss only those aspects of the Deduction that I 
take to bear on the main argument.  
The B-Deduction opens with a discussion of synthesis and combination in §15. 
Kant reminds the reader that an intuition presents a manifold through our form of 
intuition, but while this intuition may contain a manifold of (successively intuited) 
impressions it cannot be represented to consciousness as a manifold without 
‘combination’ or ‘synthesis’.43 Kant attributes all synthesis to the understanding 
                                                                                                                                               
than mere logical possibility, since staking the validity of a set of concepts on their making possible the 
thought of objects makes the deduction too easy. This is because any concept that is logically possible, 
i.e., contains no contradictions, can be the means through which an object is thought, but this is 
insufficient for showing that the object so-thought is really possible (2015a: 205). Real possibility 
requires that the object conforms to our formal conditions of experience, in this case, that the categories 
are understood in terms of their sensible conditions, space and time. See A218-226/B265-274. 
42
 I take Kant at his word when he claims that he altered only the presentation and not the content of the 
Deduction (Bxxxvii-xxxviii), at least with respect to the A- and B-Deductions. I do not see the 
Prolegomena’s deduction as compatible with the B-Deduction in its stated form, despite the efforts of 
commentators such as Longuenesse (1998: Ch. 7) and Allison (2004: 178-185, 201; 2015a: 355-369, 292-
306). Admittedly, Allison does admit that in order to make the reconciliation work the letter of the 
Prolegomena must be dropped (2015a: 368, n.59).   
43
 I am here drawing on the account of ‘synthesis of apprehension’ from the A-Deduction: ‘Every 
intuition contains a manifold in itself, which however would not be represented as such if the mind did 
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(‘whether we are conscious of it or not’) and equates ‘combination’ with the notion of 
‘synthesis’ (B129-130).44 When Kant speaks of being unable to represent something as 
combined in the object unless we have combined it ourselves, he should be understood 
as saying that we cannot represent anything as composite without the occurrence of 
synthesis, rather than that we construct the world itself (Allison 2015a, 332; Cor, 11: 
515).
45
 Since combination cannot come from the objects themselves, it must come from 
the self-activity of the subject. This is obvious: to represent something as combined 
entails that the subject consciously takes x as being a certain way, which means that the 
subject must be capable of being aware of what it is doing.
46
 Kant notes that where 
synthesis can occur then the manifold must be capable of being synthesized: ‘the 
concept of combination also carries with it the concept of the unity of the manifold. 
Combination is the representation of the synthetic unity of the manifold’ (B130). Kant 
means that combination can only take place where the manifold contains synthetic 
unity; synthesis allows this synthetic unity to be represented, but this invites the 
question of what this unity is and how it makes combination possible (B130-131).
47
 
This higher unity is quickly identified with ‘pure/original/transcendental 
apperception’. This unity is nothing other than the idea that ‘The I think must be able 
to accompany all my representations; for otherwise something would be represented in 
me that could not be thought at all, which is as much as to say that the representation 
would either be impossible or else at least would be nothing for me’ (B131-B132). It is 
important to correctly understand what Kant means by this principle. It does not, for 
instance, mean that all representations that I ever have must be unifiable in self-
consciousness. Rather, as Kant explains, it is the idea that all representations that are 
                                                                                                                                               
not distinguish the time in the succession of impressions on one another […] Now in order for unity to 
come from this manifold […] it is necessary first to run through and then take together this manifoldness, 
which action I call the synthesis of apprehension, since it is aimed directly at the intuition, which to be 
sure provides a manifold but can never effect this as such, and indeed as contained in one 
representation, without the occurrence of such a synthesis’ (A99).  
44
 Compare A78 where Kant famously attributes synthesis to the imagination as ‘a blind though 
indispensable function of the soul […] of which we are seldom even conscious’ as contrasted with the 
understanding which ‘bring this synthesis to concepts’. Kant anticipates the elevation of understanding 
over imagination in his own copy of the first edition where he amends ‘function of the soul’ to ‘function 
of the understanding’. Kant’s handwritten amendments to his copy are included in the Guyer-Wood 
translation (Guyer-Wood 1998, 211).  
45
 In this letter to J. S. Beck, Kant clearly equates combining a manifold with ‘apprehensio’. This will be 
important in the second step.   
46
 This reflexive aspect of representing is also evident in the A-Deduction’s ‘synthesis of recognition’ 
(A103-106).  
47
 The idea that a synthesizable manifold must be associable in itself has its precursor in the A-Deduction. 
There Kant speaks of the a priori ‘affinity of the manifold’ which is required for any empirical 
imaginative associations (A100-102, A113, A122). 
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contained in one intuition must be ascribable to one consciousness in order for them to 
be represented as comprising one intuition. Another key point is that Kant is not saying 
that I must be conscious of these representations as mine, but that I must be able to 
become conscious of them as mine, because ‘they must yet necessarily be in accord with 
the condition under which alone they can stand together in a universal self-
consciousness, because otherwise they would not throughout belong to me’ (B132-133). 
This tells us that there is a condition that representations must meet to be apperceived 
and that ‘From this original combination much may be inferred’ (B133).  
Kant then outlines his theory of consciousness, at least his theory insofar as this 
applies at the level of appearances or actual experience.
48
 The theory reflects both the 
Humean insight that I never encounter a permanent self in introspection, for that self, 
what Kant calls ‘inner sense or empirical apperception’, is always a determination of 
my state and is never encountered in isolation (A107), but also that the ‘I think’ is a 
necessary condition of self-consciousness and cognition. As Gardner explains: ‘Hume 
has […] employed his “I” to create his bundles in thought, and then attempted 
incoherently to delete it’ (1999: 146). Kant argues that we do not become conscious of 
representations as ours by adding consciousness to them, but rather by adding 
representations together and being conscious of the synthesis of them (B133).
49
 On this 
basis Kant concludes:  
 
Therefore it is only because I can combine a manifold of given representations 
in one consciousness that it is possible for me to represent the identity of the 
consciousness in these representations itself, i.e., the analytical unity of 
apperception is only possible under the presupposition of some synthetic one. 
(B133-134) 
 
                                                 
48
 I make this qualification because of the analysis of Gardner who argues that apperception does point 
towards the existence of an ‘I’ as a thing in itself, but that we cannot know whether the merely formal 
unity of apperception is of our self as a thing in itself or not (1999: 145-149). Similarly, Strawson 
reproaches Kant for implying that there is more to apperception than the concept-connected unity of 
experience, namely that the ‘I’ is a being that thinks (1966: 172-174).  
49
 As Allison observes, this consciousness of synthesis does not refer to an internal act of ‘synthesis 
watching’, but rather to being conscious of the end product, namely the combined representation (2015a: 
340-341). Once again, reflexivity is inbuilt into the Kantian account: it is not something that we do in 
addition to thinking but is rather an essential element of thought itself. Van Cleve refers to the idea that 
consciousness of representations occurs through their bearing relations to each other (rather than to a 
noumenal self) as Kant’s ‘system’ theory of consciousness (1999: 83).  
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Kant explains the general idea here better in his metaphysics lectures. The analytical 
unity of apperception is a ‘one in many’ where the ‘one’ in the case of apperception 
refers to consciousness. It is the idea that the same consciousness ‘I’ is contained in 
multiple representations and it is the ratio essendi of the synthetic unity of apperception. 
The synthetic unity is a ‘many in one’, which means synthesizing representations in an 
intuition together in order to apprehend them as a multiplicity in one representation; it 
involves a subject consciously taking the manifold as a manifold. However, given 
Kant’s theory of consciousness (at the level of actual experience), the synthetic unity is 
the ratio cognoscendi of the analytic unity (LM, 29: 889), hence in §16 he claims that 
the analytic unity is possible only on the presupposition of a synthetic one, for it is only 
through being conscious of synthesizing representations together can the ‘I’ be aware of 
its own identity across these representations.
50
 Kant claims that this principle of the 
unity of apperception ‘is the supreme one in the whole of human cognition’ because it 
expresses the necessity of a priori synthetic unity of the manifold where this means that 
the mind must have combined the manifold in certain ways in order for the manifold to 
be brought to the unity of apperception. Kant then builds on this argument in §17.
51
 
 Kant opens §17 with a reminder that the supreme condition of intuition is that it 
stands under the forms of intuition, space and time; the supreme principle of intuition in 
relation to the understanding is that it stands under the formal conditions of the 
synthetic unity of apperception, i.e., that it can be combined in one consciousness, 
which is necessary if it is to function in cognition (B136-137). To this opening 
statement Kant attaches an important footnote that anticipates the role of space and time 
as pure intuitions in completing the second step of the Deduction. The main point is that 
space and time contain a manifold since they are intuitions as well as forms of intuition, 
which makes them synthetic or composite unities (they contain an infinite number of 
parts in one). This means that in order for their manifold to be represented it must be 
subject to an act of synthesis, despite the fact that the manifold in them is not made out 
                                                 
50
 The idea that the principles are ratio essendi and ratio cognoscendi of each other is borrowed from 
Allison (2015a: 230).  
51
 It is disputed whether the principle of apperception is analytic or synthetic. Here (B135) Kant claims 
that it is analytic but nonetheless expresses a necessity of synthesis, but some have thought that this 
contradicts the A-Deduction, where Kant appears to claim that the same principle is actually synthetic 
(A117n). Guyer argues that the principle is synthetic, because an analytic principle cannot get the 
argument off the ground, and that Kant contradicts himself (1987: 132-140), while Allison defends the 
analyticity of the principle and counters that the guilty candidate from the A-Deduction is not the same as 
the candidate from the B-Deduction; hence there is no contradiction (2015a: 346-348; 2004: 163-167; 
1996: 41-49). I generally follow Allison’s analysis here by restricting the principle to representations in 
one intuition or perceptual state.   
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of a combination of parts into a whole, but is rather a given whole that is delimited into 
parts. Kant tells us that the ‘singularity of theirs’ will be important later, referring the 
reader to §25 (B136n).
52
 Following this Kant introduces his central claim that the unity 
of apperception and the cognition of an object are reciprocal:  
 
Understanding is, generally speaking, the faculty of cognitions. These consist 
in the determinate relation of given representations to an object. An object, 
however, is that in the concept of which the manifold of a given intuition is 
united. Now, however, all unification of representations requires unity of 
consciousness in the synthesis of them. Consequently the unity of consciousness 
is that which alone constitutes the relation of representations to an object, thus 
their objective validity, and consequently is that which makes them into 
cognitions and on which even the possibility of the understanding rests. (B137) 
 
Here Kant claims that not only is the synthetic unity of apperception a necessary 
condition of relating representations to an object but that it is also sufficient. The 
necessity claim is not controversial. Once again, if I am to represent something to 
myself as an object in an intuition I must be able to be conscious that the ‘I’ that thinks 
a is the same ‘I’ that thinks b and, again, the same ‘I’ that thinks a and b together as an 
‘object’.53 What is very controversial, however, is that this is a sufficient condition. 
Indeed, Kant’s critics have been quick to charge him with (yet another) gross non-
sequitur here, and it is not hard to see why.
54
 If Kant means that the unity of 
                                                 
52
 Kant’s reference is incorrect and should be §26, for this is where he incorporates the unity of space and 
time into his argument.  
53
 This point is explained in more detail in the ‘synthesis of recognition’ from the A-Deduction: ‘If, in 
counting, I forget that the units that now hover before my senses were successively added to each other by 
me, then I would not cognize the generation of the multitude through this successive addition of one to 
the other, and consequently I would not cognize the number; for this concept consists solely in the 
consciousness of this unity of the synthesis’ (A103).  
54
 Guyer complains that Kant just runs together the unity of self-consciousness and knowledge of objects 
without presenting any argument for why the two should be equated (1987: 116-119). In Guyer’s view the 
argument of §§17-19 just collapses back into the equally unsuccessful deduction in the Prolegomena that 
concentrated on arguing that the categories are necessary for judgements of experience over judgements 
of perception. Bird argues that the ‘modest’ view must take the unity of apperception to be the ‘final 
necessary condition’ of the objective reference of representations, excepting any empirical obstacles 
(2006: 298-299). In addition, there is the worry that the reciprocity is too strong, ruling out non-objective 
modes of consciousness, such as dreams and hallucinations. The classic version of this objection is 
Lewis’ famous remark: ‘Did the Sage of Konigsberg have no dreams!’ (1929: 221) The classic response 
is by Beck (1978: 38-60), but also see Allison (2015a: 437-440). Beck is correct in seeing the role of the 
categories as allowing us to tell a coherent (even if false) story rather than ‘dumbly facing chaos without 
even knowing it’ (1978: 54).  
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apperception is necessary and sufficient for full-blown knowledge of empirical objects 
then it is of course a hopelessly flawed argument. Fortunately, this does not seem to be 
the case.
55
 Closer inspection of the text reveals that what Kant has in mind by the 
‘objective validity’ of representations here is nothing more than the idea of 
representations being related to something, thought as an object as such or in general. 
In other words, Kant is only making the claim that where we attach the ‘I think’ we are 
unifying representations together in an intuition by means of the concept of an object in 
general.
56
 Since the first step of the argument abstracts from the nature of sensible 
intuition and concerns only a formal unity of thought in relation to objects – what Kant 
will soon term ‘intellectual synthesis’ (§24) – Kant cannot be arguing for knowledge of 
actual empirical objects. Rather, he is concerned with the transcendental conditions of 
representing anything as an object, or what Allison terms cognition in the ‘thin’ sense 
(2015a: 353). By ‘cognition’ in this ‘thin’ sense, Kant really means – and would have 
done better just to have called it – the thought of an object as something corresponding 
to the synthesis of intuitions or unity of apperception. Against this, it could be objected 
that Kant refers to the ‘objective validity’ of empirical cognition as ‘(truth)’ (A125), 
suggesting the stronger, ‘thick’ sense, but this objection neglects the fact that Kant does 
not abstract from the nature of empirical intuition in the A-Deduction as he does in the 
B-Deduction. Furthermore, in §22 Kant describes the categories as concepts for thinking 
an object as distinct from cognizing an object (B146), reflecting the equivalence of 
‘cognition’ or ‘objective validity’ in the first step with ‘thought’, and his shift of 
concern in the second step to ‘experience’ or ‘cognition’ in the ‘thick’ sense. If this 
interpretation of §17 is correct, then the non-sequitur and ‘no dreams’ objections 
(referred to above in note 54) are blocked. 
                                                 
55
 Here I am indebted to the analyses of Schulting (2012: Ch.4, esp. 53-61, Ch. 10, esp. 206-207), Allison 
(2015a: 352-355), Buroker (2006: 121-123) and Baum (2011: 62-70). This line of interpretation is 
important because the claim that an object is that in the concept of which a manifold of intuition is united 
can all too easily be taken as an expression of Berkeleyan-style phenomenalism. Thus, Strawson sees the 
categories as substitutes for the constraint that external objects would normally be thought as exercising 
over the way we represent things (1966: 61). Similarly, without the ‘thin’ conception of an object and 
objectivity it can seem as if Kant has allowed the external world to drop out of the picture completely 
with respect to the truth of cognition.  
56
 This notion of a concept of an object in general corresponds more or less with the ‘transcendental 
object’ from the A-Deduction (A104-110). I say ‘more or less’ because, like with most of Kant’s terms, 
he uses them flexibly in different contexts. Indeed, while the ‘transcendental object’ is not present in the 
B-Deduction, it is clear that there is no doctrinal change at all. Both Longuenesse (1998: 110-111, n.14) 
and Allison (2015a: 351-352) correctly insist that the notion of the ‘transcendental object’ is retained in 
the B-Deduction, though the name is dropped.  
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 In my view, §18 does little to add to the overall argument. The key point is the 
claim that:  
 
The transcendental unity of apperception is that unity through which all of the 
manifold given in an intuition is united in a concept of the object. It is called 
objective on that account, and must be distinguished from the subjective unity 
of consciousness, which is a determination of inner sense, through which that 
manifold of intuition is empirically given for such a combination. (B139)  
 
This passage reiterates what we saw above. The unity through which representations are 
related to an object (thought as distinct from them) just is the synthetic unity of 
consciousness, namely the consciousness of synthesis that is required for the analytic 
unity of apperception. The rest of this section is notoriously dense and confusing, and 
seems to be Kant’s attempt to reconcile his distinction between subjective and objective 
unities of consciousness from the Prolegomena (where it took the form of the 
judgements of perception/experience distinction) with the current account of judgement 
as such being objectively valid. Kant confuses two senses of ‘subjectively valid’ here, 
which makes the actual relevant argument difficult to follow. His point seems to be that, 
in line with §17, the objective unity is a thought unity while the subjective unity is one 
that is not consciously thought but is guided by subjective rules of association (B140). 
The latter represent states only as they come into the mind and do not represent an 
‘object’ since this requires thought. The reference to empirical apperception is seriously 
misleading insofar as this empirical consciousness of temporal determination has no 
obvious relationship to either the subjective validity of associations or the objective 
unity of consciousness as thought of an object in general.
57
 
 Kant makes his next major advance in §19, bringing in the connection with 
judgement that is distinctly lacking from the A-Deduction.
58
 After quarrelling with 
previous logicians about the inadequacy of their account of judgement, as not specifying 
the relation between the concepts combined in them, Kant states that a judgement ‘is 
nothing other than the way to bring given cognitions to the objective unity of 
apperception. That is the aim of the copula is in them: to distinguish the objective unity 
                                                 
57
 See Buroker (2006: 123-124) and Allison (2015a: 356-363) for further discussion 
58
 The absence of judgement from the A-Deduction is a justified and frequent complaint of critics. See 
Altman (2008: 122), Buroker (2006: 106, 115), Longuenesse (1998: 58-59) and Allison (2015a: 196, 327, 
372).  
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of given representations from the subjective’ (B141-142). What this means is that the 
combination of concepts thought in a judgement are brought together by their relation to 
the objective unity of consciousness (B142). It is this necessary unity of consciousness 
that brings them together and constitutes the relation of representations to an object.
59
 
The downgrading of Kant’s conception of an object here to the ‘thin’ sense helps 
explain his otherwise paradoxical claim that even empirical (contingent) judgements 
contain a ‘necessary unity’ (B142). In making the judgement, ‘Bodies are heavy’ the 
necessity is normative and formal insofar as the empirical judgement is grounded in the 
synthetic unity of apperception; it characterizes the relation between the subject and 
predicate that is being claimed in unifying diverse representations and not the perceptual 
content in the judgement (Pro, 4: 298, 305).
60
 If I apply <body> to the x of my 
judgement then I am normatively constrained to apply the other marks of the concept to 
the x in question, and I also make the demand that others should do the same.
61
 The 
main point, however, is simply that a judgement brings representations together in such 
a way that they become capable of bearing a truth-value, which is what Kant means by 
saying that the judgement issues in a relation that is ‘objectively valid, and that is 
sufficiently distinguished from the relation of these same representations in which there 
would be only subjective validity, e.g., in accordance with the laws of association’ 
(B142).
62
 The example is potentially misleading because it employs an empirical 
concept, which suggests that there is no need for the categories to establish objective 
reference of representations. However, Kant’s point is that reference to an object is not 
                                                 
59
 This point is also expressed in the ‘synthesis of recognition’: ‘We find, however, that our thought of the 
relation of all cognition to its object carries something of necessity with it, since namely the latter is 
regarded as that which is opposed to our cognitions being determined at pleasure […] rather than being 
determined a priori, since insofar as they relate to an object our cognitions must also necessarily agree 
with each other in relation to it, i.e., they must have that relation that constitutes the concept of an object. 
[…] It is clear […] [that] the unity that the object makes necessary can be nothing other than the formal 
unity of consciousness in the synthesis of the manifold of the representations’ (A104-105). See also 
A109: ‘This relation [of representations to the transcendental object], however, is nothing other than the 
necessary unity of consciousness, thus also of the synthesis of the manifold through a common function 
of the mind for combining it in one representation.’ The account is also compatible with the definition 
from the note to Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science as ‘an action through which given 
representations first become cognitions of an object’ (MFNS, 4: 475-476). 
60
 This is the mistake of Guyer who attributes to Kant the view that empirical judgements are a form of 
necessary truth, though he does also concede that Kant tries (unsuccessfully, in his view) to distance 
himself from this implication of his arguments in the B-Deduction (1987: 114, 117-121, 127).  
61
 See Allison (2015a: 365-366, 294-295) and Buroker (2006: 124-126). Both justifiably lament Kant’s 
choice of examples for, as is so often the case, they serve to obscure rather than clarify the point he is 
making.  
62
 It would be paradoxical in the extreme if ‘objectively valid’ meant ‘true’ here for it would mean that 
every judgement is true just in virtue of being a judgement! But as we have repeatedly seen, at least in the 
Deduction, what Kant usually means by this term is that representations relate to an object (in the ‘thin’ 
sense). See Allison (2004: 88, 175; 2015a: 366), Buroker (2006: 125) and Longuenesse (1998: 82).   
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something that can be gleaned from experience, for experience already presupposes that 
I am relating my representations to something (in the ‘thin’ sense). The unity of 
representations needed to represent objects cannot come from objects, and since the 
transcendental object is ‘nothing for me’ because we have to do only with our 
representations, this additional unity must be grounded a priori, namely as a way of 
representing the relations between representations in a judgement.
63
  
 Having established the missing connection between the objective unity of 
consciousness, the representation of an object (in the ‘thin’ sense), and the notion of 
judgement, Kant finally introduces the main characters, the categories, in §20:  
 
The manifold that is given in a sensible intuition necessarily belongs under the 
original synthetic unity of apperception, since through this alone is the unity of 
the intuition possible (§ 17). That action of the understanding, however, through 
which the manifold of given representations […] is brought under an 
apperception in general, is the logical function of judgments (§ 19). Therefore all 
manifold, insofar as it given in one empirical intuition, is determined in regard 
to one of the logical functions for judgment, by means of which, namely, it is 
brought to a consciousness in general. But now the categories are nothing other 
than these very functions for judging, insofar as the manifold of a given intuition 
is determined with regard to them (§ 13). Thus, the manifold in a given intuition 
also necessarily stands under categories. (B143) 
 
Most of this argument requires no comment, since we have been through each stage 
already. What does require further comment is the connection between §19 and ‘logical 
function’ of judgement and §13 (really §10).64 Nowhere in §19 does Kant mention or 
explain the notion of a ‘logical function’ of judgement, and even the title of the section 
makes reference only to the ‘logical form’ of judgement, which is not quite the same 
                                                 
63
 See Allais (2011: 102-106; 2015: 285-289) for helpful discussion explaining why the relation of 
representations cannot be a further representation.  
64
 There is some dispute over whether Kant meant to reference §13 or §10. Guyer and Wood retain §13 
on the grounds that this is where Kant first raises the problem of the justification of the categories, which 
in §20 has now been answered (1998: 727, n.41). However, it is §10 that supplies the premise to this last 
step of the argument in §20, and as we are about to see, the justification of the categories has not yet been 
completed.  
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thing.
65
 To understand the term, and with it the argument, we must go back to §10, 
which contains the so-called ‘Metaphysical Deduction’.  
Kant derives the categories from the logical functions of judgement in §10. By 
‘function’ Kant means ‘the unity of the action of ordering different representations 
under a common one’ and by ‘judgement’ he means ‘the mediate cognition of an object, 
hence the representation of a representation of it’ (A68/B93). So the basic thought is 
that judgement employs functions to combine representations together under a common 
one, where this can be applied either to combinations of concepts or intuitions (ibid).
66
 
As we saw in §§17-19, this act of making a judgement is also what constitutes the 
relation of representations to an object. Kant’s claim turns on the idea that the same 
actions or rules that govern combinations of concepts in judgements also guide the 
synthesis of intuitions such that the represented ‘something = x’ can (eventually) be 
reflected and subsumed under the categories and empirical concepts:  
 
The same function that gives unity to the different representations in a 
judgment also gives unity to the mere synthesis of different representations in 
an intuition, which, expressed generally, is called the pure concept of 
understanding. The same understanding, therefore, and indeed by means of the 
very same actions through which it brings the logical form of a judgment into 
concepts by means of the analytical unity, also brings a transcendental content 
into its representations by means of the synthetic unity of the manifold in 
intuition in general, on account of which they are called pure concepts of the 
understanding that pertain to objects a priori. (A79/B104-105) 
 
Kant does little here to argue for this bold claim, but the argument of the Deduction 
delivers most of the missing proof. Through the reciprocity of transcendental 
apperception and objective representation, Kant justifies the claim that the 
understanding introduces a ‘transcendental content’ to the synthesis of intuitions. 
Through the identification of the categories with the rules for synthesizing intuitions 
Kant succeeds in showing that a set of pure concepts – not necessarily the ones 
                                                 
65
 Specifically, the logical function is a rule-governed act of combining representations and the logical 
form is the product of the unification. See Longuenesse (1998: 78; 2005: 19, n.5).   
66
 I am not concerned with the completeness of the table of judgements or with the derivation of the 
categories from it. For partial defences of both the completeness and derivation claims see Longuenesse 
(1998) and Allison (2004: Ch. 6). For detailed analysis of the ‘guiding thread’ and an explanation of the 
‘Metaphysical Deduction’, see especially Longuenesse (2005: Ch. 4).  
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identified in the table – are required to relate representations to objects in general.67 One 
final comment concerns Kant’s claim that the manifold of intuition is determined with 
respect to one of the logical functions of judgement insofar as it is given in one 
intuition.
68
 Allison points out that this is a mistake (2015a: 371-372). Insofar as a 
judgement is well-formed then it is determined with respect to one function from each 
of the four titles (quantity, quality, relation and modality).
69
  
If the argument so far goes through then Kant has shown that the categories are 
necessary conditions of the possibility of experience because they are concepts of an 
object in general, by means of which alone representations can be thought as 
constituting a synthetic unity. That synthetic unity of representations is both the ground 
of the analytic unity of apperception and the necessary and sufficient condition of the 
relation of representations to an object in general (in the ‘thin’ sense). The categories 
are necessary as subjective conditions of thinking objects, but it hardly follows from 
this that the categories really apply to objects of experience. All that has been shown is 
that if a manifold of intuition has been brought to the unity of apperception and thus 
represents an object then that manifold stands under the categories – as the means 
through which unity was brought to the intuition – but the worry expressed at A90 is 
that because of the radical separateness of sensibility and understanding, itself a 
consequence of the discursivity thesis, it is entirely possible that appearances could be 
so constituted that they do not accord with the conditions of thought. If Kant stops here 
then he will have demonstrated that the categories have conditional necessity: if we can 
represent objects through them then the categories apply to our intuition, but Kant now 
needs to demonstrate that all appearances do conform to the conditions of thinking 
them; that is the task of the second step, to which I now turn. To be clear, the second 
                                                 
67
 By this I mean that the Transcendental Deduction shows the necessity of presupposing some a priori 
concepts for the possibility of experience, but with the exception of two examples in §26, Kant does little 
to justify the particular concepts in the Deduction. This is the task of the Principles.  
68
 What Kant means by ‘determined’ with respect to the logical functions is that when a judgement is 
made, e.g., ‘all bodies are divisible’, then it is left indeterminate which concept will occupy the place of 
the subject-concept and the predicate-concept (x is y). However, when this judgement is made with 
respect to an object, then the places of the constituent concepts are determined. That is, all bodies 
(subject/substance) are divisible (predicate/accident). See B128-129. Obviously, making this judgement 
does not require the full-blown ontological concept of substance as that which is always a subject and 
never a predicate, but it does require that in empirical intuition bodies are treated within the context of the 
judgement as substances.  
69
 For example, ‘all bodies are divisible’ is universal, affirmative, categorical and assertoric.  However, 
Buroker argues that all the categories are necessary for judging objects as they are interdependent (2006: 
86-127). Schulting (2012) argues that all the categories are derived from the analytic principle of the 
unity of apperception; thus he disagrees that the Deduction gives only a ‘global’ proof of the general 
validity of the categories.  
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step is concerned with the exorcism of the transcendental spectre that is left intact by the 
first step. The transcendental spectre that Kant is concerned with is not to be confused 
with a ‘Cartesian’ evil demon hypothesis, or any kind of external world scepticism. No 
part of the Deduction is concerned with refuting external world scepticism. I agree with 
Ameriks (2003) that Kant presupposes the actuality of experience and then works out its 
transcendental conditions. As explained above, the transcendental spectre arises because 
our cognition requires the joint efforts of two distinct and irreducible faculties, viz., 
sensibility and understanding, so it is possible that appearances could be given through 
sensibility while being incompatible with the understanding. This is not a concern about 
accurately representing reality, but about being able to represent and judge about reality 
at all.   
 
3. The Categories as Conditions of Perception and Experience: A Step 
towards ‘Objective Reality’  
 
 In §20 Kant states that ‘the beginning of a deduction […] has been made’ in 
that it has been shown that a manifold of intuition that is unified stands under the unity 
of apperception by means of the categories (B144). Since the categories are separate 
from sensibility their function needs to be specified independently of sensibility, viz., as 
the conditions of thinking an object in general.
70
 Demonstrating this meant abstracting 
entirely from the specific nature of our sensible intuition, even though it was not 
possible to abstract from the fact that the manifold of intuition had to be supplied prior 
to the synthesis of understanding, for this is entailed by the discursivity thesis. Kant 
then states what work remains to be done, and it is very important not to underplay this 
statement:
71
 
  
In the sequel (§ 26) it will be shown from the way in which the empirical 
intuition is given in sensibility that its unity can be none other than the one the 
category prescribes to the manifold of given intuition in general according to the 
preceding § 20; thus by the explanation of its a priori validity in regard to all 
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 Allison argues that the categories need to have a specifiable function independently of the sensible 
conditions and that is achieved by linking them to ‘intellectual synthesis’ (2012: 35-36).  
71
 I argue below that non-conceptual readings of the Deduction often fail to take seriously the importance 
and role of the second step in the overall argument.  
  
49 
 
objects of our senses the aim of the deduction will first be fully attained. (B144-
145) 
 
Two points are noteworthy. First, the aim of the deduction has not yet been fulfilled, 
which means that merely demonstrating that the categories are conditions of the thought 
of objects (in general) does not – of itself – grant them a priori validity. In the 
terminology that I am employing, the categories have ‘objective validity’, that is, a role 
in experience as necessary conditions of possible experience, but they do not have 
‘objective reality’. For all that has been shown so far they could be just cognitively 
‘empty’, subjectively necessary, forms of thought.72 My interpretation explains why 
Kant claims that only a ‘beginning’ of a deduction has been made with the preceding 
argument. It is because the categories have been shown, pace Hume, to have an a priori 
role in experience (they are not derived from experience and they are not dispensable 
concepts), but at the same time it has not yet been demonstrated that they accomplish 
this role. The second point is that Kant affirms that the deduction will be completed in 
§26. This short and notoriously difficult section even bears the title of ‘transcendental 
deduction’. This means that despite what has been demonstrated already, Kant does not 
take it to be enough to justify the application of the categories to objects. Unfortunately, 
while being a significant improvement over the A-Deduction with its three proofs, the 
second step of the B-Deduction is still very unclear and suffers from its own 
complexities that were not contained in A-. To anticipate, the second step turns 
explicitly on connecting the categories with the synthesis of apprehension (perception). 
The argument begins with apprehension, moves from apprehension to the forms of 
apprehension (space and time), and from there to the necessity of the categories for 
perception and experience (B159-161). But we will come to that in due course.  
 
3.1. The Second Step of the Deduction: §§21-26 
 
 Kant completes §21 by explaining that the categories only have significance in 
relation to a discursive cognizer:  
 
                                                 
72
 See Allison (2004: 185-186).  
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They are only rules for an understanding whose entire capacity consists in 
thinking, i.e., in the action of bringing the synthesis of the manifold that is given 
to it in intuition from elsewhere to the unity of apperception, which therefore 
cognizes nothing at all by itself, but only combines and orders the material for 
cognition, the intuition, which must be given to it through the object. (B145)  
 
Because the categories have no cognitive content themselves they are, as we saw 
previously, concepts of an object (unified manifold of intuition) by means of which the 
intuition is determined with respect to the logical functions; as to how they determine 
intuition has not yet been explained. Although Kant will partially explain this in §26, he 
will not properly address it until the Schematism. Instead, his present concern is with 
the connection the categories must have to empirical intuition in general in order for 
actual objects to be thought through them. Kant begins to move towards this conclusion 
in §22.  
 In §22 Kant distinguishes thinking an object from cognizing an object. It is clear 
from the text that what he here calls ‘thinking’ corresponds to what he termed 
‘cognizing’ in the first step of the Deduction, since in the first step he was concerned 
only with the thought of an object in general and in the second step he brings our 
sensible intuition back into the story. Cognition in the ‘thin’ sense, or ‘thought’, 
concerned the relation of representations to an object in the ‘thin’ sense as a unification 
of a manifold of intuition under the synthetic unity of apperception. The sense of 
‘cognition’ operative in §22 is quickly identified with ‘empirical cognition’ or 
‘experience’ (B147), meaning it is cognition in a ‘thick’ sense. Kant’s main point in the 
section is that both (sensible) intuition and concepts are required for cognition in the 
‘thick’ sense, which he illustrates by means of the role of space and time in 
mathematics. While these pure intuitions allow us to construct mathematical figures, we 
do not cognize these figures as real unless these forms can be presented in empirical 
intuition. This has an important link to Kant’s rejection of innate knowledge, which we 
will see below. Because the categories must be applied to empirical intuition to yield 
cognitive content they are for this reason restricted to use in possible experience.
73
 Kant 
repeats these points in §23, which officially spells out the implication of the categories 
being applicable only to experience, namely, that while they seem to extend further than 
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 See also A146-147/B185-186.  
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intuitions, insofar as they are concepts of things in general, they cannot be used to 
determine anything whatsoever about things that are not possible objects of experience. 
Significantly, Kant states that without relation to sensibility the categories are ‘mere 
forms of thought without objective reality […] Our sensible and empirical intuition 
alone can provide them with sense and significance’ (B148-B149).74 Now we come to 
the first of the two crucial sections of the second step of the B-Deduction.  
 In §24 Kant reminds the reader that the categories are not enough for cognition 
of an object (in the ‘thick’ sense) because they are only ‘forms of thought’, required for 
thinking ‘objects’ through bringing a manifold of intuition to the synthetic unity of 
apperception. This specific role of the categories now gets labelled ‘purely intellectual’, 
highlighting its independence from sensible conditions (B150). However, due to 
discursivity, human cognition also consists of the ‘fundamental’ form of our receptivity 
in addition to the spontaneity of thought. Only through the sensible (specifically 
spatiotemporal) manifold being thought in accordance with the unity of apperception 
can the categories ‘as mere forms of thought, acquire objective reality, i.e., application 
to objects that can be given to us in intuition’. This is called the ‘figurative synthesis’ 
(synthesis speciosa) and is distinct from the ‘purely intellectual’ synthesis (synthesis 
intellectualis) (B150-151). As if things were not complicated enough, Kant then adds 
that the figurative synthesis, if it relates to the synthetic unity of apperception, ‘must be 
called, as distinct from the merely intellectual combination, the transcendental 
synthesis of the imagination’ (B151).75 He explains this name on the grounds that the 
imagination has something in common with both sensibility and understanding: it is an 
intuitive faculty, but at the same time it determines ‘the form of sense a priori’ and is 
therefore not itself determinable, which makes its synthesis of intuitions ‘an effect of 
the understanding on sensibility’ under the guise of the ‘productive imagination’ 
                                                 
74
 Kant also denies here that the categories can be applied at all to non-sensible objects (B149), which 
will be significant in Chapters 3 and 4.  
75
 This is the first mention in the B-Deduction of the ‘imagination’ as a cognitive faculty. It appears on 
the surface to be consigned to the backseat in B- whereas it had central importance in A-. In fact, in A- 
the imagination was one of three irreducible cognitive faculties: sense, imagination and apperception 
(A94), while the understanding was conceived as the synthesis of the imagination in relation to the unity 
of apperception (A119). As we saw, Kant assigns all synthesis to the imagination in A- (A78), but all 
synthesis to the understanding in B- (B130).  By contrast, the imagination only enters the story in §24 in 
the B-Deduction and the understanding is straightforwardly identified with the synthetic unity of 
apperception (B134n). Nonetheless, insofar as the ‘transcendental synthesis of the imagination’ is in both 
Deductions and is the key to the applicability of the categories in both, there is no substantial change in 
Kant’s views. If anything, the shift to focus on the understanding was probably to emphasize the role of 
logical functions of judgement in experience, which is the only new substantial addition to the B-
Deduction.   
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(B151-B152).
76
 Unfortunately, Kant does little to elaborate on what all of these terms 
mean or how they contribute to securing the objective reality of the categories, instead 
suddenly shifting focus to the paradox of self-knowledge: why we know even ourselves 
only as appearances. 
 Despite this, it is here that he attempts to explain what the figurative synthesis 
does. Distinguishing between ‘apperception’ and ‘inner sense’ Kant argues that the 
figurative synthesis is the self-affection of the subject (B153). The basic idea is that 
consciousness receives content from outside, via inner sense. The form of inner sense is 
time, so all representations are in time. Inner sense, however, only supplies a manifold, 
but in order for this or any manifold to be something, to be an object for consciousness, 
it must be combined under apperception through the categories (ibid). This is crucial, 
for this means that any consciousness of an object (‘thin’) sense turns on figurative 
synthesis: ‘The understanding therefore does not find some sort of combination of the 
manifold already in inner sense, but produces it, by affecting inner sense’ (B155).77 
Although Kant’s aim is to back up his claim that we cognize even ourselves only as 
appearances and not as things in themselves, his wider claim is that all cognition takes 
place only through the passive subject being both externally affected (by things in 
themselves) and internally affected by the active subject (figurative synthesis); this 
dual-affection combines the representations of outer sense in accordance with the unity 
of apperception through the categories as concepts of an object in general. This point is 
clearer in one of the additional passages added to the B-edition of the Transcendental 
Aesthetic:  
 
Now that which, as representation, can precede any act of thinking something is 
intuition and, if it contains nothing but relations, it is the form of intuition, 
which, since it does not represent anything except insofar as something is 
posited in the mind, can be nothing other than the way in which the mind is 
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Kant distinguishes between the productive and reproductive imagination here, claiming that the latter is 
exercised only empirically in association, while the former contributes to cognition a priori (B152). This 
contradicts the A-Deduction where the reproductive imagination also has an a priori role, namely as the 
‘the synthesis of reproduction in the imagination’. (A100). However, later at A118 and A123, Kant 
specifies that the a priori role of the imagination is productive. See Allison (2015a: 221) for discussion. 
Thus, in the end there is no doctrinal change here, despite surface differences.  
Since ‘productive imagination’, ‘transcendental synthesis of the imagination’, and ‘figurative synthesis’ 
are all synonyms, I shall henceforth use ‘figurative synthesis’.  
77
 Kant’s examples of self-affection are all, appropriately, figurative, as having to do with spatial figures 
produced/cognized through combination of acts in time. The point is to emphasize the interdependency of 
space and time as intuitions. See Longuenesse (1998: Ch. 8, esp. 226-227). 
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affected by its own activity, namely this positing of its representation, thus the 
way it is affected through itself, i.e., it is an inner sense as far as regards its form. 
(B67-68; my emphasis)    
 
Notice how Kant claims that intuition does not represent anything without the mind 
being affected by its own activity, and he seems to equate the very notion of our ‘form 
of intuition’ as being ‘nothing other than the way in which the mind is affected by its 
own activity’. This will be very significant below in relation to §26.78 To the first-time 
reader of the Aesthetic, this claim must be entirely opaque, but I would suggest that it 
serves less to back up the ideality of time – as Kant claims – and more to connect the 
new edition of the Aesthetic with the new B-Deduction, for it is clear that the self-
activity spoken of here is nothing other than the figurative synthesis of §24. Introducing 
the reader (albeit indirectly) to the notions of ‘synthesis’ and ‘self-affection’ now helps 
alleviate the appearance of revising or even contradicting the theory of the Aesthetic 
later on.
79
 I will skip §25 as this adds nothing that is directly relevant to my 
interpretation of the Deduction.  
 In §26 Kant claims to have completed the Deduction and to have shown that:  
 
Consequently, all synthesis, through which even perception itself becomes 
possible, stands under the categories, and since experience is cognition through 
connected perceptions, the categories are conditions of the possibility of 
experience, and thus also valid a priori of all objects of experience. (B161)  
 
Our concern is to find and unpack Kant’s argument for this conclusion, for as years of 
debate show, it is not obvious what it is or whether it succeeds. Kant opens by 
reminding the reader that two things have been accomplished with respect to the 
categories. (1) The a priori origin of the categories has been shown by their derivation 
from the logical functions of thinking. Indeed, the categories just are these logical 
functions insofar as a manifold is determined with respect to the functions in a given 
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 I think it is fair to say that this notion of the mind affecting itself has been largely neglected in the 
literature, and this neglect is responsible for the some of the confusions that have arisen. For example, 
Allais claims that ‘An a priori intuition does not involve anything affecting us – because it is a priori’, and 
she takes attributing this claim to Kant to be ‘relatively uncontroversial’ (2015: 195-196). However, as we 
can see, a priori intuition does involve being affected by something: it involves the self being affected by 
itself through figurative synthesis.  
79
 I will discuss the apparent contradictions and/or revisions below.  
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intuition. (2) The possibility of them being a priori cognitions of objects of intuition in 
general was demonstrated in §20. Now Kant intends to make good on the promise of 
showing that the categories can be used to cognize ‘whatever objects may come before 
our senses’ in terms of ‘prescribing the law to nature and even making the latter 
possible’ (B159-160). In order for this to be shown, it is at least a necessary (although 
Kant also seems to think it is a sufficient) condition to connect the categories with 
objects of perception, qua objects of perception. This is indicated by the next sentence: 
‘First of all I remark that by the synthesis of apprehension I understand the 
composition of the manifold in an empirical intuition, through which perception, i.e., 
empirical consciousness of it (as appearance) becomes possible’ (B160).  
 Since this is the first mention in the B-Deduction of the ‘synthesis of 
apprehension’ and of perception being at all relevant to the argument we have to look 
back to the A-Deduction for further details. Our first question is ‘why does perception 
require a synthesis of apprehension?’ Kant offers two answers in the A-Deduction. I 
cited part of the first passage previously to help understand Kant’s notion of ‘synthesis’ 
or ‘combination’ in §15:  
 
Every intuition contains a manifold in itself, which however would not be 
represented as such if the mind did not distinguish the time in the succession of 
impressions on one another […] Now in order for unity to come from this 
manifold […] it is necessary first to run through and then take together this 
manifoldness, which action I call the synthesis of apprehension, since it is 
aimed directly at the intuition, which to be sure provides a manifold but can 
never effect this as such, and indeed as contained in one representation, 
without the occurrence of such a synthesis.  
 
Now this synthesis of apprehension must also be exercised a priori, i.e., in 
regard to representations that are not empirical. For without it we could have a 
priori neither the representations of space nor of time, since these can be 
generated only through the synthesis of the manifold that sensibility in its 
original receptivity provides. We therefore have a pure synthesis of 
apprehension (A99-100).  
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This passage claims that every intuition is itself a manifold of impressions that has been 
successively intuited.
80
 This is in line with what we learnt from B67-68 and §24 above. 
To represent anything through these impressions they must be taken by the cognitive 
subject as constituting a (synthetic) unity, which requires that the subject ‘run through 
and take together’ this multiplicity as a multiplicity.81 Kant is making the anti-empiricist 
point that even bare perception is not given as such to the perceiver but requires 
cognitive processing of some kind. Kant then adds that there must be an a priori 
synthesis of apprehension as well, for otherwise we could not have even the 
representations of space and time. This is a surprising and puzzling claim: has Kant not 
argued that space and time are given as pure intuitions in the Transcendental Aesthetic? 
Well, yes, but as I intimated above, he also hints at the idea of them requiring a 
synthesis or, more precisely, an act of internal affection (positing) for them to represent 
anything. Though Kant does not use the term in the A-Deduction, I think it is safe to 
assume that the a priori synthesis of apprehension corresponds to the figurative 
synthesis.
82
 If this is right, then the representations of space and time as actual intuitions 
‘can be generated only through the [figurative] synthesis of the manifold that sensibility 
in its original receptivity provides’ (A100). I will discuss what this means after 
analysing the second passage where Kant explains the synthesis of apprehension.  
 The second passage occurs during the ‘argument from below’. Beginning from 
scratch again, Kant explains that an appearance is given to us  only if it is combined 
with consciousness; this combination with consciousness turns the appearance into a 
perception (A120). Since this is the first step in the argument, I suggest that 
‘appearance’ here is best taken in its neutral sense, namely as the undetermined object 
of empirical intuition (A20/B34). This implies that there is a distinction to be drawn 
between ‘intuition’ and ‘perception’. This is important because one of the key 
arguments for Kantian non-conceptualism is that intuition is a singular and immediate 
representation of an object, and this is usually taken to mean that ‘empirical intuition’ 
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 The temporal aspect of the synthesis was understated in §15, where Kant seemed to imply that it is 
simply because a manifold is given that entails the need for synthesis, whereas in the A-Deduction it is 
clearer that it is the successive nature of the intuiting of a manifold that dictates the need for synthesis. 
Indeed, the fact that all representations must be ordered in time is ‘a general remark on which one must 
ground everything that follows’ (A99). We will revisit this in Chapter 2.  
81
 This contrasts with Guyer’s (1987: 122, 148) atomist account of intuition, which ignores the fact that 
Kant says intuition contains a manifold and that the synthesis is about representing it as a manifold.  
82
 As does Allison (2015a: 415, n.67) and Rosenberg (2005: 112).  
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and ‘perception’ are synonyms for Kant.83 Closer inspection of the text reveals, 
however, that Kant is very careful to draw a distinction between intuition and 
perception. It is implied here at A120 and is made fully explicit in §26: ‘I make the 
empirical intuition of a house into a perception through apprehension of its manifold’ 
(B162). Even in the Prolegomena, where Kant appears to deny any role for the 
categories as conditions of (judgements of) perception, he still defines perception as an 
‘intuition of which I am conscious’ (Pro, 4: 300).84 Furthermore, it cannot be objected 
that the perception of which Kant speaks in these passages really means ‘experience’ 
(empirical cognition) because in B162 Kant is explicitly contrasting perception with 
experience, in A120 he is building up from perception to experience, and in the 
Prolegomena he is distinguishing between (judgements of) perception and (judgements 
of) experience, where only the latter apparently require the categories. After explaining 
that different perceptions are dispersed in the mind – I assume here he means the 
‘successively intuited impressions’ of A99 – and therefore require a combination in the 
mind, Kant identifies this necessary combination with the synthesis of 
apprehension/imagination:  
 
There is thus an active faculty of the synthesis of this manifold in us, which we 
call imagination, and whose action exercised immediately upon perceptions I 
call apprehension.* For the imagination is to bring the manifold of intuition into 
an image; it must therefore antecedently take up the impressions into its activity, 
i.e., apprehend them. (A120) 
 
* No psychologist has yet thought that the imagination is a necessary ingredient 
of perception itself. This is so partly because this faculty has been limited to 
reproduction, and partly because it has been believed that the senses do not 
merely afford us impressions but also put them together, and produce images of 
objects, for which without doubt something more than the receptivity of 
impressions is required, namely a function of the synthesis of them. (A120n) 
                                                 
83
 In taking empirical intuition as being enough to present particulars to consciousness I think the 
conflation of intuition and perception underlies the non-conceptualist reading of Kant, such as that found 
in Allais (2009) and Hanna (2005; 2008). Even conceptualist readers, such as Land (2011: 202), 
mistakenly equate the two notions.   
84
 I leave it an open question whether the judgements of perception are instances of perception, for Kant, 
or a kind of judgement that take perceptions for its material but are less than a full-blown 
experience/judgement of experience.  
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Notice the link that is drawn between the synthesis of apprehension and the 
imagination. Specifically, the synthesis of imagination is called apprehension when it is 
directed to ‘perceptions’ or, what amounts to the same thing, ‘impressions’. The use of 
‘perceptions’ here is slightly misleading since it makes it sound like the imagination 
works on what are already perceptions, but Kant removes this impression in the 
footnote. There he explains that the imagination ‘is a necessary ingredient of perception 
itself’ because it has not been previously realized that the senses do not put impressions 
together into images. This activity requires more than just receptivity; it requires ‘a 
function of the synthesis’ of impressions. In short, the imagination combines 
impressions into an image and perception is only possible through this activity. 
However, both this passage and its claim have proved controversial in the literature. 
Allison, who is otherwise sympathetic to Kant’s theory of cognition, claims that the role 
of the imagination is not the formation of images (2004: 187-188).
85
 He argues instead 
that the imagination is responsible for the formation of schemata (2015a: 256). It is 
certainly correct that the imagination produces schemata for concepts, but it is 
surprising that Allison is so quick to dismiss the idea that it also produces images since 
he himself cites the key texts where Kant makes this claim. I think part of the problem 
is that Allison misreads A120n because he sees it as saying something different to A99, 
whereas I read A120n in light of A99 and these other texts. The first relevant text is the 
dense but very useful note known as ‘Loses Blatt, B 12’, the usefulness of which stems 
from its close similarity to the A-Deduction, and from the fact that it can be (fairly) 
reliably dated because it is written on the back of a letter that is dated 20
th
 January, 1780 
(Allison 2015a, 86). Although I will refer to more of it later, this is the relevant passage 
for the current point:  
 
The pure synthesis of the imagination is the ground of the possibility of the 
empirical synthesis in apprehension, thus also of perception. It is possible a 
priori and produces nothing but shapes. The transcendental synthesis of 
imagination pertains solely to the unity of apperception in the synthesis of the 
manifold in general through the imagination. Through that a concept of the 
                                                 
85
 However, see Allison (2004: 482, n.56) where he acknowledges that Kant says exactly this in A120n. 
In his latest work, Allison does seem more open to acknowledging the extent to which Kant equates 
apprehension, perception, productive imagination and the formation of images (2015a: 133, 137, 254-
255), but still claims that this is a misleading description by Kant of his own view (2015a: 255-256).  
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object in general is conceived in accordance with the different kinds of 
transcendental synthesis. The synthesis happens in time. (Loses Blatt, B 12, 23: 
18)
86
 
 
This passage in particular is useful because it foreshadows not only the A-Deduction’s 
account of the synthesis of apprehension and the role of the imagination, but also the B-
Deduction’s notion of ‘figurative synthesis’. The claim that the synthesis of imagination 
‘produces nothing but shapes’ is clearly reminiscent of Kant’s examples of figurative 
synthesis in §24, namely of the production of circles, lines and representations of the 
dimensions of space through the synthesis of acts in time and the affection of sensibility 
by the understanding. Moreover, the note supports the identification that I made earlier 
of the figurative synthesis with the pure synthesis of apprehension and it also suggests 
that these can in turn be taken as aspects of one underlying act of synthesis that operates 
on multiple levels. In other words, with respect to the ‘threefold synthesis’ of 
apprehension, reproduction and recognition, ‘intellectual synthesis’ and ‘figurative 
synthesis’ Kant is not specifying different individual acts of synthesis but different 
descriptions or aspects of the same synthesis.
87
 Since Allison freely recognizes and 
approves of the centrality of the figurative synthesis in completing the Deduction, the 
identification here of the productive function of the imagination in making perception 
possible with that synthesis should ease concerns about the imagination forming 
images. As per A99, the idea is not that sense impressions are given atomistically and 
then have to be (literally) constructed into mental pictures, but rather that the manifold 
has to be produced as a manifold representation through the subject being conscious of 
the act of synthesis through which it attends to its own acts of combination (§24), 
producing figures and shapes in apprehension.
88
 In short, reading the manifold of 
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 The Loses Blatt is a set of Kant’s Reflexionen. For useful but opposed discussions of the Reflexionen in 
the ‘silent decade’ see Allison (2015a: Ch. 3) and Guyer (1987: Ch. 2).  
87
 Buroker (2006: 107, 131), Allison (2015a: 205), and Anderson (2015: 352-353) all recognize that the 
‘threefold synthesis’ is one act of synthesis in different layers or aspects. Anderson explicitly affirms, 
against Kantian non-conceptualism, that while the exposition is bottom-up, the dependency relation is 
top-down. Longuenesse correctly affirms that the acts of self-affection, if they have data from outer sense 
are the synthesis of apprehension, but if these acts ‘are considered in themselves’ then they are the 
figurative synthesis (1998: 240).  
88
 See also A124: ‘For in itself the synthesis of the imagination, although exercised a priori, is 
nevertheless always sensible, for it combines the manifold only as it appears in intuition, e.g., the shape 
of a triangle.’  
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intuitions as an image is identical to reading the manifold as an intuition.
89
 Hence in 
A120n the ‘function’ of synthesis is nothing other than the categories.90 We now have a 
comprehensive account of the synthesis of apprehension and of its relationship to the 
figurative synthesis; this puts us in a position to return to §26.  
 I have argued that Kant thinks that perception requires a synthesis of 
apprehension because, while intuition contains a manifold of sense impressions that are 
successively intuited, in order for these impressions to represent anything to 
consciousness they must be subject to a synthesis; the subject must take them as being a 
synthetic unity. In the next step of the argument Kant connects the possibility of 
perception (synthesis of apprehension) to space and time as our forms of intuition. 
Specifically, the synthesis of apprehension must be in agreement with time, ‘since it can 
occur only in accordance with this form’ (B160).91 The synthesis of apprehension will 
be subject to whatever conditions that time is also subject to. Since the forms of 
intuition give a manifold but do not present it as a manifold to consciousness, figurative 
synthesis is required for these forms themselves to be (pure) intuitions: ‘But space and 
time are represented a priori not merely as forms of sensible intuition, but also as 
intuitions themselves (which contain a manifold)’ (B160-B161).  
Unfortunately, Kant makes life much harder both for himself and anyone still 
remotely following the argument of the Deduction by introducing a further distinction, 
one that is actually critical to the entire argument, in an exceptionally dense, cryptic and 
arguably even self-contradictory footnote. The next Section is concerned entirely with 
this note and how it completes the deduction.  
 
3.2. §26: ‘Form of Intuition’ and ‘Formal Intuition’  
 
                                                 
89
 The equivalence of ‘image’ and ‘intuition’ for Kant also helps remove another discrepancy that Allison 
finds. In the Schematism, Kant refers to time ‘as the pure image of all objects of our senses in general’ 
(A142/B182), which Allison (2015a: 385) is understandably concerned about. If I am right, however, all 
Kant means by this is that time is the pure intuition of all objects of the senses, which is no more than 
what he has already affirmed in the Aesthetic and Deduction, and is now explaining in greater detail in 
the Schematism to resolve the apparent problem of the heterogeneity of pure concepts and sensible 
intuition. Moreover, this need not conflict with Allison’s view that by ‘image’ Kant must mean something 
like an interpretation (2004: 190).  
90
 The figurative synthesis combines a manifold under apperception through ‘functions of consciousness’, 
which are directly identified with the categories (Loses Blatt, B 12, 23: 19).  
91
 Presumably, the same applies to space as well, but Kant always privileges time since all representations 
must come in this form.  
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Space, represented as object (as is really required in geometry), contains more 
than the mere form of intuition, namely the comprehension of the manifold 
given in accordance with the form of sensibility in an intuitive representation, 
so that the form of intuition merely gives the manifold, but the formal 
intuition gives unity of the representation. In the Aesthetic I ascribed this unity 
merely to sensibility, only in order to note that it precedes all concepts, though 
to be sure it presupposes a synthesis, which does not belong to the senses but 
through which all concepts of space and time first become possible. For since 
through it (as the understanding determines the sensibility) space or time are 
first given as intuitions, the unity of this a priori intuition belongs to space and 
time, and not to the concept of the understanding (§ 24). (B160-161n)  
 
This note has been read in a wide of variety of ways.
92
 I will focus on two recent 
readings that seem to me encapsulate the best of both extremes: one by Allison (2004; 
2012; 2015a) and the other by Longuenesse (1998; 2005). I mentioned earlier that there 
are concerns about the compatibility of the Aesthetic and the Deduction; specifically, it 
seems incompatible that space and time should be characterized as pure intuitions in the 
Aesthetic but that in the Deduction (and the Axioms) they are described as requiring a 
synthesis.
93
 In this respect, the note exasperates when it both attributes a unity to space 
and time as intuitions and affirms that they require synthesis to be given as intuitions. 
Indeed, Lorne Falkenstein can be forgiven for taking the note to contain a contradiction 
‘from which anything follows’ (1995: 91). It is also not immediately obvious how this 
note advances the argument of §26 to which it is appended.  
 Allison claims that the note does not contain a contradiction, but he does this by 
introducing additional terminology. Allison argues that both the ‘form of intuition’ and 
‘formal intuition’ refer to pure intuitions, in the sense of the Aesthetic. However, 
Allison takes the two terms to refer to different kinds of pure intuition, taking ‘form of 
intuition’ to mean ‘indeterminate [unconceptualized] pure intuition’ and ‘formal 
intuition’ to mean ‘determinate [conceptualized] pure intuition’ (2004: 115). He then 
argues that the former must also be taken in two separate ways: as a ‘form of intuiting’ 
and as a ‘form of the intuited’ (ibid). The ‘form of intuiting’ refers to how we intuit 
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 See Onof and Schulting (2015) for an excellent discussion of the many different interpretations of the 
note and its significance. They identify the tensions and apparent contradictions (2015: 4-5).  
93
 See Kemp Smith (2003: 347ff) and Wolff (1963: 228).  
  
61 
 
things in a certain manner; the ‘form of the intuited’ is an ‘essential order or pattern’ of 
the thing that is intuited (ibid). He continues that the ‘form of the intuited’ is ‘the single, 
and all-inclusive, space that contains within it the manifold of spaces’ and that this is 
the space that Kant is primarily concerned with and characterizes as transcendentally 
ideal; this space corresponds with neither the ‘form of intuiting’ nor the ‘formal 
intuition’ (2004: 115-116). In addition, Allison follows Falkenstein (1995: 7-9) in 
taking this space of the Aesthetic to contain a pre-conceptual ‘input’, namely that the 
data presented in it must be presented ‘in a certain fixed manner’ so that ‘on this view, 
the understanding (or imagination) does not produce a spatiotemporal order through its 
activity but merely uncovers or brings to consciousness one that is given independently 
of it, though not […] independently of the nature of sensibility’ (2004: 114).94 This 
‘input’ gets uncovered by consciousness through the imaginative synthesis in the 
‘output’, but the point is that the order is already there in the forms of sensibility. 
Allison construes the contribution of sensibility in a substantial way as not just a mere 
capacity to intuit in spatiotemporal form, but also as containing (as the form of the 
intuited) this pre-conceptual order or pattern, so that on his view, the unity of 
apperception is constrained by sensibility; for Allison, this requirement of apperception 
(intellectual synthesis) to accord with sensibility is what prevents the second step of the 
B-Deduction from being unnecessary or trivial (2004: 191-193; 2012: 37, 46-47).
95
 In 
summary, there are three main terms operating in Allison’s account. There is the ‘form 
of intuiting’ that refers to the specific way or manner that we intuit (spatiotemporally) 
as an innate capacity. Then there is the ‘form of the intuited’, the transcendentally ideal, 
pre-conceptual, pattern or framework that conditions determinate representations of 
space and time. Both of these are readings of the expression ‘form of intuition’. Lastly, 
there is the ‘formal intuition’ which is a determinate conceptualized representation of 
the ‘form of the intuited’ (2004: 115-116). This is space ‘represented as object (as is 
really required in geometry)’. As I understand Allison, only the ‘formal intuition’ 
requires figurative synthesis.
96
  
                                                 
94
 Although Allison is here explaining Falkenstein’s ‘formal intuitionism’, he makes it clear that he 
accepts this distinction in the next paragraph by using it to resolve the apparent contradiction between the 
Aesthetic and the Deduction/Axioms.  
95
 Allison affirms this interpretation in his responses to Longuenesse. He reads the first clause of the last 
sentence of the note in terms of his distinction between indeterminate and determinate intuition and takes 
the second clause to affirm that sensibility is independent of the conditions of the understanding and 
places its requirements on apperception (2012: 47, n.18).  
96
 The same holds for Onof and Schulting (2015).  
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I think Allison’s interpretation, while it is undeniably attractive, is very 
problematic, for four reasons. First, while these distinctions are helpful for discussing 
the different roles of the forms of intuition in Kant’s account, Allison is wrong to treat 
them as strictly separate from each other. In fact, in addition to needlessly complicating 
the story, he seriously downplays the role of the formal intuition in the argument of §26. 
I will explain why this is after setting out Longuenesse’s alternative so that I can discuss 
the two interpretations together.  
Second, the notion that the understanding/imagination simply uncovers or brings 
to consciousness a pre-existing, pre-conceptual, order already present in sensibility is 
directly contradicted by §24, the very section that Kant refers us back to in the note. 
Once again: ‘The understanding therefore does not find some sort of combination of the 
manifold already in inner sense, but produces it, by affecting inner sense’ (B155). 
Consider again §15: ‘the combination of a manifold in general can never come to us 
through the senses, and therefore cannot already be contained in the pure form of 
sensible intuition’ (B129; my italics).97 Allison would counter this by claiming that 
‘combination’ refers to the representation of determinate spaces and times through the 
limitation of the single, all-inclusive space and time (or form of the intuited); however, 
Kant does not say that he is concerned with the representation of spaces and times 
rather than with the unity of space and time as such. Indeed, he seems rather to affirm 
the opposite of what Allison is claiming: namely that he is concerned with the unity of 
space and time as such (not just the representation of their unity through conceptual 
determination/limitation of the single space and time). To deal with this problem 
Allison, following Onof and Schulting (2015: 27-31, esp. 28), has taken to 
distinguishing between the unicity of space and the unity of space as two different 
conceptions of unity. The former refers to the internal unity that space has 
independently of the understanding, while the latter refers to the formal representation 
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 To be sure, Kant’s point in §15 concerns the combination of appearances in terms of taking a manifold 
as a manifold rather than literally constructing a mental picture out of discrete impressions. But with 
respect to time and space these are nothing other than mere forms of representation, thus themselves 
representations. What can it possibly mean to say that forms of representation contain a pre-conceptual 
content? I take it that this ‘content’ can only be formal, that is, that intuition intuited through these forms 
must have a certain form, but this does not and cannot contain a fixed way that the data is actually 
ordered, waiting to be uncovered. Granted, I am construing ‘content’ here in a substantial way, but I 
admit that the notion is ambiguous and that there might be a minimalist sense of ‘content’ inherent in 
sensibility qua sensibility. For example, that in representing objects spatially we must represent them as 
outside each other and as outside of us. Our sensations come in spatiotemporal form independently of any 
activity on our part. Because these features of outer sense belong entirely to sensibility independently of 
the understanding’s figurative synthesis they are internal to the form of intuition, but neither feature can 
be said to yield a pre-conceptual pattern or content in any substantial sense. 
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of this internal unity. Given that Kant does not employ this terminology this cannot be 
said to be conclusive, and I will discuss it further below.  
Third, I am puzzled about why Allison thinks sensibility constrains apperception 
rather than apperception constraining sensibility, which he admits is the most natural 
reading (2012: 47). Allison defends this claim on the grounds that it is not logically 
contradictory for there to be discrete, multiple spaces and times that do not form an all-
inclusive single space and time (2015a: 380-381, 413). This is true, but I fail to see how 
this is relevant. Specifically, as Allison is plainly aware, the kind of impossibility that 
the conditions of apperception rule out is strictly phenomenological, not logical (2012: 
48): if a manifold cannot be combined in one consciousness then it cannot be an object 
for me.
98
 Allison points to Kant’s intuition arguments in the Aesthetic for the necessity 
of representing spaces and times as parts of a single space and time, but this is 
completely compatible with the account that Allison is opposing, namely that 
apperception constrains sensibility so that it must present intuitions this way.
99
 The 
phenomenological impossibility of representing separate spaces and times under the 
unity of apperception leaves it undecided what this impossibility is grounded in. Now, 
admittedly, Kant does claim that the intellectual combination is ‘subject to a limiting 
condition that it calls inner sense, which can make that combination intuitable only in 
accordance with temporal relations that lie entirely outside of the concepts of the 
understanding proper’ (B159), but I take this to mean only that our combination of the 
manifold must occur in a temporal form, which could be taken as a constraint only in a 
minimal sense.
100
 While intellectual synthesis must concur with the temporal form (of 
intuiting), it is also the case that this temporal form (of intuiting) is insufficient for the 
presentation of objects since the manifold intuited in time must then be combined in 
accordance with the unity of apperception, i.e., synthesized by means of the categories. I 
will say more about this mutual constraining of apperception and sensibility at the end 
of this Section. Moreover, we can see that this third problem with Allison’s account is 
closely connected with the second: he views sensibility as constraining apperception 
because sensibility is construed as having a (pre-conceptual) content (or pattern) of its 
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 See Onof and Schulting (2015: 25-26) for discussion of scenarios in which, for whatever reason, the 
unicity of space and the unity of apperception do not harmonize. They do not discuss time.  
99
 In fact, Longuenesse appeals to exactly the same passages.  
100
 It is also significant that Kant claims that the form of inner sense is a limiting condition of intellectual 
synthesis in §25 where he is concerned with defending his earlier conclusion that we know even ourselves 
only as appearances.  
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own – the ‘form of the intuited’ – which means that apperception has to conform to this 
pre-existing content.
101
  
Fourth, I think Allison (and by extension, Onof and Schutling)
102
 are misled by 
Kant’s talk of ‘being given’.103 In responding to the question of how Kant can say that 
the unity of space is both given and presupposes a synthesis, Allison concludes that 
there are two senses of ‘unity’ and two senses of ‘being given’ at work, and so there is 
no contradiction (2015a: 412-413). We have seen what the two senses of unity are 
(unicity and the representation of it). Allison suggests that the term ‘given’ is 
ambiguous between referring to what is given by sensibility, independently of the 
understanding, and to what is given through the operations of both faculties in 
experience (2015a: 412-413). He further suggests that the first sense is operative in ‘the 
form of intuition gives the manifold’ and the second sense in ‘the formal intuition 
gives unity of the representation’ (B160n; 2015a: 413). This is correct to a certain 
extent. Specifically, Allison falls into the trap of assuming that if something is ‘given’ 
then by definition it cannot be the result of synthesis, but this assumption is 
unwarranted. It is natural to think that if something is ‘given’ then it is presented 
immediately without any input from the understanding, but closer examination of the 
text suggests a very different distinction. Although concerned with the original 
acquisition of the categories and whether Kant undertakes a ‘normative turn’, Callanan 
(2011) demonstrates that the given/made distinction does not correspond to a ‘non-
acquired/acquired’ distinction, but rather to an ‘acquired involuntarily/acquired 
voluntarily’ distinction (2011: 7-8). Viewed in this way, the fact that a particular 
representation is given no longer entails that it cannot be the result or product of 
synthesis. Of course, this cannot be conclusive, since Kant’s terminology is rarely 
unambiguous, but it does at least suggest that the Allison/Onof and Schulting line of 
argument is not forced upon us on the grounds that Kant is contradicting himself in 
saying of the unity of space that it is both given and presupposes synthesis.      
Against Longuenesse (2005: 32), Allison denies that the aim of the B-Deduction 
is to show that space and time stand under the unity of apperception, but this is exactly 
how Kant presents the second step of the Deduction. Examine the exact wording of §21: 
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 Though, notice that even here, sensibility’s having a certain intuitive pre-conceptual content, qua 
sensibility, does not rule out the possibility that this content has its source (at least partially) in the unity 
of apperception.  
102
See Onof and Schulting (2015: 33) where they claim that space is a given infinite magnitude. Because 
this is given, this feature is held to belong internally to the unicity of space.  
103
 In Chapter 4 we will see that ambiguity of ‘being given’ is a recurring problem.  
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‘it will be shown [in §26] from the way in which the empirical intuition is given in 
sensibility that its unity can be none other than the one the category prescribes to the 
manifold of a given intuition in general’ (B144-145; my emphasis). The implication is 
clearly that there is something about the way in which the empirical intuition is given 
that entails that its unity is none other than that provided by the categories, and not the 
other way round. Notice again that Kant says that the category is what provides the 
unity of empirical intuition rather than just the representation of a pre-existing unity. 
Notice also, that now that being ‘given’ no longer precludes the involvement of 
synthesis, it is possible that understanding can be affecting sensibility as the latter gives 
a manifold to consciousness. Since the categories bring a manifold to the unity of 
apperception, it follows that Kant is claiming that empirical intuition, because of the 
way it is given, stands under the unity of apperception. What could it be about the way 
that empirical intuition is given such that it conforms to the categories? Longuenesse 
has the start of a promising answer.  
 Longuenesse (1998: Ch. 8) argues that the second step of the B-Deduction 
forces a ‘rereading of the Transcendental Aesthetic’ (1998: 213).104 Unlike some who 
think that the second step of the Deduction is either unnecessary or a trivial inference 
from the genus (sensible intuition) to the species (spatiotemporal intuition), 
Longuenesse thinks that the second step ‘turns out to be far more radical’ than such an 
inference, by reinterpreting the forms of intuition first examined in the Aesthetic (ibid). 
Longuenesse takes the space and time of the Aesthetic to be products of the figurative 
synthesis expounded in §24 (1998: 216). Indeed, as she claims, Kant does send us back 
both to the Aesthetic and to §24. She makes sense of the previously noted contradiction 
in the note by taking space and time to be products of synthesis independently of 
concepts, which, crucially for her, includes the categories (1998: 224). In short, what 
were mere forms of receptivity in the Aesthetic are now considered to be products of 
the figurative synthesis, making them entities of the imagination (1998: 305).
105
 The 
                                                 
104
 While it is a rereading, everything that is said in the Transcendental Aesthetic still holds (Longuenesse 
2005, 34).  
105
 As evidence for this prima facie strange claim that space and time are imaginary beings, Longuenesse 
(1998: 305) cites the table of ‘nothing’, where Kant states that pure space and pure time are formal 
conditions of appearances and ‘are to be sure something, as the forms for intuiting, but are not themselves 
objects that are intuited (ens imaginarium)’ (A291/B347). Kant defines an ens imaginarium as ‘Empty 
intuition, without an object’ (A292//B348). Allison objects that by inserting ‘ens imaginarium’ here 
Kant does not mean that space and time are imaginary entities, but rather he means that the idea that they 
are actual (transcendentally real) objects is what is imaginary (2015a: 411-412). I am unconvinced. There 
is no mention of the views that Kant is opposed to here (i.e., Newton’s conception of absolute space and 
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understanding (as ‘the capacity to judge’) affects sensibility in such a way as to generate 
space and time ‘as the necessary intuitive counterpart to our discursive capacity to 
reflect universal concepts, concepts whose extension (the multiplicities of singular 
objects thought under them) is potentially unlimited’ (1998: 224).106 Whereas Allison 
correctly judged that both ‘form of intuition’ and ‘formal intuition’ are ‘pure intuitions’, 
he incorrectly holds that only the latter requires figurative synthesis, where this is 
understood to be the formal representation of the form of the intuited. Longuenesse 
correctly maintains, however, that the ‘form of intuition’ from the Aesthetic insofar as it 
is a pure intuition is also a formal intuition (1998: 216-220). In short, the forms of 
intuition of the Aesthetic already are products of figurative synthesis, but in the 
Aesthetic, notwithstanding B67-68, Kant abstracts from the contribution of the 
understanding in generating space and time as forms of objects because he is concerned 
entirely with what they contribute a priori to experience qua intuitions. To support her 
controversial reading, Longuenesse cites the following passage from the Aesthetic, 
which fully identifies the ‘form of sensibility’ and ‘pure intuition’:  
 
This pure form of sensibility itself is also called pure intuition. So if I separate 
from the representation of a body that which the understanding thinks about it, 
such as substance, force, divisibility, etc., as well as that which belongs to 
sensation, such as impenetrability, hardness, color, etc., something from this 
empirical intuition is still left for me, namely extension and form. These belong 
to the pure intuition, which occurs a priori, even without an actual object of the 
                                                                                                                                               
time), and in the first edition the expression was inserted after ‘pure time’, which accords with the idea 
that ‘pure time’ is an imaginary entity. Furthermore, in responding to another critic on this point (Michel 
Fichant), Longuenesse points out that Kant characterizes space and time this way again in On a Discovery 
(2005: 72), which is especially notable because this is where Kant clarifies his view of the status of space 
and time as the a priori forms of objects: ‘one can and must admit that space and time are merely things of 
thought and beings of the imagination, which have not been invented by the latter, but must underlie all of 
its combinations and inventions because they are the essential form of our sensibility and the receptivity 
of our intuitions, whereby in general objects are given to us’ (Dis, 8: 202-203; my emphasis). Here Kant 
states, unequivocally, that space and time, as forms of our sensibility are ‘things of thought’ and ‘beings 
of the imagination’, but that they are not thereby fictitious. I will explore what this means below, but for 
now the important point is that Kant does characterize space and time on his account of them as beings of 
imagination, pace Allison, Onof and Schulting. 
106
 See Longuenesse (1998: passim; 2005: Ch. 1-4) for her comprehensive interpretation of the Critique 
that is centred on the notion of the understanding as ‘the capacity to judge’, which takes seriously the idea 
that the forms of judgement provide a ‘leading thread’ to the derivation of the categories. Though I 
disagree with aspects of her view, my current account is heavily indebted to Longuenesse.  
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senses or sensation, as a mere form of sensibility in the mind. (A20-21/B34-
35)
107
 
 
Both at the start and end of the passage Kant identifies ‘pure intuition’ with ‘form of 
sensibility’. Although not cited by Longuenesse, there is also the passage from the 
Transcendental Exposition of Space, where Kant argues that there can only be a pure 
intuition of space (for use in geometry) if that pure intuition is also the form of 
empirical intuition, with its seat a priori in the formal constitution of the mind (B41).  
Crucially, the possible objection that pure intuition refers only to the 
determination of space itself (as an object) is blocked by the fact that Kant links the 
‘pure intuition’ as the ‘form of sensibility’ to the empirical intuition of a body, showing 
that the pure intuition, qua pure intuition, is already required for the representation of 
empirical objects, not just the representation of space and time as themselves objects.
108
 
If this is right, then the ‘formal intuition’ of the Deduction corresponds to both the 
‘form of sensibility’ and the ‘pure intuition’ of this passage in the Aesthetic, and if that 
identification is correct, then a synthesis must be involved, since we are told that formal 
intuition presupposes synthesis in the note. That synthesis can be none other than the 
figurative synthesis of §24, or the pure synthesis of apprehension, for Kant affirms of 
the latter that ‘without it we could have a priori neither the representations of space nor 
of time, since these can be generated only through the synthesis of the manifold that 
sensibility in its original receptivity provides’ (A99-100).109 As is noted by both 
commentators, however, Longuenesse’s reading appears to saddle us with another 
problem: the ‘form of intuition’ in the note does not appear to have the synthetic, 
unified character that it does in the Aesthetic.  
Lest the idea that ‘form of intuition’ has multiple senses appear disingenuous to 
the reader, it should be noted that Kant warns his critic Eberhard not to go ‘leafing 
through the Critique with the help of a dictionary’ as a substitute for situating the 
argument and terminology in context (Dis, 8: 223). Just preceding this rebuke to 
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 My citation is to the Guyer-Wood translation, but, as far as I can tell, there is no significant alteration 
to Longuenesse’s (1998: 218-219). 
108
 In fairness, as I understood him above, I do not think Allison would make this objection for he 
recognizes that both ‘form of intuition’ and ‘formal intuition’ are pure intuitions.  
109
 See also the synthesis of reproduction, where Kant likewise affirms that without the transcendental 
function of the imagination we could not have the representations of space and time (A102). Allison 
correctly observes that apprehension and reproduction were separate in the A-Deduction, but in B- they 
have been merged together (2015a: 413-414, n.16).   
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Eberhard is Kant’s helpful clarification that gives us the resources to understand the 
distinction that Kant is drawing in the note: 
 
Only this first formal ground, e.g., of the possibility of an intuition of space, is 
innate, not the spatial representation itself. For impressions would always be 
required in order to determine the cognitive faculty to the representation of an 
object (which is always a specific act). Thus arises the formal intuition called 
space, as an originally acquired representation (the form of outer objects in 
general), the ground of which (as mere receptivity) is nevertheless innate, and 
whose acquisition long precedes the determinate concepts of things that are in 
accordance with this form; the acquisition of the latter is an acquisitio 
derivativa, in that it already presupposes universal transcendental concepts of 
the understanding, which likewise are acquired and not innate, though their 
acquisito, like that of space, is no less originaria and presupposes nothing innate 
except the subjective conditions of the spontaneity of thought (in conformity 
with the unity of apperception). (Dis, 8: 222-223) 
 
The first formal ground (in Allison’s analysis, the ‘form of intuiting’) corresponds to the 
‘form of intuition’ from the note. It refers to nothing more than an innate disposition 
that allows the mind to be affected in such a way that it can have specifically 
spatiotemporal representations when it is prompted by outer and inner affection.
110
 This 
is critical, for Kant explicitly identifies our form of intuition of empirical objects with 
our capacity for self-affection: ‘the form of intuition, which since it does not represent 
anything except insofar as something is posited in the mind, can be nothing other than 
the way in which the mind is affected by its own activity’ (B67-68).111 By contrast, the 
‘formal intuition’ corresponds to both the ‘formal intuition’ of the note and to the ‘pure 
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 Longuenesse calls this a merely ‘potential form’ and explains the idea in connection with Kant’s 
theory of epigenesis in biology (1998: 221-222; 2005: 26-29; CPJ, 5: 422-423). Allison (2012: 40) 
criticizes this strategy as do Onof and Schulting (2015: 31-32).   
111
 See also R5934: ‘space and time are the forms of combination in intuition and serve to apply the 
categories in concreto’ (18: 393). As I understand it, Kant is here claiming that space and time 
themselves, qua forms of intuition, are the forms of combination. Put bluntly: our form of intuiting objects 
just is the synthesis of manifolds in space and time. See also the Axioms: ‘The synthesis of spaces and 
times, as the essential form of all intuition, is that which at the same time makes possible the 
apprehension of the appearance’ (A165/B206; my emphasis). Note again, how Kant refers to space and 
time in the plural, strongly suggesting that the apprehension (perception) of objects already entails the 
representation of spaces and times, rather than the latter being something that occurs subsequent to being 
perceptually presented with objects. Nonetheless, space and time, qua forms of intuiting independently of 
the understanding, may contain some minimal content. See note 97 above.  
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intuition’ of the Aesthetic.112 This passage also includes proof that the synthesized 
representation of space is what provides the form of outer objects.
113
 In Allison’s 
analysis it is the ‘form of the intuited’ that provides the form of empirical objects (as I 
understand him), and the ‘formal intuition’ is the determinate representation of the 
‘form of the intuited’. But the passage shows that it is formal intuitions that provide the 
form of empirical objects. I therefore agree with Longuenesse that space and time, as 
the forms of empirical objects in apprehension, are products of the figurative synthesis 
but this is as far as I follow her interpretation. I do not agree with her second claim that 
figurative synthesis is independent of the categories.  
 Longuenesse argues that the figurative synthesis occurs before the categories are 
generated (as concepts). She highlights how the unity of sensibility is said to ‘precede 
all concepts’ though ‘it presupposes a synthesis’ and that the ‘unity of this a priori 
intuition belongs to space and time, and not to the concept of the understanding’ 
(B161n). Furthermore, it follows from her characterization of the understanding as ‘the 
capacity to judge’ that an application of the understanding does not necessarily entail an 
application of concepts (1998: 224). Here I generally agree with Allison’s criticisms 
(2012: 41-42).  
First, since the Aesthetic is before the introduction of pure concepts, the 
‘concepts’ which are said to be subsequent to the unity of space and time are clearly the 
concepts of space and time, not the categories; a claim that is confirmed by Kant’s 
reference to the concepts of space and time at the end of the sentence in which the 
locution occurs. Second, like Allison, I am puzzled about how a capacity can be said to 
affect anything. Presumably, Longuenesse means the exercising of the capacity, but 
since this capacity consists of judging, and judging requires concepts to combine in 
judgement, then figurative synthesis cannot be an exercise of this capacity to judge 
since it precedes all concepts. Third, when Kant attributes unity to space and time, I 
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 However, the claims in the Aesthetic and in this passage are not fully consistent, for in the Aesthetic 
Kant claims that the form of sensibility occurs a priori in the mind in terms of consisting of extension 
(space) and form (presumably, time), whereas here he claims that the spatial representation is acquired 
only with the occurrence of impressions. I take it that in the Aesthetic Kant means that the possibility of 
space (as innate disposition) is what occurs a priori but that the spatial representation as the form of 
empirical objects is acquired only with the occurrence of outer affection. In short, the pure intuition is the 
spatial representation, but the form that occurs a priori without outer affection is just the innate capacity 
to receive a manifold spatially. Once again, the preliminary nature of this passage in the Aesthetic, along 
with the abstractionist nature of the Aesthetic itself, precludes Kant from properly distinguishing the 
innate capacity and the actual spatial representation.   
113
 Kant also affirms this just before the passage, saying that the originally acquired representations are 
the form of things in space and time (Dis, 8: 221).  
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take him to be referring to their unity qua intuitions. That is, to the fact that spaces and 
times are intuited as being in them, not under them, as would be the case if they were 
concepts, which is a consequence of there being only a single space and a single time. 
This is what Kant means by denying that the unity belongs to a concept of the 
understanding in the final sentence. Fourth, if the interpretation of the first step of the 
Deduction that I provided above is correct, then it follows that the categories are 
necessarily involved (in some sense) in figurative synthesis. The intellectual synthesis is 
the combination of a manifold of intuition under the unity of apperception. The 
functions of judgement combine representations together under one consciousness, and 
the categories just are these functions insofar as the manifold is determined with respect 
to them, issuing in an objective unity (representation of an object).
114
 Unlike 
Longuenesse, who takes the intellectual synthesis to be the (teleologically guided) aim 
of the figurative synthesis,
115
 I take it to be referring to the same underlying act of 
spontaneity, but now conceived with reference to the spatiotemporal nature of our 
sensible intuition, which means that bringing a manifold of our sensible intuition to 
apperception entails unifying that spatiotemporal manifold into a formal intuition. By 
downplaying the categories, I think Longuenesse’s account risks leaving a gap in the 
deduction. This gap can be illustrated by examining her account of the argument:  
 
(1) Every synthesis of apprehension presupposes the forms of space and time; 
(2) now, these forms, being themselves unified intuitions, are under the 
transcendental unity of apperception, which is the source of the categories; (3) 
therefore, every synthesis of apprehension, by the mere fact that it presupposes 
the forms of space and time, is capable of being thought under the categories. 
(Longuenesse 1998: 214; her emphasis)  
 
Longuenesse argues that because space and time are under the unity of apperception (as 
unified intuitions) and the unity of apperception is the source of the categories, then 
space and time and the synthesis of apprehension, are also ‘capable of being thought 
under the categories’, but this does not follow. Assuming transitivity, it follows that any 
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 Kant illustrates this nicely in his response to Eberhard (Dis, 8: 223).  
115
 Longuenesse denies the involvement of the categories in figurative synthesis at least partially because 
she sees the logical functions as having an objectifying role as forms of reflection (1998: 12). I concur 
with Allison that allowing the logical forms to usurp the role traditionally thought to be held by the 
categories makes it very difficult to make sense of the first step of the Deduction, especially the argument 
of §20 (2012: 30-36).  
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synthesis of apprehension must be capable of being brought under the unity of 
apperception, but it does not follow that just because the unity of apperception is the 
source of the categories, as well as of the formal intuitions of space and time, that the 
conformity of appearances to the categories is guaranteed. This is because Longuenesse 
separates the unity of apperception (as the faculty of understanding) from the 
categories, by taking the former to be the capacity to judge. While the categories may 
have their source in the unity of apperception they are not involved in the production of 
space and time as unified (formal) intuitions on Longuenesse’s account, and thus the 
necessary application of them to empirical intuitions is not demonstrated. It is the 
logical functions of judgement that combine representations under apperception on 
Longuenesse’s account, if I understand her correctly, but while these are admittedly also 
the categories (when the manifold is made determinate with respect to the functions), it 
is still possible that appearances, while apprehendable, could be such that the categories 
as concepts fail to hold of them: that is, intuitions could be given that cannot be 
subsumed under the categories in (judgements of) experience.
116
 In short, the 
transcendental spectre remains because, despite what has been shown, appearances 
could still be given in intuition without the categories applying to them. If, however, the 
categories were necessary in some way for figurative synthesis then it would follow that 
they necessarily apply to any represented empirical objects since the synthesis of 
apprehension is this figurative synthesis in its empirical dimension.
117
 The argument 
from apprehension to apperception would be complete. I will now attempt to spell out 
how I think such an account should go.  
 On my interpretation the synthesis of apprehension (which is empirical) and the 
figurative synthesis (which is a priori) are really one and the same.
118
 What 
distinguishes them is that the former is the transcendental synthesis of the imagination 
in relation to affection from outer things, yielding the representation of empirical 
objects in apprehension, while the latter is the synthesis of the imagination 
independently of outer affection, which produces figures in a priori intuition. The 
synthesis of imagination yields a priori the form of empirical objects. In the Postulates 
of Empirical Thinking Kant states ‘that this very same formative synthesis by means of 
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 Allison (2012: 30-36) raises a similar worry. 
117
 Criticism of Longuenesse’s position reflects different concerns. Both I and Allison (2012) object 
against Longuenesse that she leaves too little of a role for the categories; by contrast, Onof and Schulting 
(2015: 31-32, n.40) object that giving the categories a ‘pre-discursive’ role, is ‘one of the most 
problematic aspects’ of her account. Both I and Allison regard it as one of the most favourable aspects.  
118
 Allison (2015a: 420) also takes them to be functions of a single combinatory act.   
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which we construct a figure in the imagination is entirely identical with that which we 
exercise in the apprehension of an appearance’ (A224/B271).119 Both the synthesis of 
apprehension and figurative synthesis, then, can be regarded as two sides of the same 
coin: viz., the synthesis of imagination. Now, I want to suggest that Longuenesse is 
right that space and time, as single and infinite, are products of the imagination, but 
equally, I emphasize that these products are nothing to us, and thus cannot function as 
the forms of objects or as themselves objects (‘as is really required in geometry’), 
without the categories supplying synthetic unity to the manifold of intuition; it is this 
second point that Longuenesse denies.  
Kant’s texts on this issue are notoriously unclear, as we have just seen. I think 
the main problem is that, for whatever reason, Kant fails to properly distinguish 
between what underlies figurative synthesis/apprehension and this synthesis itself. 
Sometimes he refers to figurative synthesis as underlying the possibility of appearances 
being given in space and time at all, which supports Longuenesse’s account. For 
instance, Kant states that the very possibility of appearances presupposes ‘a formal 
intuition (of space and time) as given’ (A268/B324). At other times he characterizes the 
synthesis as the conceptual determination or limitation of a manifold of intuition, which 
basically concurs with Allison’s account. However, we still need to ask: in what way 
does the very possibility of appearances presuppose formal intuitions of space and time 
as already given? I think Longuenesse’s account answers this question.  
 What the possibility of appearances in terms of intuition presupposes is twofold. 
First, they presuppose a form for their matter – that form is clearly space and time and 
this is what allows them to be ordered in the first place (A20-22/B34-36). This form 
corresponds to the ‘forms of intuition’ from the note and the ‘first formal ground of 
sensibility’ from On a Discovery. Second, they presuppose space and time themselves 
as given intuitions, as the projected background conditions of the perception of 
empirical objects and so I think Longuenesse is right to maintain that it is ‘quite 
reasonable to maintain that the unity, unicity (there is only one space and one time), and 
infinity of time and space – all features attributed to them as pure intuitions, in the 
Transcendental Aesthetic – are features we imagine or anticipate and thus project as 
preconditions of the unity of experience’ (2005: 34).120 However, on both accounts the 
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 The context makes clear that ‘formative synthesis’ is another term for figurative synthesis.   
120
 The projection of one space and one time through the imagination is the key role of the figurative 
synthesis on her account (2005: 34-36).   
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role of the imagination is emphasized. Allison (2012, 48) takes it to be necessary for 
representing the internal unity of space and time, while Longuenesse (2005, 47-48, 77) 
takes it to be responsible for the existence of that unity, but both appeal to it for the 
same overarching reason: the imagination is responsible for representing all spaces, 
times and appearances in one space and one time, for we only intuit the present time or 
the given space. The imagination, however, intuitively represents what is not present in 
intuition, and yet at the same time, it determines sensibility and is not itself 
determinable (§24). So conceived the imagination fills in the gaps either side of what is 
immediately presented to consciousness making Kant’s ‘pure intuition’ a curious 
mixture of immediacy and mediacy. It is immediate insofar as it relates directly to its 
‘object’, but it is mediate insofar as any given space or time is represented at all only 
insofar as it is represented as a part of a single, all-inclusive (infinite), space or time.
121
 
The projection of space and time as pure intuitions underlies both the construction of 
figures in a priori intuition (figurative synthesis in a strict sense) and the apprehension 
of empirical particulars (synthesis of apprehension). However, this projection of space 
and time as pure intuitions is figurative synthesis in the broad sense, and both are 
required for actual cognition insofar as figurative synthesis in the strict sense is identical 
with the synthesis of apprehension.
122
 These are the ‘formal intuitions’ from On a 
Discovery and the note.  
Longuenesse is therefore right that sensibility is determined by the figurative 
synthesis, insofar as the forms of sensibility are guided towards just those features that 
are necessary for intuitions to conform to the unity of apperception: namely, a single 
space, where all determinate spaces are limitations of the whole and a single time, 
where all determinate times are limitations of the whole.
123
  But Allison is right that 
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 As such, this is a phenomenological claim about the structure of our experience, rather than the 
(seemingly false) claim that what we intuit is an infinite space and time. Melnick  expresses this point 
particularly well when he suggests that Kant’s controversial claim that space is intuited as ‘an infinite 
given magnitude’ is perhaps best understood as the notion that we perceive any given space (or time) 
under the ‘pre-conception’ or ‘pre-intuition’ that it is part of a single space (or time) (1973: 11). Gardner 
makes a similar point, characterizing the pure intuitions of space and time as ‘unperceived backgrounds 
implicated in all empirical intuition by virtue of its form’ (1999: 85). 
122
 Kant outright states that perception (synthesis of apprehension) contains more than just space and time 
as formal intuitions (B207), entailing that perception does at least involve formal intuitions. See also 
B202-203. 
123
 This act of the imagination is co-extensive with, and not ontologically prior to, the effort of the mind 
to synthesize impressions as manifolds. For without external affection there would be nothing to stimulate 
the mind to originally acquire the formal intuitions. In other words, the projection of the unicity of 
specifically space and time is logically prior to empirical syntheses of apprehension (as having its innate 
ground in the cognitive subject, viz., ‘forms of intuition’ from the note/’first formal ground of sensibility’ 
from Discovery), but in fact the empirical and a priori syntheses are two sides of one combinatory act. 
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apperception is constrained by sensibility, for the manifold that is given to it is 
spatiotemporal independently of its activities, so its intellectual synthesis is restricted to 
spatiotemporal form as the figurative synthesis for us humans. Apperception and 
sensibility mutually constrain and realize each other, revealing a deep unity at the heart 
of the Kantian system. Nonetheless, as we saw in step 1, this (projected) unity, even 
though originating with the subject, still has to be taken as a (synthetic) unity by the 
subject, and this presupposes synthesis and therefore the categories. This is the 
synthesis of apprehension, to which we must again turn our attention.  
The synthesis of apprehension, as the name implies, concerns our apprehension 
of appearances as objects in space and time. Because the categories are at work in 
figurative synthesis we would expect to see the categories at work in the synthesis of 
apprehension as well. Immediately after establishing the conclusion of §26, Kant 
illustrates the necessity of the categories for apprehension in two examples, one to 
illustrate the category of quantity in relation to space and the other to illustrate the 
category of causality in relation to time. Here is the first example, along with the 
attached note that I take to confirm my reading:  
   
Thus if, e.g., I make the empirical intuition of a house into perception through 
apprehension of its manifold, my ground is the necessary unity of space and of 
outer sensible intuition in general, and I as it were draw its shape in agreement 
with this synthetic unity of the manifold in space. This very same synthetic 
unity, however, if I abstract from the form of space, has its seat in the 
understanding, and is the category of the synthesis of the homogeneous in an 
intuition in general, i.e., the category of quantity, with which that synthesis of 
apprehension, i.e., the perception, must therefore be in thoroughgoing 
agreement.* (B162) 
 
* In such a way it is proved that the synthesis of apprehension, which is 
empirical, must necessarily be in agreement with the synthesis of apperception, 
which is intellectual and contained in the category entirely a priori. It is one and 
                                                                                                                                               
The imagination projects the singularity of one space and one time as the form of our sensible intuition, 
but any synthesis of our sensible intuition under apperception must take the form of time, but equally, any 
temporal synthesis must take place within the backdrop of the unity (singularity) required by 
apperception. 
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the same spontaneity that, there under the name of imagination and here under 
the name of understanding, brings combination into the manifold of intuition. 
(B162n) 
 
It should also be noted that Longuenesse cites the two examples as well, but she takes 
them to show not that the categories are required for synthesis but that the synthesis 
conforms to them in virtue of both the categories and the act of synthesis originating 
with the capacity to judge. However, crucially, Longuenesse does not cite the whole 
passage for either example, omitting the lines that contradict her reading. Specifically, 
in the case of quantity, Kant states ‘that this very same synthetic unity […] is the 
category of the synthesis of the homogenous in an intuition in general’, and again, for 
time, ‘this synthetic unity’ abstracting from time as the form of inner sense ‘is the 
category of cause’ (B163). In both cases, the synthetic unity in question is explicitly 
identified with the relevant concept: the category is both the source of the ‘pure 
synthetic unity of the manifold’ (A128/B177) when it is guiding the synthesis of 
apprehension and it is the representation of synthetic unity ‘generally represented’ 
through a concept (A78-79/B103-104). Turning to the attached footnote we can see that 
Kant unequivocally equates the synthesis of apprehension and the synthesis of 
understanding as being the same act of spontaneity taken under two descriptions. 
Combine this result with the previous identification between figurative synthesis and 
apprehension (as the a priori and empirical sides of one action) and we arrive at the 
conclusion that all of the different syntheses explicated in the Deduction are aspects of 
one underlying activity, which at bottom involves the categories as the means for 
combining representations under apperception, as constitutive of the relation of 
representations to an object (in the ‘thin’ sense). But with their connection to the forms 
of intuition, the categories are also established as necessary (but not sufficient) 
conditions for representing objects of experience.
124
 For if the argument as I understand 
it goes through, then it follows that in order for something to be represented as an object 
to us, this tentative ‘object’ must be given to us in empirical intuition; it must become an 
object of the senses. Empirical intuition, however, presupposes pure intuition as its 
form, but pure intuition can only be intuited or given to consciousness as intuition if its 
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 Allison agrees that the second step involves a stronger conception of an ‘object’ and that the synthetic 
unity of apperception is only a necessary condition of this conception, whereas it is necessary and 
sufficient for the weaker conception (2015a: 379-380).   
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manifold can be brought to apperception. It must be subject to a synthesis that combines 
the manifold and represents it as a manifold.
125
 Since empirical intuition only represents 
objects insofar as it has the pure intuitions as its form, and the latter represent something 
only insofar as they are subject to synthesis in accord with the unity of apperception, 
then it follows that any empirical intuition (and hence, any possible ‘object’) must be in 
accordance with the unity of apperception and the categories.  
If Kant’s argument succeeds he has shown that the categories are formal 
conditions of experience by demonstrating (1), that they are the necessary conditions of 
representing a manifold as an object (in general), which is a necessary condition of 
representing any particular objects, and (2), that insofar as we perceive or apprehend a 
manifold, or better, insofar as an object is perceivable, it follows that the manifold of 
intuition can, in principle, be thought and combined through the categories under the 
unity of apperception. In short, the objective validity of the categories as conditions of 
experience has been established. At this stage, a few comments are in order before we 
proceed to examine how Kant can move from the categories being conditions of 
bringing a manifold to the unity of apperception to the categories, at least the relational 
ones, holding as conditions of the objects themselves. Specifically, more needs to be 
said about the role of the categories as conditions of perception, for recent scholarship 
implies that the categories cannot be conditions of perception for Kant. 
Recently, there has been renewed interest in Kant’s theory of cognition 
considered as an anticipation of both conceptualist and non-conceptualist theories of 
perception. Although I do not intend to enter into the complex question of whether Kant 
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 See the note appended to §21: ‘The ground of proof [that the synthesis of manifold in an intuition that 
is mine takes place by the category] rests on the represented unity of intuition through which an object is 
given, which always includes a synthesis of the manifold that is given for an intuition, and already 
contains the relation of the latter to unity of apperception’ (B144n). Admittedly, the claim once again is 
ambiguous between meaning that the unity of intuition is that through which an object is given, and 
meaning that it the representation of this unity that gives an object. If it is the former then it 
straightforwardly follows that appearances, in virtue of being apprehended, stand under the categories 
because apprehension presupposes synthesis, a taking together of a manifold as a manifold by 
representing it as determined by the logical functions. Insofar as a manifold is determined by these logical 
functions the functions operate as categories (§20). If it is the latter, I believe the same result follows, but 
indirectly, since here the categories must operate as full-fledged concepts (for use as predicates in 
judgements of experience) for (pre-discursive) unity of intuition to be represented (discursively) and thus 
for objects to be given. In either case, though, insofar as something is apprehended the intuition possesses 
unity (unity of a manifold in an intuition) and ‘already contains the relation of the latter to unity of 
apperception’ (B144n). Once again, the argument of §26, as stated in §21, turns on showing that the unity 
of empirical intuition (i.e., an apprehended manifold of intuition) is ‘none other than the one the category 
prescribes to the manifold of a given intuition in general according to the preceding § 20’ (B144-145).    
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can justifiably be termed the spiritual father of either approach,
126
 I want to situate my 
account in relation to arguments made by recent philosophers. For example, it has been 
forcefully argued by Allais (2009; 2011; 2015: Ch. 7) and Hanna (2005; 2007) that 
Kant’s conception of intuition commits him to some version of non-conceptualism. 
Allais maintains that the role of intuition on Kant’s account is to present objects to 
consciousness, and, in line with her relational model of perception, she maintains that 
what distinguishes intuition from sensation for Kant is that the former but not the latter 
has a cognitive, epistemic dimension to it (2007; 2015). Intuitions involve the direct 
presence of objects to consciousness; they are singular and immediate representations 
that relate to objects immediately (A320/B377, A68/B93; JL, 9: 91). Further, Allais 
argues that Kant’s theory of mathematics and geometry commits him to genuine, 
fundamental, non-conceptual content in the form of the a priori intuitions of space and 
time. Indeed, Kant even argues that there is some content that is irreducible to 
conceptual description, namely his account of space in relation to the phenomenon of 
incongruent counterparts (DS, 2: 281-3; Pro, 4: 286). This is all correct. What I dispute 
is Allais’ further claim that that this non-conceptual content is sufficient for perception, 
that is, for the presentation of particulars to consciousness (2009: 384; 2015: Ch. 7 and 
11). 
If the account sketched above is correct as a reading of Kant, it follows that 
while content is given to the understanding through intuition, intuition is not yet 
perception (in Allais’ sense) (B162). The reference of representations to an object does 
not come from the application of concepts. Concepts alone can never individuate an 
object, nor can they present an object to consciousness; that much is indisputable. But 
part of Kant’s insight is that even if all of our representations (in a transcendentally 
realistic sense) were directly of things in themselves, this still would not account for the 
possibility of representing an object. Even if nature was a completely unified whole, 
subject to necessary and systematic laws, the human mind would still have to represent 
this unity to itself, that is, take it as a synthetic unity.
127
 As Allais herself makes clear, 
the relation of representations to an object cannot itself be a further representation 
because then an infinite regress looms (2011: 104-105); rather, the relation of 
representations to an object consists in thinking of these representations as necessarily 
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 Hanna claims that non-conceptualists have failed to acknowledge their debt to Kant for he is the 
hidden origin of both positions (2005: 251).  
127
 For compelling accounts of the problem of representing reality to ourselves, see Gardner (1999: 33-37) 
and Altman (2008: 122-125). 
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belonging together with a kind of unity: the unity of judgement (§§17-19). It is 
uncontroversial that representations must be synthesized to be thought in a judgement: 
indeed, a judgement is already a synthesis of concepts (Longuenesse 2005, 100-101), 
but what is controversial is Kant’s fundamental claim that the synthesis of concepts 
thought in a judgement requires synthesis of intuitions (for analysis into concepts) 
(ibid), which is the central claim of the ‘leading thread’: that the same function that 
unifies concepts in a judgement also unifies intuitions (A79/B105), in such a way that 
they can be subsumed under concepts. In other words, as Kant claims in §15, the mind 
can only analyse what it has already synthesized, and the a priori rules of this pure 
synthesis are the categories. If the account I offered here is correct then the categories 
are also operative in the very apprehension of an object, or the presentation (empirical 
consciousness) of something. Does this mean that Kant is a conceptualist, that objects 
can only be perceived if the subject has the relevant concepts to describe what it is that 
they see? No, it does not, at least not in the sense of strong conceptualism, i.e., that we 
cannot be presented with a particular without the application of concepts (Allais 2009, 
386).
128
   
Since the synthesis of apprehension is logically prior to forming judgements – at 
this stage there are not even any empirical concepts to combine – the categories cannot 
function here in their full-fledged, predicative function as discursive concepts by means 
of which intuitions can be subsumed under their schemata in judgements (of 
experience). Rather, they must function pre-discursively in guiding the mind’s effort to 
grasp the apprehended manifold as something that can be thought as an object. Rather 
than specifying what shape an object has, or what magnitude it is, the manifold must 
first be minimally represented in terms of it having some (unspecified) shape, having 
some (unspecified) magnitude, etc.
129
 Granted, Kant does claim that the only use of 
concepts is for judging by means of them (A68/B93), a claim that might be thought to 
be in tension with this pre-discursive, perceptual role, but I do not think so. Unlike 
forming judgements, the employment of the categories in perception is not something 
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 Importantly, I am not advocating moderate conceptualism as a reading of Kant either. This is the idea 
that intuitions are singular and immediate representations of particulars – that their role is to give objects 
– but that in order for intuitions to be intuitions the application of concepts is required. Allais rejects both 
strong and moderate conceptualism (2015: 149). 
129
 See Allison (2004: 195-196, 483, n.70; 2015a: 418-421) for further discussion of this role of the 
categories, which he terms their function as ‘rules of apprehension’, an expression he borrows from 
Longuenesse (1998: 116-118). Longuenesse (1998: passim) sees the categories as being operative at both 
ends of the cognitive spectrum, being predicates in judgement and rules for generating schemata by 
reflecting on the sensible given in accordance with the logical forms.  
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that we consciously do, for they are not operating as concepts, but as forms of thinking 
representations as having or representing an object (in general). This may be exactly 
why Kant claims that the synthesis of the imagination (responsible for apprehension) is 
indispensable for cognition but is also ‘blind’ (A78/B103), while also claiming that all 
synthesis is governed by the understanding (B130).
130
 Insofar as we do not consciously 
employ the categories at this pre-discursive level, it is understandable that Kant would 
not include this role as a use of the categories; indeed, insofar as this role in 
apprehension is a necessary condition of there being any concepts to combine in 
judgements in the first place, we could even say that the pre-discursive role is still 
concerned (albeit indirectly) with the use of concepts to form judgements.
131
 Given that 
the categories do not operate as full-fledged concepts in apprehension this should go 
some way to reconciling the insights of both conceptualist and non-conceptualist 
readers of Kant. Indeed, Allais even hints that there might be room for a pre-discursive 
role for concepts in perception as rules for synthesis, claiming that her concern ‘is with 
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 Allais suggests that when Kant attributes all ‘combination’ to the understanding, he is attributing only 
one specific kind of synthesis to the understanding (2009: 396, n.35). This is unconvincing, not least 
because Kant amended his own copy to assign the imagination as a function of the understanding. 
Furthermore, the three syntheses of the ‘threefold synthesis’, or the figurative and intellectual syntheses, 
are really applications of the one and the same underlying combinatory act. Schulting criticizes Allais for 
failing to see that her attempt to separate synthesis from (pure) concepts misses the point of the ‘leading 
thread’ (2012: 246-247, n.8). Indeed, he is right that if synthesis as the combining of a manifold under 
apperception is removed from the categories the entire chain of argument, from the ‘leading thread’ 
through to §20, falls apart. One might even say that synthesis just is the pure concepts, or better, the 
logical functions, being applied to different levels of cognition. To be sure, not every connection in 
consciousness requires synthesis. This is exactly the point of Kant’s (admittedly not very clear) §19 
where he distinguishes between an objective unity of consciousness (judgement) and a subjective unity 
(empirical association), but those subjective associations themselves presuppose a priori synthetic unity as 
their necessary condition. I discussed §19 in Section 2. Allais could counter that A78 seems to distinguish 
between synthesis (as such) and bringing synthesis to concepts, but if Kant does take the understanding 
(apperception) and imagination (apprehension) to be the same act as he claims in §26 then I would 
suggest that the distinction be read as a preliminary or merely functional one. At any rate, it is clear that 
pure synthesis is inseparable from the categories.  
131
 It is important not to misunderstand this point. In saying that the categories are a priori rules of 
synthesis that are presupposed for combining concepts in judgements, Kant is not claiming that each pure 
concept is presupposed for exercising judgement under the correlated logical form. He is not, for instance, 
saying that judging under the hypothetical form presupposes the full-blown concept of causality or that 
making a categorical judgement presupposes the full-blown conception of substance, pace Guyer (1987: 
98-99), Bennett (1966: 92) and Strawson (1966: 81-82). Rather, the point is that judging under a certain 
form presupposes a certain way of thinking the connection between representations – the logical functions 
of judgement as forms of conceptualizing – and that when what is to be combined is a manifold of 
sensible intuition the logical functions become categories. To think of an event or appearance as, in itself, 
determined with respect to the categorical form of judgement the subject is taken as if it were a substance 
in the context of the judgement: e.g., Socrates is mortal. As Allison puts it, the corresponding category is 
generated through the logical function as a ‘hypostatization or projection onto an object’ (2004: 149). 
There are not two sets of concepts (functions and categories) where one presupposes the other but rather 
one set that functions in two ways (as logical functions for synthesis of concepts and as categories for 
synthesis of manifolds of sensible intuition) See Longuenesse (1998: 78) and Allison (2004: 149-156; 
2015a: 178-180).  
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whether, according to Kant, having and applying concepts understood as general rules 
which are essentially constituents of judgments is necessary for perception of 
particulars’ (2009: 389).132 Given that she at least leaves open the possibility that one 
could also plausibly characterize concepts for Kant as rules for synthesis it is surprising 
that she completely rejects the thought that synthesis requires concepts, for as I 
understand her, I am not sure that the account I have offered of the role of the categories 
as rules for apprehension is incompatible with emphasizing the irreducible role of 
intuition in perception as the representation that relates immediately to an object. That 
claim can hold even if the categories – as rules of synthesis – are necessary for 
representing or giving the content of intuition to consciousness, as I have argued.
133
  
In short, I am claiming that a cognitive subject, on Kant’s account, does require 
the pure concepts (at least the mathematical ones) in their pre-discursive form in order 
to be presented with a particular in consciousness: for x to see F, x must be able to 
represent F as occupying space and time, even if x does not consciously determine F as 
being F (or not F). Seeing F as being F undoubtedly requires judgement and, here 
again, the categories are necessary conditions of the thought of an object in general. But 
while closely related, this is separate to the perceptual role of the categories as rules of 
apprehension, guiding the mind’s effort to unify the sensible data in such a way that will 
enable the eventual subsumption of intuitions under the categories in their full-fledged 
predicative function. Empirical concepts are not required to see F, though they are 
necessary for representing F as F, but pure concepts, operating as rules for perceptual 
synthesis, are necessary for consciousness to be presented with an F.
134
 If this were not 
the case, and intuition alone was enough to present particulars to consciousness, then 
the deduction would fail because then there would be no way for non-empirical 
concepts to apply to objects.
135
 As we will see in Chapter 3, without a necessary 
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 See also Allais (2015: 173-174). 
133
 Walsh helpfully characterizes intuition as ‘proleptically’ an awareness or presentation of particulars to 
consciousness (1975: 14-15). Earlier I denied that intuition requires the categories to be intuition, which 
may appear to contradict my account of apprehension. The point is that intuition is that in our 
representation that relates immediately to an object, but that for the object to be perceived awareness 
(‘empirical consciousness’) of the intuition must be generated through apprehension.  
134
 On this point, see Kant’s example of a savage perceiving a house in the Jäsche Logic. Kant argues that 
without concepts the savage could still see the object (the house), but not conceive of it as a dwelling fit 
for human habitation, etc., because he lacks the concept of a house (JL, 9: 33). This example is frequently 
cited by non-conceptualists (Allais 2009, 388; Hanna, 2005, 262) to support their account, but I take it as 
obvious that Kant is referring to empirical concepts (specifically, that of a house) in the example.  
135
 Similarly, see Gardner (1999: 140, 162) who claims that the categories must enter into intuition in 
order for there to be objects of intuition for us. Though Gardner does not appear to distinguish between 
the perceptual and discursive roles of the categories, I suggest that it is the perceptual role that must enter 
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connection to the synthesis of apprehension the categories would be only subjectively 
necessary, showing at most that we must think in certain ways in order to represent 
things as objects, but not that things actually are that way (B167-168). We shall return 
to the role of the categories in apprehension in Chapter 2.  
As a final point, one might object that the ‘perception’ and ‘apprehension’ that 
Kant refers to in §26 are not the same as being presented with particulars, or that we 
cannot rest a resolution of this dispute on passages where Kant talks about perception, 
because he uses both ‘Wahrnehmung’ and ‘Perzeption’ for ‘perception’; in addition, it 
is not clear whether he uses the two systematically in a technical sense (Allais 2015, 
151, 154, n.18). Allais argues that by perception, Kant means not the presentation of 
particulars to consciousness but rather having a certain state of awareness of what one is 
seeing: ‘In this sense, when I see a house but am not aware of the individual bricks as 
parts of the house, I do not perceive the bricks, even though I am seeing them’ (2015: 
151). This is not something we can fully investigate here, but I would point out that 
Kant writes: ‘that by the synthesis of apprehension I understand the composition of the 
manifold in an empirical intuition, through which perception, i.e., empirical 
consciousness of it (as appearance), becomes possible’ (B160) and ‘Consequently all 
synthesis, through which even perception itself becomes possible […]’ (B161; my 
emphasis). Granted, this is a delicate point, but by saying that ‘even perception itself’ 
becomes possible Kant does not seem to be invoking a special technical sense of 
perception as meaning a particular state of awareness (the representation of distinct 
things as consisting of complex parts), but rather consciousness of intuitions, 
consciousness that something is being presented to consciousness. My reading makes 
sense of why Kant says ‘even perception’, for this suggests that he is making a 
surprising point, whereas the idea that the representation of something as consisting of 
complex parts requires concepts is far less surprising.
136
  
To support her interpretation of Kant, Allais cites A120 and B160 as evidence. I 
do not find her evidence compelling. When Kant talks about perception at B160, it is to 
contrast it with ‘experience’, as cognition through a rule-governed connection of 
perceptions. In this context, I am unclear on why Allais takes this to be referring to a 
specific mode of awareness of an object (a house perceived as consisting of bricks), 
                                                                                                                                               
into intuition; the discursive role is too strong, and the Kantian non-conceptualists are right to reject this 
on exegetical grounds.  
136
 See further note 148 below.  
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when Kant’s example of the apprehension of a house is explicitly concerned with taking 
the empirical intuition to represent a shape (drawing its shape in space through synthetic 
unity). Similarly, at A120, Kant is talking about what must be done to a manifold of 
intuition in order to yield the image (singular representation) of an object, which 
concerns how we must take the manifold as a synthetic unity.
137
 I agree with Allais that 
by ‘manifold of intuition’ or ‘empirical intuition’, Kant does not mean a ‘sensory 
mush’, but it does not follow from this that intuitions entirely by themselves present 
particulars to consciousness. Allais argues that any conceptualist account (of any form) 
cannot do justice to Kant’s argument in the Deduction. She gives many reasons for this 
and I cannot engage with them here.
138
 One point I will make, however, concerns her 
account of §26. Allais is dismissive of §26, and argues that what Kant says there 
‘cannot be taken to drive the interpretation’ (2015: 174-175).139 I fundamentally 
disagree. First, what Kant says there should be afforded the most weight of all because 
the section represents the outcome of the second step of the Deduction, which is his 
attempt to exorcize the transcendental spectre. Second, and more importantly, Kant even 
titles this section the ‘Transcendental deduction’, indicating that this short, notoriously 
dense section contains the actual deduction of the categories, or at least the final stage of 
the deduction. Third, this section represents Kant’s only effort in the Deduction itself to 
illustrate the legitimacy of particular categories: quantity and causality. Allais argues 
that §26 cannot overrule Kant’s opening of the Deduction (A89-90/B122-123), where 
he states that appearances can be given in intuition without the categories, on the 
grounds that B160n-161n is ‘an unclear and controversial footnote’ (ibid), but this 
works both ways. Kant’s opening is neither clear nor uncontroversial; indeed, as we 
saw, it has been taken as evidence for the ‘patchwork’ theory of the Deduction, and it 
has also been taken to be the statement of a starting position that Kant ultimately means 
to reject. The passage is compatible with both of these interpretations, even though I 
have agreed that Kant does not think that intuitions require the categories to be 
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 I assume that Allais would disagree with this, since on her account the synthesis of apprehension is 
about turning representations of particulars into representations of unified complex parts; without the 
synthesis we are still presented with a distinct thing, but cannot represent it as a unified complex of parts 
(2015: 165, 274).  
138
 I intend to write a paper in the near future arguing that Kant is neither a conceptualist nor a non-
conceptualist about perception, but loosely a ‘proto-conceptualist’ where I will engage fully with the 
arguments for and against these different readings of Kant on the role of concepts in perception.  
139
 Allais is referring specifically to the footnote (B160n-161n) that I have discussed at length, but since 
she does not, as far as I am aware, anywhere discuss the argument of §26 as a whole, including the two 
examples of categorial synthesis that Kant supplies, I take her to be effectively dismissing the overall 
significance of this section.  
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intuitions. Since the controversial footnote occurs in the conclusion of the Deduction, 
this is exactly where we would expect Kant to reject his earlier claims if that is his 
intention. At any rate, whatever the merits of the non-conceptualist account – and they 
are considerable, for there is genuine evidence for both sides – its supporters owe their 
opponents a compelling account of why Kant does claim that the categories are 
conditions of perception if this is not his true position, as he explicitly and 
unambiguously does in §26.
140
 
 
Conclusion: ‘Original Orderability’  
 
 If Kant’s arguments go through, by the close of the B-Deduction he has 
demonstrated that pure concepts are necessary for representing an object insofar as the 
relation of representations to an object cannot itself be a representation, or derived 
empirically, for this would presuppose just what is to be explained. As such, if Kant’s 
identification of the pure concepts with those in his table of categories is correct, then he 
has shown that these concepts have objective validity insofar as they are subjective 
conditions of the thought of an object in general. But this leaves open the possibility 
that there could be appearances in intuition that are not subject to our forms of thought. 
Kant still needs to show that appearances are originally orderable. The second step of 
the Deduction demonstrates that they are. It does so by showing that in order for things 
to be given in empirical intuition they must be given in accordance with the forms of 
intuition (space and time). Since these forms of intuition do not represent anything to 
consciousness without synthetic unity they must themselves, as the forms of empirically 
intuited objects, be subject to an a priori synthesis, termed the figurative synthesis of the 
imagination. The categories are the means by which a manifold (pure or empirical) is 
brought to the unity of apperception and thus issues in the representation of something 
as an object. It therefore follows that insofar as something is perceivable in empirical 
intuition, it is necessarily subjectable to the categories. Appearances cannot be given in 
intuition without also being combinable through the categories. The transcendental 
                                                 
140
 On a further note, it is worth pointing out that just as my account of the categories does not sit easily 
with the letter of Kant’s account in the Prolegomena, the same is equally true of Allais’ account. Kant 
explains the ‘relation of representations to an object’ in the Prolegomena as concerning how we take our 
intuitions to be determined as universally valid; he does not explain the notion as something that involves 
how we must think an object in general in order to make empirical concept-application possible, which is 
Allais’ view (2015: Ch. 11). Indeed, it is clear from Kant’s examples of judgements of perception that 
they already involve the use of empirical concepts, such as those of heat, stone, air, etc.   
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spectre has been exorcized to the extent that, if something is given in empirical intuition 
then that something must be represented as an ‘object’ to consciousness and this 
requires pure concepts operating pre-discursively as rules of synthesis. As such, any 
intuitable manifold is originally orderable from the side of the conditions of thought, 
qua intuitable, not because concepts directly relate to objects, but because in order for 
the content of the intuition  to be presentable to consciousness as perception, to be 
something for me, qua cognizer, it must conform to pure concepts operating pre-
discursively.  
Appearances are originally orderable because at bottom they are given to 
consciousness through one underlying cognitive act that has both a priori and empirical 
dimensions. Although I have argued in detail for a view that sits between the 
interpretative extremes of Longuenesse (figurative synthesis creates the forms of space 
and time) and Allison (figurative synthesis merely represents pre-given unities of space 
and time), what is essential to the current account that combines elements from both is 
that all empirical intuitions – and thus all possible objects of experience – fall under the 
categories, because it is only through the forms of intuition being represented as formal 
intuitions that space and time provide the form of empirical objects. But the 
representation of space and time as formal intuitions entails taking the manifold as a 
synthetic unity, which in turn presupposes the categories. On Kant’s account, if an 
appearance is presented to consciousness in perception then this appearance can be 
thought as an ‘object’ (in general) through the categories. However, there is much that 
Kant’s argument has not shown at this point.   
Aside from two dense examples (quantity and causality), Kant has done nothing 
to show that his proposed table of categories is the correct one. A more serious problem, 
however, to be picked up in Chapter 2, is the fact that so far only the mathematical 
categories have been shown to play a role in the mere perception of an object. This is 
problematic because Kant’s argument in §26 jumps directly from the claim that the 
categories are conditions of perception to them therefore being conditions of experience 
(B160-161), but this means that only those categories that are necessary for perception 
have been established to be conditions of experience. Part of the problem here is that it 
seems as though x will be a necessary condition of the intuition of y if and only if x is 
aimed at the intuition of y. Thus, it is clearly the case that the mathematical categories 
do apply to things, qua perceived, for this is how Kant explains the role of these 
principles (A161-162/B199, B110). By contrast, the dynamical categories do not appear 
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to be aimed directly at intuition but rather at the relations between the existences of 
appearances, such that they are unifiable in one spatiotemporal order. Granted, Kant 
does not introduce this distinction (in a substantial way) until the Analytic of Principles, 
but if the dynamical categories do have a different role than the mathematical ones then, 
at the very best, the Deduction is incomplete.
141
 There is the further problem of showing 
how just because empirical intuitions must have been synthesized through these 
concepts as rules of synthesis that it follows that they have objective reality. The 
exorcism of the spectre removes the in principle incompatibility of appearances and 
pure concepts, but it does not show that for any given case that we can necessarily apply 
our concepts to intuited manifolds. There is no guarantee that we will be able to do this 
in practice just because it is impossible in principle that the manifold will be 
incompatible with our forms of thought. There are two issues here. One, which I will 
not discuss further, concerns what Kant calls the ‘power of judgement’, namely our 
capacity to actually subsume intuitions under concepts as constituents of judgements. 
He thinks that it can be demonstrated not only that we can apply pure concepts to 
intuitions in judgements, but also that we must be able to do so (A135-136/B164-175). 
The second issue concerns what I have called the objective reality of the categories. It 
should be clear that showing that certain concepts are necessary as formal rules for 
synthesis, or even for subsuming intuitions under empirical concepts in judgements, 
does not show that these concepts actually accurately describe the objects to which they 
are applied. One response, to be discussed and rejected in Chapter 3, is to say that there 
is nothing more to these concepts being objectively real than their use as formal rules of 
judgement as subjective conditions of thought. The second response is to see if Kant has 
additional arguments available to him that can prove the objective reality of pure 
concepts. That is, that concepts such as substance and causality, apply to objects that are 
(or are grounded on) substances and that are causally efficacious. We will see in 
Chapter 2 that Kant demonstrates that appearances are originally orderable not just from 
the side of the conditions of thought, but also that they are in themselves determinable in 
accordance with the conditions of thought. We have seen that space and time, as the 
forms of objects, are generated through the figurative synthesis, suggesting that the 
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 See Allison (2004: 197-201; 2015a: 423-424) for careful discussion of what Kant does and does not 
manage to establish with his argument that the categories are conditions of experience because they are 
conditions of perception. Allison revises this opinion in an important way in his latest work on the topic, 
but I will discuss this in Chapter 2. 
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transcendental ideality of space and time in part rests on the unity of apperception,
142
 
but it is not yet clear how this shows that the objects of experience themselves must 
conform to our conditions of cognition. To complete the proof of original orderability 
and showcase the connection between transcendental idealism and empirical realism, 
we must turn to the Analogies of Experience.  
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 While I have focused on Longuenesse’s account to explicate the idea that figurative synthesis is 
responsible for the pure intuitions of space and time, Gary Banham  also argues that the idealism of 
sensibility is dependent on an idealism of apperception (2011: 109-125, esp. 122-124). However, like 
Longuenesse, he denies that categories play any role in the production of space and time as forms of the 
manifold.  
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2. ‘Original Orderability’: The Analogies of Experience  
 
Introduction  
 
 In this Chapter I will analyse the Analogies of Experience, following on directly 
from my analysis of the Transcendental Deduction. Briefly, I argued that Kant needs to 
show both the objective validity and the objective reality of the categories to provide the 
required proof of the legitimacy of the categories, or what amounts to the same thing, 
their empirical reality as necessarily applying to the objects of our possible experience. 
Kant’s strategy for legitimating the categories is to show that appearances are originally 
orderable by the understanding, that is, that appearances can be ordered by the mind 
through the application of the categories. I suggested that the Transcendental Deduction 
establishes the objective validity of the categories as necessary conditions for the 
representation of something as an object in a ‘thin’, intentional sense. I also suggested 
that Kant took a large step towards proving the objective reality of the categories by 
showing that the categories are necessarily connected to the objects of our perception, 
insofar as these objects are represented through the synthesis of apprehension. Insofar as 
apprehension presupposes space and time as forms of intuition, and the latter represent 
something only through the unity of intuition generated by being brought under the 
unity of apperception, it follows that any objects of apprehension conform to the 
categories in the sense that the categories are the means by which their representation in 
apprehension is possible. While this removes Kant’s dreaded spectre that appearances 
might be constituted in such a way that they can be presented to consciousness without 
being thinkable through the categories, it is still a far cry from showing that these rules 
of synthesis accurately characterize the objects to which they are applied, viz., their 
objective reality. In the present Chapter we will examine Kant’s attempt to prove the 
objective reality of the (relational) categories in the Analogies of Experience. The 
Chapter is divided into three Sections.  
 In Section 1 I discuss further the complicated relationship between the 
Transcendental Deduction and the Analogies of Experience. Specifically, I address 
whether the latter makes the former redundant and whether Kant, in a sense, rewinds or 
restarts the argument in the Analogies, as if the Transcendental Deduction had not just 
preceded it. This is not a side issue, for it concerns what Kant thinks he has already 
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shown in the Deduction and what work remains to be done. I think it is easy to overstate 
what the Deduction is supposed to achieve and that both arguments are required to 
legitimate the categories.
143
 In addition, I begin to address the concern leftover from the 
previous Chapter that Kant has helped himself too quickly to the conclusion that the 
categories are conditions of experience because they are conditions of perception. I 
argue that Kant does not make a mistake in claiming that the concept of cause is 
necessary for the perception of objective succession in §26, as opposed to the 
experience of objective succession. This analysis leads into Section 2. In the rest of the 
Chapter, I argue that the Analogies of Experience contains a two-step argument where 
Kant moves from a phenomenological account of our perception of temporal relations to 
a metaphysical argument about the necessary conditions of our perception of temporal 
relations. Kant argues from the categories as conditions of the possibility of experience 
to the categories as conditions of the possibility of the objects of experience. In Section 
2 I explore the first step, namely, Kant’s phenomenological account of the perception of 
time and the temporal relations between objects. I argue that Kant’s account is 
regressive: he begins with a purely empiricist account of perception, shows that this is 
inadequate to explain our ordinary everyday experience of objects, and then concludes 
that our ordinary experience must be guided by the relational categories. This account is 
essentially continuous with the analysis of perception in the Deduction, especially §26. 
If Kant stops with the Deduction he will have shown only that pure concepts are 
necessarily presupposed in our perception of objects, but not that they are conditions of 
the objects of experience, and demonstrating the latter requires the second step. In 
Section 3 I examine what more Kant says in the Analogies and in his pre-Critical work 
to ground the move from the necessary presupposition of the relational categories in 
perception to the proof of their objective reality. Here I draw on recent work by Eric 
Watkins (2005; 2010) to underscore the ontological side of Kant’s thought. That is, the 
Analogies are not intended as purely epistemic principles, ‘inference tickets’, or merely 
the forms for thinking temporal relations; rather, they exhibit the necessary ontological 
structures that things must possess to conform to our forms of intuition in order to be 
objects of experience for us.  
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 I focus on the relational categories, as I indicated in the Introduction to this thesis, but I would suggest 
that for any type of category, both the argument of the Deduction and its corresponding section in the 
Analytic of the Principles is required to prove its legitimacy.  
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1. Restarting the Argument? The Place of the Analogies in the 
Transcendental Analytic  
 
In this Section I want to discuss two issues that relate to the place of the 
Analogies of Experience in the overall critical system. The first issue concerns the 
relationship between the argument of §26 and the argument of the Analogies of 
Experience, for as we saw previously, there is a concern that Kant moves too quickly 
from claiming that the categories are conditions of apprehension to the conclusion that 
this proves that they are necessary conditions of the possibility of experience. The 
second issue concerns the role of the Transcendental Deduction vis-à-vis the Analogies 
of Experience more generally. The basic point is that if the Transcendental Deduction 
has answered the quid juris what further work remains to be done? Prima facie, the 
entire Analytic of Principles would appear to be redundant, but given the importance of 
the Principles, as well as the fact that Kant deploys very different arguments there to 
justify the categories, the opposite worry is generated: far from being redundant, the 
Analytic of Principles (especially the Analogies) is where Kant appears to do the heavy-
lifting, making the Deduction either redundant or irrelevant. Let us begin with the 
tension between the role of the categories in perception and experience.  
We saw in the previous Chapter that Kant’s strategy for legitimating the 
categories as conditions of possible experience turns on a proof in two steps. The first 
step demonstrated that the categories are concepts of an object in general, and that they 
bring a manifold of intuition to the unity of apperception by determining the intuition 
with respect to the logical forms of judgement (§20), thus yielding the representation of 
an object, in a thin, intentional sense. This step shows that the categories are objectively 
valid. The second step demonstrates that the categories are necessary conditions of the 
perception of objects, because the synthesis of apprehension involves representing a 
manifold as a synthetic unity, and the categories are the source of synthetic unity. Space 
and time, as formal intuitions, represent a manifold and any perception of objects in 
space and time presupposes these formal intuitions. Representing a manifold of intuition 
as a manifold requires that the manifold be brought under the unity of apperception, 
which is the job of the categories. Consequently, the representation of empirical objects 
in perception stands under the categories (§26). Since experience is defined as 
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‘cognition through connected perceptions’, it follows that as necessary conditions of 
perception, the categories are also necessary conditions of experience (B160-161). Kant 
concluded the second step with two examples of the role of the categories in 
apprehension, but these examples are unclear at best. The worry was raised that if 
Kant’s argument focuses on the categories as conditions of experience because they are 
conditions of perception, then the lack of detailed explanation of the role of the 
categories in perception leaves a serious hole in his account. More specifically, there are 
two related concerns that have been raised.  
The first is that in stressing their role in perception, Kant obscures the essential 
distinction between perception and experience. Only the mathematical 
categories/principles (quantity and quality) are employed in perception, but in moving 
to experience – cognition through a connection of perceptions – we transition to an 
additional level of synthesis, aimed at representing appearances as unified in a single 
time (and space) through the dynamical relations between the existences of appearances 
(A160-162/B199-202). The categories of relation (and modality) are required for this 
second level of synthesis, but they are not required for perception, or so runs the 
objection.
144
 Moreover, claiming that perception is also structured by the categories 
directly contradicts Kant’s justification of the categories in the Prolegomena, where the 
categories are not required for judgements of perception, but only for turning these 
subjectively valid judgements into objectively valid judgements of experience (Pro, 4: 
297-302, esp. §18).  
 The second objection extends from the first. Notwithstanding Kant’s apparent 
collapse of the distinction between mathematical and dynamical categories/principles, 
even if Kant’s argument in §26 works, Kant provides only two examples to substantiate 
the conclusion.
145
 If so much argumentative weight is attributed to the second step, 
particularly the connection drawn between conditions of apprehension and conditions of 
experience drawn in §26, it is reasonable to expect him to have said more about the role 
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 Allison raises this objection to §26 (2004: 197-201), and later objects that in the Analogies Kant is 
incorrect to call the analogies ‘rules of apprehension’, because their role is for thinking the subjective 
order of apprehension as objectively ordered (2004: 234).  
145
 Kant complicates matters by including only one example for quantity which strictly speaking is the 
title of a group of categories, and one example of the categories of relation. While the reference to 
quantity independently of its three moments might be taken to anticipate the fact that the mathematical 
categories turn out to have only one principle serving for all three, rather than one principle for each 
category, Kant does nothing to explain the need for this difference here. He does not even acknowledge it. 
Thus, the discrepancy in his treatment of the two cases is a source of confusion.  
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of the individual categories in the constitution of perception, but he does not.
146
 Prima 
facie, this objection ignores the detailed account given in the Analytic of Principles, 
where Kant does explain the distinction between the two kinds of principles 
(mathematical and dynamical), and provides arguments for all of the individual 
principles, but this account only serves to reinforce the suspicion that the argument of 
§26 is faulty: the Analytic of Principles explicitly emphasizes the difference between 
perception and experience, whereas the former emphasizes their similarity. In answer to 
both of these objections, I will maintain that it is not a mistake for Kant to speak of 
causality being a condition of apprehension on the grounds that the Analogies of 
Experience also contains an argument that the relational categories are necessary for 
apprehension, not just experience. In fact, it will be shown that the role of the relational 
categories in apprehension is necessary for grounding their distinct role in experience. 
Before moving directly to the text of the Analogies, however, it is worth nothing that 
Allison himself in his most recent work has put forward a proposal for justifying the 
argument of §26. 
 As with his earlier account,
147
 Allison believes Kant is entitled to conclude that 
the mathematical categories are necessary conditions of the possibility of experience 
because they are conditions of perception, for experience requires perception. But since 
experience involves more than perception – namely cognition through a rule-governed 
connection of perceptions – it is not clear that the argument of §26 has demonstrated 
that the categories are needed in this sense. The Prolegomena indicated that the move 
from perception to judgments of experience was the connection of representations in a 
universal consciousness and established that undertaking the conversion is the task of 
the relational categories (2015a: 423). Allison cites the example of causality and objects 
that what Kant describes as apprehension or perception of an event should be described 
as the experience of an event, and that as it stands this  contradicts his ‘official account’ 
in the Second Analogy (2015a: 423-424). He further argues that this is not ‘quibbling’ 
because Kant also states that only the mathematical principles are unconditionally 
necessary, since they are conditions of the possible intuition of objects; the dynamical 
principles hold only in relation to the condition of empirical thinking (of objects) in 
experience, and so are only conditionally necessary (A160-161/B199-200). The 
relational categories are responsible for undertaking the conversion of perception into 
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 Again, Allison’s account (ibid) exhibits this concern.  
147
 See Allison (2004: 197-201). 
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experience (empirical cognition) through a connection of perceptions, but Kant has not 
yet argued for this. Indeed, as Allison points out, the second example, presumably 
provided to achieve the global proof of the dynamical categories, only obfuscates 
matters further by contradicting what Kant will go on to say about the dynamical 
categories. The dynamical categories are not aimed, unlike their mathematical 
counterparts, at the mere intuition of appearance but at the experience of appearances. 
While this is certainly true, Allison appears to overlook the possibility that the 
dynamical categories – at least the relational ones; the case is complicated with respect 
to the modal categories – are also necessary for apprehension as well as experience, 
while also playing a distinct role in making experience possible. While the 
mathematical categories are able to make their contribution to the possibility of 
experience just by merely making possible the apprehension of an appearance as a 
quantum (magnitude), perhaps the relational categories must fulfil two roles. Making 
apprehension possible is only a necessary but not a sufficient condition of their 
successful contribution towards the possibility of experience (as distinct from 
perception). In other words, to experience something as a determinate magnitude 
(quantitas) nothing more is required than an application of the categories of quantity 
through the axioms of intuition, but while it is necessary that to experience an event we 
must apprehend the manifold as an event, this is not enough to empirically cognize it as 
such.
148
 I say more about this below. 
 Nonetheless, Allison extends his account and suggests that if we take seriously 
the idea that the B-Deduction consists of one proof in two steps, it is possible to supply 
the missing argument on the basis of what Kant has supposedly demonstrated in the first 
step of the proof, though it does take us beyond the explicit argument of §26 (2015a: 
425-426). To perceive or cognize an object (in the ‘thin’, intentional sense) entails 
unifying perceptions (constituted as we have seen through the mathematical categories) 
within one consciousness, a task which belongs specifically to the dynamical (or at least 
the relational) categories. Allison formulates the missing step as follows:  
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 A quantum is a whole perceived as a single entity, but such that it can be quantified determinatively. 
Quantitas is the quantitative determination of a quantum. For example, returning to Kant’s favourite 
example of a house once again, perceiving the house as an object in space means perceiving it as a 
quantum (§24). Cognizing determinate measurements of the house such as its width and height, etc., 
through successive application of a unit, say a metre (or a brick), is to determine it quantitatively, as a 
quantitas. See Longuenesse (1998: 263-271) for further discussion. 
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1. It follows from the first five steps [of §26] that all perceptions, as contents of 
an empirical consciousness, fall under the mathematical categories.  
2. It follows from the principle of the synthetic unity of apperception that 
episodes of empirical consciousness that are not connected in a single self-
consciousness would be nothing to me qua cognizer, i.e., I could not even be 
aware of them as jointly mine.  
3. As was argued in the Prolegomena and will be shown in the Analytic of 
Principles, this connection is the work of the dynamical (or at least the 
relational) categories.  
4. Therefore, all perception and all empirical consciousness must also fall under 
these as well as the mathematical categories. (Allison 2015a, 426)  
 
This is an attractive argument, but there are problems. One problem is that it runs the 
risk of completing the argument of §26 by fiat.
149
 This is because appealing to the first 
step of the Deduction cannot help here as the actual connection of the categories to 
objects of experience turns on their necessary connection with the synthesis of 
apprehension. This is, as we saw previously, how the exorcism of the transcendental 
spectre is achieved. Essential to completing the exorcism is showing that insofar as 
something is apprehended by consciousness then consciousness has been guided (pre-
discursively) by the categories as ‘rules of apprehension’. This is what Kant’s examples 
must show, and indeed, he does make this claim on behalf of the relational categories, 
but this move is rejected by Allison – he denies that the relational categories are ‘rules 
of apprehension’ – so he cannot help himself to it now. I now want to turn to the second 
issue of this Section, that of the relationship between the Analogies of Experience and 
the Transcendental Deduction.  
 The basic issue is straightforward. Kant’s avowed task in the Deduction is to 
settle the question of the quid juris with respect to the categories. If the Deduction is 
taken to have settled this question, as Kant claims, then it is natural to ask what further 
work needs to be done. It is tempting to think that if the Deduction has succeeded then 
there is no further essential work to be done, other than at most explaining the 
arguments and implications of the Deduction in greater detail and clarity.
150
 As has been 
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 This is Allison’s initial criticism of Kant’s treatment of the dynamical categories in §26 (2015a: 423). 
150
 Kant does give this impression in the opening of the Analytic of Principles, when he states that here he 
is concerned with explicating the synthetic a priori judgements that arise by applying the categories to 
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frequently pointed out, however, Kant does not write in the Analytic of Principles as if 
the Deduction has achieved the main task. Guyer goes so far as to claim that is as if 
Kant is restarting the argument of the deduction from scratch (1987: 178);
151
 Bennett 
patronizingly suggests that Kant supplies the Analogies of Experience because his 
previous arguments ‘have not the faintest appearance of following’ (1966: 93). Such 
comments aside, there is a real issue here about how far the proofs of the individual 
principles in the Analytic of Principles presuppose or depend on the Deduction. It 
would not be unreasonable to expect Kant to insert each category into a generic 
formulation of the overall argument from the Deduction to yield each a priori principle 
in turn, but he does not do so. Furthermore, the Analogies receive a substantially longer 
treatment than the other three principles, which does at least suggest that they are in 
some way more important than the other three. If the Analytic of Principles was about 
applying the results of the Deduction to the individual categories then we could expect 
similar treatments of each. Moreover, if it presupposes the Deduction then it would be 
natural to assume that the proofs would make extensive reference back to such key 
notions as the synthetic (and analytic) unity of apperception, to the logical forms of 
judgement, as well as to the claim that the objective unity of apperception consists in 
the relation of representations to objects. While Kant does refer to the unity of 
apperception in the Analytic of Principles, its role is clearly subdued compared to the 
importance it was afforded in both editions of the Deduction. The logical forms have 
effectively no role at all, and Kant’s arguments do not come together systematically to 
substantiate the link between the representation of an object and the objective unity of 
consciousness. At most, then, the Deduction can be taken to supply only a global or 
very general proof that experience rests on a priori conceptual conditions, but that 
everything about what principles make experience possible and how they do so remains 
to be explained. But if this is the case then the question inevitably looms whether Kant’s 
‘crown jewel’, as Allison puts it (2015a: 425), is actually redundant since each of the 
principles could be plausibly read as establishing by itself the legitimacy of each 
                                                                                                                                               
possible experience (A148/B188-189). However, in the opening section of the Analytic of Principles, the 
Schematism, Kant reflects upon how a priori concepts like causality can be justified in light of Hume’s 
claim that we cannot perceive an impression of necessary connection. As Kant puts it, we cannot 
empirically intuit causality (A137-138/B176-177).  
151
 Guyer does admit that he may be overstating the point, but argues that even so, all that Kant strictly 
borrows from the Deduction is the notion that experience requires the concept of an object in general, and 
that the results of the Metaphysical Deduction are ignored entirely, as the arguments of the Principles 
have to do only with the structure of time and not the structure of judgements (1987: 178-180).  
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correlated category. Indeed, the Second Analogy is often broken off and evaluated as a 
response to Hume’s sceptical doubts about causality independently of the Deduction or 
the Principles as a whole are separated and taken in combination with Kant’s account of 
natural science in the Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science. Perhaps, however, 
Kant’s arguments for the individual principles will turn out to be unsound if they are 
divorced from the Deduction? 
Broadly following this line, Longuenesse takes the Deduction to have 
established that the conditions of the possibility of experience are the conditions of the 
possibility of the objects of experience.
152
 Similarly, Eric Watkins takes the Deduction 
to have shown that application of the categories to experience is normatively justified, 
insofar as the Deduction shows that they are not ‘unavoidable distortions bound up with 
our perception of the world rather than accurate reflections of it’ (2005: 187-188). As 
such, without the Deduction the Principles can establish at most that a certain category 
is necessary for experience, but not that it is a condition of the objects of experience. 
This is a tempting line of thought, and it would certainly supply much-needed force to 
Kant’s epistemological arguments in the Principles, but while it is true that the 
arguments for the principles are meant to be evaluated in light of the Deduction, this 
line of thought rests, I think, on too strong a conception of Kant’s aims in the 
Deduction. 
 
 I argued previously that Kant addresses two questions in the Deduction. The first 
is how can concepts that are not derived from experience be justifiably applied to 
objects given in experience? Or, to put the question in more Humean terms as Kant does 
in the Schematism, how can concepts that cannot be empirically intuited (or derived 
from Humean impressions) nonetheless have objective validity (A137-138/B176-177)? 
The answer is that such concepts could still be taken to make their objects possible if 
they are necessary a priori conditions of the cognition of objects. As we saw, however, 
by ‘cognition’ in the first step of the Deduction Kant means ‘thought’, so the first 
question can be answered as follows: Non-empirical (i.e., a priori) concepts may have 
objective validity if and only if they make possible the thought of something as an 
object (in general). As the argument develops, Kant comes to equate the thought of a 
manifold as representing an object with the objective (synthetic) unity of consciousness, 
which is governed by the categories as the forms of intellectual synthesis. If successful, 
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 Longuenesse makes this point in her analysis of the Second and Third Analogies respectively (2005: 
134, 159, n.22, 198-199, n.19). I discuss Longuenesse’s account of the Analogies below.  
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the first step shows that a priori concepts are necessary for the representation of 
anything as an object in general through the unification of a manifold of intuition in one 
consciousness. But that is all that it shows. It is left to the second step to show that any 
manifold of sensible intuition can be brought to the synthetic unity of apperception.  
In order to prove this Kant must first remove the unwelcome possibility that 
appearances could be given to consciousness in intuition while being unable to be 
brought to the unity of apperception. This is the transcendental spectre. I will not repeat 
my analysis of Kant’s exorcism here, save to note the implications of it. First, if the 
argument of the second step succeeds, then Kant has removed that possibility by 
showing that a priori concepts are also the pre-discursive rules of the synthesis of 
apprehension that make empirical intuitions into perception (empirical consciousness) 
of appearances. Once again, though, the most that this shows is that a priori concepts 
are employed in a synthesis of intuitions such that they can belong to one 
consciousness, making perception of particulars possible. The proof does not show that 
these concepts will be applicable in a predicative function in judgements, nor does it 
show that the concepts accurately represent the world and are not ‘unavoidable 
distortions’ (as Watkins put it above). Now, if all that one wanted to show was that a 
priori concepts are real and are indispensable from the human standpoint, then I would 
agree that the Deduction is enough for this purpose. But this would be a surprising place 
for Kant to stop in his strategy if he really is in the business of replying to Hume. After 
all, the latter (as Kant reads him) does not dispute the indispensability of the concept of 
cause and effect, but only that we directly perceive an impression of connections 
between events, or have any basis of inferring through reason and understanding that all 
A-type events will necessarily be followed by B-type events, or that the future will 
resemble the past.
153
  
The indispensability of the notion of causality for Hume rests on its use in 
science and common life, whereas if the interpretation I have given of the first step of 
                                                 
153
 For Kant’s reading of Hume, see especially Pro (4: 257-258, 310). He famously claims that on Hume’s 
account the concept of cause and effect is nothing ‘but the bastard of the imagination […] impregnated by 
experience’ (ibid). For Hume’s sceptical doubts about causality and his account of the concept as arising 
from custom and habit see Hume (2007: esp. §IV, §V, §VII). For insightful discussion concerning the 
extent of Hume’s scepticism and of Kant’s response to it, see Callanan (2006). Callanan argues that 
Hume’s scepticism in the Treatise concerns not just the justification of metaphysical concepts, but also 
the rational justification for any judgement whatsoever. For criticism of Callanan’s view, see Schulting 
(2012: 46-48). For my purposes of explicating Kant’s idealism and realism it is enough to stick with 
Kant’s response to Hume regarding metaphysical concepts, even if Hume’s scepticism has a larger 
purview than implied here.  
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the Deduction is correct, for Kant it rests on the concept being a necessary condition of 
the unification of a manifold in one consciousness through which objects (in a thin, 
intentional sense) can be represented. If the interpretation I have given of §26 is also 
correct, then the concept also has a pre-discursive role in perception through guiding the 
synthesis of apprehension, though clearly more needs to be said about that role since 
Kant says precious little in §26. At any rate, neither of these two roles could be said to 
constitute the objective reality of the concept, i.e., a proof that objects stand in real (not 
Leibnizian ideal) relations of physical influence on one another, such that when A is 
posited a cause necessitates that B shall universally follow.
154
 Thus, as I construe the 
Deduction, Kant has only shown the objective validity of a priori concepts, and while a 
necessary step has been taken towards objective reality, viz., connecting them with 
objects of perception, more is required to substantiate the reality of these concepts. 
Nonetheless, the Deduction is not irrelevant to this project for the pre-discursive role 
serves as a vital ground for the proof of their objective reality. 
However, given the difficulties that we have encountered in exploring the 
relationship between the Deduction and the Analogies, it might be preferable to find an 
account of the latter that dispenses with the arguments of the former, along with the 
dubious psychological notions of synthesis, acts of the mind and Kant’s taxonomy of 
cognitive faculties. Before I provide my own account of how the Analogies complete 
the quid juris, I want to examine an influential interpretation that treats Kant’s theory in 
the Analogies independently of the Deduction, as a purely epistemological project. This 
is Guyer’s reading.  
 For Guyer the answer to the question of what it means for something to be a 
condition of experience ‘is to say no more and no less than that it is a necessary 
condition for the justification, verification, or confirmation of the judgments about 
empirical objects that we make on the basis of our representations of them - to whatever 
degree of confirmation they actually admit.’ He denies that the principle or concept 
‘constitutes an empirical object in any ontological sense’, and he also denies that it is 
‘somehow a psychological precondition of the occurrence of a representation’ (1987: 
245-246). Guyer, following Strawson, explicitly rejects what he takes to be Kant’s 
transcendental psychology and thinks transcendental idealism is a doctrinal disaster 
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 I deliberately leave the determination of A and B here ambiguous to account for as many readings of 
the Analogies as possible. Below, I will argue that A and B are states of an underlying substance and not 
discrete events such as Hume’s two billiard balls colliding.  
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caused by Kant falling under the sway of some very bad arguments. What he does 
approve of, however, is the theory of empirical time-determination contained mostly in 
the Analogies and the Refutation of Idealism, which he holds to be free of (or at least 
separable from) transcendental idealism. Guyer holds a purely epistemological reading 
of the Analogies, according to which Kant is only clarifying the epistemic conditions 
under which we can confirm or verify empirical judgements we make about objective 
states of affairs (in the Analogies) and about our own subjective states (in the 
Refutation) (1987: 258-259, 303-304). Guyer’s view is that Kant is arguing for the 
existence of causal laws, but only insofar as they serve as conditions for verifying 
judgements. He seems to hold an extreme epistemological reading, however, insofar as 
actual knowledge of what causal laws obtain in any particular event is required in order 
to confirm that we have correctly interpreted an objective succession in our stream of 
representations (1987: 252). Guyer’s account has suffered from frequent attacks from 
many angles, both for its implausibility, as well as for appearing circular.  
 First, Guyer’s account seems wildly implausible since it requires that in order to 
correctly recognize whether objective succession has taken place we must subsume that 
sequence of representations under a known causal law, but this just seems misguided: 
after all, as Allison asks, is it not the case that we correctly recognize instances of 
objective succession, such as the freezing of water, without having to have known about 
the causal conditions under which water will freeze? (2004: 256-257). Second, Guyer’s 
account is dangerously close to being circular. In order to justify our (claimed) 
knowledge of objective succession (or simultaneity) we require actual knowledge of 
what causal laws obtain, but in order to ascertain what casual laws obtain we need to 
appeal to something in order to recognize the instantiation of a causal relation in the 
first place, and the apparent source would seem to be knowledge of objective temporal 
relations. But, if so, then it seems that we are using knowledge of objective temporal 
relations to justify knowledge of objective temporal relations.
155
 Guyer is well aware of 
the danger, however, and responds by claiming that it is because knowledge of causal 
laws is held only to function in the confirmation or justification of judgements of 
objective temporal relations (and not the generation of beliefs about objective 
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 Multiple commentators have charged Guyer with circularity. See Watkins (2005: 198-199); 
Longuenesse, (1998: 337-338; 2005: 167, n.32) and Allison (2004: 257; 1996: 89). Abela argues that 
causal laws must be ‘presupposed in general’, but that knowledge of them is not required to claim that we 
have perceived an objective succession; knowledge of causal laws is ‘the product of reflective judgment, 
not the spontaneous judgements of the understanding’ (2002: 182-185). Longuenesse agrees that the 
presupposition of causal laws is required but not actual knowledge of them.  
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succession) that he can avoid this charge. Guyer claims there is no circularity provided 
one does not both derive an objective succession from a chain of representations while 
also using that same chain as evidence for a causal law (1987: 258-259). While Guyer 
manages to dodge the circularity charge it lands him with a different problem instead, 
i.e., how do we first recognize an instance of objective succession?
156
 Presumably, 
Guyer would dismiss this problem altogether insofar as it concerns what, for him, are 
the dubious considerations of ‘real or imagined psychological processes for the 
generation of particular representations and beliefs’ (1987: 258). But, as I will show, it 
is these ‘real or imagined’ acts of synthesis that allow Kant to move beyond the 
impoverished position of Humean empiricism to provide a genuine grounding for the 
relational categories. We began to see this in Chapter 1 through the tight connection 
Kant draws between perception, the synthesis of apprehension, and the categories as 
pre-discursive rules of synthesis; now it is time to see how he continues this account in 
the Analogies. While I will draw on the First and Third Analogies, my focus will be on 
the Second Analogy.   
 I understand the argument of the Second Analogy to be comprised of two steps. 
I will first sketch out my reading and then substantiate each step with analysis of the 
text. In Section 2 I suggest that the first step is concerned with demonstrating that 
application of the concept of causality is necessary for the possibility of experience. In 
Section 3 I argue that the second step demonstrates that the concept is a condition of the 
possibility of the objects of experience. That is, that objects of experience must causally 
influence one another; mutatis mutandis for the concepts of substance and community. 
It should be stated that I am not providing a step-by-step analysis of Kant’s explicit 
argument in the text, but rather reconstructing what I take to be the overall thrust of the 
argument, irrespective of Kant’s untidy presentation of it.157 
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 Again, Watkins (2005: 199) and Longuenesse (2005: 167, n.32) both raise this problem. Allison 
argues that Kant’s answer to Hume is precisely that the schema of causality is required for forming the 
representation of an objective succession (2004: 257).  
157
 Watkins argues that there are two lines of argument in the text. The first is the condensed argument 
added to the B-edition (B323-324) that turns heavily on Kant’s account of the cognitive faculties, and the 
other main line that makes far less appeal to his faculty psychology (2005: 207-209). Longuenesse 
provides an exhaustive analysis of the five different A-edition expositions and of the separate B-edition 
argument (2005: 177-183).    
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2. Kant’s Phenomenological Argument: The Analogies of Experience as 
Conditions of The Possibility of Experience 
 
I argue that Kant’s first step in the Analogies is regressive, moving from a 
description of our temporal awareness of objects back to the conditions of such 
awareness. (1) First Kant assumes a purely Humean conception of perceptual 
awareness, according to which all we have is our subjective stream of consciousness, 
which is always successive. (2) From a successive stream of representations, however, 
we cannot infer the objective order of representations – that is, represent an object – 
because that stream is always successive. As such, there is nothing that we can use in 
this successive sequence to infer the objective order from the subjective; yet we clearly 
can and do make judgements distinguishing subjective from objective time-relations. (3) 
Therefore, something must account for this ability through which in ordinary experience 
we distinguish the subjective succession of say (to borrow Kant’s example) our 
perception of a house from the objective coexistence of the all the parts that constitute 
the house as a relatively enduring empirical object. Similarly, it takes no great conscious 
effort to perceive a ship going downstream; rather, what takes conscious effort is to 
notice precisely that the order of our representations is successive.
158
 (4) Kant therefore 
concludes that our order of apprehension is determined by the relational categories and 
that this accounts for the sense in which they are, as conditions of apprehension, 
conditions of the (eventual) conscious judgements (of experience) that our 
representations are of causal connections between the objects of our (successive) 
perception. In short, the first step of the Second Analogy describes the implicit 
presupposition that is at work in any perception of objective succession. The concept is 
not derived from experience, but is rather a necessary condition of connecting two 
empirical intuitions into the empirical cognition of a fixed necessary order. But this is 
only the first step in Kant’s overall argument. If Kant stopped here he would have 
responded to Hume only by suggesting that Hume got the capacity wrong that is 
responsible for the concept; Hume took the imagination to produce the concept through 
habitual association, based on perceived regularities, whereas Kant argues that it is the 
understanding that is responsible. 
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 See Longuenesse (2005: 160) who makes this phenomenological point.   
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Kant might be thought to be essentially conceding Hume’s point insofar as he 
has only shown that we must presuppose the validity of the concept (as a matter of even 
perceiving an objective succession, let alone forming judgements of experience 
concerning actual objective temporal relations), but he has not shown that we are 
justified in making this presupposition, and thus Hume’s question about the justification 
of the concept remains untouched. As such, since we have to use the categories then it 
could be concluded that they do have objective validity, being necessary for the thought 
of objects, but they could easily lack objective reality: there may be no causal 
connections in nature despite the concept of such connections having a compulsory 
application for us. It could still be the case that ‘I would not be able to say that the effect 
is combined with the cause in the object (i.e., necessarily), but only that I am so 
constituted that I cannot think of this representation otherwise than as so connected’ 
(B165; my emphasis). How, then, can Kant move from the application of the concept 
being a necessary condition of the possibility of experience to the content of the concept 
(i.e., necessary causal relations) holding as conditions of the possibility of the objects 
of experience themselves? Of course, one might object that Kant need not (and does 
not) take this second step; Guyer’s epistemological reading that we have just considered 
holds that Kant makes no ontological points with the Analogies. All Kant proves is that 
in order to take one set of judgements to be true (judgements concerning subjective or 
objective temporal relations) we must take another set of judgements to be true 
(judgements concerning substances and causal relations), but Guyer grudgingly 
concedes that these judgements need not actually be true, though he thinks that if 
scepticism plays this game then ‘it is boring’ (1987: 426-427). Boring or not, if Kant’s 
claim that the conditions of experience are the conditions of the objects of experience is 
to be taken seriously (and not either as a mere tautology or as an obvious non-sequitur) 
then he must make the second step, that is, demonstrate their objective reality. 
Furthermore, Guyer’s reading has already been demonstrated to be inadequate. I will 
explain what this second step consists in after justifying attributing the first step to Kant.     
(1) That Kant thinks that the apprehension of the manifold of intuition is always 
successive should be uncontroversial: Kant states many times throughout the Analogies 
and the Deduction that our apprehension of time is always successive.
159
 What may be 
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 See A189/B234 and A182/B225. Kant also implies successiveness of the manifold implicitly at A99. 
Kant’s claim is obviously philosophically controversial. Lovejoy (among many) objects that we can just 
see when objects are and are not successive or simultaneous, and that Kant’s psychological problem is his 
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more controversial is the claim that this presupposes a purely Humean conception of 
perceptual awareness.
160
 To be sure, although the Analogies are clearly aimed at Hume 
Kant does not anywhere (as far as I am aware) explicitly claim that if Hume was right 
subjective succession in apprehension is all that we would possess; the only point Kant 
makes about what would follow if Hume was right is that the concept of causality 
would be empirical and would not contain the necessity that we typically ascribe to it. 
Rather, so-called causal connections would be contingent and empirical, containing 
only a feigned universal validity (A195-196/B240-241). Nonetheless, I find such an 
argument concerning apprehension implicitly contained at A194-195/B239-240.
161
 The 
argument is indirect, assuming that there is nothing that precedes an object’s state 
(occurrence) through which it follows in accordance with a rule. If this were so, then 
there would be nothing to distinguish any sequence of representations from any other 
and thus no way to distinguish the objective sequence from the (always successive) 
subjective sequence because in this case there would be ‘nothing in the appearance that 
determines it so that a certain sequence is thereby made necessary as objective’ 
(A194/B239-240). Since we do experience or at least represent to ourselves that things 
happen (even if not necessarily why they happen, i.e., possess insight into Hume’s 
‘secret powers’ or necessary connections) it follows that ‘we always presuppose that 
something else precedes it, which it follows in accordance with a rule’ (A195/B240). 
Although no explicit reference to Hume is made, the very next paragraph contains a 
description of what would be the case if the concept of causality was derived from 
experience (just as Hume suggested); so I think this speaks in favour of (1). 
 (2) Again, I do not think there is anything too controversial in ascribing this 
premise to Kant. It is a key premise of all three analogies that the successive nature of 
apprehension prevents us from using apprehension as the basis upon which to infer what 
the objective order is. Nonetheless, a few remarks are necessary for it is here that the 
                                                                                                                                               
alone (1967: 297). Interestingly, Lovejoy does concede that it is only in actual perception (‘not mere 
sensation’) that we just see objective temporal relations, which demonstrates his lack of understanding of 
the argument, for it is concerned precisely with what it is to perceive an object rather than just to have 
‘mere sensation’. This is because Lovejoy takes the argument to be concerned with distinguishing 
between objective and illusory perceptions of temporal relations rather than with how we come to 
represent something objectively in the first place. On the other hand, more sympathetic scholars have also 
raised concerns about Kant’s claim that apprehension is always successive. Beck helpfully suggests, 
however, that the claim can be weakened without loss to the more reasonable idea that the subjective 
stream of successive states may sometimes be different to the objective relations (1978: 144-145). 
160
 Although not quite the same claim, I am not the first to consider the idea that Kant may be comparing 
different conceptions of experience. Beck distinguishes between Lockean experience and Kantian 
experience as part of his analysis (1978: 40-41).  
161
 According to Longuenesse, this brief argument is the second exposition (2005: 179-180).  
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famous charge of Strawson – that the Second Analogy contains a ‘non sequitur of 
numbing grossness’ – can be addressed.162 Strawson reads Kant as confusing two types 
of necessity: conceptual and causal. He reads Kant as inferring from the (to Strawson) 
reasonable assumption that if objects causally determine our apprehension then we must 
regard the order of our representations as necessarily fixed (conceptual necessity), to 
the distinct claim that the order of states in the object must also be necessary (causal 
necessity). In short, if I am to regard my perceptions A and B as constituting an event 
then I am conceptually constrained to think of A as necessarily preceding B, and I 
cannot reverse the order, but from this it does not follow that the succession of B upon 
A is itself necessary in the object. This confusion amounts to inferring from a feature of 
our subjective apprehension (irreversibility) the necessary succession of the states of the 
object. This would, of course, be a non-sequitur, but as has been pointed out many 
times, Kant makes no such inference.
163
 Kant makes it clear numerous times that we 
cannot infer the objective order from our subjective apprehension.
164
 The key place that 
this point is made clear is ironically the very passage that Strawson cites as evidence 
against it. While Strawson reads this passage as claiming that we can infer from 
irreversibility to necessary succession of the occurrence, Kant makes what appears to be 
the opposite of this inference:  
 
In our case I must therefore derive the subjective sequence of apprehension 
from the objective sequence of appearances, for otherwise the former would be 
entirely undetermined and no appearance would be distinguished from any 
other. The former alone proves nothing about the connection of the manifold in 
the object, because it is entirely arbitrary. (A193/B238; my emphasis)  
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 For the charge of non-sequitur see Strawson (1966: 28, 137-138); however, the objection was actually 
first made by Lovejoy in 1906, reprinted in Gram (1967: 284-308, esp. 300-303). While both attribute a 
non-sequitur to Kant, they do so for different reasons. Lovejoy’s charge focuses on how the principle of 
sufficient reason has nothing to do with what Kant actually argues, and that he allegedly plagiarizes an 
argument about time from Wolff.  
163
 Although they disagree on what the argument does consist in (and achieves), Allison, Longuenesse, 
Guyer, Friedman, Watkins and Melnick all agree that there is no non-sequitur in the Analogies. Rather, as 
Guyer explains, the non-sequitur is actually Strawson’s. See Guyer (1987: 255-259, esp. 256), Allison 
(2004: 254-256), Watkins (2005: 204-206; 2010: 162-163), Longuenesse (1998: 367-368, n.75; 2005: 
164-165) and Melnick (2006: 206-207). For a particularly interesting response to the charge, see 
Friedman (1992: 168-170, 186), who focuses on the original charge by Lovejoy.  
164
 See A182/B225-226, A189/B23, and (implicitly) B257-258.  
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So, rather than inferring the objective order from the subjective, the passage seems to 
suggest that the subjective order must be inferred from the objective. We will see that 
this is not quite right either, but for now the point is that the subjective order is not the 
(inadequate) datum from which we infer the objective order.
165
 How should we 
understand Kant’s claim in the passage? Rather than claiming that we can infer the 
objective order from the subjective, Kant should be understood as providing a 
transcendental analysis of what is involved in thinking of an objective succession in the 
objects of our representation. This is Allison’s view. The idea is that the schema of 
causality is the rule through which we interpret our subjective apprehension as the 
representation of an event; that is, we move ‘to the assumed irreversibility (in a 
particular instance) of the sequence of perceptions by subsuming this sequence under 
the schema of causality, through which one takes this sequence as the cognition of an 
event’ (2004: 256). This, though, is not enough by itself to refute the charge, for we can 
still ask how we recognize in the first place when we should interpret the sequence as 
irreversible; at least, the link between irreversibility and causality has become obscure 
at best. What justifies us in employing the schema in this way? Instead, we should view 
irreversibility as a feature of our subjective apprehension, as nothing more than a 
consequence or symptom, at most, of an actual objective succession (Walsh 1975, 138), 
but we cannot infer from our subjective apprehension being irreversible to the existence 
of an objective succession.
166
 That is precisely why Kant claims that we must derive the 
subjective apprehension from the objective order, which is a claim that has puzzled even 
those who do not agree with Strawson.
167
 We will return to this issue as part of the 
second step below.  
(3) Subjective apprehension, then, is not enough to distinguish the objective 
order from the subjective, and yet, as Kant’s two examples make plain, leaving aside 
philosophical pedantries, we are clearly able to recognize when our perception of an 
object or event should be considered successive or simultaneous. Our perception of a 
house is always successive – I can go from perceiving the roof to the base or the base to 
the roof or the roof to the windows, etc., but I do not therefore think that the parts of the 
house are themselves successive; similarly, when I perceive a ship sailing downstream 
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 This passage is also where we could introduce the second step of the argument, which could be 
understood as beginning here, but I shall refrain from doing that until later. 
166
 One might say that irreversibility of apprehension is a necessary but not a sufficient condition of a 
causal connection in the apprehended object(s). 
167
 Namely Allison (2004: 250-251) and Wolff (1963: 268).  
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and I see it at 𝑝1 at 𝑡1 and at 𝑝2 at 𝑡2 I do not assume that it is a different ship at the 
second point in time (unless circumstances provide good evidence for this), but rather I 
assume that the transition of the ship from the first to the second point is of a relatively 
enduring object that is changing its state rather than being a new object at a new time.
168
 
Leaving aside any philosophical machinations, my ordinary experience confirms this 
simple (trivial) ability, and yet, if Kant’s contention that the subjective order of 
representations is no clue to the objective order in the objects then Humean empiricism 
renders this simple ability a complete mystery: at the level of ordinary experience strict 
empiricism cannot be the whole story. Something must account for this seemingly 
trivial ability, shared by all cognitively efficient humans, to recognize when objects or 
their states exist successively or simultaneously.
169
 Yet, it is by no means obvious that 
the transcendental idealist is any better placed to solve this mystery than the Humean 
empiricist. Indeed, the situation may actually be worse for the transcendental idealist as 
Kant maintains that time itself is not an object of perception (B233).
170
 If we could 
directly see time or, as the claim is usually understood, our perceptions came with a sort 
of temporal stamp on them that indicated their objective position in absolute time, then 
it seems that there would be no problem: we would be able to just see, without any 
conscious effort, the temporal relations between the objects of our perception; but our 
perceptual states do not come with any sort of time-stamp on them and we cannot read 
off the objective order from features of the subjective order. What resources does the 
transcendental idealist have that a Humean empiricist does not? The answer is clear: a 
priori concepts of the understanding and a priori forms of intuition.  
(4) Since we are capable of determining time empirically, the Kantian account 
holds that special concepts and principles must be at work that allow us to do this, and 
since concepts belong to the understanding and are not the domain of the imagination or 
sensibility, it follows that causality is not ‘a bastard of the imagination […] impregnated 
by experience’ (Pro, 4: 258), but is rather a concept that must be applied to a sensible 
manifold such that the manifold is connected in a fixed and necessary way. But what 
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 Kant’s examples in the Second Analogy presuppose the truth of the First Analogy, namely that the 
perception of alteration presupposes the existence of an enduring substance, the states of which suffer 
change while the substance is whatever endures through that alteration. 
169
 There are obvious exceptions and qualifications here and I do not intend to list them.  
170
 This claim that time cannot be perceived might be thought to be in tension with the Aesthetic and 
Deduction, for Kant describes time as a pure intuition and claims that we can represent space (and by 
implication, time) as an object through formal intuition (A33/B50, B160n). I analysed the latter claim at 
great length in Chapter 1.  
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sort of application is this? Is it a conscious or unconscious process? Here again we must 
keep in mind Kant’s two examples: perception of a house and perception of a ship 
sailing downstream. These do not seem to me to designate processes that require a 
special conscious effort to carry out; by contrast, it is precisely the recognition that our 
subjective sequences of representations are insufficient to ground awareness of 
objective relations that requires a special effort of conscious reflection, hence why we 
are tempted to raise the objection that we can just see temporal relations.
171
 As such, it 
seems more likely that Kant’s thought is that special concepts are at work, 
unconsciously or implicitly, in the mere apprehension of a sensible manifold, as pre-
discursive rules of synthesis. The relational categories describe what is presupposed in 
the perception of an objective succession or simultaneity, or in the case of the First 
Analogy, what is presupposed as conditions of the perception of any temporal relation 
whatsoever. Moreover, it is precisely because they first make possible the perception of 
an objective succession that they serve as necessary (but not sufficient) conditions of 
possible experience as distinct from perception. Kant’s example from §26 (the 
perception of water freezing) makes this clearer.  
When I see that water freezes – a change of state of the empirical ‘object’, water 
– I presuppose that the freezing follows something else, something distinct from the 
water (in that state) as that which the freezing – or the unknown change of state – 
follows in accordance with a rule. Thus, as I successively apprehend a manifold of 
intuition already in the apprehension these (implicit) rules are being used to convert 
empirical intuition into perception, making it ‘something for me’, qua cognizer, a 
manifold representation of which I am conscious, which can then go on to be converted 
into empirical cognition proper, or at least serve as the material for judgements that 
make a claim to objective validity (judgements of experience). Rather than being in 
tension with §26, the Analogies are a continuation of that argument, but they do inject 
an additional element into Kant’s account of perception that was perhaps only implicit 
in §26: rather than being understood as a purely passive taking in of a manifold, the 
synthesis of apprehension should be understood as quasi-active. It is not yet the fully 
active capacity of consciously forming judgements (of experience), but nor is it the 
completely passive reception of sense data that is then subsequently combined to yield 
cognition. To perform the synthesis of apprehension with respect to a manifold that is of 
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 Longuenesse develops this phenomenological observation in more detail (2005: 160-161).  
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an objective succession is to be, even as becoming (empirically) conscious of the 
representation, searching for rules through which the perception can be understood (i.e., 
experienced).
172
 With respect to the concept of causality, the synthesis of apprehension 
entails presupposing that the change of state (e.g., of water as liquid) to another 
different state (water as solid) presupposes something upon which the second state 
follows in accordance with a rule. Kant explicitly affirms that the synthesis of 
apprehension does presuppose such a rule in the object of apprehension, and the 
synthesis does not simply supply the (successively apprehended) material to which the 
rule must then be consciously applied in order to make the order of subjective 
apprehension objectively fixed.
173
 Rather, further refining his account of the ‘threefold 
synthesis’ given in the A-Deduction, the synthesis of appearances is always successive 
when it occurs through the imagination alone:  
 
But if this synthesis is a synthesis of apprehension (of the manifold of a given 
appearance), then the order in the object is determined, or, to speak more 
precisely, there is therein an order of successive synthesis that determines an 
object, in accordance with which something would necessarily have to precede 
and, if this is posited, the other would necessarily have to follow. 
(A201/B246)
174
      
 
Recall that for Hume the concept of causation is a product of the imagination. With that 
in mind, I take this passage to confirm what I claimed earlier, namely that Kant begins 
with a Humean conception of what is involved in perception, then shows that this is 
inadequate to account for what we take for granted, viz., an ability to distinguish 
between subjective and objective succession without any conscious reflection, and 
concludes, pace Hume, that our perception is guided by a priori rules of the 
understanding, viz., the relational categories. Kant explicitly distinguishes a synthesis of 
appearances as that of a synthesis of imagination from a synthesis of apprehension, 
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 See A126: ‘[The understanding] is always busy poring through the appearances with the aim of 
finding some sort of rule in them.’ 
173
 He misleadingly suggests this is the case when he writes: ‘In the synthesis of appearances the manifo ld 
representations always follow one another’ (A198/B243), but as we will see he clarifies exactly what he 
means soon after.  
174
 Kant also talks repeatedly of the perception of objective succession or changes of state here in addition 
to the experience of them, implying that he is just as concerned with perception as he is with (judgements 
of) experience, which tells against Allison’s reading that the Analogies are concerned solely with 
experience.  
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which, if as I have argued, continues the argument of the Deduction, means that the 
synthesis of apprehension must be held to be distinct from the actual cognition of what 
the actual rule is that relates the successive states to an object. As we saw, in §26 Kant 
explicitly distinguishes the synthesis of apprehension/perception from the experience of 
an event so, unless we want to be uncharitable to Kant, we should assume that the 
synthesis of apprehension that Kant details in the Deduction is exactly the same as the 
synthesis of apprehension that Kant mentions in the Analogies.
175
 If this is granted, then 
we can clearly see that the relational categories have two roles in the Analogies: first, 
they function as the implicit pre-discursive rules of the synthesis of apprehension of a 
manifold, which if combined with the account given in the Deduction, means they are 
the rules through which we become conscious of a manifold by bringing the manifold to 
the unity of apperception, issuing in the representation of something as an object (in the 
‘thin’ sense). Second, they function discursively as the concepts under which connected 
intuitions must be subsumed in order to cognize objective temporal states of affairs, 
e.g., in the judgement of experience that if the sun shines on the stone, the stone will 
become warm (Pro, 4: 301n, 312). It should also be clear that the first pre-discursive 
function in apprehension is a necessary ground of the second discursive function in 
experience: that is, unless I presuppose in my perception of the change of state of the 
stone that it has changed in accordance with a rule, a rule which holds universally such 
that when some state a is posited of an object x then another state b follows as a state of 
x in accordance with a universal rule, then I cannot form the (eventual) judgement of 
experience that the rule in question is that the heat of the sun causes the stone to warm 
up, that the heat of the stone is, as an appearance, in itself determined with respect to the 
logical function as the consequent of a hypothetical judgement. Thus, the conditions of 
apprehension, of connecting a manifold in consciousness, are conditions of the 
possibility of experience. Now, I would suggest that the way to reconcile what Kant 
says here with what he says about the division of the mathematical and dynamical 
principles would be to take the mathematical principles or categories to constitute all 
perception of objects, whereas the dynamical categories and principles hold only under 
an added condition, namely that we relate multiple intuitions to each other, rather than a 
manifold of representations in a single intuition, which is the case with the 
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 Just as Allison maintained that it was a mistake for Kant to make causality a condition of apprehension 
in the Deduction, he takes Kant’s claim in the Analogies that the concept is a ‘rule of apprehension’ to 
also be a mistake (2004: 234). The account developed here obviously challenges Allison’s on this point. 
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mathematical categories. Admittedly, Kant nowhere (as far as I am aware) explicitly 
states this, and it does turn on a very flexible usage of ‘intuition’ and ‘manifold of 
representations’, but as we have seen many times, Kant frequently uses his terminology 
in (irritatingly) flexible ways. Nonetheless, if Kant does have something like this in 
mind, it would help explain why he characterizes the dynamical categories as both 
conditions of apprehension (in §26) and as conditions of experience, as explicitly 
distinct from apprehension. It also makes sense of why the mathematical categories are 
said to condition only the intuition of appearances because they extend only to the 
perception of things as occupying space and time. The mathematical categories are 
more fundamental with respect to apprehension because they constitute all perception 
whatsoever, albeit only with respect to the intuition of something, while their relational 
partners condition only some perceptions and have a distinct role in experience of things 
(as objectively determined in time).  
However, it could easily be objected that if this is all Kant argues for in the 
course of reaching his conclusion, i.e., that there are universal rules that hold of the 
objects (of experience) themselves, he has helped himself to much more than his 
argument allows. Specifically, why does he feel able to shift from the 
epistemological/phenomenological point that we must presuppose that alterations ‘occur 
in accordance with the law of cause and effect’ to the much stronger, 
metaphysical/ontological conclusion that they do or must occur in accordance with such 
a law? In other words, the move from the (relational) categories being conditions of the 
possibility of experience to them being conditions of the objects of experience, at this 
point, still stands in serious need of justification. As we saw in Section 1, appealing 
back to the Deduction here does not help us, for the same problem exists there as well: 
there is a gap between objective validity of the categories as formal rules of synthesis 
and their objective reality, i.e., not being ‘unavoidable distortions’ of reality. We cannot 
defer a solution to this problem any longer. In addition, there is the related question of 
why Kant feels he can help himself to the ‘same cause, same effect’ principle and not 
just the weaker ‘some cause, some effect’.176  
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 Of course, one might object to this second claim that Kant does not help himself to such a conclusion, 
but I follow Longuenesse and Watkins in taking Kant to have concluded in favour of the strong principle 
despite his explicit argument only confirming the weaker principle. Friedman and Guyer also argue for 
the strong principle. By contrast, Allison, Beck and Buchdahl all argue that Kant is trying to ground only 
the weak principle. Strawson maintains that Kant tried to show too much, and therefore only affirms a 
weak principle that the spatio-temporal framework itself must endure as a general backdrop to experience, 
or at least, to any coherent conception of experience we can make intelligible to ourselves. See Watkins 
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3. Kant’s Metaphysical Argument: The Analogies of Experience as 
Conditions of The Possibility of The Objects of Experience 
 
 There are two main threads in Kant’s thought that can be appealed to in order to 
explain why he felt he was entitled to draw metaphysical principles about the objects of 
experience from the Analogies, along with the existence of causal laws. First, Kant’s 
argument in the Analogies must be understood in the context of the account of time that 
he has developed in the Transcendental Aesthetic and other parts of the Critique; this 
line of thought is pursued by Longuenesse. Second, Kant’s argument in the Analogies, 
particularly his conceptions of causality and substance, most be understood in light of 
his earlier and more detailed accounts given in his pre-Critical works; this line of 
thought is developed by Watkins. By combining elements of both lines of analysis I aim 
to explain Kant’s second step in the Analogies, through which he bolsters support for 
the conclusion of the first step, while providing ontological principles that can be 
known to hold of the objects of experience. That said, with respect to drawing on the 
significance of his early work it must be emphasized once again that I am reconstructing 
how his argument could have been developed, rather than how he actually presented the 
argument. I will begin with the significance of Kant’s views on time and then move to 
his broader metaphysics. 
 As I read him, what allows Kant to go further than he otherwise could in 
asserting that the conditions of experience are conditions of the objects of experience is 
his account of the unity of time. Because time is an a priori intuition we can know in 
advance of any experience of objective relations ‘that the preceding time necessarily 
determines the following time (in that I cannot arrive at the following time except by 
passing through the preceding one’ (A199/B244). This is a truth about the nature of 
time as human subjects represent it. If one takes issue with this then the second step of 
the argument will fail, but I take it that at least with respect to ordinary experience, one 
cannot advance to another point in time save first passing through the preceding times 
leading to that moment. From this seemingly innocent claim Kant infers an important 
conclusion, namely:  
                                                                                                                                               
(2005: 216), Longuenesse (2005: 171-172), Allison (2004: 247; 1996: 80), Beck (1978: 111-129, esp. 
126), Buchdahl (1969: 651-655; 1974: 128-150), Friedman (1992: 170), Guyer (1987: 252) and Strawson 
(1966: 144-146).  
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It is also an indispensable law of the empirical representation of the temporal 
series that the appearances of the past time determine every existence in the 
following time, and that these, as occurrences, do not take place except insofar 
as the former determine their existence in time, i.e., establish it in accordance 
with a rule. For only in the appearances can we empirically cognize this 
continuity in the connection of times. […] Now this determination of position 
cannot be borrowed from the relation of the appearances to absolute time (for 
that is not an object of perception), but, conversely, the appearances themselves 
must determine their positions in time for each other, and make this 
determination in the temporal order necessary. (A199-200/B244-245) 
 
The key point is that appearances must conform to the unity of time, that is, be 
consistent with the nature of time, such that they can be the ‘law of the empirical 
representation of the temporal series’.177 What this means is that in order for events 
and states of affairs to be individuated in time (and space) certain rules for relating 
appearances to time are required. Since time itself is unperceivable, these rules must 
hold of the objects themselves so that the objects, through their states/change of states 
happening in accordance with these rules make necessary their position or 
determination in time.
178
 But this argument seems to leave Kant’s second step on shaky 
territory, for it might look arbitrary to assert any connection between the nature of time 
and the necessity of causal connections between objects. At most, the argument given so 
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 Watkins also suggests that appearances must be consistent with time (2010: 164), and even suggests 
that more than perceiving temporal relations is at issue here: it is about constituting temporal relations 
(2005: 191). While I certainly agree that time is ideal for Kant, and is not already given as such, I do not 
see the analogies as being the means of constituting temporal relations, but as the means through which 
events and objects in it can be represented in accordance with our forms of intuition, by also revealing the 
ontological conditions that must hold of the objects (of experience) themselves. Allison rejects the idea 
that the Second Analogy is ‘an argument from the nature of time, though it is concerned with the 
conditions of the representation of a succession in time’ (2004: 252). I agree that it is not an argument that 
is concerned with the nature of time as such, but I disagree insofar as I take it to be an argument that is (at 
least partially) based on the necessary conditions for appearances to conform to the nature of time (as we 
represent it). I am situated somewhere between Allison and Watkins on this issue.  
178
 See Longuenesse (2005: 172-177) for a similar conclusion. Longuenesse, however, focuses on how the 
Second Analogy presupposes the results of the Transcendental Aesthetic, according to which we possess 
time as an a priori intuition. She argues that ‘only through the preservation of empirical correlations 
through time can the unity, continuity, and ordering of our pure temporal intuition be realized in empirical 
objects of knowledge (appearances)’ (2005: 174). I agree with her reading, but as she herself notes, it 
makes the strength of the Second Analogy dependent upon the strength of the Aesthetic, and that is 
among the most controversial aspects of Kant’s theory of experience (2005: 176-177). By contrast, while 
I do draw on the ideality of time I also want to connect the Analogies to Kant’s earlier work to 
substantiate his conclusions.  
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far can show (once again) only that we must presuppose that objects stand in the 
connections necessary for us to correlate them in time, not that for any particular case of 
time-determination that they must actually do so. Fortunately, further focus on the so-
called ‘unity of time’ that Kant refers to can bridge the gap from epistemology to 
metaphysics, especially once combined with resources from his earlier pre-Critical 
works.  
 The unity of time consists of the three modi of time: persistence, succession and 
simultaneity. These jointly constitute the unity of time. Time must be persistent; it 
remains the same while its moments arise and cease, but time cannot come into and out 
of existence, else experience would be impossible.
179
 The second two modi specify what 
temporal relations must exist between objects and their states such that they can be 
represented in one persisting time. All objects or events must be either before or after 
one another (successive), or exist at the same time (simultaneous).
180
 We have seen 
what must be presupposed in our apprehension of objects if we are to represent objects 
(of consciousness); now we need to determine whether Kant can substantiate the link 
between the unity of time and objects such that these rules can be known to obtain. A 
brief examination of his earlier philosophy will demonstrate why he thought the second 
step was sound and not worth explicitly spelling out.    
In Kant’s pre-Critical works he presents arguments for many of the conclusions 
reached in the Analogies, but in more detail and with an unambiguous metaphysical 
tone. He attacks both Leibniz’s position of pre-established harmony and the (literal) 
version of physical influx that was opposed to pre-established harmony.
181
 Against 
these two theories Kant presents a sophisticated position that still relies on a harmony of 
nature, but explicitly entails causal interactions between substances. Most notably for 
our purposes he is concerned with the determinations of objects and how causality is 
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 This does not mean that time is a substance or a real thing, but that all events must be relatable in a 
single timeframe that itself does not change. In short, all moments of time are parts of one time, and this 
is the sense in which time itself is permanent. It is the permanent whole in which all individual times are 
intuited in relation to each other.   
180
 See Watkins (2005: 191-195) for a more detailed account of the unity of time and of Kant’s interest in 
it.  
181
 Pre-established harmony is the Leibnizian doctrine that causal interaction – or physical influx – is 
metaphysically impossible. Instead, Leibniz maintains substances can act only on themselves and that 
God established substances (monads) at the time of their creation in such a way that all of their future 
states would harmonize with each other. In this way, it appears as if substances causally interact when in 
fact they cannot. The main attraction of this position for Leibniz (and his supporters, such as Wolff) is its 
ability to resolve the mind/body problem generated by Descartes’ dualism. See Leibniz (1989: 143, 214). 
Leibniz’s doctrine is complicated and had a large influence on the young Kant’s metaphysics. See 
Watkins (2005: Ch. 1, esp. 23-37) for an insightful discussion of Leibniz.  
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possible at all. Kant distinguishes between grounds and determinations in Nova 
Dilucidatio (1755), arguing that for every determination there is a ground that explains 
why that predicate is posited and why its opposite is excluded (ND, 1: 392-394). He 
also argues that each ground can provide only one set of determinations, such that if a 
substance’s state is to change then the grounds for that change, pace Leibniz, cannot be 
found in that substance but must be sought in external substances. Following Crusius – 
another influence on the young Kant – Kant maintains that in order for a world to exist 
all the substances that make up that world must stand in real connections with each 
other, i.e., causally interact, otherwise there would just be a collection of substances, but 
nothing like a self-subsistent dynamical whole that in turn is not part of another 
whole.
182
 In order for causal interaction to occur there must be real grounds that contain 
the determinations of other substances. This is because a substance cannot change its 
own state or determination without changing its own grounds, but if grounds are to 
change then an unacceptable infinite regress looms: what is responsible for a change of 
ground if substances only act on themselves? Kant reasons that grounds must be 
immutable, and also maintains that grounds posit their determinations immediately 
(ND, 1: 411), so it makes sense to think that the same ground cannot posit multiple, 
different determinations (except where specific added circumstances are required such 
as the object being in motion instead or at rest).
183
 Given all of this, it follows that 
substances must act on each other, which means that pre-established harmony is false 
(ND, 1: 412). That means that the unity of the world depends on causal interaction, 
since it would not be a world (a dynamical whole) if substances did not interact, for 
change would not be possible. It is no coincidence, either, that Kant borrows Crusius’ 
terminology of grounds and determinations (albeit while using it in his own distinct 
way).  
Very significantly, Crusius defines a real ground as something that ‘brings about 
or makes possible a thing outside of thought […] either by means of an efficacious 
cause […] [or through] the laws of truth in general’, such that when one thing is posited, 
logically something else must be posited as well (Crusius, ibid, §36). A real ground is 
something that makes possible a thing outside of thought; this indicates a realist rather 
than an idealist metaphysics. While Kant converts Crusius’ real inefficacious cause into 
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 See Crusius, Sketch of the Necessary Truths of Reason, §350, translated in Watkins (2009: 170). 
183
 See Watkins (2005: 118-125) for an explanation of how Kant inherits the conception of 
grounds/determinations offered by Wolff and Meier while using it to reject pre-established harmony. I 
pass over the details since they are not relevant to my purpose.    
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a ‘logical ground’ he retains his notion of a real efficacious ground. Of course, this 
would mean very little with respect to Kant’s argument in the Analogies if he had 
abandoned the notion of a ‘real ground’ by 1781 in favour of purely epistemological 
conditions of justification, but there is good evidence to the contrary. For example:  
 
It is therefore important to show by an example that even in experience we never 
ascribe sequence (of an occurrence, in which something happens that previously 
did not exist) to the object, and distinguish it from the subjective sequence of our 
apprehension, except when a rule is the ground that necessitates us to observe 
this order of the perceptions rather than another, indeed that it is really this 
necessitation that first makes possible the representation of a succession in the 
object. (A196-197/B242-243; my emphasis)  
 
The status of the required rule is admittedly ambiguous between being a rule for 
thinking a subjective order of apprehension as order-determinate, thereby representing 
the apprehension as an objective succession in thought, and the ground being something 
in the object that makes this order determined in itself. Kant moves to the latter claim 
four paragraphs later (A199-200/B244-245), but here he could still reasonably be 
construed as sticking merely to conceptual grounds. Given the (implicit) progression of 
the argument from conditions of experience to conditions of the objects of experience it 
is not surprising that the clearest example is located in a footnote appended to the 
conclusion of the Analogies:  
 
The unity of the world-whole, in which all appearances are to be connected, is 
obviously a mere conclusion from the tacitly assumed principle of the 
community of all substances that are simultaneous: for, were they isolated, they 
would not as parts constitute a whole, and were their connection (interaction of 
the manifold) not already necessary on account of simultaneity, then one could 
not infer from the latter, as a merely ideal relation, to the former, as a real one. 
Nevertheless we have shown, in its proper place, that community is really the 
ground of the possibility of an empirical cognition of coexistence, and that one 
therefore really only infers from the latter back to the former, as its condition. 
(A218/B265; my emphasis)  
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Kant does not spell out in the Critique this distinction between real and ideal relations, 
so it seems reasonable to assume that it means what it did in his pre-Critical works. A 
real relation is one that makes possible an object or something outside of our thoughts – 
what he elsewhere terms an ‘antecedently determining ground’, and an ideal relation is 
one that makes possible the cognition of something – what he elsewhere calls a 
‘consequently determining ground’.184 With this terminological distinction clear, the 
implications of the passage should be transparent: the principle of community, 
expounded in the Third Analogy, is the ideal ground through which we cognize the 
simultaneity of appearances, but through it we infer the real ground that makes possible 
the actual simultaneity of appearances, i.e., mutual interaction of causally efficacious 
substances. To restate the point in terms of the argument of the Critique, the ideal 
ground/relation is the condition of the experience (empirical cognition) of the temporal 
relation, while the real relation/ground is the condition of the object of experience with 
regards to its conformity to the unity of time.
185
 Here we see, perhaps better than 
anywhere else, Kant’s famous method of the ‘Copernican turn’ in its full application: 
objects must conform to our conditions for cognizing them – in this case, they must 
conform to the nature of time as we represent it in figurative synthesis, as expounded in 
the Deduction. But equally important, we could never come to experience the ideal 
ground of experience of temporal relations if the relational categories were not already 
operative in the synthesis of apprehension (perception) itself, as the conditions through 
which we can become conscious of representations as unified under one consciousness, 
as I argued above and in Chapter 1. If I am right, though, would we not expect Kant to 
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 This distinction is introduced in Nova Dilucidatio as part of Kant’s analysis of the principle of 
determining/sufficient ground. See ND (1: 394) for ‘consequently determining ground’, or ground of truth 
and (1: 396) for ‘antecedently determining ground’, or ground of existence. Although clearly a precursor 
to his distinction between logical and real grounds, Kant does not draw the latter distinction until 1763 in 
Negative Magnitudes (NM, 2: 202). It is important to keep in mind that the two distinctions are not 
equivalent. In both cases the real ground or ‘antecedently determining ground’ is one that is explicitly 
causal and not true merely through conformity to the principle of identity (so the ground is what Kant will 
refer to in the Critique as synthetic), but the ‘consequently determining ground’ is a ground of cognition, 
identical to Crusius’ ideal ground, whereas Kant’s logical ground has more in common with Crusius’ real 
but inefficacious (existential) ground, which, unlike for Crusius, is explicitly not causal for Kant, since it 
is true merely through the principle of identity. Given that Kant in Negative Magnitudes (2: 203) 
purposely points out the difference between his distinction and Crusius’ it is odd that he should invoke 
the distinction between real and ideal grounds in the Critique, rather than his own distinction between real 
and logical grounds. Nonetheless, the text unambiguously confirms that it is the former distinction that 
Kant draws on there.  
185
 This claim may bring to mind Strawson’s non-sequitur again, but the claim is not a psychological one 
about particular instances of human cognition. Rather, the point is that in Kant’s transcendental analysis 
conditions of objects of experience are revealed to be equivalent to conditions of experience.  
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have spelled this out more clearly than he did, especially with respect to the significance 
of ideal and real grounds?  
 We saw in Chapter 1 that Kant has an unhelpful habit of relegating key 
arguments to footnotes (B160-B161); nevertheless, the straightforward answer is 
negative. The Critique must be understood in context of the pre-Critical philosophy, and 
it must be remembered that what we as modern commentators emphasize as being a 
direct and conscious shift from the tone and aims of Kant’s early work to the Critical 
period is ultimately an artificial distinction. While there are certainly many differences 
between Kant’s early and later work there is also a great deal of continuity. In 
particular, the first Critique should be understood as emerging from those earlier 
reflections on metaphysics. Perhaps the clearest example of this is with the final section 
of Negative Magnitudes where Kant expresses his puzzlement concerning the mystery 
of real grounds:  
 
I fully understand how a consequence is posited by a ground in accordance with 
the rule of identity. […] But what I should dearly like to have distinctly 
explained to me, however, is how one thing issues from another thing, though 
not by means of the law of identity. The first kind of ground I call the logical 
ground, for the relation of the ground to its consequence can be understood 
logically. In other words, it can be clearly understood by appeal to the law of 
identity. The second kind of ground, however, I call the real ground, for this 
relation belongs, presumably, to my true concepts, but the manner of the relating 
can in no wise be judged.  
 
As for this real ground and its relation to its consequence my question presents 
itself in the following simple form: How am I to understand the fact that, 
because something is, something else is? A logical consequence is only really 
posited because it is identical with the ground. […] A body A is in motion; 
another body B, lying in the direct path of A, is at rest. The motion of A is 
something; the motion of B is something else; and yet the one is posited by the 
other. Now, you may subject [these concepts to as much analysis as you please: 
you will never find the motion of B contained in the motion of A]. Nor am I 
willing to be fobbed off by the words “cause” and “effect,” “force” and “action”. 
For if I already regard something as a cause of something else, or if I attach the 
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concept of force to it, then I am already thinking of the cause as containing the 
relation of the real ground to its consequence, and then it is easy to understand 
that the consequence is posited in accordance with the rule of identity. […] Let 
us see whether we can offer a distinct explanation of how it is that, because 
something is, something else is cancelled, and whether we can say anything 
more than I have already said on the matter, namely that it simply does not take 
place in virtue of the law of contradiction. I have reflected upon the nature of our 
cognition with respect to our judgement concerning grounds and consequences, 
and one day I shall present a detailed account of the fruits of my reflections. 
(NM, 2: 202-204) 
 
The ‘detailed account’ of Kant’s musings on the question of real grounds is the first 
Critique. But the reason that the logical/real grounds distinction does not receive 
explicit attention is twofold. First, it is present in the Critique, but no longer as a 
distinction between grounds but rather as a distinction between two kinds of judgements 
or principles: the ‘logical ground’ becomes the analytic judgement and the ‘real ground’ 
becomes the synthetic judgment.
186
 Kant’s answer, then, to the question of real grounds 
is nothing other than the possibility of synthetic a priori judgements; the most famous of 
which are the analogies of experience.  
Second, the intended audience of the Critique would already have likely read 
Kant’s earlier efforts so it is not surprising that Kant simply presupposes knowledge of 
his earlier theories in the Critique. The three analogies undeniably have their origins in 
the principles of succession and co-existence of the Nova Dilucidatio, Negative 
Magnitudes and Inaugural Dissertation and, as Watkins  explains, since Kant is 
concerned with grounds and determinations in his early works it stands to reason that, 
insofar as Kant is concerned with exactly the same ontological principles in the 
Critique, that there he is simply concerned with finding the real grounds for specifically 
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 The equivalence of logical grounds with analytic judgements and of real grounds with synthetic ones is 
stated explicitly by Kant in the Critical period text, Metaphysik Volckmann, (28.1: 403-404), cited in 
Longuenesse (1998: 355-356). Longuenesse notes that the logical/real ground distinction is the precursor 
to the analytic/synthetic distinction. Watkins notes that it is the question of real grounds that motivates 
Kant’s project in the Critique. Allison denies that the logical/real grounds distinction is equivalent to the 
analytic/synthetic distinction, but maintains that, viewed retrospectively, Negative Magnitudes is the point 
at which the distinction is required for Kant to move forward (2015a: 17-18). Allison’s claim would seem 
to be contradicted by several texts such as by R3753, cited in Longuenesse (1998: 353) and R3738 (17: 
278). Although from the 1780s, the Metaphysik Volckmann passage unambiguously equates the analytic 
with the logical ground (reason) and the synthetic with the real ground (reason), suggesting that Kant 
certainly came to view the analytic/synthetic distinction as equivalent to his pre-Critical one.    
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temporal determinations (2005: 231). But it is precisely the unity of time as something 
appearances must be consistent with that functions as the answer to the question of the 
relation between real grounds and their consequences.
187
 
   
Conclusion: ‘Original Orderability’ As Kant’s Answer to Hume   
 
Thus, Kant’s argument in the Analogies is completed. The analogies are not just 
epistemological conditions of the justification of judgements about temporal relations, 
pace Guyer, but equally they do not admit of a completely metaphysical grounding 
either; nor do they simply expound the conditions for thinking our successive stream of 
representations as representing objective succession or simultaneity, pace Allison. 
Rather, from phenomenological/epistemological conditions of the unity of 
representations in one consciousness, as rules that are operative in the very perception 
(synthesis of apprehension) of appearances, the categories ground principles (the 
analogies) under which appearances can be reflected, subsumed and recognized under in 
judgements of experience. But these principles can only apply if the objects themselves 
obey these rules. Building on his earlier work that was concerned with the relationship 
between grounds and determinations, Kant turns to the unity of time as something 
represented in a priori intuition and attempts to demonstrate that being an object of 
experience requires conforming to this unity. Having taken his arguments to have 
proved this conformity, Kant reasons that we can infer the real grounds of temporal 
relations – grounds that make possible things outside of thought – (the conditions of the 
objects of experience) from the ideal grounds of cognition (the conditions of 
experience). 
Notice, however, that if we ignore the role that the (relational) categories play in 
the synthesis of apprehension then it becomes difficult to see how Kant can achieve this 
result and refute Hume. Rather, it looks as if Kant cannot directly refute Hume at all 
since they presuppose such radically different metaphysics of nature.
188
 But if the 
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 Time as an a priori intuition is what makes up for the lack of analytic connections for real grounds. 
Longuenesse argues that no state/object would be individuated in time unless the rules for correlating 
things in time were always true. Like me, she sees this not as expounding a purely epistemic condition for 
knowledge of temporal relations but as being an ontological principle true of the objects themselves (as 
appearances) in order for them to be things ‘endowed with recognizable properties, and individuated in 
space and time’ (2005: 174).  
188
 This is precisely Watkins’ conclusion. He rejects the kind of phenomenological account that 
Longuenesse and I focus on as placing too much emphasis on the ‘subjective’ aspect of the Deduction, 
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account presented here is on the right lines then Kant does have an answer to Hume: the 
concept of causality plays a role in the mere perception (synthesis of apprehension) of 
an event – and Hume does not doubt that he has perceptions – but if Kant is right then 
the only way the concept can play this role is if the conditions of experience are the 
conditions of the objects of experience. That is, the role that Kant identifies in the 
Deduction is taken for granted by Hume and is subsequently demonstrated to have as its 
condition the conformity of the objects themselves to the unity of time; a conformity 
which consists in the objects of our experience actually being causally efficacious 
substances. Crucially, it is the ‘subjective’ side of Kant’s project that undermines 
Hume’s sceptical doubts and serves as the first step towards validating the categories as 
being ‘able to represent necessary connections in nature’, as Watkins puts it, but without 
that first step Kant cannot show that our concepts enable our cognitive access to 
reality.
189
 While Hume does not doubt the indispensability of the concept, he does seem 
to take it to be a practical issue only, whereas as Kant argues that without this concept 
(and its counterparts) we would not even have perceptions, let alone empirical 
knowledge of Hume’s matters of fact. But this role in perception itself turns on reality, 
at least at the level of ordinary experience and macroscopic objects, being accurately 
characterized by these concepts. By appealing to the nature of time, as something that is 
given to us as an a priori intuition, Kant argues that because time itself is not a direct 
object of perception external objects must possess certain features if they are to be 
consistent with the unity of time and representable in time as our a priori form of 
intuition. Under the methodological assumption of the ‘Copernican turn’, Kant 
demonstrates that the conditions of experience, e.g., presupposing that a change of state 
follows in accordance with a rule, truly are conditions of the objects of experience as 
well, i.e., that in order to be experienced the states of an object really must follow in 
accordance with a rule. Thus the ‘subjective’, epistemological, side of Kant’s account – 
and all the different acts of synthesis that it encompasses – turns out to be an 
                                                                                                                                               
and thereby leaving no distinct work for the ‘objective’ aspect. But he then later concludes that there is no 
feature in Kant’s account of causality that Hume takes for granted, no neutral philosophical ground 
between them, and so Kant cannot directly refute Hume. See Watkins (2005: 198) for his rejection of the 
phenomenological interpretation and (2005: 373-389, esp. 386) for Kant’s reply to Hume.  
189
 Watkins claims that the categories can only pick out necessary connections in nature if there are such 
connections to pick out (2005: 406), but as we have seen, the objective validity of the categories consists 
in guiding the unification of representations under the unity of apperception. Their validity consists in 
being concepts of an object in general, necessary for taking a manifold as constituting an objective unity 
under apperception. Their reality is grounded on their validity, insofar as their validity serves as the ratio 
cognoscendi or ‘ideal ground’ of their reality.  
  
120 
 
indispensable clue to legitimating the ‘objective’, metaphysical, side of the account. We 
can only form judgements of experience if our apprehension is already guided towards 
the possibility of forming such judgements by ‘rules of apprehension’. But, in turn, due 
to the nature of time as we generate and represent it in figurative synthesis, the objects 
of our experience can be known to obey the presuppositions implicitly made in the mere 
apprehension of appearances. In short, the categories are both objectively valid, as 
conditions of the thought of objects, and objectively real, as accurate characterizations 
of what mind-independent empirical reality must be like to conform to our forms of 
intuition. Of course, this does not mean that we are guaranteed to make correct 
judgements, for this is a matter of repeated scientific observation and discovery, but it 
does justify our search for laws at the empirical level, because such uniformity of nature 
is a condition of our very ability to engage in those practices in the first place. In brief, 
this is Kant’s empirical realism. Through the transcendental ideality of space and time 
we can know that the objects of our ordinary experience are causally efficacious 
(relatively) enduring substances. Mind-independent reality exists, and we have access to 
some of its structural features a priori in virtue of forms of intuition, which only 
represent objects when the manifold in them is brought to the unity of apperception.  
But there is a problem that must have occurred to any reader remotely familiar 
with Kant. Kant famously denies that we can cognize things as they are in themselves, 
yet the position I have ascribed to him seems surprisingly realist. It may appear that I 
am claiming that on Kant’s account the Analogies of Experience reveal fundamental 
ontological principles that hold of things as they are in themselves, but this is not the 
case. Even if I am not ascribing knowledge of things in themselves to Kant’s account, it 
could still be argued that my Kant is far too metaphysical to be the ‘real’ Kant. After all, 
this is the philosopher who claimed to have ended the appeal and grounds for dogmatic 
metaphysics, who took away the metaphysician’s right to ratiocinate concerning 
transcendent reality, and concluded that reason’s only genuinely legitimate use is in the 
practical domain.
190
 These are two important objections and if either goes through then 
the account of Kant I have given can hardly be called Kantian, not even in spirit. In the 
next Chapter I address both concerns and show that Kant can affirm both the form of 
empirical realism I have outlined and maintain his epistemic humility concerning things 
in themselves.  
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 For a clear statement to this effect see Pro (4: 278). Kant develops his account of practical reason at 
great length in both Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals and Critique of Practical Reason.  
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3. Kant’s Metaphysics and Epistemic Humility 
 
Introduction  
 
 I have argued that Kant’s transcendental idealism should be understood in 
relation to his claim that it is a form of empirical realism. In Chapter 1 I argued that 
Kant seeks to establish the legitimacy of the categories by demonstrating that they have 
objective validity, as the conditions of thought in a possible experience, and that he 
makes a step towards proving their objective reality by linking them to the synthesis of 
apprehension, responsible for our perception of objects. In Chapter 2 I argued that Kant 
completes this proof by establishing that the world of experience must be subject to the 
categories in order for us to determine temporal relations between objects of experience 
(as well as of objects to ourselves). I concluded that the categories are not just epistemic 
conditions of the cognition of temporal relations, or rules for thinking of determinate 
temporal relations, but that they actually characterize the objects of experience 
themselves insofar as these must exhibit certain formal features that make possible their 
unification in one time. Kant’s proof of the categories as conditions of the objects of 
experience rests on his thesis of the ideality of space and time, for without this ideality it 
could not be established a priori that the world of experience must be subject to certain 
rules. I suggested that this accounts for one link between his realism and idealism. Kant 
can hold empirical realism (that the categories necessarily apply to the objects of 
possible experience) only because of his transcendental idealism. However, these claims 
may be thought to be in severe tension with other aspects of Kant’s account. First, it 
may seem that I have made a pre-Kantian metaphysician out of the philosopher who 
was once described as taking an ‘executioner’s sword’ to metaphysics.191 Kant is 
famous for claiming that metaphysics, as it had been practiced up to the Critique, is 
impossible. After all, he asserts that ontology must ‘give way to the modest [name] of a 
mere analytic of the understanding’ (A247/B303). He has, to this end, often been 
construed as doing away with metaphysics, even to the point of making transcendental 
philosophy nothing over and above an analysis of the necessary conditions of the 
possibility of experience, where these conditions are taken in a methodological non-
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 Heinrich Heine, cited in Altman (2008: 28).  
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metaphysical or even anti-metaphysical sense.
192
 Second, related to this first objection is 
the perhaps more serious concern that Kant, as I have presented him, ends up violating 
his own critical strictures that we do not and cannot know things in themselves. If 
Kant’s analogies are ontological principles such principles may be thought to provide us 
knowledge of things as they are in themselves, but this thought is clearly contradicted 
by the text. These are two serious objections and it is the concern of the present Chapter 
to answer them. In the process, we will get clearer about the complicated relationship 
between Kant’s idealism and realism.  
 In Section 1 I explain why Kant’s transcendental idealism should still be 
considered a metaphysical position, even though he does criticize traditional 
metaphysics. I argue against the idea that Kant rejects metaphysics of any kind. I 
demonstrate that Kant’s epistemic humility concerns the illegitimacy of the method of 
metaphysics and does not constitute an outright denial of all metaphysical claims. I term 
anti-metaphysical readings of transcendental idealism ‘formalist’ due to the way that the 
categories and principles are taken to be formal conditions of experience. I examine the 
account of Melnick (1973) as representative of this general position and explore some 
aspects of the larger view. I will suggest that the formalist approach can make good 
sense of the objective legitimacy of space and time (as forms of intuition), but that it 
runs into serious difficulties by trying to make sense of the legitimacy of the categories 
using the same model. It is here that we will revisit the status of space and time as 
empirically real vis-a-vis the categories as empirically real. We will further clarify our 
understanding of the relationship between the ideality and empirical reality of space and 
time by distinguishing between the related (but separate) contributions of the ideality of 
space and time to Kant’s overall realism. It will be argued that in the Analogies, it is 
primarily the ideality of time that is responsible for grounding Kant’s empirical realism 
with respect to the categories, but it will be shown that the ideality of space plays an 
additional role in grounding Kant’s realism. In Section 2 I turn to the second objection, 
viz., that taking the analogies to be ontological principles implies that we have 
knowledge of things in themselves, which would be obviously inconsistent with Kant’s 
frequent limitation of human knowledge to appearances. I draw out a sense of the 
transcendental distinction that allows for the ascription of ontological principles to the 
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 By ‘metaphysics’, I mean a concern with the ‘nature of reality’, rather than just a philosophical non-
empirical form of reflection. Clearly, Kant remains committed to the necessity of the latter (Gardner 
2015, 2), but whether he is committed to (a form of) the former is controversial.   
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objects of possible experience in a way that does not contradict Kant’s limitation of 
knowledge to appearances. This second sense takes ‘appearances’ to be objects as 
determined through the understanding as limited to the sensible conditions of its 
application, and ‘things in themselves’ to be noumena or putative objects of a pure 
understanding; I find this sense operative in the Amphiboly in the Critique, and I 
accordingly analyse Kant’s argument both to define this second sense of the distinction 
and to substantiate my rejection of metaphysical ‘one world’ readings that maintain that, 
by denying us knowledge of things in themselves, Kant is denying that we can know the 
intrinsic natures of things.
193
 By the end of the Chapter, we will be a position to 
examine the third sense of the transcendental distinction, and to complete the account of 
Kant’s idealism as empirical realism.  
 
1. Transcendental Idealism and Metaphysics 
 
1.1. The Role of the ‘Copernican’ Turn 
 
 It is undeniable that Kant’s project in the Critique has huge implications for 
metaphysics. Indeed, in the second edition preface (1787), following the line of the 
Prolegomena (1783), Kant makes explicit that he is concerned with examining the very 
possibility of metaphysics as a science. Central to Kant’s ‘Critical’ philosophy is the 
notion of the ‘Copernican revolution’, or as it is sometimes called, the ‘transcendental 
turn’.194 The famous passage in which Kant compares his investigation with Nicholas 
Copernicus’ famous hypothesis admits of multiple interpretations, but one fairly 
common reading of the turn takes it to prescribe that philosophy must put aside the first-
order investigation into the properties of things in favour of a second-order investigation 
into the conditions of the possibility of our knowledge of things. As Allison puts it 
during an explanation of Kant’s conception of an ‘object’: ‘first-order talk about objects 
is replaced by second-order talk about the concept of an object and the conditions of the 
representation of an object’ (2004: 175). Similarly, Gardner claims that one important 
aspect of the revolution is the turn towards epistemology over metaphysics, but that the 
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 See Section 1 of my Introduction for the three ways Kant uses the appearances/things in themselves 
distinction, and the Appendix for my general analysis of ‘one world’ metaphysical readings. I discuss the 
phenomenalist account of the distinction again in Chapter 4, in relation to the mathematical antinomies.  
194
 See Gardner (2015).  
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revolution also entails rethinking the basic framework of epistemology as well (1999: 
40).
195
 In other words, both these components of the ‘turn’ point towards it being 
intended more as a metaphilosophical strategy, rather than being a straightforward 
metaphysical thesis about the nature of reality. As Gardner is quick to point out, 
however, Kant emphasizes that the arguments of the Critique do not just assume the 
methodological hypothesis of the revolution, but are rather intended to prove the 
apodictic certainty of the hypothesis (Bxxiin; 1999: 47).  
The hypothesis is the idea that we might get further with the problems of 
metaphysics by assuming that the objects of our cognition must conform to our 
conditions of cognition, rather than that our cognition must conform to the objects (in 
themselves) (Bxvi). This hypothesis breaks down into two claims. First, objects must 
conform to the constitution of our faculty of intuition; second, objects must conform to 
our conceptual conditions of cognition. Together, the two claims say that objects must 
conform to our conditions of cognition, rather than that our cognition must conform to 
the objects. A clear implication of this hypothesis is the notion that there are conditions 
of cognition in the first place, but more importantly, for Kant, investigating what these 
conditions are should tell us something a priori about the nature and scope of these 
conditions. Of course, what Kant means is very specific; not just any necessary 
condition of cognition can count as relevant, but specifically those that come from the 
nature of the cognitive subject (rather than the world) and those that place some kind of 
constraint or necessity on how we formally represent things. Kant characterizes the 
revolution as a ‘change in our way of thinking’ (Bxxiin), but this ‘change’ is clearly 
closely related to the doctrine of transcendental idealism, taken in its broadest terms, as 
the thesis that the objects of our cognition are appearances and not things in themselves. 
But all this leaves unspecified what Kant means by the hypothesis along with the status 
of these conditions and their objects (as appearances). In Chapters 1 and 2, I have given 
a detailed account of what I think it means to say that objects must conform to the 
conceptual conditions of their cognition, but here I want to say more about what it 
means for objects to conform to the conditions of their intuition, as well as to reject one 
important alternative to my account of the conceptual conditions.    
                                                 
195
 The idea that the ‘Copernican revolution’ reflects a methodological standpoint is most clearly and 
compelling expressed by Allison’s ‘deflationary’ interpretation of the revolution as advocating a shift 
from a theocentric to an anthropocentric conception of cognition and its conditions. I discuss this in detail 
in Chapter 4.  
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In Chapter 2 I argued that Kant intends the principles of the employment of the 
categories to be metaphysical principles, characterizing objects themselves (as 
appearances). To that extent, I have taken a decidedly metaphysical or ontological 
reading of the ‘Copernican revolution’; however, there is a common line of thought that 
takes the revolution to reject the very idea of metaphysics as an investigation into the 
nature of reality. Investigating the nature of reality, or metaphysics in the old sense of 
the rationalists, must be replaced by a new metaphysics. If metaphysics cannot be an 
investigation into the nature of an an sich reality – that is to say that things in 
themselves are not and cannot be the proper objects of human inquiry – then what form 
can it take? Obviously, the Kantian response is to replace the old metaphysics with 
transcendental philosophy, according to which we can specify a priori the conditions of 
the possibility of experience, but that famous claim is open to wildly different 
interpretations. There is a clear split in the literature between so-called ‘analytic’ 
interpretations, and those that include some form of idealism. Strawson’s (1966) 
interpretation embodies the analytic strategy, according to which what can be salvaged 
from the disreputable idealist metaphysics of the Critique is the notion of 
metaphysically-neutral transcendental arguments. These arguments attempt to show 
something about our conception of experience and then derive necessary 
‘transcendental’ pre-conditions of the realization of this conception.196 Of course, the 
well-documented and obvious problem with such a realist project is that it is prima facie 
very difficult – perhaps impossible – to bridge the gap between psychological 
necessities of representation and reality.
197
 By switching to some form of idealism, it at 
least becomes prima facie possible to bridge that gap, but other, equally serious 
problems, emerge. We saw in the Introduction that it is all too easy to construe Kant’s 
repeated talk of appearances being representations in a phenomenalist, even extreme 
Berkeleyan, fashion.
198
 Gardner (and to an extent, Allison) offers a position that 
removes the resemblance to Berkeley, while also dealing with the worry that Kant 
cannot get to extra-representational reality through transcendental conditions, but 
Gardner’s position exhibits a major difference to the analytic interpretation concerning 
the status of these transcendental conditions.  
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 As we saw in the previous chapter, Guyer (1987; 2007) carries on the legacy of Strawson’s approach, 
buttressed by much closer analysis of the Kantian corpus.  
197
 Stroud (1968) argues that Strawson’s attempts to employ transcendental arguments run into this 
problem.  
198
 See the Appendix for my analysis of ‘two world’ and phenomenalist interpretations. We will see this 
again in Chapter 4. 
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According to what I term the ‘formalist’ approach, these conditions are taken to 
be nothing more than subjective conditions of representing, or mere necessities of 
representing. They attach not to objects but to our mode of cognizing objects, specify 
our conceptual scheme, and establish how we must represent the world through 
transcendental functions in order to make experience possible for us.
199
 This 
interpretation takes seriously Kant’s ‘Copernican revolution’ as a shift in our way of 
thinking. The shift concerns our conception of objects, such that these objects can meet 
the conditions of their ‘epistemic seeming’, thereby removing the gap between our 
beliefs and reality by reconceiving what it means to know an ‘object’ in the first place, 
or what it means for something (e.g., causally-ordered experience) to be a 
transcendental condition. We constitute objects through these conditions such that we 
can know them. The basic idea is expressed forcefully by Gardner: ‘the existence of X 
can be inferred from the necessity of our representing X, because X is something whose 
very existence is a function of such necessities (crudely: it exists because we make it, 
and we make it because we need it)’ (1999: 186). Such an argument is unlikely to 
impress a sceptic who wants to know whether the world really contains the condition 
(e.g., is causally ordered), but Gardner takes Kant to be undermining the epistemic 
framework from which scepticism gets its traction (2015: 5-6). If we conceive of an 
object as something that exists with its intrinsic constitution independently of our 
cognition of it – reality in the strong sense – then the sceptic’s objections hit their target, 
but if we accept a weaker sense of reality – reality insofar as it necessarily conforms to 
our conditions of cognizing it – then the sceptical challenge can be answered. This is 
what Gardner (and to an extent, Allison) takes Kant’s notion of ‘appearances’ to mean: 
they are objects conceived as meeting the conditions of their ‘epistemic seeming’ (ibid), 
objects as they are constituted by the cognitive subject, rather than objects as they are in 
themselves (1999: 41, 122). While this way of understanding the status of objects as 
‘appearances’ does, prima facie, avoid the pitfall of equating transcendental idealism 
with a more sophisticated form of Berkeleyan idealism, it is not clear, as Gardner 
concedes, that no strong idealist story is required at some point to deliver on the 
necessary conformity of appearances to transcendental conditions by showing how the 
mind can impose conceptual form on objects (2015: 7). Of course, it is also always open 
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 This way of stating the position deliberately echoes Kant’s definition of the ‘transcendental’ at B25: ‘I 
call all cognition transcendental that is occupied not so much with objects but rather with our mode of 
cognition of objects insofar as this is to be possible a priori.’  
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to the realist to dig in their heels and maintain that knowledge is only knowledge when 
it is of how things are in some (suitably qualified) sense independently of the mind.
200
 
Admittedly, the transcendental idealist could respond by pointing out that because of 
our cognitive capacities we will always represent objects in terms of x, whether or not x 
actually holds of things in themselves; furthermore, even if x does pertain to things in 
themselves, this is not the reason that we represent the world in terms of x, so how 
matters stand with things in themselves drops out of the relationship between mind and 
world as cognitively irrelevant (2015: 6).
201
 Still, it could reasonably be objected to this 
that the transcendental idealist is not answering the sceptic’s challenge so much as 
moving the goalposts in an equally dogmatic manner.
202
 One way out of this impasse 
would be to show that x (whatever x is) is not only existentially tied to the function of 
representational necessities but is and can be nothing more than this. If this could be 
successfully demonstrated then transcendental idealism can not only answer the 
sceptical challenge to x, by showing that x’s legitimacy does not consist in its being 
mind-independently real, but also reveal something genuinely substantial and 
philosophically interesting about the nature of x. I think it can be successfully shown 
that Kant does adopt this strategy with respect to the justification of space and time as 
being empirically real while transcendentally ideal, but that we cannot straightforwardly 
apply this model to the legitimacy of the categories, at least not to the relational 
categories. To illustrate why this is the case I will analyse the account of Melnick 
(1973; 2006) that exemplifies this ‘formalist’ approach.     
Melnick takes a purely formal reading of the categories. According to his 
interpretation, the categories as pure concepts do not pick out features of the world that 
it can be said to either possess or lack (2006: 225-226; 1973: 158-159). The categories 
do not apply to objects in this way. Rather, the categories serve as concepts that make 
possible an ‘epistemic link’ between the logical forms of judgement – our means for 
connecting representations – and the data given through sensibility (1973: 41-42, 52-
53). They set up an ontology that allows for judgements to relate to objects in the first 
place, for a cognitive relation to exist between mind and world. This agrees with the 
idea that the ‘Copernican revolution’ involves a conscious shift away from determining 
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 See Prichard (1909) who takes Kant’s account of knowledge to simply fail to satisfy what is normally 
meant by ‘knowledge’.  
201
 As Kant puts it at one point: ‘what the things may be in themselves I do not know, and also do not 
need to know, since a thing can never come before me except in appearance’ (A277/B332-333).  
202
 Gardner discusses this concern (2015: 14-16).  
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the nature of mind-independent reality to specifying the formal conditions of the 
possibility of experience, by showing that certain intuitional forms and conceptual 
conditions play the role of transcendental functions in constituting experience. A 
transcendental condition is not such a condition because it is indispensable, but because 
it is a formal condition: 
 
i.e., its being not a feature of the world itself that we require in order to relate 
to the world but rather a feature that makes sense only in terms of (or is 
introduced by) that relation. […] The world itself being composed of objects is 
nonsense, for the world being composed of objects is just our relating to 
experience cognitively (judgmentally). It makes no sense to say that a formal 
element may not, after all, really obtain or be found in the world itself as if it 
ought to be, as if unless it were we would be dealing merely with our own 
chimeras. One cannot object that we ought not relate to the world as being 
composed of objects unless our so relating corresponds to the world itself really 
being composed of objects, or that we may relate to the world as composed of 
objects yet this may not be the way it really is, for our relating to the world 
cognitively is identical to its being composed of objects. There is no feature of 
the world itself that is the basis of our relating to it in a formal way; our relating 
to it in this way is precisely what it means for the world to have this feature. […] 
We must conceptualize in terms of causal connections, but still are causal 
connections really to be found in the world? Does our conceptualization 
correspond to the world itself? To understand the formal nature of causality is to 
understand the nonsense of this question. The element of necessity that is 
involved in the notion of a causal connection is our use of the hypothetical 
judgment counterfactually in relation to time-determination. (1973, 158-159; 
Melnick’s emphasis)  
 
On this account, the categories do not pick out features of the world itself; their 
applicability consists in allowing us to relate cognitively to experience, that is, making 
judgements about the objects of experience with an aim to cognition.
203
 Of course, it is 
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 See also Ernst Cassirer’s interpretation, an example of which is cited in Gardner (2015: 9). Cassirer 
takes the transcendental method not to concern things but the validity of truth, by asking not what things 
are or are not, but what judgements precede all others.  
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incontestable that the categories play the epistemic role that Melnick identifies;
204
 
indeed, this just is what I have examined at length in Chapter 1 as the objective validity 
of the categories, but even so, it is still deeply misleading to suggest that their entire 
legitimacy is exhausted by their objective validity. Melnick goes as far as to claim that 
it is ‘nonsense’ to ask whether causal connections are in the world, or whether the world 
is composed of objects. Yet, I take it that Kant does not think it is nonsense to ask 
whether the world contains causal connections or causal unity, otherwise he would not 
spend so much time and effort delving into the issue, as we saw in Chapter 2. 
Sometimes Melnick seems to be aware of this and asserts that time-determination 
requires that the objects themselves be subject to rules that allow for the determination 
of states and events in time. For objects to be subject to such rules just means that the 
objects must be determinable in time in virtue of certain features that those objects 
(appearances) must have. For example:  
 
We require a means of concluding from features of events or states of affairs to 
their temporal ordering; i.e., we require rules that license inferences (“inference 
tickets” in Ryle’s terminology) from features of events or states of affairs to 
temporal ordering. But the notion of a rule that licenses such inferences is 
precisely the core of the notion of a causal law. The transition from (i) time-
determination must be based on features of appearances, to (ii) time-
determination requires causal laws, is, for Kant, an obvious transition, for a 
causal law is precisely a rule that allows us, on the basis of features of 
appearances, to conclude to a certain temporal ordering of appearances. (1973: 
91; Melnick’s emphasis)  
 
Melnick claims that Kant is not open to the objections that Stroud (1968: 254-257) 
famously makes because causality is a formal concept. If the concept picked out a 
feature of things that is required as a condition of experience, or of us relating to 
experience, then ‘transcendental idealism is a sham’ because our requiring x to obtain 
would not guarantee that x does actually obtain. Stroud’s objections in this case hit their 
target. However, because the concept is formal there is nothing more to x really 
obtaining than us relating to the world in just this way (Melnick 1973, 157-158; 2006: 
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 See Melnick (1973: 144-151, esp. 147) for the role that the categories play in the unity of 
apperception.  
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225-226). Similarly, Gardner maintains that the task of demonstrating the validity of 
pure concepts does not involve showing that there are extra-representational features of 
the world that these concepts identify, but rather that the concepts play a transcendental 
function in giving us a world in the first place; they constitute ‘the initial conceptual 
form of the given’, and ‘not inferences about reality that may be made on the basis of it’ 
(1999: 178).  
 If the formalist position is right, then Kant does have an answer to the Humean 
sceptic, but it is one that is very weak and unlikely to persuade such a sceptic. In a 
nutshell, the transcendental idealist is telling the Humean that his questions are the 
wrong ones. It does not matter whether the world actually contains necessary 
connections, substances, etc., so long as these are features of our conceptual scheme, 
this is how we will relate to experience and the world, and, on the strongest form of this 
position, there is no way that such features could belong to the world itself since they 
are nothing more than our relating to experience in this way. As Gardner points out, to 
defeat the transcendental idealist, it is incumbent on the opponent to show that other 
concepts can play the role of constitutive transcendental functions, or that the categories 
fail to cohere with the overall transcendental theory of experience (1999: 179). While I 
agree that the categories are transcendental functions, in the sense of constituting the 
relation of representations to an object in general as I argued in Chapter 1, I think this 
position comes with serious exegetical and philosophical costs that are not outweighed 
by the supposed benefits. I will make a few points against the position before moving 
on to explain my alternative.    
First, we saw above that Melnick claimed that the formal status of the 
transcendental conditions is what allows them to survive Stroud’s objections. Prima 
facie, this is right. If x is not the kind of thing that can be said to be either in or not in 
the world, then it makes no sense to object against the condition that it is not in the 
world, or that the world only contingently satisfies the condition, etc. However, this 
may be too quick. Transcendental idealism is often (unhelpfully, in my view) compared 
to a set of glasses that we cannot take off: everything we see is ‘coloured’ by these 
glasses.
205
 In this case the glasses of spatiotemporal and conceptual form. Since we are 
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 See Gardner (1999: 91-92) and Altman (2008: 111) for useful discussions of the ‘glasses analogy’. 
Gardner focuses on space and time and Altman on the categories; both reject the appropriateness of the 
analogy as a reading of transcendental idealism.  
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currently concerned with the conceptual conditions let us examine this form using the 
concepts of causality and substance.  
While it may be the case that the objective validity of these concepts entails 
nothing more than their playing the role of transcendental functions in making 
experience possible – in this sense, they cannot be features of the world itself – it does 
not follow that there is no sense in which they can be said to hold of the world itself. 
This important point can be brought out by contrasting these two categorial components 
of the concept of an object in general with the concept of an object in general itself. 
Melnick claims that asking whether the world is composed of objects is nonsense, and 
here we can, I think, agree with him provided that this is understood correctly. For Kant, 
we saw in Chapter 1, the notion of an ‘object’ consists in thinking of the manifold of 
intuition as united in a concept (of an object in general), and that it is the role of the 
categories to establish this relation between representations and their ‘object’ that they 
are putatively representations of (B137). To this end, in this specific Kantian technical 
sense of the term, there can be no ‘objects’ in the world itself, for the representation of 
the world as dividing up into ‘objects’ requires reference to a cognitive subject. This 
does not mean, of course, that there is no mind-independent reality or existence of 
things, but that the representation of this reality as being of objects does not exist 
independently of cognition. Does this same logic hold for the concepts of causality and 
substance? I do not think so.  
Representing things as objects does not require mind-independent reality to do 
anything, other than to affect the mind (in some sense) to provide sensory 
representations to the mind.
206
 However, with the concept of causality, it is not enough 
that I relate to appearances through a counterfactual employment of the hypothetical 
form of judgement, but that the things that I identify (or in Gardner’s sense, constitute) 
must actually do something. Specifically, against Leibniz, Kant holds that mind-
independent substances must causally affect each other (and us); substances must 
interact with one another (and us). So while it is the case that the formalist 
commentators could say that the concepts of cause and substance are nothing other than 
modes of judging things as determined in time (means of time-determination), the 
successful application of these forms of judgment to experience requires reality to do 
something, for something to be the case that is not up to me (qua constituting subject), 
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 This is true of any representation of objects, notwithstanding the notorious ‘problem of affection’, 
which I do not intend to engage with here.  
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but is up to the world itself. Now, granted, to this it could be objected that things 
causally affecting each other is a projection of the mind, a mind-dependent connection 
between (in themselves) disconnected events (or, at least, if there is a connection then 
we cannot perceive it), but if this strategy is pursued then the realist concern regains its 
force. To say that we project connections onto the world that the world does not have 
(in itself) is just to say that our representations fail to grasp reality, or ‘colour’ it with 
features that it does not possess independently of the mind. This leads back to Hume’s 
sceptical conclusion that the concept is one based on habit and custom, and not on 
rational insight into the world, albeit with the additional point that without making use 
of this concept we could not have experience at all. But even with that additional 
‘transcendental’ aspect to the concept, it remains the case that the formalist model could 
only ever say that we must treat reality as if it contained (relatively/absolutely) 
permanent substances, necessary real physical causal connections, and universal 
interaction, but never that the world actually does (or can) contain these features.
207
 In 
terms of the argument of this thesis, the relational categories would contain objective 
validity but no objective reality. It might be the case that pure concepts are the kind of 
things that we cannot say that either they do or do not apply to reality (in itself), but on 
this position we nonetheless project through them the notion that reality does contain 
such features, even though we (Kantians) know that it does not. As such, Kant would be 
open once more to the charge that his transcendental idealism degrades reality, so that 
we can say only that we know how things must seem to us because our minds impose 
such forms on reality and never how they really are, because these forms distort our 
representation of reality.
208
 It is no help to appeal to the ‘object-enabling’ features of 
these conditions because it remains the case that we project features onto reality that 
reality cannot really have. At best, transcendental idealism becomes a theory about how 
we must think (i.e., a set of subjective necessities of representation) and not a theory 
about the conditions under which thought and cognition can represent an objective 
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 See Allais (2015: 49) who denies that Kant argues that we must treat our perceptions as if they contain 
substances, causes, etc. I agree.  Nonetheless, the interpretation is not groundless and Kant was clearly 
tempted by a position like this. For example: ‘We do not have sensations of outer substances (only of 
their outer effects on us), rather we add them to sensations in thought. But only in relation to the 
affections of our mind; thus not as what they are in themselves, but as that which is permanent in 
appearance’ (R5358, 18: 160, 1776-1778; my emphasis). 
208
 Of course, this will not be an effective argument against those who do read Kant’s idealism in this 
way, but it should be a serious cause for concern for those who take seriously Kant’s denial that the 
distinction between appearances and things in themselves is one between illusion and reality (B69).  
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world (i.e., a set of objective necessities).
209
 Kant explicitly denies that his account of 
the categories reduces them to subjective necessities, which leads to my second point: 
the formalist account is exegetically flawed.  
Kant explicitly rejects the idea that the categories represent only subjective 
necessities. In contrasting his position with the alternatives of Humean empiricism and 
pre-established harmony/pre-formation, Kant writes that, on the assumption of these 
other accounts ‘I would not be able to say that the effect is combined with the cause in 
the object (i.e., necessarily), but only that I am so constituted that I cannot think of this 
representation otherwise than as so connected’ (B168). Kant does not want to say 
merely that we judge of things in a certain way because of the way our minds are 
constituted, but that effects really are necessarily connected with their causes, etc., in 
the objects of experience. Although Melnick cites B168 as evidence that the categories 
are not just indispensable postulates of thought (1973: 158), it is very hard to see how 
they can be anything other than exactly just this on his account.
210
 Presumably, Melnick 
thinks they are more than this because of the formal status of these conditions: there 
cannot be any question about whether they really obtain because they cannot fail to 
obtain, given their formal status. As I suggested above, however, this reeks of a merely 
verbal victory over the sceptic, and it also transforms Kant’s principle that the 
conditions of possible experience are equivalent to the conditions of the possibility of 
the objects of experience into vacuous babble. Also, just as Kant criticized Hume for 
dropping the notion of ‘necessary connection’ from his conception of causality (B5), so 
too could we accuse Kant of dropping the notion of ‘connection between objects’ from 
his conception, in favour of a conception where the concept is nothing more than a rule-
governed synthesis of representations in consciousness.
211
 Kant does not present his 
account in this way. Kant does not present the analogies overall as if they specified 
merely how we must treat our perceptions; he presents them as metaphysical principles 
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 See Kitcher (1990: 1; 2011: 218) who holds that ‘we can do no other’ than apply the categories and 
that this is Kant’s answer to the quid juris. See Shaddock (2015: 267-269) for discussion. Shaddock 
rightly rejects interpretations like Kitcher’s as subjectivist, holding only that the categories are 
subjectively necessary. He argues that Allison’s (2004) account, despite rejecting subjectivism, is also 
subjectivist by Kant’s standards insofar as Allison relativizes the concept of an object to its necessary 
epistemic conditions (2015: 70-71; Allison 2004, 12), but I am unconvinced this is right, since Shaddock 
neglects Allison’s position that Kant rejects a theocentric conception of cognition and its norms. See 
Chapter 4. 
210
 Interestingly, Kant does characterize the categories as practical postulates of thought for the use of the 
understanding in R6109 (18: 457, 1783-1784), though I take him to mean by this merely that they have a 
restricted conditional application only to possible objects of experience, which is what he affirms in the 
passage.  
211
 See also A91-92/B123-124 and B168. 
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about the actual nature of the objects of experience. The first analogy is: ‘All 
appearances contain that which persists (substance) as the object itself (my emphasis), 
and that which can change as its mere determination, i.e., a way in which the object 
exists’ (A182). The second analogy is: ‘All alterations occur in accordance with the law 
of connection of cause and effect’ (B231); and the third analogy: ‘All substances, 
insofar as they are simultaneous, stand in thoroughgoing community (i.e., interaction 
with one another)’ (A211). The principles unambiguously assert that they hold of the 
actual objects of experience, and not the comparatively weaker claim that we must 
regard the objects of our perception as if they behave in certain ways (as substances, 
causes, etc.,).
212
 Granted, Kant is much more hesitant in the Prolegomena (§26) to say 
that the principles hold of objects. Indeed, in addition to affirming (as expected) that 
they do not hold of things in themselves, he is unwilling to state that they even hold of 
appearances, because technically they hold only of our cognition of things as 
appearances, which might be thought to support the formalist position (Pro, 4: 309-310). 
However, closer inspection of the text shows that the natural reading of this section is 
that Kant is explaining the mode of proof of the principles, and insofar as this turns on 
the possibility of experience rather than the dogmatic method of rationalist 
metaphysics,
213
 he is quite correct to say that the principles hold directly only in relation 
to the possibility of experience, rather than directly of appearances. At any rate, the 
Critique (especially the B-edition) must surely take interpretative precedence over the 
Prolegomena, and while there are passages that could be thought to support the 
formalist reading of the categories, on balance the Critique affirms the metaphysical 
interpretation.  
My final point is that the formalist approach makes it very hard to see what the 
difference is between so-called ‘constitutive’ and ‘regulative’ principles. The former are 
constitutive because they are transcendental conditions of the possibility of experience 
that have been legitimated through a transcendental deduction; they are the principles of 
the Aesthetic and Analytic. However, the latter are also afforded transcendental status 
by Kant, but he denies that they have objective validity, or claims that if they do, then 
they have only ‘indeterminate’ validity and cannot receive a transcendental deduction 
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 The text of the Third Analogy, in particular, contains many more examples. See A211-215/B257-262.  
213
 I expand on the method of traditional metaphysics below.  
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(A663-664/B691-692, A669-670/B697-698).
214
 Although there is much dispute in the 
literature over the consistency and cogency of Kant’s account of ‘regulative’ principles, 
it is clear that he feels the need to draw a distinction between them and the principles of 
pure understanding; this is very hard to make sense of on the formalist account if Kant’s 
claim that the regulative principles are also transcendental is taken seriously.
215
 The 
constitutive principles have more than a merely ‘as-if’ application, but this is exactly 
how Kant characterizes the regulative principles of reason and their application to 
experience.
216
 However, I want to make it clear that I reject the formalist position only 
in relation to the categories and principles of understanding; I think the position 
accurately models Kant’s account of the forms of intuition, but it is precisely the 
significant difference between the forms of intuition and the forms of thought that 
necessitates the need for the much lengthier deduction of the latter.
217
 To see this, let us 
revisit and expand on Kant’s thesis that space and time are transcendentally ideal.  
By the transcendental ideality of space and time, I am referring to how space and 
time, for Kant, are only the forms of appearances and not features of things in 
themselves. They do not pertain to or describe things in themselves, nor are they to be 
understood as being themselves entities, properties or relations between things 
(A26/B32, A32-33/B49). I agree with Allison that space and time are not to be 
understood ontologically, but epistemologically (2012: 72). This means that space and 
time are forms for intuiting objects, forms of representing; or, as Gardner puts it, ways 
that objects are ‘brought to appear’ (1999: 109). They are forms of intuition which, on 
my account, as the forms of empirical objects are generated through figurative 
synthesis, an act of the mind that produces space and time as formal representations 
through its own activity of self-affection (B67-68). Allison claims that Kant’s chief 
move is to ‘deontologize’ space and time, by viewing them as subjective conditions of 
cognition, rather than an sich realities of any sort (2004: 121, 132). This is right, to an 
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 That said, Kant does label the dynamical principles as being regulative, but this is not in the same 
sense as in the Transcendental Dialectic. Kant distinguishes between the dynamical principles as 
‘regulative principles of intuition’ that are constitutive of experience and regulative principles of reason 
that are not (A664/B692). See A178/B221 and A180/B223 for the distinction between constitutive and 
regulative principles of the understanding.  
215
 See Guyer (2005), Buchdahl (1969; 1974) and Allison (2004: Ch. 15).   
216
 For examples, see A616-617/B644-645, A619/B647, A643-645/B671-673, A670-671/B698-699, 
A685/B713 and A686/B715. 
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 This is explicitly denied by Melnick, who maintains that the objective validity of the categories should 
be understood on the same model as that of space and time; more precisely, that the idea that space and 
time do not apply to things in themselves should be understood in light of how the categories, as formal 
conditions, do not apply to things in themselves (1973: 139).  
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extent. Yes, it is the case that space and time are viewed by Kant as forms of 
representing or perception and, as such, their phenomenological character cannot be 
carried over to things in themselves, nor can the latter share a qualitatively identical 
form with appearances, but it does not follow that Kant is not interested in the kind of 
reality that space and time have. In fact, the reverse is the case: it is because space and 
time are only real as forms of bringing appearances to appear, that is, understood in 
terms of their epistemic functions, that Kant can block the (otherwise obvious) objection 
that these forms distort the mind’s representation of reality (in itself).218 Space and time 
being real, on Kant’s account, just means that things can be represented to 
consciousness through these forms: they are real as forms of intuition/pure intuitions. 
As phenomenological, pre-conceptual forms of awareness, space and time cannot be 
said to have any other kind of reality. Put bluntly: the (transcendental) ideality of space 
and time just is the (empirical) reality of space and time.  
To say that empirical objects really are in space and time – i.e., that the objects 
of our experience are spatiotemporal, or that space and time are objectively valid – is 
just to say that these objects can be represented spatiotemporally. But since space and 
time are nothing more than forms of representing objects in (pure and empirical) 
intuition, then there is nothing more to objects being in space and time than their being 
represented as being in space and time (B41; A35-36/B52; esp. A374n-375n). It is easy 
to see that space and time can be treated formally in this way precisely because they 
have been deflated or ‘deontologized’ from being substances or properties to being 
sources of cognition, but it remains an ontological thesis. Space and time apply only to 
appearances because the only objects that we can perceive are those that affect us; but 
the form that affection takes is already ‘in us’ (in the transcendental sense).219 Thus, 
space and time can be said to hold only of appearances because things in themselves are 
things conceived, or thought, independently of the sensible conditions of experience. 
Since objects are in space and time only in virtue of the relationship they have to the 
mind in experience, then Kant can maintain both his empirical realism and 
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 An objection which once again brings to mind the idea of the distorting glasses that we can never 
remove. Allison is emphatic that the ideality of space and time does not threaten their empirical reality 
(2004: 121), but I suggest that the only way for this claim to hold is that we accept that Kant’s is an 
ontological thesis about the real nature of space and time. Of course, this has not stopped Kant’s critics 
from attributing to him an appearance/reality distinction.  
219
 Kant distinguishes between transcendental and empirical senses of ‘in us’ and ‘outside us’ at A373. 
Something exists outside us transcendentally when it is a thing that ‘exists distinct from us’, and a thing is 
‘outside us’ empirically when it is a thing that is to be encountered in space. Something is ‘in us’ 
empirically when it is an object of inner sense (time). I discuss this distinction further in the Appendix.  
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transcendental idealism in relation to space and time precisely (and only) because of 
their formal nature. There is no gap, then, between the objective validity of the forms of 
intuition, as conditions of cognition, and their objective reality, because there is nothing 
more that the forms of intuition as such forms must do, or conditions that they must 
meet, other than making possible the representation of things in intuition. Nonetheless, 
this is not the whole story, for as we saw back in the Introduction to this thesis, there 
remains an explanatory gap in the current account: if space and time are just subjective 
sensible conditions of human experience what separates (in principle) those things or 
aspects of reality that can appear and those that ostensibly cannot?  
Because of the analysis given in Chapter 2, we can now fill that gap and say that 
only because the things which can be given to us in space and time have, in themselves 
(as appearances), certain ontological (but not directly perceivable) features, i.e., they are 
causally efficacious substances, that it is possible for these very things to be objects of 
our spatiotemporal intuition. That is to say, space and time are empirically real, or really 
apply to things that can be given in our forms of intuition, because those things meet the 
conditions for their representation under the unity of apperception: all appearances must 
be orderable in one space and one time. Since representing appearances as temporally 
determined requires the analogies as principles of time-determination, which themselves 
reflect the real grounds of time-determination, to represent something in space and time 
is already enough to warrant the claim that the thing really is in space and time. Or, 
equivalently, space and time are unconditionally valid of all objects of the senses. Kant 
can therefore say that objective validity and objective reality do not come apart for the 
forms of intuition, whereas they can come apart with respect to the categories, and it is 
exactly this possibility that generates the transcendental spectre exorcized in the B-
Deduction. There is a further link between the ideality of space and time and Kant’s 
realism that I have not yet identified, but it is relevant here for showing just how 
inseparable validity and reality are with respect to these forms: the ideality of space in 
Kant’s rejection of empirical idealism. 
Kant’s refutation of idealism is famous in the history of Western philosophy 
because of the importance it attaches to the existence of the outside world as a basic 
presupposition of the determination of the self in time. But there is another aspect of 
Kant’s rejection of idealism that receives less attention. The ideality of space plays a 
simpler role in constituting Kant’s realism. Basically, if space were a thing in itself then 
in addition to the problems of accounting for a priori knowledge of it – something that 
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Kant thinks we have – it would be hard to see how the fact that we represent things 
spatially would afford us knowledge that things really are in space. However, if space is 
ideal in just the way that was explained in Chapter 1, that is, it is a form of intuition but 
not yet itself an actual (formal) representation, then something must be responsible for 
our acquiring the formal representation of space itself. We saw that Kant explicitly 
rejected the idea that the formal representations of space and time are innate as the 
forms of objects/objects themselves (Dis, 8: 222-223). Rather, only the possibility of the 
representation is innate, but in order to acquire it we must be affected by external things 
in order to stimulate our cognitive faculties into action; only then do we acquire the 
formal representation of space. In this way, the original acquisition of space requires the 
occurrence of experience, but it is not itself derived from experience. In other words, in 
order for space to be given to us as an actual representational object (formal intuition), 
there must be an external reality in order for this form of intuition to be realized: ‘if 
extended beings were not perceived, one would not be able to represent space’ 
(A292/B349).
220
 Once again, then, the transcendental ideality of space and time is what 
guarantees the empirical reality of the objects of experience.
221
  
  Although it is often a neglected point, Kant does claim that the Transcendental 
Aesthetic contains a transcendental deduction of space and time (A87-88/B119-120); it 
is not just the categories that require a deduction (although they are the only concepts 
that receive a chapter titled as a deduction). Because space and time are sensible 
conditions of intuition, showing that they are transcendental conditions is enough to 
provide a deduction of them, for nothing can be given to us as an object unless it can 
appear in space and time (ibid). As we saw in Chapter 1, the case is not the same with 
the categories, for these are not conditions of objects being given in intuition. 
Nonetheless, Kant’s argument is lacking two important claims that are needed in order 
for his claim that a sufficient deduction of space and time has been given to hold. The 
first is the formal nature of space and time. The second is the discursivity thesis.  
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 See also Pro (4: 337) where Kant asserts that his formal idealism ‘destroys material or Cartesian 
idealism’.  
221
 Collins makes this connection between the ideality of space and reality of the external world but in 
connection to Kant’s argument in the Fourth Paralogism (1999: 54-55, 80-81). I think this is best taken as 
an example of how Kant should have argued in the Fourth Paralogism, but unfortunately did not. I think 
we can agree, though, that this argument is what can be extracted from Kant’s discussion even if we 
cannot agree on whether or not it is what he actually said. I discuss the Fourth Paralogism in the 
Appendix.  
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As explained above, Kant’s deduction of space and time only succeeds in 
showing their objective validity and reality – or better, that objective validity and reality 
cannot come apart for them – if he shows that the nature of space and time is exhausted 
by what can be attributed to them as pure intuitions, viz., their status as formal sensible 
conditions. This is important. For without showing their formality Kant is left wide-
open to the rejoinder of the neglected alternative. As we saw in the Introduction, the 
natural conclusion to draw from the success of space and time in representing objects in 
intuition is simply that we can represent objects spatiotemporally (through forms of 
intuitions) because objects really are in space and time, independently of our forms of 
intuition. The discursivity thesis is equally necessary. Both intuitions and concepts are 
necessary for cognition, but because of discursivity, there is a difference in what these 
components are applied to. Space and time are forms of a content that is essentially 
formless and already intrinsically sensible (manifold of sensation). There is no prior 
constraint placed on space and time in terms of them fulfilling their role in generating 
cognition; by contrast, the categories are applied to sensible intuitions, intuitions that 
already have non-conceptual spatiotemporal form. There is therefore a problem 
concerning how something conceptual (the categories) could apply to and order 
something intrinsically non-conceptual (Gardner 1999, 129). To make matters worse, it 
is uncontroversial to say that we experience the world in space and time: every event, 
every perception we have occurs in one or both of these forms, but it is not obvious that 
the categories enjoy this status. As we have seen, this difference is what gives rise to the 
transcendental spectre that there could be things that can appear without being thinkable 
as objects by the understanding. Part of Kant’s response was to argue that the categories 
are pre-discursive rules of apprehension, rules for representing or apprehending the 
content of intuition; in short, for turning empirical intuition into perception (empirical 
consciousness of appearance). The other part was to argue that the categories hold of the 
objects of experience themselves insofar as the objects of our intuition must have 
certain ontological features in order for appearances to be united under the unity of 
apperception. It is their relation to sensible intuition that provides sensible content to the 
categories, relating them to the world, without which they are merely logical forms for 
thinking a manifold as an object in general. The principles of substance, causality, etc., 
hold of objects independently of the mind, but there is an important sense in which Kant 
limits the application of the categories to appearances, and that is to claim that the 
categories, taken abstractly, do not apply to objects (that is, to things in general). 
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Rather, the objects are to be subsumed under the schemata of the categories, not the 
categories themselves (A181/B223). This is because the categories only have 
application to objects that can be given in space and time, since these are the sensible 
conditions under which the categories can be employed empirically. This is the sense in 
which they can be said to hold only of appearances and not of things in themselves. As 
Kant succinctly states regarding the categories in the Phenomena and Noumena chapter: 
 
In a word, all of these concepts could not be vouched for and their real 
possibility thereby established, if all sensible intuition (the only one we have) 
were taken away, and there then remained only logical possibility, i.e., that the 
concept (thought) is possible is not the issue; the issue is rather whether it relates 
to an object and therefore signifies anything. (B302n-303n) 
 
Just because the categories hold only of appearances does not mean that they cannot 
hold of actual objects in a mind-independent sense. Indeed, if the categories are to be 
distinguishable from the ideas of reason then they must be constitutive of the objects of 
experience, not just (subjectively) how we must think them given the nature of our 
cognitive faculties. Still, it could be objected that my account ignores or seriously 
downplays Kant’s criticisms of metaphysics and ontology, and consequently has him 
engaged in the very enterprises that he disparaged.  
 
1.2. Kant’s ‘Critical’ Conception of Metaphysics  
 
 While it is undeniably true that Kant does reject general metaphysics or 
ontology, along with so-called ‘special’ metaphysics – the concern of the 
Transcendental Dialectic – it does not follow that he rejects all metaphysical 
speculations, or that his own position does not contain any metaphysical claims or 
commitments.
222
 Rather, I will argue that he introduces a new method for metaphysics 
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 Ameriks stresses that the Transcendental Analytic does little by itself to demolish particular 
metaphysical claims and theories and that even the Transcendental Dialectic does not recommend a 
wholesale dismissal of metaphysics (2003: 120-121). Ameriks also emphasizes the metaphysical aspects 
of Kant’s doctrines against those who neglect them (2003: 147). Similarly, Moore  points out that if 
Kant’s denial of metaphysical speculation is supposed to encompass all a priori knowledge then Kant’s 
own positive conclusions, such as those reached in the Analogies, are illegitimate as well (2011: 236). 
Allais reaches a similar verdict: that just because Kant is concerned with disputing the metaphysics of his 
predecessors this is no reason to think that he does not have metaphysical commitments of his own, 
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to follow and that this method yields immanent metaphysics. Kant is concerned to curb 
the pretensions of sensibility and understanding from thinking that they reach and 
cognize objects beyond possible experience. Related to this project is his concern with 
showing that sensibility and understanding themselves only apply to objects under 
certain a priori conditions. This means that metaphysics faces a restriction of its claims 
to knowledge and not a complete denial. That this is so becomes clearer once we 
examine exactly what Kant understands by ‘metaphysics’. Kant replaces the dogmatic 
procedure of his predecessors (of equating logical and ontological relations) with 
transcendental philosophy, but we should be in no doubt that the conclusions of the 
latter are still metaphysical.      
Although examining the possibility of metaphysics as a science is the primary 
aim of the Critique (B22), Kant discusses metaphysics itself surprisingly little. In the 
Preface and Introduction to the Critique we are told little about what metaphysics is for 
Kant. There is the famous claim that metaphysics must contain synthetic a priori 
cognitions if it is to be a science (B18), but this does not distinguish metaphysics from 
any other theoretical science of reason (A10/B14). What is distinctive of metaphysics is 
that it is the attempt to cognize things a priori from mere concepts, devoid of any 
influence from experience or intuition (Bxiv). Kant complicates matters by dividing 
metaphysics into various branches. In the Preface he simply claims that metaphysics 
consists of two parts. The first part is concerned with what can be cognized a priori 
concerning the objects of experience, or as he puts it: metaphysics ‘concerns itself with 
concepts a priori to which the corresponding objects appropriate to them can be given 
in experience’, for with the ‘Copernican’ method of the Critique, Kant claims not only 
to be able to show how a priori cognition is possible but also takes himself to have  
delivered ‘satisfactory proofs of the laws that are the a priori ground of nature, as the 
sum total of objects of experience’ (Bxviii-xix). This is the combined result of the 
Transcendental Aesthetic and the Transcendental Analytic. Kant clearly takes his 
positive contribution in the Critique to still be metaphysics. This part of metaphysics, 
later identified as ‘immanent’ metaphysics (A845/B873), is contrasted with the second 
part, later identified as ‘transcendent’ (ibid). Transcendent metaphysics concerns what 
can be cognized beyond experience (cognition of God, immortal souls and the world-
whole) and this is the part that Kant rejects in the Critique (Bxviii-Bxix). The point is 
                                                                                                                                               
especially once we see that what Kant means by ‘metaphysics’ is not the same as what we take it to mean 
today (2015: 5-7).  
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reinforced when Kant comes to outline his revolution in philosophy: it is not the 
overthrow of metaphysics that he seeks, but rather the transformation of ‘the accepted 
procedure’ of metaphysics (Bxxii). The traditional procedure is the attempt to derive 
rational cognition from concepts alone, sometimes described as doing metaphysics 
dogmatically, and this Kant completely rejects on two grounds: first, it is one of the 
main aims of the Critique, particularly of the Transcendental Analytic, to show that no 
cognition arises from concepts in isolation from intuition; second, even if this were 
possible, then, by the argument of the Introduction, it would still not be metaphysics 
since metaphysics must contain synthetic a priori cognitions and not merely analytic 
ones, since the latter add nothing new, being a mere analysis of concepts (B23).
223
 In 
the Architectonic Kant defines metaphysics in general as ‘the whole (true as well as 
apparent) philosophical cognition from pure reason in systematic interconnection’ 
(A841/B869). The Architectonic introduces the ideas of the ‘metaphysics of nature’ and 
the ‘metaphysics of morals’. The very fact that Kant thinks that a metaphysics of nature 
is still achievable (though not, in the end, achieved by Kant)
224
 is more than enough to 
show that Kant takes metaphysics to still be a worthy goal of transcendental philosophy, 
albeit a metaphysics that must operate within severely restricted boundaries.  
In Chapter 4 I will explain the importance of the antinomies to Kant’s argument 
in the Critique, but it is worth noting now that the claims of both parties in the 
antinomies fall under the heading of ‘transcendent’ metaphysics, because although they 
concern appearances (empirical objects), the ‘world’ is a pseudo-empirical concept 
(Grier 2001, 176; Allison 2004, 390; A479/B509; Pro¸ 4: 337-338). This means that 
while the object of the concept is empirical, it is nonetheless an (unachievable) idea of 
reason because the totality or sum total of appearances can never be given as a 
totality.
225
 In employing the idea, reason strives for completeness in the series of 
conditions, and it is just this striving for conditions that Kant uses to first characterize 
metaphysics in the Critique as a battlefield of endless controversies (Avii-viii). Kant 
rejects this kind of metaphysics because it employs principles not meant for use in 
experience and that instead overstep all bounds of experience (A296/B352-353), even 
though, in the case of the antinomies, these principles do concern appearances. None of 
this, however, rules out the possibility of ascribing ontological principles to objects in 
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 In the Prolegomena, Kant concedes that metaphysics will still contain analytic cognitions, but 
maintains that the main part of it must consist of synthetic a  priori judgements (4: 273-274).  
224
 He did, however, go on to write a metaphysics of morals in a work of the same title.  
225
 Kant refers to this as the ‘transcendental cognition of the world’ (A846/B874).  
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virtue of which they are objects of experience; the (relational) categories yield such 
principles. 
 It could be objected that Kant rejects ontology (in addition to transcendent 
metaphysics), so how can the Critique contain ontological principles? It is true that 
Kant rejects ontology, as we saw above (A247/B303), but we have to understand 
exactly what Kant means by ‘ontology’. Unfortunately, Kant does not tell us much in 
the Critique, but he does elaborate in his metaphysics lectures, following the Critique. 
Ontology is ‘the science of the properties of all things in general’ (LM, 29: 784, 1782-
1783). As Manfred Baum explains, with this strict definition, according to which 
ontology deals with the universal predicates of all things as such, Kant is criticizing 
Baumgarten’s formulation according to which ontology deals with the more general 
properties of things (2011: 63-66, esp. 65).
226
 Kant’s revised notion of ontology, 
however, contains nothing but the a priori concepts used to think a thing in general, 
though this is an abstract notion without any (actual) determinate object (ibid).
227
 Since 
the concepts that structure the thought of an object in general are from understanding 
and reason, this is really self-cognition and belongs to transcendental philosophy (LM, 
29: 757, 1782-1783). Indeed, these a priori concepts of ontology are the categories.
228
 
Any science that cognizes the properties of all things must be a priori, because 
experience can never show that all objects must have certain properties; it can only 
show that the objects perceived so far have them (LM, 29: 785-786, 1782-1783). Kant, 
in contrast to the suggestions of the Critique, explicitly states  that ontology, as defined, 
does belong to transcendental philosophy (rather than the latter being the replacement of 
it), and so it cannot be ontology per se that he means to reject. Rather, as with 
metaphysics, the procedure for doing ontology must be transformed, and this 
transformation yields a restriction on the legitimate scope of metaphysical claims. 
                                                 
226
 See also Boer (2014: 225) who explains that the conception of ontology that Kant inherited was 
Wolffian and concerned the investigation ‘into the conceptual determinations that allow us to achieve 
knowledge of something at all.’ 
227
 As was explained at length in Chapter 1, thinking an object in general is to represent something as an 
object by regarding one’s representations as a synthetic unity, and thus as representations of something in 
a broad sense.  
228
 Indeed in some places Kant refers to the pure concepts as ‘transcendental concepts of ontology’ (LM, 
28: 263-265, 1770s) and in others equates the principles of experience with the synthetic a priori 
propositions as constituting an ‘inference of ontology’ (R552, 18: 219). The former reference does have 
to be considered in the context of rational psychology, admittedly, but it is nonetheless very suggestive. In 
case there is any doubt that the transcendental concepts through which the ‘I’ is determined are the same 
as the categories, see A398-400, where Kant states that the predicates of the pure ‘I’ are just the 
categories. Perhaps the clearest example is R5603 (18: 247, 1778-1780s): ‘We have spoken in ontology of 
concepts of the understanding the use of which in experience is possible because they themselves make 
experience possible’. 
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Nonetheless, Kant does reject the idea that ontology has an actual object (being in 
general); for in thinking a thing in general one is not yet thinking any particular thing, 
not even an unknown something. Rather, the subject is merely considering formally 
how any ‘object’ must be conceptualized in thought, but no object has yet been given 
(for this requires intuition).
229
 To take these conceptual conditions of thought as 
principles that lead to knowledge of actual objects leads to metaphysical error.
230
 But 
this is because an essential component is missing: a factoring in of the means by which 
an object can be given. This is nothing other than space and time as the forms of 
sensibility. Since only objects of the senses can be given through space and time, it 
follows that the categories can only be legitimately applied to objects of the senses. 
Preceding the passage where Kant replaces ontology, he asserts that:  
 
Now from this it follows irrefutably that the pure concepts of the understanding 
can never be of transcendental use, but always only of empirical use, and that 
the principles of pure understanding can be related to objects of the senses only 
in relation to the general conditions of a possible experience, but never to things 
in general (without taking regard of the way in which we might intuit them). 
(A246/B303)    
 
Taking into account what Kant says in his lectures in combination with the arguments 
of the Critique, it is clear that Kant does not reject the idea that certain principles can be 
known to hold a priori of objects, but he limits the scope of these principles to objects of 
possible experience; thus the rejection of ontology is not the rejection of attempts at a 
priori cognition (or claims about objects), but the rejection of attempting to speculate 
purely through concepts, isolated from the conditions under which alone they can be 
known to apply to, and thus determine, objects. When commentators such as Michelle 
Grier claim that Kant turns ontological conditions into epistemological conditions or 
replaces ontology with ‘transcendental epistemology’ (2001: 85, 107), this is only 
partially true. These conditions figure as epistemic conditions insofar as they are 
necessary for us to have knowledge of these objects, but they are also still ontological in 
the sense of characterizing objects (of possible experience) themselves. The exception 
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 See A845/B873, where Kant claims that considering reason and understanding as a system of concepts 
related to objects in general is to consider objects without assuming that they are given. He terms this 
‘Ontologia’ and claims that it is the province of transcendental philosophy.  
230
 See Section 2 below and Chapter 4. 
  
145 
 
to this, as discussed above, is space and time as forms of intuition, for here Kant’s move 
is precisely to argue that space and time are not entities or properties but only internal 
structures for perceiving and organizing appearances. The (relational) categories, by 
contrast, concern the synthesis of representations necessary for a temporally unified 
consciousness, but given the argument of the Analogies, this requires that appearances 
(empirical objects) themselves must be determinable in time in virtue of ontological 
features that, in Kant’s account, also serve primarily (for us) as epistemic conditions. 
The way to discovering this, however, is not through a first-order consideration of 
objects, as in traditional metaphysics, but with a second-order investigation into the 
forms, concepts and principles required for any thought and experience at all. We 
cannot cognize the possibility of causality, etc., from the pure concepts alone, but 
always require the relationship of the concept to ‘a third thing’, the possibility of 
experience; taken in this relation, then, we can cognize a priori the laws of the 
connection of things in general, as objects of possible experience (A766/B794).
231
 
Further, provided that we apply the categories only in accordance with their schemata 
(under the conditions of space and time, accordingly) then we can also conclude that the 
conditions of experience are the conditions of things; if we try to think up new objects 
or features independently of these conditions then these concepts do not have any object 
and remain empty (but logically coherent) fictions (A770-771/B798-799).
232
     
 If my argument is accepted, then I have shown that attributing the position I 
have described to Kant is compatible with his rejection of traditional metaphysics, but it 
could still be argued that my account does contradict his frequent denial that the 
principles of experience apply to things in themselves, and his famous conclusion that 
we can have no knowledge of things in themselves.
233
 If by ‘things in themselves’ Kant 
is understood to mean straightforwardly ‘mind-independent objects’ or ‘how things are 
independently of the mind’ with appearances meaning ‘how things seem to be’ or ‘how 
we represent things’, then there is a contradiction, but I now hope to show that this is 
not the only employment Kant makes of the distinction, nor is the sense operative in his 
denial that the categories characterize things in themselves. We now need to see if there 
are other ways of understanding the distinction that avoid the egregious position of 
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 Although what empirical features and laws actually hold cannot be discovered at all without 
instruction from experience.  
232
 See also A783/B811.  
233
 For Kant’s denial that the categories characterize things in themselves/noumena, see B149, B309, 
A286-287/B242-243, A288-289/B344-345, A358-359 and Pro (4: 312-313). 
  
146 
 
Berkeleyan phenomenalism, do not reduce appearances to illusions, and are consistent 
with the account of empirical realism that I have given, along with being broadly 
consistent with the text. I think that there are, and I will now establish the first of these 
additional compatible senses.  
 
2. ‘Things in Themselves’ As Objects of Pure Understanding 
 
We can make a start on formulating a non-distorting version of Kantian humility 
by examining Kant’s repeated claim that noumena or things in themselves are ‘objects 
of pure understanding’, specifically, his account of metaphysical error in the Amphiboly 
of the Concepts of Reflection. This section concerns Kant’s account of how Leibniz 
arrived at his rationalist doctrines of monadology and pre-established harmony by 
confusing the different representations of the mind.  
The Amphiboly closes the Transcendental Analytic, offering the first of various 
accounts of metaphysical error that Kant proffers in the Critique.
234
 Specifically, Kant 
diagnoses Leibniz’s error as involving a ‘transcendental amphiboly’. A transcendental 
amphiboly is Kant’s term for confusing ‘the pure object of the understanding with the 
appearance’ (A270/B326). Although this sounds vague and too broad, it actually 
designates a very specific error. The error is of confusing an object as it would be 
thought through pure concepts alone with the object as it appears through sensibility, or 
more directly, taking a comparison that pertains to the content of concepts (a 
comparison of concepts) to pertain to the objects themselves (a comparison of things), 
which results from conflating the contributions of understanding and sensibility 
(Longuenesse 1998, 133).
235
 Kant identifies four sets of concepts of comparison or 
reflection and demonstrates how each misled Leibniz to an ‘intellectual system of 
cognition’ (A280/B336). The four sets are <identity> and <difference>, <agreement> 
and <opposition>, <inner> and <outer>, and <matter> and <form> (determinable and 
determination) (A261/B317). The clearest example is the first, so I shall use that to 
illustrate the general idea.  
If some object is presented to us multiple times with the same inner 
determinations – by this Kant simply means properties – then, according to a 
                                                 
234
 See Grier (2001: 101-130) for discussion.   
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 Although she is concerned with what it can tell us about Kant’s views on concept-formation, 
Longuenesse (1998: Ch. 6) gives an excellent analysis of the overall argument of the Amphiboly. 
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comparison of concepts or mere ‘logical reflection’, it is the same object. For example, 
if an x is presented to me with four legs, a wagging tail and it makes barking noises at 
me then since this x exhibits the same marks as the y I later see I can assume that x and y 
fall under the same concept ‘dog’ because they share the same inner determinations. I 
have compared these representations with respect only to their belonging under the 
same concept. I have made a comparison of concepts according to the marks that 
constitute the concepts in question and have determined that my concept of x and my 
concept of y are identical. If, however, I am concerned with x as an appearance, and 
multiple objects appear to me as x then I am concerned with a comparison through 
sensibility, the forms of which are space and time. If I intuit multiple objects that appear 
as x then it is enough that they occupy different places in space, represented through 
sensibility, for the objects to count as individuals, even if there is no conceptual 
(‘inner’) difference between them. Yet, represented as an object of pure understanding, 
according to mere inner determinations, there is only one dog.
236
 The point may seem 
trivial, but if Kant is right, it is just such a conflation as this that leads Leibniz to his 
famous principle of the identity of indiscernibles (A263-264/B319-320).
237
 That is, 
since space and time are held to be distortions or confused representations of things in 
themselves for Leibniz, then only conceptual considerations – inner determinations – 
discoverable (in principle, even if not in practice for us) through analysis of concepts 
can be the ground of knowledge. This is exactly what we see in this passage. An object 
that is represented through the pure understanding – what it means to be an ‘object of 
pure understanding’ – just is an object that is represented or thought through only 
conceptual properties; given that these properties are the only true representation of 
things (as they are in themselves), since perception is unreliable, it follows 
straightforwardly that the principle of the identity of indiscernibles holds for objects.
238
 
Kant maintains, pace Leibniz, that because of the equally fundamental contribution of 
sensibility and its forms for cognition, the principle only holds for a comparison of 
representations under a concept, not for a comparison of objects (appearances) (ibid). If, 
following Leibniz, we take the appearance (object of sensibility thought through 
schematized categories, represented through space and time) for a thing in itself (object 
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 Kant’s own example is the comparison of two raindrops regarding their inner determinations (as 
indiscernible) and their appearances in space (as individual drops). 
237
 See Guyer and Wood (1998: n.100) for further discussion. Although it is not a point I want to pursue 
further here, it could be argued that a similar line of thinking underlies Spinoza’s Proposition 5 in The 
Ethics that ‘In nature there cannot be two or more substances of the same nature or attribute’ (1996: 3).  
238
 See Leibniz (1989: 30-34, 215-217). 
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represented through concepts alone, not represented in space and time where the latter 
are confused representations of the former) then we inevitably arrive at Leibniz’s view 
that where there is no ‘inner’ difference between objects, then they are identical, an 
essential component of Leibniz’s intellectual system (A271-272/B327-328).            
Kant continues this analysis for the remaining three sets of concepts, arguing 
that in each case if one conflates how the object is thought as a thing in itself (object of 
pure understanding or noumenon),
239
 and how the object appears then one is led to an 
erroneous metaphysical principle or claim.
240
 Crucially, one of these claims is that 
substances must really be monads and, as such, possess intrinsic determinations.
241
 But 
what Kant does in each case is to show that the claim at issue results from taking the 
representations of sensibility as being non-fundamental, or reducible to (confused) 
representations of the understanding. This presents us with a very clear account of 
things in themselves. When Kant denies us knowledge of things in themselves, this does 
not mean that we are stuck behind some idealist ‘veil of perception’ that traps us among 
the contents of our mind, but rather that we must take into account the dual (or 
discursive) nature of human cognition: that the proper determination of the properties 
and features of objects entails the joint contributions of sensibility (denied by Leibniz) 
and understanding (denied by Locke) (A271/B327).
242
 But it is precisely because the 
two types of contribution are irreducible to each other that the possibility of error arises: 
the concept of an object in general is nothing other than what is represented through the 
forms of thinking in general. Because the categories contain the forms of thought in the 
unity of apperception, they may seem to have a greater extension than sensibility, which 
is clearly limited to being affected by objects, and thus we (like Leibniz) can be misled 
by this logical connection of representations in general by taking them to be 
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 The concept of a noumenon is of an ‘object determinable in accordance with mere concepts’ 
(A285/B341). When I refer to ‘noumenon’, this should be taken in its positive sense, as an object of a 
pure understanding or intellectual intuition, i.e., as an object for God. However, it is important to note that 
Kant distinguishes between a positive and negative sense of the term in the B-edition. The negative (and 
legitimate) use of ‘noumenon’ refers to an object considered in abstraction from our sensible intuition, as 
a merely limiting problematic concept of reason. The positive sense of ‘noumenon’ is an object of non-
sensible intuition, i.e., of intellectual intuition. Kant is clear that we cannot know whether or not such 
noumena are possible. See A287/B343, B307-311.   
240
 See the very helpful R5534 (18: 230-231, 1778-1783) where Kant explains in detail the concepts of 
‘thing in itself’, ‘transcendental object’ and ‘noumenon’.    
241
 This is the bedrock of Langton’s interpretation of things in themselves as being these intrinsic 
determinations of substances. See the Appendix.  
242
 See Kant’s famous claim that ‘Leibniz intellectualized the appearances, just as Locke totally 
sensitivized the concepts of understanding in accordance with this system of noogony (if I am permitted 
this expression), i.e., interpreted them as nothing but empirical or abstracted concepts of reflection’ 
(A271/B327).  
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determinative of things in general; that is, determinative of objects independently of the 
contributions of sensibility (A279/B335, A289/B345-346). This is what Kant means by 
a ‘transcendental use or misuse of the understanding’ (A296/B352). Kant even goes so 
far as to attribute the entire Leibnizian enterprise to the transcendental amphiboly, as 
‘resting on nothing but a misunderstanding’ (A270/B326). So much for Leibniz, but 
what does this tell us about Kant’s conception of things in themselves?  
I suggested that this account is a starting point for outlining a version of Kantian 
humility that is compatible with his genuine idealism and realism. According to this 
account, knowing things in themselves would not be to know some extra facts about, or 
properties of, the objects of experience, but rather would take the form of knowing them 
in a different way; a way that is, for us, strictly impossible. In denying us knowledge of 
things in themselves, Kant denies that we can cognize objects through concepts alone, 
independently of sensibility. He goes further, though, by showing how the denial of 
sensibility’s role results in grand metaphysical theories, such as Leibniz’s monadology 
and pre-established harmony which presume ‘to cognize the inner constitution of things 
by comparing all objects only with the understanding and the abstract formal concepts 
of its thinking’ (A270/B326).243 I argue that this point should be taken as referring to 
what we think would be true of noumena given our concepts (of comparison), but the 
reference to cognizing the ‘inner constitution of things’ is ambiguous. It could mean 
that Kant thinks that there is an inner constitution of things (as things in themselves), 
and that Leibniz’s error was in thinking that he had found the means to cognizing this 
specific constitution (as monads). Or it could mean that Kant rejects the framework in 
which the problem is set up. Langton (1998) and Allais (2015: Ch. 10) take the first 
option, but now I want to examine a key passage that sheds light on why we should take 
the second reading: 
 
According to mere concepts the inner is the substratum of all relation or outer 
determinations. If, therefore, I abstract from all conditions of intuition, and 
restrict myself solely to the concept of a thing in general, then I can abstract 
from every outer relation, and yet there must remain a concept of it, that 
signifies no relation but merely inner determinations. Now it seems as if it 
follows from this (my emphasis) that in everything (substance) there is 
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 Both the monadology and the thesis of pre-established harmony are attributed to comparing objects in 
accordance with <inner> and <outer> without sensibility (A266/B322, A274-275/B330-331).  
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something that is absolutely internal and precedes all outer determinations […] 
consequently that it is simple […] [and] all things would really be monads, or 
simple beings endowed with representations. And this would all be correct, were 
it not that something more than the concept of a thing in general belongs to the 
conditions under which alone objects of outer intuition can be given to us, and 
from which the pure concept abstracts. For these show that a persistent 
appearance in space (impenetrable extension) contains mere relations and 
nothing absolutely internal, and nevertheless can be the primary substratum of 
all outer perception. (A282-284/B339-340)  
 
This is a very long and dense passage, and I have tried to preserve the general flow and 
logic of it as much as possible. The ellipses cover the extended details of why objects of 
pure understanding, considered as such, must be conceived of as monads, but since 
these details fall within the gaps in the passage that come after the locution ‘Now it 
seems […]’ I believe my selective citation preserves Kant’s reasoning. At the start of 
the passage Kant discusses what must be true according to mere concepts. He explains 
that the inner must be what serves as the substratum of outer relations, according to 
mere concepts, since nothing else is given that can serve this role, for the concept of a 
thing in general is nothing more than the concept of a thing that abstracts from the 
contribution of sensibility and thinks it through concepts alone. A thing composed only 
of internal determinations cannot contain composition, since this presupposes outer 
(i.e., spatial) relations between its parts, and this is exactly what is denied, according to 
mere concepts, so this thing is a monad (simple being with representations). So far, it 
could easily be thought that Kant endorses this Leibnizian picture, but he then 
completely rejects it by saying that it would be true were it not the case that something 
more than just the concept of a thing in general is required for cognition, i.e., sensibility, 
for bringing back in what we have abstracted from reveals that the conditions of 
intuition yield the substratum (space) that is not simple (for space is continuous), but 
nonetheless serves as the substratum of all outer perception.
244
 Absolutely inner 
determinations are not necessary to ground the substantiality of the objects of 
experience, for the relational/dynamical theory of matter as filling space through 
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 This point is actually made more explicit just after this passage: ‘But since something is contained in 
the intuition that does not lie at all in the mere concept of a thing in general, and this yields the substratum 
that cannot be cognized through mere concepts, namely a space that, along with everything it contains, 
consists of purely formal or also real relations’ (A284/B340).  
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attractive and repulsive forces is enough to account for this. Kant has a purely relational 
ontology, or at least, he seems open to the possibility that nothing in scientific 
explanations of phenomena requires a non-relational ontology. 
  An important objection has been raised against the claim that Kant has a purely 
relational ontology by Allais. Allais, following Langton, thinks that Kant’s epistemic 
humility takes the form of denying that we can cognize the intrinsic natures of things; 
however, unlike Langton, she is much more sensitive to the obscurities and ambiguities 
that plague the Amphiboly chapter (2015: 224). She also agrees that science, on Kant’s 
account, does not require intrinsic properties. Nonetheless, she argues that Kant’s 
critique of Leibniz should not be thought to consist in ruling out non-relational intrinsic 
grounds for relational phenomena, but rather as denying that we can determine what 
these intrinsic grounds are, namely, that we cannot say, as Leibniz did, that the 
absolutely inner determinations are monads (simple soul substances); there are intrinsic 
natures but we cannot determine what these are through comparison of concepts 
(‘logical reflection’) alone. She examines three significant passages from the 
Amphiboly – A265-266/B321-322, A274/B330, A282-285/B338-341 – the last of 
which I have also just examined. She concedes that the first two are ambiguous between 
the two possible readings, but maintains that the third conclusively shows that Kant 
thinks that intrinsic natures are required as a conceptual truth for non-relational natures 
(2015: 236-238).  I agree that it is a conceptual truth, for Kant, that relations require the 
non-relational, and that Kant does expresses this point in the third passage; what I 
question is whether this is enough to attribute to him the view that things have 
absolutely intrinsic natures as things in themselves.  
Allais admits that the passage could be understood as arguing that conceptual 
truths capture mere analytic entailment-relations among concepts that do not provide us 
with any metaphysical insight (2015: 239). This is in line with distinguishing between 
our concept of things as they are considered in themselves and how things actually are 
as things in themselves (noumena). Allais rejects this weaker reading, however, on the 
grounds that it misunderstands Kant’s account of logical possibility. She rightly 
observes that if something is logically possible on Kant’s view that this is not enough to 
guarantee its real possibility (A244/B302), but suggests that if something is deemed 
logically impossible, then this is enough to show that it is really impossible (2015: 240). 
Since Kant thinks that it is logically necessary that relations entail non-relational 
grounds, relations that do not require this are impossible (ibid). Prima facie, Allais is 
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right: the principle of non-contradiction is a necessary (but not sufficient) condition of 
metaphysical truth (A150/B189). This is a very delicate point, however. While Kant 
does call a comparison of concepts a ‘logical reflection’, I think Allais’ objection can be 
challenged; I make three related points. First, if the conditions under which concepts 
apply are not met then these concepts remain empty of cognitive content; in the current 
case, they are nothing more than forms of comparing concepts (not things). We have to 
keep in mind that Kant compares the (cognitively inadequate) notion of ‘logical 
reflection’ with the notion of ‘transcendental reflection’, where the latter is ‘a duty 
which no one can escape from if he would judge anything about things a priori’, since it 
alone ‘goes to the objects themselves’ (A262-263/B318-319).  
 Second, when applied solely at the level of concepts, it is contradictory to say 
that the outer (relational) can exist without the inner (non-relational), but this is a truth 
that holds only because we are abstracting from the other half of the equation: concepts 
are not adequate for determining real possibility because they are lacking the forms of 
sensibility, the necessary conditions for their application to objects. As such, as Kant 
says, an entire source of determining what can ground relations (attractive/repulsive 
powers of matter, represented through sensibility) has been cut off (A285/B432). This 
means that while it seems as if everything ‘outer’ must be grounded on something 
‘inner’, this is not the case because sensibility ‘yields the substratum that cannot be 
cognized through mere concepts’ (A284/B340). If the objects of our cognition were 
things that could be determined through thought alone (noumena), then our concepts 
could be used to determine them, but we cognize only appearances. That is, we can only 
cognize things that can only be determined through both the forms of spatiotemporal 
intuition and concepts employed together. Moreover, I think Kant explicitly denies that 
things must have an intrinsic nature simply in virtue of the conceptual relationship 
between ‘inner’ and ‘outer’. Kant says that because of the missing component in 
cognition: ‘I cannot say that since without something absolutely inner no thing can be 
represented through mere concepts, there is also nothing outer that does not have 
something absolutely internal as its ground in the things themselves that are contained 
under these concepts and in their intuition’ (ibid). This sentence is tortuous, even by 
Kant’s standards. As I read him, Kant is saying that the claim that we cannot make is 
that ‘there is also nothing outer that does not have something absolutely internal as its 
ground’, etc. Despite following from ‘mere concepts’, the claim does not hold because 
‘mere concepts’ abstract from the necessary condition of their applicability, viz., 
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sensibility (space). When considering things through ‘mere concepts’ there must be 
something absolutely inner, but ‘mere concepts’ are inadequate for determining the 
features of actual things: thinking that they are sufficient for determining any features of 
noumena is what Kant is reprimanding Leibniz for. As such, claims to cognition based 
on ‘mere concepts’ are, pace Allais, completely illusory.  
 Third, and following on from the second point, not only are claims through 
‘mere concepts’ illusory, they actually make the concept of a thing in general 
contradictory. Kant says:  
  
But if I apply these concepts to an object in general (in the transcendental sense), 
without further determining whether this is an object of sensible or intellectual 
intuition, then  limitations (which do not flow from this concept) immediately 
show up, which pervert all empirical use of them, and by that very means prove 
that the representation of an object as a thing in general is not merely 
insufficient but rather, without sensible determinations of it and independent of 
an empirical condition, contradictory in itself, thus that one must either abstract 
any object (in logic), or else, if one assumes an object, then one must think it 
under conditions of sensible intuition[.] (A279-280/B335-336) 
   
This is important: if we do not determine whether our object is one of sensible or 
intellectual intuition then our concept of an object in general is inherently contradictory. 
If we abstract any object then the concept does not apply to objects and if an object is 
assumed then it must be considered in relation to the sensible conditions of intuition. 
Whether a claim is coherent, contradictory or a mere contrary is determined by whether 
it is taken to hold of an actual thing in itself, an appearance or as neither (as  considered 
purely formally through ‘mere concepts’). This point can be made clearer by briefly 
considering Kant’s resolution of the mathematical antinomies.  
Briefly, it looks like it would be a contradiction to say that something (the 
world) must be both infinite and finite (in space and time); indeed, this is a logical 
contradiction: a thing in space and time cannot be both and must be one or the other. 
Kant’s answer is that this contradiction vanishes once we recognize that the world is not 
a thing in itself, but the sum total of appearances. If the world is a thing in itself then it 
is true that it must be either finite or infinite in space and time, but if the world is an 
appearance then it does not need to be either, since the world is nothing more than the 
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(thought) sum of appearances.
245
 The same can be said of the apparent contradiction in 
thinking of relations without something non-relational: this is true of things considered 
through ‘mere concepts’ (which we take to also cognize things in themselves) but is not 
true of appearances. So, while it is a conceptual truth that the ‘outer’ requires the 
‘inner’, we cannot take this to mean that there really is an intrinsic nature to things as 
they are in themselves, pace Allais. It is a logical truth that something relational must 
have non-relational grounds, but the contradiction in denying this disappears once we 
adopt transcendental idealism.
246
 Lest this comparison between conceptual relations and 
the antinomies seem too much of a stretch to hold it should be noted that Kant affirms 
that the error involved in the antinomies is another instance of the amphiboly 
(A484/B512). Still, while I think I have given strong responses to the objection, it 
cannot be pretended that this is conclusive.
247
 It seems to me, however, that the 
genuinely critical response would be to remain agnostic about whether things as things 
in themselves really have intrinsic natures or not, rather than assuming that they do just 
because our concept of them requires this.  
We can now go further in specifying what it means to consider things as ‘things 
in themselves’. It is not merely considering things in relation to sensible intuition (as 
appearances) and as not in this relation (as things in themselves), as the deflationary 
‘one world’ view would have it, but the idea also covers what would be true of objects if 
it were the case that the conditions for determining them could be met through concepts 
alone. The problem does not just concern our taking appearances for things that can be 
determined through thought alone (as noumena),
248
 but also that our very means of 
thinking things as noumena is an illusory representation of what we think would be true 
of noumena. On this account, the transcendental distinction is not between appearance 
and reality. Rather, it shows that a certain means of determining reality is not open to 
us, that we require sensible intuition (being affected by the objects of our cognition) in 
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 See Chapter 4. 
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 This is not to say or assume that Kant’s argument is a good one; I am merely appealing to his 
resolution of the antinomies to illuminate his account in the Amphiboly.  
247
 And in fairness to Allais, she concedes that claiming that appearances have intrinsic natures that 
ground them is the ‘controversial point’, though she thinks that there are ‘strong grounds’ for attributing 
the view to Kant (2015: 242-243).  
248
 This appears to be Boer’s view. She holds that Kant’s ‘things in themselves’ do not refer to the mind-
independent things that affect us but rather to things conceived as knowable through inner characteristics. 
Her view of things in themselves is similar to what I am proposing here, but unlike Boer, I do not think 
that this how Kant always uses the term, and my account goes further in taking Kant to analyse what 
would be true of objects of experience if they were objects of pure understanding, i.e., knowable through 
‘mere concepts’, rather than simply denying that we can know them through mere concepts. See Boer 
(2014: esp. 238-247).    
  
155 
 
order to have knowledge of reality. Keeping with the theme of the upcoming 
Transcendental Dialectic, what Kant seems to identify here is an illusory system of 
cognition that attempts to determine reality without the aid of the senses.
249
 Intelligible 
objects (objects thought as determinable without sensibility) are impossible because the 
objective reality of the categories only holds for objects that can be given to their 
schemata. While we can form the thought of objects not meeting these conditions 
through the formal activity of thinking in general, we cannot claim that any such objects 
exist; however, just as we have no grounds for proving that noumena (in the positive 
sense) are possible, nor do we have any means of ruling out their existence either. As I 
argued above, this suggests that transcendental idealism is best thought of as a 
restriction of the scope of metaphysics. We cannot determine that the categories or 
spatiotemporal predicates pertain to all things (in general) without distinction, but only 
to objects of the senses, i.e., objects that are given through the joint efforts of sensibility 
and understanding (A286-288/B342-434).
250
 Kant says as much when at the close of the 
Amphiboly he explains that the concept of a noumenon is not the concept of an object:  
 
but rather the problem, unavoidably connected with the limitation of our 
sensibility, of whether there may not be objects entirely exempt from the 
intuition of our sensibility, a question that can only be given the indeterminate 
answer that since sensible intuition does not pertain to all things without 
distinction room remains for more and other objects; they cannot therefore be 
absolutely denied, but in the absence of a determinate concept (for which no 
category is serviceable) they also cannot be asserted as objects for our 
understanding. (A287-288/B344)  
 
The idea that there could be objects beyond those that we can possibly experience will 
play a key role in Chapter 4. However, although this notion is certainly present in the 
passage, it is less obvious how we can apply this account of things in themselves, as 
objects beyond experience, to the consideration of an object of experience as it is in 
itself. In fact, we have to be very careful here as Kant not only warns us not to confuse 
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 Grier makes a similar point: ‘On Kant’s view, the consideration of things in themselves is basically an 
illusory way of representing appearances’ (2001: 278). However, in Chapter 4 I will object that she slips 
into a subjectivist position.  
250
 Although he rejects this reading of transcendental idealism, Melnick expresses this idea eloquently 
when he writes that the concept of a thing in itself ‘serves a limiting function by reminding us that there 
may be more things in heaven and earth than are dreamt of in the Transcendental Deduction’ (1973: 152).  
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knowledge of appearances – things as determined through sensibility and understanding 
– with things in themselves – things thought as objects of understanding alone – but he 
also forbids us to think of things in themselves in terms of the categories.
251
 My 
interpretation appears to run the risk of violating this restriction. To close this Section I 
will deal with this worry.  
Specifically, I take seriously Kant’s central lesson of the Schematism, which 
warns against taking thought of things in themselves to yield even a minimal amount of 
information about things in themselves; for as we have seen, such thinking only tells us 
about the concept of a thing in general, which is not a real object but merely 
representative of the formal unity of thought in general. Kant makes this point again in 
the Amphiboly. Kant claims that by limiting sensibility to appearances, we can think a 
thing in itself ‘but only as a transcendental object, which is the cause of appearance 
(thus not itself appearance), and that cannot be thought of either as magnitude or as 
reality or as substance, etc. (since these concepts always require sensible forms in which 
they determine an object)’ (A288/B344-B345). This may be thought to stand in tension 
with my claims above, where I argued that it is compatible with Kantian humility to 
take the analogies as fundamental ontological principles of the objects of experience; for 
here Kant denies that we should think of the thing in itself as a substance, etc. First, it 
should be noted that this claim only yields a contradiction with my account of the 
Analogies if ‘things in themselves’ is construed as referring to the ‘objects themselves’ 
as opposed to the ‘representation’ of an object. On ‘two world’ and phenomenalist 
readings this is how the term is usually understood; however, here I have suggested that 
it be construed as referring to a particular way of considering how objects are 
determined. We therefore have two readings of the passage at hand. It can be taken as a 
metaphysical denial that objects, considered as they are mind-independently, are 
substances, causally efficacious, realities (positive determinations), etc., or it can be 
taken as meaning that considered as objects of pure understanding we are not licenced 
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 This is a difficult point, because as well as forbidding us from taking the categories to apply to things 
in themselves, Kant also thinks that in considering objects as things in themselves, we can and must think 
them through the pure categories, but the important point is that such thinking gives no purchase on how 
things may be in themselves. See Schulting (2011b: 160-161), who is particularly critical of confusing the 
notion of how we must consider or think things in themselves and how they actually are as things in 
themselves. See also Kohl (2015: esp. 94-102) who, despite being an advocate of the ‘two world’ camp, 
emphasizes that noumena are not substances, causes, etc.; however, he does also think that the negative 
analytic judgements about thing in themselves, such as their being non-spatiotemporal, are truths about 
actual things in themselves and not just of our concept of them; he denies that this counts as knowledge 
on Kant’s account and therefore holds it not to violate Kant’s epistemic humility (2015: 101, n.17).   
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to claim that objects are substances, etc. This seems to me to be what Kant means in the 
passage, as suggested in particular by the parenthesized phrase ‘(since these concepts 
always require sensible forms in which they determine an object)’. The point, then, is 
that Kant does not deny anything about the nature of reality, but instead shows us that 
we can determine objects only as appearances and not as things in themselves, because 
the former are the only kind of objects that can be given to us through the joint efforts 
of sensibility and understanding, i.e., objects of possible experience. This leaves open 
room for objects that could, conceivably, be only determined as things in themselves for 
a being that would, unlike us, be able to apply its concepts to things without the 
mediation of (sensible) intuition or would know things directly through intuition 
without the need for concepts.
252
 It should come as no surprise, then, that Kant goes on 
to offer yet another account of appearances and things in themselves in the Critique, 
where ‘things in themselves’ stands in for objects that cannot be given to our sensible 
form of intuition, or even objects that are given but cannot be given in their totality to 
our kind of intuition. This is broadly his notion of the ‘unconditioned’ or ‘unconditioned 
totality of conditions’. To illustrate this third sense of the distinction I turn to the 
Antinomy of Pure Reason in Chapter 4.  
 
Conclusion: A Non-Distorting Idealism and Epistemic Humility 
 
In this Chapter I have considered whether Kant’s views on metaphysics and his 
denial that we cognize things in themselves are in tension with the account that I have 
given of his realism. I argued that Kant is still doing metaphysics, albeit a metaphysics 
that has a greatly restricted scope compared to its predecessor. I argued against the idea 
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 These two are obviously not equivalent but I pass over the details of this alternative hypothetical form 
of cognition. Kant refers to it often in the first Critique as ‘intellectual intuition’ or ‘non-sensible 
intuition’, suggesting that such an intuition does not require concepts at all, while in the third Critique, he 
refers to it instead as ‘intuitive understanding’ (B72, B145, B307-308; CPJ, 5: 406-408). See Quarfood 
(2011: 144-152, esp. 149-52) for an interesting discussion of what this form of cognition is and whether 
these expressions are equivalent. Quarfood (2011: 153-157) explores ‘things in themselves’ as a theory of 
the structure of conceptuality in much the same way as I do here. He also thinks Kant’s argument in the 
Amphiboly is not an endorsement of rationalist metaphysics but is rather ‘a diagnosis of how the 
discursive understanding has to conceive of things metaphysically, when it misunderstands its function’ 
(2011: 155). However, he focuses on what sense this reading can make of Kant’s claims about things in 
themselves not being possible through the whole, whereas I focus on how these ‘hypostatized structures 
of discursivity’ (2011: 156) can account for Leibniz’s monadology and give us (part of) a non-distorting 
account of appearances and things in themselves by isolating one sense of the distinction. Clearly, 
however, the present account of things in themselves as objects of pure understanding is indebted to 
Quarfood’s and should be understood as complementing his account.  
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that the categories are only formal concepts that make experience possible and argued 
that they do characterize ontological features of objects themselves. The categories are 
formal concepts, but the relational concepts (at least) do pick out necessary connections 
in the objects of experience themselves, as being substances, empirical causes, etc., or 
rather they do when applied to objects through the analogies. In Section 2 I addressed 
the concern that my account contradicts Kant’s epistemic humility about things in 
themselves. I set out an advanced deflationary epistemological account of the distinction 
as it is presented in the Amphiboly. According to this account, appearances are objects 
as they are determined through schematized categories, and things in themselves are 
things thought as ‘objects of a pure understanding’. That is, things considered as if their 
features could be determined through ‘mere concepts’ alone. The Amphiboly sets out a 
compelling account of how conflating appearances and things in themselves can lead to 
Leibnizian doctrines such as pre-established harmony and that ultimate reality consists 
of monads. In addition, this epistemological account has metaphysical implications. 
Specifically, the fact that we cognize only objects of a possible experience – that is, 
appearances or phenomena – conceptual room remains for things that do not appear at 
all and that could, in principle, only be determinable for an intellectual intuition. While 
we may be misled (as the younger Kant was) into thinking that thought in accordance 
with ‘mere concepts’ can yield knowledge about things as they are in themselves, the 
mature Kant recognizes not only that appearances do not represent how things would be 
for a (hypothetical) intellectual intuition, but also that any attempt we do make to 
determine objects through ‘mere concepts’ – to take them as things in themselves or 
noumena – is an inherently illusory exercise, for when divorced from the sensible 
conditions of their application, ‘mere concepts’ combine to form an inherently  
contradictory concept of a thing in general.  
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4. The Real as Ideal: Things in Themselves as the Unconditioned 
and the Transcendental Turn Revisited 
 
Introduction 
 
 In this Chapter I complete my account of Kant’s transcendental idealism as 
empirical realism. I isolate a third sense of the transcendental distinction, according to 
which, when Kant denies us knowledge of things in themselves this is to be understood 
as the denial of the possibility of acquiring knowledge of what he calls the 
‘unconditioned’, or the ‘unconditioned totality of conditions’ for a given conditioned 
phenomenon. In short, the unconditioned stands in for the idea of complete explanation 
insofar as the idea marks what is self-explanatory. However, Kant exhibits unresolved 
ambivalence towards the idea of the unconditioned, seeming to fluctuate between two 
different conceptions of it.
253
 According to the first conception, as presented in the 
resolution of the mathematical antinomies, Kant takes the idea of the unconditioned to 
be completely illusory, that is, that both positions in the mathematical antinomies are 
deemed to be necessarily false because the objects of our knowledge are appearances 
and not things in themselves. According to the second conception, however, best 
illustrated in the resolution of the dynamical antinomies, both positions may be true 
insofar as they hold of appearances and things in themselves, respectively. I argue that 
Kant is wrong to conclude that both the thesis and antithesis are false with respect to the 
mathematical antinomies, that in fact that resolution reveals an implicit reliance on the 
metaphysical idealist account of transcendental idealism. This is a very controversial 
claim. Deflationary interpretations (Allison and Grier) and ‘moderate’ metaphysical 
readings (Allais and Ameriks) both take the resolution of the mathematical antinomies 
to reveal a non-phenomenalist form of idealism. I argue that Kant’s resolution is 
incompatible with a non-phenomenalist idealism and that a genuine deflationary reading 
of the mathematical antinomies, when properly understood, yields a ‘both potentially 
true’ resolution, rather than a ‘both necessarily false’ verdict.254 If I am right, this 
complicates the third sense of the transcendental distinction. Allison’s deflationary 
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 For reasons of space my account focuses solely on the role of the unconditioned in the Antinomy of 
Pure Reason. I think it is compatible with what Kant says in the Paralogisms and the Ideal.  
254
 Henceforth I refer to these as the ‘both false’ and ‘both true’ resolutions. The modal element in each 
(necessarily false, potentially true) applies throughout.  
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account is also controversial in another respect. Insofar as he understands the 
‘transcendental turn’ to entail a shift from a theocentric to an anthropocentric paradigm 
of cognition and its norms, Allison argues that in some respect Kant’s ‘both false’ 
resolution also holds for the dynamical antinomies. On Allison’s account, there is no 
‘fact of the matter’ for either type of antinomy, and in fact the thought that necessarily 
one position or the other must be true is indicative of the transcendental  illusion that 
ensnares reason (2004: 48-49).
255
 I argue that this does not follow from a genuine 
deflationary position. However, my account owes much to Allison’s work on 
transcendental idealism, here in particular his idea that the transcendental turn can 
helpfully be understood with reference to different paradigms of cognition. I borrow 
Allison’s idea and reformulate it to show that all four antinomies can be resolved with a 
‘both true’ resolution, adding the final component needed to substantiate Kant’s 
empirical realism as a non-distorting formal idealism.  
 The Chapter is in three Sections. In Section 1 I examine the mathematical 
antinomies and Kant’s oft-maligned claim that reason is in the grip of a ‘natural and 
unavoidable’ transcendental illusion. After explaining what I take to be at issue in these 
two antinomies, I ask what kind of idealism is needed to make sense of the ‘both false’ 
resolution that Kant provides. I suggest, against the current interpretative trend, that the 
‘both false’ resolution follows only on the assumption of a metaphysical idealism, but I 
also argue that it is not required to resolve the antinomies. Drawing on Kant’s earlier 
work, I explain how a methodological deflationary reading could make sense of 
providing a ‘both true’ resolution for these antinomies. In the process I consider the 
supposed methodological readings of Grier and Allison, the ‘moderate’ metaphysical 
view of Allais, and the rejection of undecidability as a solution by Gardner. In Section 2 
I turn to the dynamical antinomies and provide a deflationary reading of them, but I 
challenge Allison’s claim that there is no ‘fact of the matter’ at issue. I show that a 
deflationary account of transcendental idealism need not be in tension with the idea that 
Kant’s conception of freedom entails a metaphysical conception of a non-natural kind of 
causality (transcendental freedom). In the final Section I consider the transcendental 
turn as a turn from a theocentric to an anthropocentric model of the norms and 
conditions of cognition. I show that this account makes sense of Kant’s realism and 
idealism and allows for the ‘both true’ resolution to hold for all the antinomies. 
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 Allison makes this claim directly with respect to the third antinomy and Kant’s theory of freedom. I 
assume that he takes it to hold of the fourth antinomy as well.  
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However, it should be noted that due to space constraints the arguments expressed in 
this Chapter are in condensed form.   
 
1. The Mathematical Antinomies: Methodological or Metaphysical 
Resolution? 
 
 In the Antinomy of Pure Reason Kant sets out his view that reason finds itself 
locked in disputes that cannot end because reason finds itself committed to two equally 
compelling, but contradictory, conclusions. Of a piece with the Paralogisms and the 
Ideal, Kant’s aim is to exhibit what happens when reason attempts to grasp the 
completeness of appearances in terms of what is unconditioned or self-explanatory. The 
Antinomy concerns the concept of the world, but unlike its two companions, the 
Antinomy seeks to show that reason is pulled in two opposing directions, in the form of 
a thesis and antithesis for each of the four disputes, rather than in constituting a one-
sided illusion (A406/B433). Kant affords great significance to his discovery of the 
antinomies, not least because he takes the resolution of them to provide indirect support 
for transcendental idealism (A506-507-B534-535), but also because they serve to 
awaken reason and Kant from their ‘dogmatic slumber’ (Pro, 4: 338; Cor, 12: 257-258). 
In Section 1.1 I discuss Kant’s theory that reason is in the grip of transcendental 
illusion, his account of the mathematical antinomies, and his ‘both false’ resolution. I 
argue that the ‘both false’ resolution is not supported by the application of 
transcendental idealism (in its non-phenomenalist form) to the mathematical 
antinomies. In Section 1.2 I examine Kant’s earlier account of metaphysical error as an 
alternative account of how a methodological treatment of the mathematical antinomies 
should go. In Section 1.3 I consider possible objections to my account of how Kant 
should have resolved the mathematical antinomies based on his rejection of epistemic 
modesty and the distinction between the mathematical and dynamical antinomies as 
turning on different kinds of synthesis.  
 
1.1. Transcendental Illusion and Resolving the Mathematical Antinomies 
 
The mathematical antinomies, so-called because they concern the mathematical 
totality of appearances in space and time, comprise of two disputes. The first antinomy 
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concerns whether the world is limited in space and time or is infinite in both respects. 
The thesis argues that the world is finite in both respects (A426/B454), while the 
antithesis argues that it is infinite (A427/B455). The second antinomy concerns whether 
composite substance is infinitely divisible or divisible into simple parts. The thesis 
argues that the simple is all that really exists (A434/B462), while the antithesis affirms 
that composite substances are infinitely divisible (A435/B463). The status of the 
disputes as forming an antinomy concerns the peculiar fact that both sides can perform a 
successful reductio ad absurdum on their opponent, which means that reason is forced 
to accept two contradictory conclusions, but since this is not acceptable, the antinomies 
threaten to issue in ‘the euthanasia of pure reason’ (A407/B434). I am not concerned 
with whether Kant is right that both conclusions are equally warranted, nor with the 
arguments that the proponents of the thesis and antithesis positions supposedly make 
but only with what type of idealism is needed to make sense of Kant’s official 
resolutions.
256
  
 To appreciate Kant’s resolution we need to understand his idea that there is a 
transcendental illusion operating at the heart of the antinomies and all of reason’s efforts 
to grasp the unconditioned. The basic problem is that a guiding subjective principle of 
reason gets transformed into an illegitimate and illusory principle that reason must 
assume in order to fulfil its purpose. Following Grier (2001: 119-122) and Allison 
(2004: 330), let us call these P1 and P2. P1 states that reason should ‘find the 
unconditioned for the conditioned cognitions of the understanding, with which its unity 
will be completed’ (A307/B364). Allison aptly terms this principle an ‘intellectual 
categorical imperative’ for theoretical reason (2004: 385). The principle commits reason 
to always look for further conditions of any given conditioned cognition; in short, to 
never let the quest for explanation stop (A498/B526). P1 makes no claims about the 
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 See Allison (2004: 366-376), Guyer (1987: 404-412), Wood (2010: 245-265), Grier (2001: Ch. 6), 
Bennett (1974) and Walsh (1975: 195-214) for some of the standard objections and responses to the 
individual proofs. Sadik Al-Azm (1972) has convincingly argued that the main source of inspiration for 
Kant’s presentation of the antinomies was the correspondence between Leibniz and Clarke (1956). Al-
Azm argues that the antithesis position in the antinomies is, perhaps surprisingly, best associated with 
Leibniz’s arguments against the Newtonian Clarke, whose own arguments typically mirror those 
deployed by Kant on behalf of the thesis. However, I do not agree with Al-Azm’s stronger claim that it is 
wrong to associate the thesis positions with rationalism and the antithesis positions with empiricism. 
While it may be the case that historically Leibniz did champion arguments and positions in his disputes 
with Clarke that are decidedly empiricist-sounding, it is also the case that Leibniz is mainly referring to 
the phenomenal/empirical world in these arguments; the Leibnizian idea that nonsensible reality consists 
of monads, for example, clearly lends itself much better to the thesis position that reality must consist of 
indivisible simple substances. Besides, the antinomies are supposed to capture opposed ways of thinking 
about the unconditioned that stem from the nature of human reason and so they are not meant to be 
limited to any particular historical moment. 
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objects themselves; it merely tells reason to always seek for further 
conditions/explanations. The problem is that P1 presupposes P2 as its condition of 
application, comparable to the relationship between a category and its schema (Allison 
2004, 330; Grier 2001, 124-126). P2 is the (illusory) principle that ‘when the 
conditioned is given, then so is the whole series of conditions subordinated one to the 
other, which is itself unconditioned, also given (i.e., contained in the object and its 
connection)’ (A307-308/B364). P1 is analytic, simply spelling out the conceptual 
connection between the conditioned and its condition(s) (A498/B526), but P2 is 
synthetic, expressing a connection between the conditions and the unconditioned, which 
is not analytically entailed by the mere concept of a ‘condition’ for the ‘conditioned’ 
(A308/B365).    
Nonetheless, P2 appears to be sound: after all, what could be more intuitive than 
thinking that if a conditioned (e.g., an effect) is given then the condition of that (e.g., the 
cause) is also given, where the former is dependent on the latter? Indeed, this is nothing 
more than one of the immanent principles of Kantian metaphysics (i.e., the second 
analogy); so far, however, this is just P1. The problem arises, though, once we assume in 
accordance with the illusory principle that all the conditions are given with the 
conditioned, right back to the unconditioned. To stick with the example, from the chain 
of causes and effects we trace the connection back to an unconditioned first (uncaused) 
cause or take the entire causal series itself to be unconditioned (i.e., given as infinite). 
But as can be seen from this example, P2 by itself underdetermines which of the two 
alternatives is actually right as it licences both conclusions.
257
 While we hold P2 to be 
true, a necessary condition of P1 (searching for the conditions for a given conditioned), 
we cannot escape from the conviction that one of the two claims must be true and the 
other false (A501/B529-530). Since the principle is synthetic, it stands in need of 
something to justify its application to reality, just as all synthetic a priori judgements do; 
it requires reference to a ‘third thing’ to connect the conditions and unconditioned 
together. Since the antinomies concern our conception of the world as a whole and the 
world would seem to be the locus of this connection, analysing this concept is our next 
task.  
Understanding what Kant means by the ‘world’ is not an easy task. First, Kant 
explains that the object of his investigation are so-called ‘world-concepts’ that concern 
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‘the absolute totality in the synthesis of appearances’, which he equates with the idea of 
the ‘world-whole’ (A408/B434). From here, Kant divides the genus ‘world-concepts’ 
into two species; those of the ‘world’ and those of ‘nature’. The concept of the ‘world’ 
‘signifies the mathematical whole of all appearances and the totality of their synthesis in 
the great as well as the small, i.e., in their progress through composition as well as 
through division’ (A418/B446). By ‘nature’ Kant refers to ‘the very same world’ 
considered as ‘a dynamic whole’ in terms of the ‘unity in the existence of appearances’ 
(A418-419/B446-447), or as considering the sum of appearances as ‘a subsisting whole’ 
(A419n/B446n). Kant complicates matters by pointing out that he calls ‘world-
concepts’ ‘cosmological ideas’ in order to account for the ambiguity present in the term 
‘world’, for the latter can mean both ‘the sum total of all appearances’ but also, in its 
‘transcendental’ sense, the ‘sum total of existing things’ (A419/B447). As we will see, 
Kant exploits these ambiguities in his resolutions of the antinomies, particularly with 
respect to the division between mathematical and dynamical conflicts. For now, it is 
important to see that Kant can mean at least three different things by ‘the world’. He can 
be referring to the totality of appearances or the totality of existing things – these are not 
obviously equivalent expressions – and with respect to that ambiguity, he can in turn be 
considering the totality as a quantity in space and time, as a mathematical whole, or as a 
dynamic, explanatory whole.  
One further feature of the idea of the ‘world’ that is worth noting is its pseudo-
empirical status. Ostensibly, the idea refers to the complete synthesis of appearances, 
that is, objects of possible experience, and this suggests that the ‘world’ is simply a 
higher-order empirical concept. The problem is that the concept carries the synthesis of 
appearances beyond the limits of any possible experience, making it an ‘idea’ in Kant’s 
technical sense. The idea is inherently problematic, then, insofar as it combines a 
synthesis of empirical items with a transcendent degree of synthesis (A420/B448), 
which makes it a good candidate for a source of dialectical reasoning.
258
 Let us now go 
straight to the resolution of the first antinomy, where I will provide the bulk of my 
analysis.  
The first antinomy concerns the limits of the world in space and time. The thesis 
claims that it must be finite and the antithesis concludes that it must be infinite. Kant 
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argues that both claims are false. The world is not finite in space and time, but it is not 
on that account infinite either. Proponents of both positions wrongly take the thesis and 
antithesis to be contradictories that mutually exhaust all possible solutions, but in fact 
they are really contraries, for they do not exhaust all possibilities. Kant illustrates the 
structure of his resolution by appealing to an analogy: ‘If someone said that every body 
either smells good or smells not good, then there is a third possibility, namely that a 
body has no smell (aroma) at all, and thus both conflicting propositions can be false’ 
(A503/B531). Similarly, if someone says that ‘a square circle is round’ and someone 
else says ‘a square circle is not round’, we can say that both disputants are wrong, 
because the concept of a ‘square circle’ is inherently contradictory: square circles are 
logically impossible (Pro, 4: 341). Kant thinks that this same logic can be applied to the 
mathematical antinomies as the concept of the ‘world’ is also inherently contradictory. 
The idea of the ‘world’ as constituting a quantity in space and time is contradictory 
because it leads to the conclusions of both the thesis and antithesis. Since a 
contradiction cannot be true, it follows that the world cannot exist as a mathematical 
whole in space and time (modus tollens). This is the basis of Kant’s infamous indirect 
proof of transcendental idealism:  
 
The proof would consist in this dilemma. If the world is a whole existing in 
itself, then it is either finite or infinite. Now the first as well as the second 
alternative is false. […] Thus it is also false that the world (the sum total of all 
appearances) is a whole existing in itself. From which it follows that 
appearances in general are nothing outside our representations, which is just 
what we mean by their transcendental ideality. (A506-507/B534-535)
 
 
 
The indirect proof is very controversial.
259
 I take it to fail, at least in establishing 
transcendental idealism as Kant is employing it here. Clearly, if transcendental idealism 
and transcendental realism exhaust the only possible ways of understanding the status of 
the ‘world’ then Kant’s conclusion that transcendental idealism is true goes through 
(appearances are nothing outside our representations), but if it is not then the argument 
fails.
260
 We need to analyse this proof very carefully. First, if Kant’s reasoning is 
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correct, it does seem to be the case that the world cannot exist as a mathematical whole, 
if by so existing we are led to contradictory conclusions.  However, from this it is 
unclear whether we can really say that the world cannot so exist as a determinate 
totality or only that we cannot coherently represent it to ourselves that the world exists 
as a determinate quantity. In any case, it is not obvious that the denial that the world 
exists as a mathematical whole is in any way directly equivalent to ‘appearances being 
nothing outside of our representations’. To put the point another way, it is not clear that, 
despite structural similarities, Kant’s examples are relevantly similar enough to his 
transcendental conflict to warrant such a straightforward rejection of the thesis and 
antithesis as grounded on a self-contradictory concept.
261
  
 The concept of a square circle is inherently contradictory because it involves 
ascribing two properties to the object that cancel each other out. This is obvious and is 
unlikely to be contested (except perhaps by philosophers who reject contradiction as an 
adequate reason for taking something to be objectively impossible). By contrast, Kant’s 
explanation for why the concept of a world existing as a mathematical whole is 
contradictory is far from watertight. He argues that the appearance of a contradiction 
disappears once we assume that the world does not exist as a thing in itself. If we 
assume that the world is a thing in itself then it follows that it must be either finite or 
infinite, but if the world exists ‘only in the empirical regress of the series of 
appearances, and by itself it is not to be met with at all’ then it is neither finite nor 
infinite as a whole because it does not exist as a whole (A504-505/B532-533). One way 
of understanding Kant’s point would be to read him as denying that the ‘world’ is an 
object, or at least an object of possible experience. The world cannot have a finite or 
infinite magnitude because it is not an object; as such, it cannot have any magnitude in 
itself, because it is not the kind of thing that can have a magnitude. The attempt to 
determine the magnitude of the world as an object would appear to constitute a category 
error, mistaking the ‘world’ as a naming expression or definite description.262 The 
obvious problem is that this linguistic analysis does not seem remotely idealist. Granted, 
as Allison points out, it also ignores the role of transcendental illusion in generating the 
initial problem (2004: 389-390), but it seems that a realist can reject the dispute of the 
first antinomy by simply pointing out that the ‘world’ fails to refer, and so both sides are 
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wrong. It does not turn on any claim about the ideality of space and time, nor the 
ontological status of the objects of experience, and so it cannot feature in an indirect 
proof of transcendental idealism from the mere existence of the antinomy.  
 Nonetheless, the failure of the ‘world’ to refer seems to me to be inadequate to 
warrant the dissolution of the mathematical antinomies. We could reject the precise 
formulation of the thesis and antithesis, as erroneously assuming that the world is an 
object, and reformulate them to remove this assumption, while still expressing the pull 
of reason towards both conclusions. What is to stop us from simply asking whether if 
we could (per impossibile) travel through all of space or travel back in time (in Kant’s 
terms, keep the empirical regress of appearances going) would we reach a point where 
we could not travel any further, where we would find no ‘objects’ in space or ‘events’ in 
time? Admittedly, there are very questionable assumptions about space and time, among 
other things, at work here, but it still seems a natural enough question to ask, and the 
rejection of the world being an object does not seem sufficient to rule out any 
speculation whatsoever about the limits of the domain of events and objects in time and 
space. At most, Kant’s purported resolution shows only that great care must be taken to 
be precise and clear about the scope of the claims we make about the cosmos. Part of 
the problem in Kant’s presentation of the antinomies is the vagueness of his own central 
claims. When he effectively denies that the ‘world’ refers to an object, what sense of 
‘world’ is operative here? For example, he does not deny that there might be an 
outermost sun in space, or claim that we must have an infinite number of ancestors in 
time. Instead, he agrees that there could be an outermost sun in space and a first pair of 
living beings in our ancestral history (A522/B550). This is because both of these are 
determinate appearances that can be given as a whole in intuition. There we cannot say 
that the regress in their synthesis must be without end precisely because they are given 
as wholes (or can be so given), but while this may be so it makes it difficult to make 
sense of Kant’s overall claim that both the thesis and antithesis must be false. How can 
we make sense of the idea of an outermost sun if we do not have anything (an imagined 
or experienced boundary) by which to decide what is to count as the outermost?
263
 
Similarly, with respect to ancestral history, does Kant mean to deny that the Earth has a 
beginning in time as an empirical body? Presumably not, but then we need to be a great 
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deal clearer about just what is meant by the ‘sum total of appearances’, and what is to 
count as a possible appearance in this context. One could potentially resolve this 
problem by construing ‘world’ in its ‘transcendental’ sense as the ‘totality of existing 
things’. It does not make sense to ask whether the total sum of existing things has a 
beginning in time, but only of particular things in the world, not the world itself.
264
 It 
seems to me that Kant may be trading on the ambiguity of the ‘world’, as meaning both 
the ‘totality of appearances’ and the ‘totality of existing things’. In affirming that there 
can be an outermost sun, etc., he is relying on the ‘totality of existing things’ – the 
‘transcendental’ sense of the term – but in denying that the world can have a beginning 
in time or a limit in space, he is relying on the world as the ‘sum total of appearances’, 
where ‘appearance’ means precisely something given through and presented as being in 
space and time, since the latter are transcendentally ideal.
265
 The possible reformulation 
of the thesis and antithesis to avoid treating the world as a pseudo-object and the 
ambiguity inherent in the ‘world’ constitute two reasons to be suspicious about Kant’s 
‘both false’ resolution, but they are far from conclusive.266  
I want to now show that to get his ‘both false’ resolution, Kant must rely 
implicitly on a metaphysical idealism that is precluded by the deflationary and moderate 
metaphysical readings. That is, his idealism here does not just concern ways of 
considering objects transcendentally (as appearances/as things in themselves), or claim 
that the objects of our experience must be metaphysically inferior to their fundamental 
grounds, but consists of the outright idealist reduction of what exists to what can be 
determined to exist by human minds. The first option is advocated by Allison and Grier, 
the second option by Allais, and the third by Guyer. I will argue with Guyer that what 
Kant puts forward is an idealism that is hard to tell apart from Berkeley, but I will set 
out exactly what I think the deflationary reading should say about the mathematical 
antinomies and argue that, so construed, transcendental idealism does resolve the 
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antinomies.
267
 Let us first consider what Allison and Grier say. I argue that there are two 
issues here. First, I argue that Allison’s account contains an implicit reliance on just the 
kind of metaphysical idealism that he rejects as a characterization of transcendental 
idealism. Second, I argue that Grier’s analysis, at least of the second antinomy, ends up 
degrading appearances to how things merely seem to be to us, while things in 
themselves capture what is really true. Neither of these are satisfactory features for 
deflationary accounts to have since the central features of this interpretation are the 
rejection of the resemblance of Kant to Berkeley and the idea that appearances are only 
how things seem to be, and that there is some aspect of reality that we cannot know.
268
  
 Both of these deflationary readers take Kant’s resolution of the mathematical 
antinomies to be sound. They hold that Kant is correct to conclude that both the thesis 
and antithesis are false, and they also accept that Kant is correct to affirm a ‘both true’ 
verdict for the dynamical antinomies.
269
 I think this is mistaken. On the Allison-Grier 
reading, transcendental idealism is an epistemological or methodological thesis about 
the correct way of considering objects in relation to the conditions of their possibility. 
They can be considered in relation to the way they appear to us (as appearances) 
through being given through the forms of sensibility (space and time), and considered as 
things in themselves, things as thought through the categories independently of the 
conditions of sensibility.
270
 On this reading, Kant does not deny that objects of 
experience are real but instead draws attention to the essential role of epistemic 
conditions in the possibility of experience, conditions that do not derive from the nature 
of objects in themselves. The reading can also maintain, as I argued in Chapter 3, that 
the discursivity of human cognition entails the irreducible faculties of sensibility and 
understanding working together and that, because of their essential distinctness, it is 
possible for us to be misled by attempting to determine reality through pure concepts 
alone, as happens in Leibnizian metaphysics.   
 According to this reading, when Kant talks of things being appearances and not 
being things in themselves, what is at issue is whether or not these things are taken as 
things whose nature is determined by the sensible conditions of their experience or 
things that are thought to be determinable independently of those conditions. This is 
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confirmed by Allison in his analysis of what Kant means when he claims that if the 
conditions and conditioned were things in themselves then P2 would actually be true. 
Kant says:  
 
If the conditioned as well as its condition are things in themselves, then when 
the first is given not only is the regress to the second given as a problem, but 
the latter is thereby really already given along with it; and, because this holds for 
all members of the series, then the complete series of conditions, and hence the 
unconditioned is thereby simultaneously given, or rather it is presupposed by the 
fact that the conditioned, which is possible only through that series, is given. 
Here the synthesis of the conditioned with its conditions is a synthesis of the 
mere understanding, which represents things as they are without paying 
attention to whether and how we might achieve acquaintance with them. 
(A498/B526)f 
  
This is a very ambiguous passage, but it is undoubtedly the key to Kant’s entire 
strategy.
271
 Allison reads it along very similar lines to the account I gave in Chapter 3 of 
the Amphiboly. That is, when Kant equates a synthesis of the mere understanding as 
one representing how things are, this is not to be understood as saying that a synthesis 
of understanding succeeds in representing how things really are, but rather that it draws 
attention to how this synthesis can mislead us into thinking that we cognize how things 
really are when we employ the concepts of the understanding – here in the form of P2 – 
independently of the conditions under which they apply to reality.
272
 The main point is 
that by abstracting from sensibility the metaphysician implicitly takes the relationship 
between the conditioned and its conditions to be timeless, so that the conditions are 
given with the conditioned in just the same way that the premises of an argument are 
given simultaneously with the conclusion in a piece of syllogistic reasoning (A498-
499/B527-528, A417/B444). By contrast, transcendental idealism takes into account 
how things are given through the conditions of sensibility and thus the transcendental 
idealist can avoid being duped into thinking that the totality of conditions is given 
simultaneously with the conditioned.
273
 By distinguishing between appearances and 
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things in themselves we can see that P2 is illusory and therefore false, whereas 
transcendental realism has no way of seeing through the cognitive illusion: the 
unconditioned is not given simultaneously with the conditioned.
274
  
 While I believe that this is all correct, I nevertheless maintain that it is not 
sufficient to yield the conclusion that both claims must be false. Allais also questions 
the motivation behind the deflationary reading of Kant’s claim that the unconditioned 
would be given if the conditions were things in themselves, asking ‘why should 
abstracting from the conditions of knowledge force us to say anything about whether or 
not the unconditioned must be thought as given?’ As she points out, ‘abstracting gives 
you less, not more’, so it is hard to see how abstracting sensible conditions would allow 
Kant to say that mind-independent reality (things in themselves) must contain the 
unconditioned (2015: 93). If Allais is correct then a deflationary reading cannot say 
anything about how the antinomies should be resolved. Fortunately, I think this 
criticism rests on a misunderstanding of what is involved in the deflationary position. 
Allais’ objection would be right if the deflationary position maintained only that 
appearances are things merely considered in relation to the conditions of sensibility – 
then it would follow that Kant cannot claim that things in themselves contain the 
unconditioned – and things in themselves are things considered independently of those 
conditions, but the position contains more than this, or at least can contain more than 
this. Using the account given in Chapter 3, a deflationary account also shows that 
Kant’s conception of things in themselves covers what would be true of things if they 
were things whose nature could be determined through pure reason alone. If we attempt 
to determine reality through pure concepts, independently of their schemata/sensible 
conditions, then we reach erroneous metaphysical conclusions as these concepts cannot 
determine anything other than the basic form of thinking an object in general when 
deployed absent material from (sensible) intuition, through which an object is given. It 
is crucial to see that the sensible conditions not only realize but also restrict the 
application of pure concepts (A146-147/B185-186). We saw this in relation to P2 above: 
if there is no temporal gap between conditioned and conditions then they are given 
simultaneously, but reality cannot be accurately reflected through conceptual structures 
of thought alone; therefore, in relation to appearances, to reality determined through our 
conditions of cognition, P2 is false and illusory. In turn, this means that any attempt to 
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theoretically (or dogmatically) determine the world in terms of its extension, 
divisibility, causality and possibility is bound to fail. The same mistake underlies each 
of the antinomies. 
In each case, the thesis assumes that the world can be abstracted from its 
sensible conditions (space and time). It does this because it takes the sensible world to 
be a world ‘in general’, analogous to the object or thing ‘in general’, whereby it is 
thought through pure concepts independently of the sensible conditions that restrict and 
realize their application.
275
 The antithesis recognizes that the world of the senses is 
conditioned by space and time, but goes on to project these epistemological conditions 
of things as appearances as ontological conditions of all things in general. Since the 
thesis abstracts from time as a condition it assumes (erroneously) that all the conditions 
are given simultaneously, including an unconditioned first member; the antithesis 
assumes that all the conditions are given to infinity, rather than as a first member of the 
series.
276
 But does it follow from the necessary failure of the thesis and antithesis to 
dogmatically resolve the antinomies that there is no determinate ‘fact of the matter’ at 
issue? I do not think so.    
 While it is hard to see how the mere notion of considering sensible conditions 
concerning how objects are given to us could bear on whether or not the world can have 
a determinate magnitude, it could still be reasonably objected that taking into account 
the ideality of these sensible conditions does warrant the ‘both false’ resolution. 
Specifically, (i) if space and time are transcendentally ideal, then appearances – things 
as given in space and time – are also transcendentally ideal; if (ii) spatiotemporal 
objects are ideal, and the ‘world’ is just the ‘sum total’ of them, then it follows that the 
‘world’ itself is ideal; that is, (iii) the world does not exist outside of the empirical 
regress of representations. Since the world does not exist outside of the empirical 
regress then (iv) it is false that it is finite (there is no predetermined boundary), but it is 
also false that it is infinite (because this would be to negatively determine its boundary). 
Instead, as Kant says, the world’s magnitude, which is constituted only through the 
regress of appearances, can only be taken to continue indefinitely, insofar as it is 
possible for us to continue the regress (A504-507/B532-535, A517-523/B545-551). 
There are two problems here. First, (i) is consistent with two different interpretations of 
the transcendental ideality of appearances. On the traditional ‘two world’/phenomenalist 
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interpretation, appearances are things that really are spatiotemporal, but do not 
represent the ‘real’ things existing ‘behind’ them, where these putative ‘things’ (in 
themselves) are non-spatiotemporal.
277
 In other words, space and time do not exist 
mind-independently and this status is transferred directly over to the things intuited in 
space and time: they also do not exist mind-independently.
278
 If we insert that 
interpretation of (i) into the argument then the conclusion (iv) directly follows, since the 
items that make up the ‘world’ do not exist in themselves, it follows that the ‘world’ 
does not exist as a mind-independent thing (in itself). By contrast, if we take a ‘one 
world’ approach (be it deflationary or moderately metaphysical), so that the 
transcendental ideality of space and time does not transfer to the existence of 
appearances as objects of possible experience, but only to the way in which these things 
are represented, then (iv) no longer follows. This is crucial: by interpreting (i) in ‘one 
world’ terms space is made for a distinction between the ideality of the existence of 
things and the ideality of the manner of representing things in a way that is closed to 
traditional interpretations, but as we have seen, Allison and Grier nonetheless agree 
with the ‘both false’ resolution.279 This is odd because Allison makes clear that a major 
advantage of his position is that ‘the temptation to worry about the existence of things in 
themselves disappears once it is recognized that Kant is not primarily concerned with a 
separate class of entities, which, unlike appearances, would supposedly “be there” even 
if there were no finite cognizers’ (2004: 51). Instead, what is ideal is merely the manner 
in which things are represented (as spatiotemporal), as indicated by Kant in this 
important (but double-edged) passage:   
 
We have sufficiently proven in the Transcendental Aesthetic that everything 
intuited in space or in time, hence all objects of an experience possible for us, 
are nothing but appearances, i.e., mere representations, which, as they are 
represented, as extended beings or series of alterations, have outside our 
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thoughts no existence grounded in itself. This doctrine I call transcendental 
idealism. The realist, in the transcendental signification, makes these 
modifications of our sensibility into things subsisting in themselves, and hence 
makes mere representations into things in themselves. (A490-491/B518-519) 
  
The passage can easily be read in favour of either ‘one world’ or ‘two world’ 
interpretations. The identification of ‘appearances’ with ‘mere representations’ which 
are not to be taken as ‘subsisting’ things clearly supports the latter, but, equally, the 
former can appeal to the phrase ‘as they [objects of experience] are represented, as 
extended beings or series of alterations, have outside our thoughts no existence 
grounded in itself.’280 In other words, the existence of things is not threatened by 
transcendental idealism, for Kant’s idealism concerns only the form in which they 
appear to cognitive subjects. This distinction is precisely what allows Kant to 
distinguish his idealism from Berkeley’s (Allison 2004, 35). However, taking seriously 
the deflationary interpretation of Kant’s idealism requires modifying Kant’s resolution. 
We cannot say that the ‘world’ does not exist apart from in the regress of appearances 
since the ‘world’ refers to both the ‘sum total of appearances’ and to ‘the totality of 
existing things’. On the deflationary account, things exist and, therefore, the ‘world’ in 
the ‘transcendental’ sense also exists. Reality exists in an indeterminate way because 
only through space and time and the principles of the understanding can we make 
claims about the individuation and quantity of things, but nonetheless mind-independent 
reality exists. What does not exist is the ‘world-whole’, for as Kant says, such a world-
whole can never be given in intuition (A519/B547). But does it follows that there is no 
determinate ‘fact of the matter’ regarding the magnitude of the world? No, all that 
follows so far is that we can only say that the magnitude is indefinite, since we cannot 
have an intuition of an infinite series (of parts of space or moments in time), nor of a 
finite boundary. Neither of these are objects of possible experience. Moreover, since 
things are not in space and time – that is, represented spatiotemporally as extended 
beings, etc., – independently of their being represented as being in space and time 
through being given in our forms of intuition (A374-375), then it is impossible to 
determine the magnitude of the world prior to instituting the empirical regress of 
intuitions. Objects cannot be given as objects of experience unless they are given 
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 Indeed, Allison uses this passage to justify his reading of appearances as qualifying how things appear 
rather than stating that appearances exist only in a Berkeleyan sense (2004: 35).  
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through the forms of space and time; that is, they cannot be assigned a determinate 
magnitude unless synthesized in space and time as magnitudes. But to claim that 
something cannot have a determinate magnitude (in the sense of its having some fact of 
the matter if given through synthesis) because that magnitude cannot be determined 
independently of the act of assigning one (through the regressive synthesis) is an invalid 
argument, for it equivocates on the meaning of the conditioned and conditions ‘being 
given’. This is our second problem.  
 Specifically, Kant reasons from one sense of the conditions ‘being given’, the 
sense in which the conditions are given simultaneously with the conditioned, to a 
conclusion about another sense that concerns the existence of the conditions, that is, if 
they cannot be presented with the conditioned then they do not exist.
281
 Kant does not 
just make the epistemically modest claim that, from the human standpoint, the 
unconditioned cannot be given, but the epistemically immodest claim that the 
unconditioned does not exist at all in the case of the mathematical antinomies.
282
 Kant is 
particularly explicit about this in the second Critique, where he states that for the 
mathematical antinomies ‘the unconditioned can never be found’ because ‘the two 
opposed ways of finding the unconditioned and the totality of conditions for it were 
both false’ (CPR, 5: 104). This is not just a claim about what we cannot cognize, but a 
claim about what exists, irrespective of whether we can cognize it or not. Kant’s main 
reason for this conclusion is that the mathematical antinomies concern a different kind 
of synthesis to the dynamical ones. We will see below that this distinction is flawed. All 
that can be said so far is that the world as a spatiotemporal whole cannot be given in 
intuition, but not the claim that the world (in the ‘transcendental’ sense) has no 
determinate magnitude.  
There is, then, a very narrow and specific sense in which Kant can say that the 
world itself has no spatiotemporal magnitude, but this sense precludes ruling out the 
idea that there is any sense in which it exists as a determinate (but unknowable) totality: 
things exist but they cannot exist as a spatiotemporal whole unless they are represented 
through our forms of intuition; things cannot be represented as a complete collection in 
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 Wood also takes ‘being given’ to be relevantly ambiguous (2010: 259-260).  
282
 Similarly, Allison remarks that the unconditioned and conditions in the mathematical antinomies 
cannot be said to exist, not even in principle from a God’s-eye perspective (2004: 385). I discuss 
Allison’s account further in Section 3.  
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space and time by us; therefore, the world does not exist as a spatiotemporal whole.
283
 
But since the things that are appearances are just the same things that are things in 
themselves (at least on the ‘one world’ views under current consideration), we can also 
say that, if we could intuit all objects of possible experience (objects in space/events in 
time) then we could determine how far the empirical regress could actually go. In short, 
while the world does not exist as a spatiotemporal whole, it does exist as a determinate 
totality, and there could be a fact of the matter about far the empirical regress could go, 
albeit this fact is necessarily unknowable for us.
284
 To deny this is to implicitly fall back 
into a ‘two world’ interpretation of the ideality of appearances where it is their existence 
that is cancelled out, rather than the manner in which they are represented as existing. In 
Section 1.2 below I will develop this resolution by drawing on Kant’s pre-Critical 
account of metaphysical error. I have argued that Allison’s Kant must implicitly rely on 
a ‘two world’ conception of transcendental idealism to get the ‘both false’ resolution 
through; now I want to show that such a resolution also converts the transcendental 
distinction back into a distinction between appearance and reality by examining an 
example from Grier’s account.  
 Grier explicitly advocates the methodological reading of transcendental idealism 
(2001: 86-94). It is therefore surprising that in her analysis of the mathematical 
antinomies she comes very close to identifying appearances with how reality seems to 
be to us and things in themselves with how reality really is. Consider this explanation of 
the resolution of the second antinomy, concerning whether composite substances are 
finitely or infinitely divisible:  
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 For a similar verdict see Guyer (1987: 385-411), who argues that Kant’s ‘both false’ resolution goes 
through only by assuming the principle that what exists must be determinable by or decidable for us. I 
agree, but have chosen to focus on Kant’s possible equivocation on the senses of the conditions ‘being 
given’. 
284
 Kant even considers the possibility that things in themselves outreach our representations, hinting at 
the possibility of a ‘both true’ resolution of the first antinomy in this late note: ‘A thing in itself does not 
depend on our representations, and can thus be much greater than our representations reach. But 
appearances are themselves only representations, and their magnitude, i.e., the idea of their generation 
through progressus, cannot be greater than this progressus; and since this is never given as infinite, but 
rather as only possible to infinity, the magnitude of the world as appearance is also not infinite, but the 
progressus in it proceeds to infinity’ (R5902, 18: 379, 1785-1789). As appearance the world’s magnitude 
is indefinite, but as a thing in itself it could be greater than our representations. This is very different to 
saying that it is absolutely impossible that the world is either, because it is not a thing in itself. Similarly, 
in an earlier note he reflects that ‘The world has a beginning, not, however, as appearance but rather as 
being in itself’ (R4618, 17: 610, 1772). Kant goes too far here by saying that the world (in itself) does 
have a beginning, but the basic point that we cannot conclude that world in itself does not have a 
beginning simply because the world as appearance does not is in line with the deflationary, 
methodological view that Kant should have taken in the Critique. See also note 301 below. 
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In short, if composites are things as they are, then we must conceive their 
elements to be either prior to or conditioned by (coextensive with) space (i.e., 
the exclusive disjunction seems to stand). Transcendental idealism shows the 
error in both. Because space necessarily conditions any composite, understood 
as appearance, we cannot argue with the thesis that appearances have the 
unconditionally simple at their ground. As appearance, the composite and each 
of its parts is necessarily given in space. But because space itself is 
transcendentally ideal, we also cannot conclude (along with the antithesis) from 
features of our sensation of the real to a metaphysics of things as they are; that 
is, we cannot conclude that “things as they are” independent of us necessarily 
conform to the (geometrical) features of space-time (e.g., infinite divisibility). 
(Grier 2001, 213; Grier’s emphasis) 
    
Although the locution ‘things as they are’ was earlier given a deflationary interpretation 
it is very hard to not read its use by Grier as lacking the further implication that ‘things 
as they are’ are how things really are independently of us. If this is how Kant’s 
methodological resolution of the mathematical antinomies is to be understood then I can 
see no discernible difference between this reading and the metaphysical reading that 
Grier and Allison both oppose, for this statement explicitly takes Kant to have denied 
something about the real nature of things (that things independent of us conform to the 
geometrical features of space-time). But, I also confess that I am puzzled by Grier’s 
resolution, for the last sentence suggests something much closer to the methodological 
recommendations of the Dissertation – to be discussed below – that puts her account of 
the resolution explicitly at odds with Kant’s. For Kant does not say that the thesis could 
be true of things in themselves (reality could contain the simple), while the antithesis is 
true of appearances, but that both conclusions are necessarily false.
285
 To take up 
agnosticism about the unconditioned being predicable of mind-independent things in 
themselves is also to reject Kant’s own resolution in the Critique, as he declares that 
both thesis and antithesis are not only false but also absolutely impossible.
286
 It is also, 
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 However, just as he suggested in his notes that things in themselves could be bigger than our 
representations reach, in another text after the Critique he suggests that the simple could exist in things in 
themselves. See Discovery (8: 209-209n) and note 301 below.  
286
 Specifically, Kant moves from the already familiar claim that we cannot experience an infinite time-
series in the world of sense and nor can we experience an absolute boundary of the world of sense, to 
their actual impossibility. From this empirical impossibility, because of the reduction of spatiotemporal 
objects to representations, he declares that a beginning of the series in time or the world to be infinite in 
  
178 
 
as I will show below, to effectively elide any significant difference between how the 
mathematical and dynamical antinomies should be resolved. Before turning to the ‘both 
true’ resolution of the dynamical antinomies I want to briefly examine Kant’s earlier 
account of metaphysical error to substantiate how I think a methodological reading of 
the mathematical antinomies should run. 
 
1.2. Kant’s Alternative Methodological Resolution  
 
It is generally acknowledged that Kant’s procedure in the Inaugural Dissertation 
is methodological; it is controversial, however, whether this method carries over to the 
Critique.
287
 I shall argue that the Inaugural Dissertation is methodological throughout 
in its resolution of metaphysical problems and that the Critique is methodological only 
in the resolution of the dynamical antinomies. The Inaugural Dissertation contains a 
superior method for dealing with the problems of metaphysics. In the fifth section Kant 
analyses one particular source of metaphysical error concerning how principles of 
sensitive cognition can contaminate those of intellectual cognition.
288
 He issues a 
warning to metaphysicians that whatever is predicated of a concept of the understanding 
that has to do with relations of space and time, due to the ideality of the latter, ‘must not 
be asserted objectively; it only denotes the condition in the absence of which a given 
concept would not be sensitively cognizable’ (ID, 2: 412-413). The fallacy of 
predicating spatiotemporal relations of objects of understanding (intellectual cognitions) 
                                                                                                                                               
past time to be ‘absolutely impossible’, completely cutting off any possibility of epistemic humility in the 
conclusion. That is, they are not just impossible for us to experience, but also impossible in themselves 
(A520-521/B548-549). I reject the inference from empirical impossibility to absolute impossibility 
because it turns on the principle that what exists must be determinable by us, whereas Allison accepts it 
(2012: 18). I therefore also disagree with Ameriks who  attempts to save Kant from the charge of begging 
the question by suggesting that it is the dogmatists who rely on the spurious principle that experience is a 
reliable guide to absolute dimensions (2003: 109-110), for while this is undeniably true, it is an 
inadequate defence because Kant also relies on this principle: Kant does not make the epistemologically 
modest claim that we cannot know whether the world is finite or infinite, but the epistemologically and 
ontologically immodest claim that since both are ‘empirically impossible’ they are both ‘absolutely 
impossible’, in direct contrast to his methodological procedure in the dynamical antinomies. 
287
 Guyer (1987: 16-20 and Ch. 18, esp. 388-390) argues that Kant’s procedure prior to the Critique is 
laudably methodological, but that it becomes dogmatic and metaphysical in the Critique. Guyer has been 
attacked for this view by Grier (2001: 191-194) and Allison (2004: 394-395), who both take the 
methodological method to carry over into the Critique and critically dispute Guyer’s ontological reading 
of transcendental idealism.  
288
 Kant actually claims that he is concerned with preventing ‘the infection of sensitive cognition by 
cognition deriving from the understanding’ (ID, 2: 411), but Walford (in Kant 2002, 407, n.x) says that 
Kant must mean the opposite, and indeed this is apparently confirmed a few lines later: ‘great care must 
be taken lest the principles which are native to sensitive cognition transgress their limits, and affect what 
belongs to the understanding’ (ID, 2: 411). Allison agrees and concludes that Kant is entirely concerned 
with the contamination of intellectual cognition by sensitive principles (2015a: 78, n.81).  
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issues in what Kant calls three ‘subreptic axioms’ (ID, 2: 412). Kant’s rejection of the 
axioms constitutes a recommendation of epistemic modesty. At the basis of the 
‘subreptic axioms’ is the mistaken assumption that whatever cannot be given in our 
sensible intuition is impossible. This spurious principle is invalidly derived from the 
true principle that, whatever cannot be given in any intuition at all is not thinkable, and 
is therefore impossible (ID, 2: 412-413).
289
 The claim is that we conflate what is 
subjectively impossible (because not cognizable by us) with what is objectively 
impossible (because not thinkable/able to be intuited at all). Admittedly, the pre-Critical 
Kant uses this modesty to open up space for direct (intellectual) cognition of noumena 
(God and the soul) (ID, 2: 406-410), whereas the Critical Kant does not.
290
 Nonetheless, 
the warning not to mistake subjective impossibility for objective impossibility is sound 
advice, and, moreover, these ‘subreptic axioms’ clearly anticipate the problems of the 
Antinomy (though not yet expressed in the form of antinomies). The axioms transfer 
conditions of sensitive cognition over to the objects themselves (making them the 
equivalent of intellectual cognitions). The three axioms are:  
 
1. The same sensitive condition, under which alone the intuition of an object is 
possible, is a condition of the possibility itself of the object.  
2. The same sensitive condition, under which alone it is possible to compare 
what is given so as to form a concept of the understanding of the object, is also a 
condition of the possibility itself of the object.  
3. The same sensitive condition, under which alone some object met with can be 
subsumed under a given concept of the understanding, is also a condition of the 
possibility of the object itself. (ID, 2: 413)  
 
The first and second axioms are the most relevant. The first axiom is illustrated by the 
principle ‘whatever is, is somewhere and somewhen’, and Kant finds it at work in ‘idle 
questions’ about the location of the soul and God. There is an indirect link between this 
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 As Allison points out, Kant is unfortunately silent on the question of how we can know when 
something cannot be given in any intuition (2015a: 79).  
290
 Some think that Kant allows cognition of things in themselves through practical reason. Allison denies 
this (2004: 48), while Wood affirms it (2010: 264-265). Walsh is very suspicious of the role of practical 
considerations in the resolution of the antinomies (1975: 211-214). Kohl (2015: 102-109, esp. 103) thinks 
that Kant allows us to give positive content to the idea of noumenal freedom and things in themselves 
through practical reason, but that this does not address theoretical questions, such as how freedom is 
possible. 
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axiom and some aspects of the antinomies. For example, the axiom could underlie the 
thought that the world, as an object, must have a location in space and time (a 
beginning and a limit), or that, in relation to the fourth antinomy, the necessary being 
must be part of the world (as in space and time) and not outside it. In addition, since the 
mathematical antinomies allegedly parallel the application of the mathematical 
principles of the understanding they also can be said to concern the possibility of 
intuition (of the world), just as their legitimate counterparts (the axioms of intuition and 
anticipations of perception) make possible the intuition of appearances.
291
  
A direct link exists between the antinomies and the second axiom. Kant gives 
two examples of this axiom: ‘every actual multiplicity can be given numerically, and 
thus every magnitude is finite. The second is: whatever is impossible, contradicts itself’ 
(ID, 2: 415). The first example immediately suggests the first antinomy, specifically the 
thesis. The error stems from the fact that forming a conception of magnitude entails 
sensitive intuition of the object. Since sensitive intuition of an object occurs only 
through successive synthesis, the apprehension of the object needs to be attainable in a 
finite time; since an infinite series is one that cannot be apprehended successively to 
completion, it follows that we can have no sensitive cognition of an infinite magnitude. 
Once again, we move from the subjective impossibility of our apprehension of an 
infinite series to the objective impossibility of an infinite series itself (ibid).  
In 1770, then, Kant was well aware of the dangers of conflating what we can 
judge to be possible in accordance with our specific cognitive powers and what may be 
objectively possible. Notwithstanding his theory of cognition of noumena through the 
(uncontaminated) use of the intellect, Kant’s procedure for dealing with metaphysical 
disputes turns on an analysis of the different cognitive powers and the strict separation 
of their domains of application. Because sensitive cognition is limited to the object 
considered as phenomenon we should not expect truths knowable through reason to 
necessarily be displayable in experience. Equally, we should not dismiss the 
conclusions of experience just because they do not match the requirements of reason. 
What we find in the Dissertation is a subtle and sophisticated account of the ways in 
which (what will later be identified as) reason and the understanding exert their 
influence on attempts to find complete explanations of phenomena, but in a way that 
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 Kemp Smith is suspicious of Kant’s transference of the mathematical/dynamical distinction from the 
categories over to the ideas of reason (2003: 510), whereas Allison accepts the claimed link (2004: 364-
365; 2012: 17).  
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advocates epistemic modesty as the preferred position. To rephrase in terms of the 
Critique, just because the unconditioned cannot be displayed in sense experience we 
should not conclude that it is impossible in itself, but equally we should not take the 
conclusions of our sense experience to be false because they do not match up to the 
principles of reason.  
Kant’s account of transcendental illusion, if correct, has doomed the aspirations 
of reason to settle the antinomies dogmatically by deciding with certainty in favour of 
one side over the other, but once construed in a genuine deflationary way, it leaves open 
the possibility that there is a determinate ‘fact of the matter’ at issue in the conflicts, but 
cautions that the question of which side (if either) is correct is undecidable from the 
human standpoint. Notice that my resolution is different from Kant’s official account 
but that it takes into consideration how transcendental idealism exhibits the errors in the 
arguments of both parties. If Kant is right, then P2, the ‘natural and unavoidable’ 
illusory principle that the conditions are given with the conditioned in a complete series 
back to the unconditioned, guarantees that any attempt we make on the basis of pure 
reason to answer the questions that transcend possible experience will always fail. In 
this sense, it is true that both the thesis and the antithesis of the mathematical 
antinomies are false, even necessarily false, for P2 will always sabotage our attempt, 
either (as with the thesis) wrongly concluding something about the world on the basis of 
abstracting from its spatiotemporal nature, or (as with the antithesis) wrongly projecting 
space and time as ontological conditions of all reality, not just empirically cognizable 
reality. But this holds just as well for the dynamical theses and antitheses as well. What 
my account does not rule out, contrary to Kant, is the possibility that there could be a 
fact of the matter with respect to things in themselves, things as they are considered 
independently of our epistemic conditions. As I will demonstrate below, my account fits 
exactly with Kant’s resolution of the dynamical antinomies. The thesis takes the 
intellectual conditions as constitutive independently of the sensible conditions under 
which they apply to reality; the antithesis takes the sensible conditions as holding 
without qualification of all things in general. Neither side manages to tell us anything 
about the nature and existence of the unconditioned, but only by a non-sequitur can we 
conclude that not only do both types of argument necessarily fail to prove their 
conclusion, but that both conclusions are, in themselves, necessarily false as well.   
 
1.3. Objections and Responses  
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 In this Section I want to consider some of the objections that could be raised 
against my position that the mathematical antinomies are undecidable for us. First, I 
consider Gardner’s objection that ‘undecidability’ is not an appropriate resolution of the 
antinomies and offer some responses. Relatedly, I consider whether Kant’s ‘both false’ 
resolution can still be deemed ‘methodological’, as Grier and Allison both claim. 
Second, I consider the much-cited fact that Kant distinguishes between the 
mathematical and dynamical antinomies on the basis that they involve different kinds of 
synthesis, and the implication that this distinction justifies Kant’s different resolutions. I 
argue that the distinction is problematic and that it does not provide adequate grounds 
for Kant’s different resolutions.  
 Gardner (1999) considers the possibility that Kant should have concluded not 
that there is no determinate fact of the matter regarding the world’s magnitude, but 
rather that the question is unanswerable, for the truth cannot be known by us. He argues 
that ‘undecidability fails in this context to count as a philosophical solution’ (1999: 
251). Gardner’s first point turns heavily on the assumption that the arguments of the 
thesis and antithesis are sound – let us assume that they are. Gardner asks us to assume 
that there is a truth at issue, that the universe is in fact finite in space and time, and that 
we somehow know this – perhaps God told us.292 He then points out that we would be 
stuck in a hopeless position of knowing that the thesis is definitely true, and therefore 
knowing that the antithesis is false, but being unable to understand how the antithesis 
can possibly be wrong given that its argument is actually sound. As Kant says, 
‘however the answer might come out, it would only increase our ignorance’ 
(A485/B513). Gardner compares this unhappy situation with the idea of God telling us 
that 2+2 does not equal 4, suggesting that we would find such a case ‘inconceivable’ 
(1999: 251). Second, in order to make ‘undecidability’ an appropriate solution, the 
transcendental realist would need to provide a plausible account of why the truth is 
something that is beyond our capacity to ratiocinate about, but since transcendental 
realism holds the mode of our cognition to be adequate to knowledge of things in 
themselves, such a realist cannot do this without already embarking on the Critical path 
(1999: 252). By contrast, Gardner maintains that ‘the diagnostic power of the Critical 
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 If the reference to God’s knowledge is unconvincing, then we can substitute it with an infallible or 
much-higher intellect. The important point is that, for the purposes of the thought experiment, we 
somehow learn that the thesis really is true and the antithesis really is false, or vice versa, but that the 
arguments nonetheless appear to us to be fully cogent.  
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perspective’ allows Kant to explain the paradox in three ways: (1) in terms of different 
conceptions of the unconditioned in relation to different cognitive powers, (2) in terms 
of the conflation of appearances and things in themselves, and (3) by understanding the 
bounds of knowledge (1999: 253). Explaining that Kant takes the antinomies to be a 
problem forced on us not by the objects themselves – we do not perceive finite or 
infinite world-series – but by the ideas of reason, Gardner concludes that 
‘undecidability’ fails as a solution ‘not because it leaves us in perplexity regarding the 
cosmos, but because it leaves us in perplexity regarding ourselves’ (1999: 254-255).  
 Before I reply to Gardner’s points, it is important to note where we agree. 
Certainly, we agree that there is a transcendental illusion operating in the arguments of 
both the thesis and antithesis that nulls any claim to validity. We also agree that the 
‘Critical perspective’ allows Kant to explain the antinomies in terms of conflicting 
conceptions of the unconditioned, linked to the different requirements of our main two 
cognitive powers. The antithesis is influenced by the understanding’s principles always 
to seek further conditions, while reason influences the thesis in desiring completeness in 
the series of conditions. However, while transcendental idealism certainly entails the 
distinction between understanding and reason, I confess I do not see why it could not be 
open to a more sophisticated realist to distinguish between different cognitive powers 
and their influences and requirements. At any rate, the important point is that I am not 
arguing on behalf of transcendental realism: my account of how Kant should have 
resolved the mathematical antinomies is still transcendental idealist; my form of 
‘undecidability’ concerns a ‘fact of the matter’ in relation to things in themselves, while 
we can only say that the synthesis of appearances is indefinite.  
Taking Gardner’s first point, I agree that Kant thinks a dogmatic answer only 
increases our ignorance. If Kant’s proofs on each side of the equation are sound then it 
is very hard to reconcile the known truth of one position with the successful argument of 
its opponent. This, of itself, however, does not seem to me a convincing objection. With 
respect to the dynamical antinomies, particularly the third antinomy, Kant does seem to 
take both sides to be potentially true, and as years of analysis will testify, making sense 
of how one and the same subject can be both fully determined as phenomenon and 
possibly free as noumenon is extremely difficult. Indeed, Kant goes to great pains to 
stress that he is not proving the reality of freedom, but only that its possible reality does 
not contradict the lawfulness of nature (A558/B586). I suggest, then, that this objection 
is a good one, but that it counts just as much against the ‘both true’ resolution of the 
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dynamical antinomies that Gardner (and others) look favourably upon as it does against 
taking the mathematical antinomies to be undecidable. Granted, Kant does not exactly 
claim the dynamical antinomies are undecidable, but he does think we can accept the 
possible reality of freedom while still remaining committed to thoroughgoing 
determinism holding for phenomena: this is effectively the same as admitting that we 
are ignorant as to how both positions can really be true, but this is no argument against 
them both being true (in some suitably qualified sense), which is what Gardner would 
need to make his first point stick.
293
  
I think Gardner’s second point rests on an interpretative difference concerning 
what it means to be a transcendental realist. On Gardner’s account, a transcendental 
realist is someone who thinks that we have knowledge of things in themselves, where 
the latter is understood to be how things really are, independently of our conditions of 
cognition. Appearances have an inferior reality compared to things in themselves (1999: 
294), and the transcendental philosopher is constrained to make claims only about 
‘necessities of representation’ rather than how reality actually is, about the ‘shape’ of 
the human perspective, not the ‘fundamental constituents of reality’ (1999: 304). As 
such, it is of course true that if a transcendental realist thinks our mode of cognition can 
reveal how things really are then it makes little sense for this same realist to think that 
there are things about reality that we necessarily cannot know, such as the magnitude of 
the cosmos. But this is not what Kant says, at least here in the Antinomy. He says that 
the transcendental realist makes what are mere representations (appearances) into things 
subsisting for themselves (A490-491/B518-519); thus, this realist reifies representations 
into things and makes an object (the world) out of ‘mere representations’. This is why 
the mathematical antinomies are not undecidable for Kant, because the thing we call the 
‘world’ does not exist outside of the indefinite regress of appearances. When Kant talks 
about the world being appearance or thing in itself he seems to be talking about the 
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 In the third Critique Kant appeals frequently to a different conception of things in themselves as the 
supersensible substratum of nature, in order to resolve the antinomies of taste and judgement. Kant argues 
that, while from the human standpoint, we cannot unify the two types of judgement together, nor give one 
a higher priority than the other, they may nonetheless be ‘objectively unifiable’ in the supersensible 
ground of appearances (CPJ, §78). I suggest that a similar appeal could be made to the supersensible 
ground (or equivalently, appeal to the principle of the purposiveness of nature), to ground the possibility 
that natural causality and spontaneous causality could also be ‘objectively unifiable’, despite the fact that 
we cannot coherently unify the two types of causality as causal explanations of human actions. See 
Geiger (2011: 81-87) for an insightful discussion of the role of the ‘supersensible’ in the third Critique; 
however, while I find his analysis of the principle of purposiveness in relation to the supersensible 
compelling, I do not agree that the notion has no ontological aspects, as he claims. 
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ontological status of the thing in question rather than whether we take knowledge to be 
of how things really are (or not).
294
 
This point also addresses whether the ‘both false’ resolution can be considered 
‘methodological’. I maintain against Allison and Grier that it cannot, as can be seen 
from this passage:  
 
Now if I ask about the magnitude of the world with respect to space and time, 
for all of my concepts it is just as impossible to assert that it is infinite as that it 
is finite. For neither of these can be contained in experience, because it is not 
possible to have experience either of an infinite space or infinitely flowing time, 
or of a bounding of the world by empty space or by an earlier, empty time; these 
are only ideas. Therefore the magnitude of the world, determined one way or the 
other, must lie in itself, apart from all experience […]  
 
So far, this is very suggestive of the methodological restrictions recommended by the 
pre-Critical Kant. We cannot have an experience of infinite space or time or of a limit to 
either, so, Kant reasons that ‘the magnitude of the world, determined one way or the 
other, must lie in itself, apart from all experience’, but then Kant continues:  
 
But this contradicts the concept of a sensible world, which is merely a sum total 
of appearance, whose existence and connection takes place only in 
representation, namely in experience, since it is not a thing in itself, but is itself 
nothing but a kind of representation. From this it follows that, since the concept 
of a sensible world existing for itself is self-contradictory, any solution to this 
problem as to its magnitude will always be false, whether the attempted solution 
be affirmative or negative. (Pro, 4: 342) 
 
Kant’s claim here is hard to reconcile with his avowed humility.295 Furthermore, his 
conclusion that the world and its components are nothing but representations violates 
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 Gardner himself makes effectively the same point against the methodological reading by saying that 
the locution ‘the world in itself’ does not lend itself easily to their ‘thing considered in itself’ 
interpretation (1999: 292). 
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 The passage also indirectly exhibits the failure of the ‘indirect proof’ to licence the conclusion that 
appearances are nothing outside our representations, for as can be seen, although Kant does try to force 
the stronger conclusion that all appearances are representations, one could just say that the world is 
transcendentally ideal without its components (appearances) having to be ideal.  
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his own ‘sceptical method’ and objections that he employs. Specifically, a ‘dogmatic’ 
objection is one where the critic argues he has insight into the constitution of the object, 
whereas a critical one shows only that the ‘assertion is groundless, not that it is 
incorrect’ (A388). If Kant’s resolution really is reducing objects to representations, then 
he is clearly overstepping his claim to provide only a ‘critical’ objection to the 
assertions of reason by making the dogmatic claim that his ‘indirect proof’ of 
transcendental idealism ‘brings us to a discovery about the true constitution of things as 
objects of sense’ (A507/B535; my emphasis; A423-424/B451). Nonetheless, we have 
yet to consider Kant’s direct explanation for resolving the dynamical antinomies with a 
‘both true’ resolution: his argument that the two types of antinomy entail different kinds 
of synthesis, and so this is our next task. 
Kant claims that the mathematical antinomies concern a synthesis of the 
homogenous, of appearances in space and time. Because the synthesis concerns 
homogenous items it must always connect spatiotemporal appearances; there is no space 
for things in themselves, so Kant cannot invoke things in themselves in resolving the 
mathematical antinomies (A528-529/B556-557). By contrast, the dynamical antinomies 
may admit of a synthesis that includes heterogeneous items, or can at least be thought to 
include them without contradiction, hence it may be that both positions are true for 
these conflicts rather than both false (A530-531/B558-559). Like their categorial 
counterparts, the dynamical antinomies concern what must be thought in relation to 
appearances, rather than what must be intuited, as Allison correctly points out (2012: 
17). However, I do not find this convincing, for several reasons.  
First, the idea that only the dynamical antinomies involve what must be thought 
rather than intuited is false. Specifically, we do not intuit the boundary of the world nor 
its infinitude, but as Kant says, we have the latter in the world-whole only in concept 
(A519/B547), which is effectively to say that we think it as the unconditioned ground of 
the world-series.
296
 Second, the idea that the dynamical antinomies may go beyond 
appearances to include (thought of) things in themselves constitutes a clear revision by 
Kant of his opening diagnosis, according to which all of the antinomies concern what 
must be thought to complete the objective synthesis of empirically given appearances; 
what must be thought with respect to things in general/things in themselves is reserved 
explicitly for the Ideal of Reason (A407-408/B434-435). Furthermore, Kant claims that 
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the ‘world-concepts’ only carry the degree of the synthesis to transcendence, not in kind 
(A419-420/B447-448), but invoking any reference to things in themselves, even as 
merely negatively-conceived intelligible grounds, violates the ‘same-in-kind’ 
restraint.
297
 While Kant’s accounts of freedom and God are far from clear, it is 
undeniable that intelligible causality and a necessary being are not appearances, in 
either ‘one world’ or ‘two world’ interpretations. In fact, given the strict methodological 
constraints on the deflationary view – that in talking of ‘things in themselves’ Kant is 
defining the notion in terms of the activities involved in thinking things in general/as 
objects of pure understanding, or that in speaking of things in themselves, Kant is 
talking about a philosophical way of considering things, rather than a set of objects that 
are distinct from appearances (Grier 2001, 89-90) – it is hard to make sense of what it 
would mean to add things (distinct heterogeneous items) to a synthesis of appearances 
when such things are supposedly the same things but just considered ‘in themselves’. Of 
course, Allison’s view is meant to leave open the idea of things that are only things in 
themselves, but many have suspected that he cannot coherently do that by the 
constraints of his own interpretation.
298
 By contrast, if we allow for a methodological 
conception of things in themselves for the objects of experience and a metaphysical 
conception of things in themselves as the unconditioned then there is no difficulty in 
making sense of Kant’s resolution. 
Third, Kant draws a distinction between two kinds of ‘world-concepts’. He 
distinguishes between the ‘world’ in the narrow sense, as a magnitude, and ‘nature’ as 
the very same world but considered as a dynamic and explanatory whole. I argue that 
this is undermined if Kant’s ‘both false’ resolution for the mathematical antinomies is 
taken seriously. The issue concerns how Kant characterizes the two senses. A dynamic 
whole is one that is ‘a subsisting whole’ (A418n-419n/B446n), yet this cannot be 
identified with being the very same ‘world’ as the mathematical whole of appearances, 
for that world is the sensible world; that is, ‘the sum total of appearances’, a concept of 
a world for which Kant states that it would be a contradiction in terms for it to exist 
outside of representation (Pro, 4: 432). If the sensible world, conceived as a magnitude, 
does not exist outside of the regress of representations then it is hard to see how this 
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 Kant’s claim in the second Critique, that the distinction between the two kinds of antinomy ‘permitted 
to make the synthesis transcendent’ (CPR, 5: 104) for the dynamical conflict, expressly contradicts his 
opening account in the Antinomy.  
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 This is a charge that is frequently levied against ‘one world’ readings in general, e.g., Schulting 
(2011a: 11) aims this objection at Allais.  
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same world could coherently be conceived as a ‘subsisting whole’ through accordance 
‘with an inner principle of causality’ (A418n-419n/B446n). Note that this conflict 
between the two ‘world-concepts’ exists only on the assumption that Kant’s denial that 
the mathematical antinomies concern a matter of fact goes through. If we reject that 
conclusion, as I have argued we should, then we can distinguish between the world in 
the ‘transcendental sense’ as the ‘totality of existing things’ and the taking of this world 
to have a spatiotemporal magnitude. We can agree with Kant that, because of 
transcendental idealism, the sensible world cannot have a spatiotemporal magnitude 
independently of the regress of appearances, for the size of the regress determines its 
spatiotemporal magnitude; however, crucially, we can maintain that there is a matter of 
fact at issue in the mathematical antinomies, for while the spatiotemporal magnitude is 
dependent on the subjective regress, all that exists – things in general – while not 
individuated (for us) nonetheless exist as a determinate totality.
299
 This fits very well 
with a ‘one world’ interpretation, for it leaves intact the reality of the external world, 
while taking into account Kant’s insights into the futility of attempting to answer the 
antinomies dogmatically through the use of pure reason.         
  It must be noted that I am not the first to claim that Kant’s resolution of the 
dynamical antinomies should apply equally well to the mathematical ones. W. H. Walsh 
has argued that the second antinomy should be resolved by claiming that both sides can 
be true (1975: 210-212).
300
 We can agree with the antithesis that nothing in the sensible, 
i.e., spatiotemporal, world can be absolutely simple, but agree with the thesis that this 
does not rule out the possibility of the simple as such perhaps being in noumena (1975: 
212-214).
301
 We saw above that Grier’s formulation of the resolution of the second 
antinomy appeared to hint at this possibility, while still claiming that both sides are false 
(2001: 213). Allison objects that Walsh’s conclusion ‘is correct but beside the point, 
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 See Gardner (1999: 255) and Allais (2015: 93-94). 
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 See Kemp Smith (2003: 510-513) for a similar claim.  
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 In his early work, Physical Monadology (1756) and in his submission for the Berlin Royal Academy 
of Sciences prize essay (1764), Kant took the view that Leibnizian monads were compatible with the 
infinity of space because the simplicity of monads could be distinguished from the sphere of their activity 
(the force of impenetrability), which is subject to the infinite divisibility of space. Thus, the infinite 
divisibility of space does not affect the fact that bodies consist of indivisible monads (PM, 1: 477-483; 
PE, 2: 286-287). The difference between the early Kant and the Critical Kant concerns the status of these 
claims: the former claims to know and to be able to demonstrate the existence of monads and other 
simples, while the latter (provided he sticks to his own principles) can allow the thought of such claims – 
thoughts of things in themselves and noumena – but does not claim to know or ‘to seriously assert the 
least thing about all this’ (A780-781/B808-809). Kant even entertains the possibility of the non-sensible 
ground of appearances consisting of monads, but again cautions that we can never know whether this is 
the case, for the sensible always consists of composites (Dis, 8:209-209n).  
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since it ignores the cosmological nature of the question at issue’ (2004: 502-503, n.12). 
It is hard to see how Walsh’s conclusion fails to count as cosmological, since it 
concerns the world as a whole. I take it that what Allison means, and this is suggested 
by his second point, is that Walsh overlooks Kant’s claim that the conditions must be 
homogenous with the conditioned in the mathematical antinomies, so it is illegitimate to 
add things in themselves to the regress. I have suggested that this distinction is flawed: 
all the antinomies concern what must be thought as the intelligible ground of the 
completeness of appearances. Now, of course, what I am suggesting does represent a 
slight modification of the thesis of the second antinomy, because the original claim does 
concern the spatiotemporal world; however, this is because the two disputants are 
(implicitly) transcendental realists, so there is no room for a distinction between the 
world as appearance and the world in itself. Once we take up transcendental idealism, as 
the doctrine that spatiotemporal features of reality are empirically real (but only in 
relation to being given through our forms of intuition) we can allow for the possibility, 
as Kant does, that the antithesis is true of things as appearances, since appearances are 
conditioned by space and time, and that the thesis may be true of things considered 
independently of our forms of intuition.
302
 In the next Section I will summarize Kant’s 
resolution of the dynamical antinomies and the implications for the third sense of the 
transcendental distinction: things in themselves as the unconditioned.  
 
2. The Unconditioned in Things in Themselves  
 
 I have argued against Kant’s official resolution of the mathematical antinomies. 
For this reason, the last Section was long because it was necessary to disentangle Kant’s 
‘both false’ resolution, which I argued relies implicitly on a metaphysical idealism, 
from the ‘both true’ resolution that he holds for the dynamical antinomies. Since I have 
no qualms in principle with the ‘both true’ resolution as following from the application 
of transcendental idealism to the antinomies, we can be briefer here.  
 Famously, Kant holds that transcendental idealism allows the dynamical 
antinomies to be arbitrated ‘to the satisfaction of both parties’ (A530/B558). This stems 
from Kant’s idea that in their case it is permitted to think of something unconditioned as 
being outside the conditioned series of appearances, for in this way the series can be 
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grounded on something empirically unconditioned, placating reason, while not 
upsetting the series of (homogenous and empirical) conditions, thus appeasing the 
understanding.
303
 As such, while the individual arguments of the disputants are no more 
successful than they were before, their conclusions can nonetheless be allowed to stand 
when ‘taken in a corrected significance’, so that the two claims could both be true 
(A531-532/B559-B560). As Kant explains at length, the ‘both true’ resolution requires 
transcendental idealism, for if the objects of our cognition were things in themselves 
then P2 would be true and the unconditioned would have to be given with the 
conditioned as the conditions would once again be necessarily homogenous 
(A535/B563); in short, this would undermine both the claims of the thesis (there is 
freedom) and the antithesis (everything happens through natural causality) for it 
generates the paradox of the antinomy (A543/B571). Nonetheless, the structure of the 
‘both true’ resolution is only the start of Kant’s efforts to explain how the third and 
fourth antinomies may coherently be resolved. It is well beyond the scope of this work 
to explain, much less evaluate, Kant’s theory of freedom or conception of God, so I will 
settle with sketching out my interpretation of the resolutions and explaining their 
significance regarding my attempt to link the unconditioned with the transcendental 
distinction.  
 The resolution of the third antinomy is notoriously complex and has been read as 
advocating both compatibilist and incompatibilist models of freedom.
304
 As I read it, 
Kant is arguing that the application of transcendental idealism allows us to say that all 
phenomena are causally determined, but because this idealism restricts the conditions 
under which we can have knowledge, then there is room for the possibility that there is 
an additional causal element involved in free actions that is not empirically cognizable: 
intelligible spontaneous causation, or freedom. Kant is not arguing that we are really 
free while appearing to be determined, or that we are determined while falsely believing 
that we are free; he is not arguing either for freedom and determinism amounting to the 
same thing. He is arguing that we really are causally determined as phenomena in space 
and time, but that in addition to that, it is not impossible that we could be really free as 
well, albeit in another relation (A536/B564). Kant says that the idea of the freedom of 
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 Kant often talks of appearances being ‘behind’ things in themselves or things in themselves being 
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the will – what he calls ‘practical freedom’ – presupposes that ‘its cause in appearance 
was thus not so determining that there is not a causality in our power of choice such 
that, independently of those natural causes and even opposed to their power and 
influence, it might produce something determined in the temporal order in accord with 
empirical laws, and hence begin a series of occurrences entirely from itself’ 
(A534/B562).
305
 The key idea is that the causality of appearances is determining but not 
sufficient for rationally-taken action. In order to take ourselves to be rational (and a 
fortiori, moral) agents we have to presuppose that we were capable of doing otherwise 
for any action over which we assume some responsibility. The difficulty is reconciling 
this moral vision of ourselves with the thoroughgoing determinism of nature, the truth 
of which Kant takes himself to have demonstrated in the Second Analogy.  
 To expand his solution, Kant distinguishes between the cause, the effect, and the 
‘causality of the cause’. He maintains that the cause and effect may both be empirical in 
nature (appearances), but that the causality of the cause – that is, the determination of 
the cause to act – could be intelligible, and thus not stand under any other casual law 
(A544-545/B572-573). This is a difficult idea to grasp, but the best way of 
understanding it is, I think, to think of one causal series – the empirical series of 
appearances – running along in time, with interjections by intelligible causality at points 
in the causal series where the subject makes choices. In this way, the freely acting 
subject is a phenomenon or appearance, the effects of their actions are also appearances, 
and so the empirical lawfulness of nature holds, while at the same allowing that the 
empirical lawfulness of nature is ‘not so determining’ as to make its effects necessarily 
follow from the empirical causes alone. Kant admits that his solution to the free will 
problem seems overly subtle and obscure, but maintains that its fruitfulness will become 
clear in application (A537/B565).  
                                                 
305
 Kant introduces the contrast between ‘transcendental’ and ‘practical’ senses of freedom in the opening 
of his discussion. Briefly, transcendental freedom is the proper concern of the third antinomy and 
expresses the idea that something could begin a state entirely from itself alone, without being determined 
by another cause necessitating the change of state in accordance with a law of nature (A533/B561). As 
such this causality, if it exists, must be nonsensible since the Second Analogy has shown that all 
empirical causality happens in accordance with the law of cause and effect in time. Practical freedom 
concerns the ‘independence of the power of choice from necessitation by impulses of sensibility’ and 
understanding this kind of freedom is impossible without first resolving the problem of transcendental 
freedom (A534/B562). For a thorough discussion of the two conceptions of freedom and of the very 
complicated relationship between them, see Allison (1990: Ch. 3). Kohl (2015: 106) and Hogan (2009: 
esp. 56) argue that Kant’s theory of freedom entails that free actions do not have metaphysical 
determining grounds that necessitate their effects. In other words, such actions do not have grounds such 
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  Appearances, Kant says, must be ‘grounded in a transcendental object’ for they 
are not things in themselves.
306
 This means that it is logically possible that the 
transcendental object could possess two types of causal powers. The type that we 
cognize in experience is natural causality, but the other possible type is an intelligible 
causality. Applying this idea of two causalities to things yields Kant’s distinction 
between empirical and intelligible characters, where the former is the character of a 
thing in appearance and the other its character as a thing in itself (A538-359/B566-567). 
A thing’s empirical character is the rule or principle through which its causality occurs, 
and applying this to humans suggests that in the case of, e.g., the malicious liar, the 
empirical character of the liar could be his bad upbringing, bad temper, insensitivity to 
shame, etc. By appealing to his empirical character we do explain the action of lying 
(A555/B583). Nonetheless, insofar as we take this person to be a rational agent, 
responsible for their actions, we ‘set aside’ the empirical character and still blame them 
for the way they behaved, for reason ‘could have and ought to have determined the 
conduct of the person to be other than it is’ (ibid). This is a very controversial passage, 
both exegetically and philosophically, but I take Kant’s point to be that the empirical 
character does explain, and, thus in some sense, contributes to the liar’s action, but 
because his empirical character is an appearance it is not sufficient to cause his action, 
for reason, as intelligible causality, must approve (or reject) the action in question in a 
way that stands outside of temporal conditions, relying instead on imperatives and 
maxims that can determine the subject to act (A552-557/B580-585).
307
 In short, Kant’s 
solution is to open up a space in which intelligible causality could enter into, and thus 
begin, an empirical series of appearances, but in a way that neither proves that this is 
actual (or even really possible) and that preserves the thoroughgoing determinism of 
nature (A557-558/B585-586). Kant’s solution does not require noumena in the strict 
positive sense of a noumenal subject (distinct from the phenomenal subject) but only the 
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 The transcendental object, in at least one of its many senses, is effectively the A-edition version of the 
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 On the question of how best to understand reason’s intelligible causality, I follow Allison’s suggestion 
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causally necessitate the action in question, for this would render reason a literal non-temporal causal 
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will debate is to take science and physical laws to be necessarily incomplete, so that there may be actions 
or circumstances in which physical laws underdetermine (or simply have nothing to say about) what 
actions should follow from given causes and conditions. See Allais (2015: 305-307) for a brief sketch of 
this approach. This does not seem to me to be necessarily incompatible with the broad position I advocate 
here, for it could be that physical laws have nothing to say about a subject’s reasons for acting. 
  
193 
 
idea that where action is concerned, empirical causes underdetermine whether the action 
occurs or not, for there could be a second causality involved. Here the unconditioned is 
clearly the notion of such an intelligible causality, both in its transcendental sense in 
which something would begin a new causal series from itself, where with respect to the 
cosmos this something would have to be outside the world, and in its practical sense in 
relation to the problem of free will. In this second sense, the solution does not require 
the cause to be outside of the empirical series, but only its determination to act – the 
causality of the cause – has to be intelligible (A561/B589).  
 As Kant explains, the case is very different with the fourth antinomy. Not only is 
this antinomy fraught with internal tensions, its resolution also goes well beyond that of 
the third antinomy in requiring reason to think itself out of the series of appearances 
altogether.
308
 Kant’s solution once again turns on transcendental idealism. As with the 
third antinomy, we can agree with the antithesis that nothing in the sensible series of 
appearances can be regarded as empirically unconditioned and therefore as necessary, 
but we can likewise agree with the thesis that there could be something necessary and 
empirically unconditioned that is the ground of the conditioned and always contingent 
series of appearances in the world (A560-562/B588-590).  Once again, we cannot claim 
that the thesis is true, but only that it could be true given that appearances are not things 
in themselves, and thus must be grounded on something that is not itself appearance. 
Kant admits that the idea of a necessary being may even be impossible, but that if this is 
so then it cannot be shown through a conflict between the two positions themselves 
(A562-563/B590-591). In relation to the unconditioned, then, it is clear that this is going 
to be the idea of God as the necessary being needed to ground contingent appearances. 
It is not until the Ideal of Reason that we get Kant’s full account of God as the idea of a 
necessary and most-real being, but it is clear already that through the use of pure reason 
we can cognize neither the (real) possibility of freedom nor the (real) possibility of the 
existence of God.   
 I want to end this Section by providing some brief examples of Kant linking 
knowledge of the unconditioned to knowledge of things in themselves to substantiate 
the third sense of the transcendental distinction because, admittedly, the link is not 
immediately transparent. As we have seen, Kant takes the side of the antithesis for the 
dynamical antinomies with respect to appearances and for the mathematical antinomies 
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he downgrades their claims: for the first antinomy, infinite regress becomes indefinite 
regress, and for the second antinomy, infinite regress and infinite number of parts 
becomes an infinite regress but an indefinite number of parts, owing to his conclusion 
that the world-series does not exist outside of the synthesis of appearances. From this it 
is clear that empirical cognition is always of conditioned appearances, thus of things 
that are never self-explanatory (A483/B511, A508/B536). By contrast, the 
unconditioned is whatever completes the process of explanation by closing off the series 
of appearances. This is why reason desires the unconditioned; however, the existence of 
the unconditioned is not counted among the transcendental conditions of the possibility 
of experience, for the unconditioned is neither necessary for knowledge (of individual 
appearances), nor does it make any difference to the process of explaining individual 
phenomena:  
 
For example, you will not be able to explain the appearance of a body the least 
bit better, or even any differently, whether you assume that it consists of simple 
parts or completely of parts that are always composite; for no simple appearance 
can come before you, and neither can any infinite composition. Appearances 
require to be explained only insofar as their conditions of explanation are given 
in perception, but everything that can ever be given in it, taken together in an 
absolute whole, is not itself any perception. But it is really this whole for which 
an explanation is being demanded in the transcendental problem of reason. 
(A483-484/B511-512)    
 
Kant links reason’s desire for the complete explanation of appearances with its need to 
go beyond experience, for we do not find the requisite closure in experience:  
  
For that which necessarily drives us to go beyond the boundaries of experience 
and all appearances is the unconditioned, which reason necessarily and with 
every right demands in things in themselves for everything that is conditioned, 
thereby determining the series of conditions as something completed. […] 
consequently that the unconditioned must not be present in things insofar as we 
are acquainted with them (insofar as they are given to us), but rather in things 
insofar as we are not acquainted with them, as things in themselves. (Bxix-xxi)  
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The passage directly states that the unconditioned must be present ‘in things insofar as 
we are not acquainted with them, as things in themselves’. The claim is metaphysical 
and not just deflationary, for it asserts of things as they are independently of our 
experience of them that they must contain that which closes the series of appearances. 
However, we have just seen Kant explain at length a sophisticated theory of 
transcendental illusion that raises serious question marks over reason’s right to demand 
the unconditioned in things in themselves. If we take his official account seriously then 
it seems that in the mathematical antinomies the unconditioned is not to be found 
(metaphysically) in things in themselves – in fact, it does not exist at all! However, with 
respect to the dynamical antinomies, it is possible that the unconditioned may exist with 
respect to noumena, but we cannot affirm or deny the real possibility of the 
unconditioned. I have suggested that Kant’s argument for denying the possible 
existence of the unconditioned in relation to the mathematical antinomies fails, for it 
turns on conflating two senses in which the conditions can be said to ‘be given’ with the 
conditioned. Therefore, if I am right, the mathematical antinomies should be resolved in 
line with the dynamical antinomies; the direct upshot of this is that in denying us 
knowledge of things in themselves Kant can be taken as advocating a sophisticated 
epistemic humility through the Antinomy, according to which we can have secure 
knowledge about the objects of possible experience, but must renounce the attempt to 
settle, either through the use of pure reason or science, questions as to the age and size 
of the cosmos, as well as the existence of God and the nature and scope of causality.
309
 
 In the last Section of this Chapter, I wish to return to the question of the 
‘transcendental turn’ that I discussed in Chapter 3. Here, however, I will focus on a very 
important interpretation of what the ‘turn’ consists in for Kant that I omitted from that 
discussion. This is Allison’s idea that the ‘turn’ should be understood as a turn away 
from a theocentric paradigm of cognition and its norms to an anthropocentric one. 
While this interpretation has little direct evidence to support it from the text of the 
Critique, I believe that it provides a very helpful model for understanding how Kant’s 
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transcendental idealism can uphold the dual claim to be both idealist and realist enough 
to capture the cognitive relation between the human mind and reality.
310
  
 
3. Transcendental Idealism as a Shift between Conceptions of Cognition 
 
Allison sees Kant’s ‘transcendental turn’ not as a turn to the transcendental, but 
as a turn from transcendental realism to transcendental idealism (2004: 34).
311
 What this 
means is that, according to Allison, the two forms of transcendentalism are mutually 
exhaustive standpoints that offer different conceptions of human cognition. Allison 
claims that they are metaphilosophical or even metaepistemological standpoints and are 
not themselves metaphysical positions. For this reason, Kant can include a wide variety 
of different philosophers’ positions (Locke, Hume, Leibniz, Berkeley and the pre-
Critical Kant) all under the broad title of transcendental realism (2004: 20, 34-35). What 
unites all variants of transcendental realism is a collective failure to distinguish 
appearances from things in themselves, where this means refusing to acknowledge the a 
priori conditions that structure the way in which the mind receives its sensory data and 
must synthesize it to bring it to the unity of consciousness, which in turn entails a 
rejection of the claim that human cognition is discursive, involving both sensibility and 
understanding (2004: 26-27). It should be clear that the account of transcendental 
idealism I provided through the Amphiboly in Chapter 3 is very much along these lines, 
as is my methodological resolution of all the antinomies, and my account of empirical 
realism in terms of the original orderability of appearances from Chapters 1 and 2. As 
Allison correctly notes, though, so far transcendental realism has not been presented as 
a positive doctrine, making it look like a heading to capture all that Kant opposed. This 
is not the case.  
The positive doctrine can be best captured by taking transcendental realism to 
embody an implicit or explicit commitment to ‘a theocentric paradigm or model of 
cognition’ (2004: 28). Operative in all transcendental realist accounts is the implicit 
ideal of a divine form of cognition that non-divine (human) cognition is compared with 
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it in terms of divine knowledge (2015: 88-89). This is correct, but Kant frequently discusses the 
transcendental distinction in terms of sensible and intellectual (divine) intuition. Moreover, in his famous 
letter to Herz (26
th
 May, 1789) concerning Maimon’s attack on the Critical philosophy, Kant objects 
against the latter that he wrongly takes human reason to be the same in kind as divine reason, just with a 
difference in degree, whereas Kant argues that human reason is entirely distinct in kind (Cor, 11: 54). 
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 See also Allison (2012: Ch. 4) and (2015b).  
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and inevitably found wanting, since it cannot cognize what divine cognition can, i.e., 
things in themselves. This is contrasted with the anthropocentric model which 
‘considers the human mind as the source of the rules or conditions through which and 
under which it can alone represent to itself an objective world’ and ‘this entails that 
discursive cognition is elevated to the norm rather than degraded to a second-class form 
of cognition, as it inevitably is under the theocentric model’ (Allison 2004, 38). The 
theocentric model does not require a commitment to the existence of God, merely the 
thought that human cognition ought to be measured against a putative divine 
counterpart as comprising the normative standard of what counts as cognition (2004: 
28). Of course, this model of cognition has much in common with the familiar notion of 
a God’s-eye perspective on the world, but it elevates that idea to the status of being the 
final arbiter on questions of truth, reality and existence. What is true is what would be 
true for God; what exists is what exists for God, etc.
312
  
 Rather than question whether Kant is right to classify these philosophers as 
transcendental realists, I want to explore what this theocentric-anthropocentric shift 
means for Kant’s account of the unconditioned and for our lack of knowledge of it. 
Unfortunately, Allison’s own account is very unclear. I have examined the deflationary 
view that Kant is right to introduce a distinction between the mathematical and 
dynamical antinomies, and to argue that the former must be resolved by the recognition 
that there can be no fact of the matter with respect to their problems, while in the latter 
two we must acknowledge that both parties to the debate could potentially be right. 
Unfortunately, this is not the only response that Allison puts forward. Alison also claims 
that transcendental illusion consists not in just thinking that the mathematical 
antinomies must be rejected as disputes without a right answer, but that also the 
dynamical antinomies should be rejected for the same reason. Specifically, with respect 
to the third antinomy, Allison takes Kant to deny both that we are free and we are not 
really free, as the positions are contraries, not contradictories:  
 
The question: “Are we really free?” keeps returning. And the answer: “Yes, but 
only from a practical point of view” appears to be either a dodge or a confusion, 
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 The claimed connection between the theocentric model of cognition and the rationalist philosophers 
might be viewed sympathetically by the reader, but the connection with empiricist accounts is less 
obvious. See Allison (2004: 25-27) for an explanation of why Hume is a transcendental realist. He also 
explains why Leibniz, Locke and even the pre-Critical Kant all count as transcendental realists (2004: 27-
34).  
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because we cannot help assuming that there must be some fact of the matter. 
Although this is true, Kant has an explanation for it. Moreover, this explanation 
is an essential, though generally overlooked, aspect of his transcendental 
idealism. It is to be found in the doctrine of transcendental illusion, which will 
be the centrepiece of the fourth part of this book. For the present, it must suffice 
to note that the illusion is not that we are free, or, for that matter, that we are 
causally determined. It lies rather in the assumption that we must really be one 
or the other in some ontologically privileged, context-independent sense. Such 
an assumption is unavoidable for transcendental realism with its theocentric 
paradigm, but it is precisely what is called into question by Kant’s “Copernican 
revolution.” (Allison 2004, 49) 
 
Allison explicitly identifies the transcendental illusion with the assumption that there 
must be some fact of the matter concerning the third antinomy, not just the 
mathematical ones. This might be a plausible idea. I argued that all four antinomies 
should have the same resolution if Kant is to stick to his methodological procedure, but 
I suggested that we should extend the dynamical resolution to the mathematical 
antinomies. One could, however, take the opposite view and instead extend the 
mathematical resolution to the dynamical antinomies, which is what it looks like Allison 
is effectively suggesting, at least here.
313
 Nonetheless, there are problems. First, as 
previously noted, Allison is completely committed to the distinction between the 
mathematical and dynamical antinomies and Kant’s claim that they should be resolved 
differently. That commitment, on the face of it, seems incompatible with rejecting the 
idea that there is a fact of the matter regarding whether there is non-natural causality in 
the world.
314
 Since Allison does not revisit this specific problem later in the book, 
despite dedicating a considerable portion of it to analysing the doctrine of 
transcendental illusion, it is unclear why he thinks that this works. I assume it is because 
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 See also Allison (2012: 82).  
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Allison in a later work does acknowledge the criticism that the possibility of being true requires a fact 
of the matter (2012: 82). He responds by saying that the criticism depends on what we mean by being 
‘true’, and that if truth is understood as ‘warranted assertibility from a point of view’ in the terminology 
of Dummett and Putnam, then it is possible for the thesis and antithesis to both be true without there 
being a fact of the matter. He then sends us back to the (2004: 48) account that I am currently discussing. 
I do not agree with attributing the ‘warranted assertibility’ conception of truth to Kant, for I do not think 
that adopting ‘warranted assertibility’ is necessarily entailed by rejecting the theocentric model of 
cognition. See below.   
  
199 
 
of his rejection of the theocentric model of cognition.
315
 I will explore a possible 
alternative reason below. 
 According to the theocentric model, what is real or true is what would be 
cognizable with intellectual intuition. From the divine perspective even infinity would 
be given, though it cannot be given for a human intellect (Allison 2004, 30). From that 
assumption it is easy to see why the rejection of the theocentric model would allow the 
dissolution of a determinate fact of the matter for the antinomies. If we switch to the 
anthropocentric model of cognition then the human mind is regarded as the source of 
the rules and conditions of objects, and thus if we cannot experience an infinite 
magnitude to the world in space and time (or an absolute boundary) then taking up this 
stance means rejecting the thought that there must be a fact of the matter here. Rather, 
since space and time only apply to objects of sensible intuition the restriction of their 
scope means things have no determinate magnitude independently of the forms of 
intuition. From there, we can apply the same thinking to the dynamical antinomies. We 
can neither experience a first cause, nor an infinite regress, of empirical causes, so we 
can reject the assumption that one or the other must be the case. Instead, we subject the 
question ‘are we really free?’ to two different analyses, one that focuses on our 
theoretical warrants and the other on the standards we hold ourselves to through 
practical reason. According to the former, every effect has a cause and its causality is 
the effect of another cause, etc., but from the practical point of view, where we become 
aware of a higher vocation and system of values (CPR, 5: 105-108), we can assume our 
(practical) freedom as a condition of taking ourselves to be moral agents (Allison 2004, 
47-49; 2012, 82-83).    
This way of resolving the antinomies certainly has its appeal. For one, we get rid 
of four of the most problematic issues in metaphysics at a single stroke, but as Allison 
mentioned above, the question ‘are we really free?’ keeps returning, and I suggest that 
to deny even the possibility of there being a determinate fact of the matter here, when 
the question is locked down to a specific context, namely humans acting independently 
of external causal constraints, really is to dodge the question. In fact, worse than that it 
is to get rid of the Kantian conception of morality altogether, since if it is not even 
possible (in principle) that I can really act purely under the idea of freedom then how 
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 This is certainly the case with respect to the rejection of the world having a magnitude. See Allison 
(2004: 391).  
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can I regard myself – in any sense – as a moral agent on a Kantian account?316 Allison is 
correct in understanding Kant to rule out knowledge of freedom, but surely if we take 
that further and, through the arguments of the Critique, conclude that there is no subject 
matter to decide upon, then all ideas of reason (God, immortal soul, and freedom) lose 
their action-motivating status as postulates of the practical use of reason. It may be the 
case that we can justifiably regard ourselves as free, etc., from the practical point of 
view, but doing so would seem to require, as the bare minimum, the possibility that we 
actually are free, that freedom is not impossible. I take it that this is exactly what Kant 
affirms in the three Critiques, in particular at the end of his resolution to the third 
antinomy. Kant claims only to have shown that freedom is not necessarily incompatible 
with thoroughgoing empirical causality, but does not claim to have demonstrated either 
the actuality or real possibility of freedom, because this cannot be done through the 
theoretical use of reason (A557-558/B585-586). On Allison’s account, though, the 
affirmation that freedom is not impossible must fail, for what Kant has done on that 
account – despite Allison citing the same passage as affirming the non-contradictory 
status of freedom and empirical causality – is to rule out the possibility of us being free 
as part of the illusion that there must be a fact of the matter. Kant is not, I think, 
objecting to the thought that we must be one or the other, but rather to the idea that we 
can know which one is the case and to the idea that we can only be one or the other.
317
 
Transcendental idealism allows Kant to restrict the scope of empirical causality to 
objects of possible experience thereby maintaining the complete validity of the causal 
principle, while at the same time keeping open conceptual space for non-natural 
causality. This provides a more nuanced position, then, insofar as we can be both, if we 
have independent (practical) grounds for taking ourselves to be the latter as well as the 
former. Allison’s account of the third antinomy seems to drift between affirming that 
both positions can be correct, in line with Kant’s explicit account in the three Critiques, 
and between claiming that there is no fact of the matter concerning the possibility of 
non-natural causality, which seems to rely very heavily on his rejection of the 
theocentric model of cognition. Does the shift from the theocentric model to the 
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 Admittedly, Allison recognizes that Kant is completely open to the possibility that we are not free, and 
that we are in fact completely causally determined, but rightly maintains that we are unable to take 
ourselves to be rational agents if we do deny the possibility of freedom (2012: 27-28). Thus, where 
practical reason is dominant we are not concerned with what is true, but rather with what must be 
assumed as true as a condition of action.  
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 As Allison put it in a much earlier work, following Wood, Kant’s conception of freedom is definitely 
incompatibilist, but he argues for the ‘compatibility of compatibilism and incompatibilism’ (1990: 28).  
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anthropocentric model warrant the denial of a matter of fact concerning freedom? I do 
not think so. 
Above I claimed that to conclude that the two positions are contraries rather than 
contradictories (in the mathematical antinomies) was to implicitly slide from a 
methodological resolution into a metaphysical idealist resolution. I suggested that it was 
akin to adopting the spurious premise that what exists must be determinable by (human) 
minds or conflating the existence and the determinablity of the conditions thought as 
given with the conditioned, but I also noted that rejecting that premise did not mean 
rejecting Kant’s shift from a theocentric model to an anthropocentric one. Prima facie, 
this might seem paradoxical, but it is not, for the two are separate. The principle that 
what exists must be determinable is nowhere argued for in the Critique, as already 
explained, and it is thoroughly at odds with Kant’s whole denial of knowledge to make 
room for faith. Further, as demonstrated previously, it by no means follows directly 
from adopting transcendental idealism. Transcendental idealism, as I have characterized 
it in this work, neither entails nor requires such a principle. Shifting from the 
theocentric to the anthropocentric model of cognition does not affect the possibilities 
that can exist independently of human thought and knowledge, or at least that is not 
what I think follows from it. Rather, what that shift does – as best exhibited in the 
‘Copernican Turn’ – is to radically reconfigure our cognitive relationship with the 
world. Just because something is held to be true or knowable from the divine 
perspective no longer dictates what must be considered to be true in general. What Kant 
does in the first Critique is to set out an impressive, albeit flawed, thesis that human 
cognition comes with its own normative standards and conditions, that human cognition 
is fundamentally different not only in degree but in kind as well. For example, space and 
time may not exist from the divine perspective – this is precisely one of Leibniz’s chief 
reasons for regarding space and time as confused representations of reality reducible to 
conceptual relations of subject-predicate containment
318
 – but, for us, knowing the 
spatiotemporal relations between objects, even if such relations do not pertain to them 
independently of the form of our sensible intuition, just is to know them as empirical 
objects through empirical cognition. That is, what will count for us as a true judgement 
about empirical objects is both constrained and, crucially, enabled by our 
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 See Allison (2004: 30-31) and Leibniz (1989: 30-34, 146-147, 213-225). Kant explains that his 
conception of sensibility does not attribute any ‘confusedness’ to the faculty, clearly indicating that the 
faculty does not distort the representations of the understanding: it simply does not represent things as 
things in themselves (Dis, 8: 219-210). 
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intersubjective forms of intuition, forms of judgement and the categories. It is precisely 
the transcendental turn from transcendental realism and the theocentric model, to 
transcendental idealism and the anthropocentric model, that allows Kant to maintain the 
reality of space and time and the world as it appears in space and time, through 
affirming the empirical reality of both (empirical objects/appearances really are in space 
and time), at the modest cost of the transcendental reality of both (they are not in space 
and time from the divine perspective/independently of the human mind). But that is 
where the shift ends.  
Kant’s transcendental turn makes us rethink the status of claims to knowledge 
made through human cognitive capacities, but he does not go further and make what 
exists in general dependent upon those capacities. It is essential to his overall 
conception of both theoretical and practical reason that Kant proffers epistemic modesty 
with respect to speculative metaphysics, and this means restricting the scope of 
metaphysics to the conditions of possible experience. It is precisely because Kant can 
restrict the scope of synthetic a priori principles that he is able to affirm both the 
applicability of those principles to the domain of nature, while also leaving open the 
possibility that the principles do not hold of all things in general. To take the conditions 
of experience and make them into conditions of things in general is exactly the kind of 
metaphysical dogmatism, exhibited in traditional ontology, that Kant means to resist 
with transcendental idealism; however, it is only by illegitimately extending the scope 
of the principles of the understanding that we could conclude that there is no fact of the 
matter regarding the four antinomies. What, then, is the role of the transcendental turn 
in relation to reason’s endless quest for the unconditioned?  
I suggested that the implication of the transcendental turn for the unconditioned 
is to rule out the possibility of knowing the unconditioned. We cannot know, either 
through pure reason or through possible experience, whether the world (the domain of 
existing objects) has a limit in time and space, whether composite substances reduce to 
simples or are infinitely divisible, whether every effect has a cause the causality of 
which begins in time and is thus the effect of another cause or if this process must 
terminate in a spontaneous uncaused causality, and finally, whether or not the 
contingency of beings in the world or the world itself requires grounding in a necessary 
being, i.e., God. Since the unconditioned in all four cases, once we reject Kant’s 
resolution of the mathematical antinomies as I have argued we should, is to be located 
in or with things in themselves, it is logical to conclude that another sense in which 
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Kant can legitimately claim that we have no knowledge of things in themselves is by 
denying the possibility of knowledge of the unconditioned. Regarding the dynamical 
antinomies this is uncontroversial, I hope, but even with the mathematical antinomies, 
Kant does as I have pointed out above toy with the idea that the world in itself may have 
a beginning and even may consist of simples despite the infinite divisibility of space and 
time and therefore of appearances in space and time. With the dynamical antinomies it 
is not impossible that there could be freedom as well as natural causality and that there 
could be a necessary being; indeed, from the practical point of view we are licensed to 
assume both, particularly freedom, as postulates of practical reason. Thus, our desire to 
answer metaphysical questions is fruitless because any attempt to answer questions 
concerning the unconditioned will be sabotaged by the natural and unavoidable illusion 
that the conditions are given with the conditioned, including the unconditioned. But 
Kant tempers this depressing account with the positive story that releases us from the 
conviction that we must find out the answers to such questions. Appearances, not things 
in themselves, are the proper objects of human knowledge. Our genuine empirical 
knowledge of the world and nature is not threatened by the impossibility of knowledge 
of things in themselves.
319
 As Kant puts it in the Amphiboly, ‘what the things may be in 
themselves I do not know, and also do not need to know, since a thing can never come 
before me except in appearance’ (A276-277/B332-333).320 The ideas of the 
unconditioned may satisfy reason’s desire for explanatory completeness, but the ideas 
make no difference to how individual appearances are to be explained (A483-484/B511-
512), for they are always either too big or too small for the regress of appearances 
(A486-488/B514-517). 
Nonetheless, Kant does not reject the God’s eye-view entirely, for as things in 
themselves, the unconditioned may very well exist and thus complete the regress of 
appearances. This is, I think, the reason why one of the features of intellectual intuition 
(first Critique) or intuitive understanding (third Critique) is to grasp the whole 
immediately without the need for a successive synthesis of the parts to the (projected 
idea of the) whole (B72, B145, B307-308; CPJ, 5: 406-408). What Kant does deny to 
the divine perspective, though, is its status as final arbiter on what counts as true or 
what really exists, in the sense of not degrading what is (empirically) real to different 
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 Kant claims that the ideas of God, freedom and immortality are the true pursuits of metaphysics, but 
crucially they are not needed for natural science, but only to get beyond nature (B395n).  
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 See also A30/B45: ‘the thing in itself, is not and cannot be cognized through them [appearances], but 
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cognitive subjects – in virtue of shared enabling cognitive capacities – to what is only 
(empirically) ideal. To borrow a term from Abela (2002: 238), we could say that there 
are ‘hidden truths’ that are beyond our cognitive capabilities, but that nonetheless may 
exist or be knowable if we could (per impossibile) reach the end of inquiry, or take up a 
God’s eye-view.321 
So far I have focused on how the shift from the theocentric to the 
anthropocentric model of cognition could explain why Allison thinks that Kant can 
deny that there is any fact of the matter to all the antinomies. We saw that Allison also 
held onto Kant’s key claim that the mathematical antinomies must be resolved by 
showing that both positions are false and the dynamical ones by demonstrating that they 
could both be correct, but it is specifically the claim that we can assert our freedom 
from the practical point of view that allows Kant to maintain both that there is no fact of 
the matter about freedom and that the thesis can still be ‘true’ from the practical 
standpoint (Allison 2004, 47-48; 2012, 82). I now want to show that even adopting a 
‘warranted assertibility’ account of truth does not yield the expected goods: specifically, 
the idea that there could be a practical warrant for adopting a different resolution for the 
dynamical antinomies but not the mathematical ones. 
Prima facie, the mathematical antinomies concern problems only of theoretical 
reason, questions our reason feels inclined to ask, but ones that have no implications for 
the practical use of reason. There is a clear sense, however, in which the resolution of 
the dynamical antinomies directly impinges on the practical use of reason. If it is 
absolutely impossible for there to be freedom in the world then praise and blame cannot 
be imputed to moral agents; indeed, on Kant’s account they cannot be considered as 
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 I am using the term ‘hidden truths’ differently to Abela. Abela uses the term to designate recognition-
transcendent truths in experience, truths that are facts, but would not (in principle or practice) be revealed 
at the end of inquiry. Abela uses the notion of divine idealization of inquiry and argues that this alleged 
‘warranted assertibility’ account reduces in effect to a traditional truth-conditional account of truth. 
Abela’s problem with warranted assertibility/pragmatism is that it seems to leave some claims as truth-
indeterminate that Kant would think were genuinely truth-determinate, such as whether Homo-sapiens 
came out of Africa. Kant’s ‘possible experience’ constraint concerns the form of experience and would 
not leave this example truth-indeterminate. The present example can be resolved by the use of 
counterfactuals: ‘if someone (per impossibile) had been there to see it […]’, but since this no longer is 
constrained by what can be verified through experience the fully idealized conception of the end of 
inquiry is really just a disguised truth-conditional realist account of truth. I agree with this and it is one 
reason why I reject Allison’s attribution of a ‘warranted assertibility’ conception of truth to Kant, but, 
unlike Abela, I think Kant does allow for ‘hidden truths’ beyond experience, though they cannot be 
confirmed or denied on the basis of any theoretical employment of reason or the understanding. Abela 
does discuss the mathematical antinomies and argues, similarly to Grier and Allison, that they arise 
through mistakenly taking logical possibility to be the same as real possibility, but he does not discuss the 
dynamical antinomies at all, and this, in my view, prevents him from seeing that the notion of ‘hidden 
truths’ goes beyond truths about experience. See Abela (2002: 238-248) for discussion.   
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rational agents of any kind (GM, 4: 447-448; CPR, 5: 97). Similarly, if it could be 
decisively demonstrated that there is no God, then this would undermine Kant’s claim 
that the idea of God is justified from the practical point of view (CPR, 5: 11n, 124-125, 
143; A829/B857). Now, this is not an argument that Kant can use at this point in his 
project because he has yet to demonstrate that reason is practical, and that is the concern 
of the second Critique, but it could be argued on his behalf that the dynamical 
antinomies can be resolved differently to the first two because they have a practical 
dimension to them. There is nothing that pure theoretical reason can appeal to in order 
to solve the dilemmas positively, but it is open, in principle, for us to get the warrant for 
positive conclusions for the dynamical antinomies precisely because the practical use of 
reason requires these ideas as postulates. In other words, they are warranted as 
assertions of practical reason, while no such warrant is available for the claims at issue 
in the mathematical antinomies. Although it would be illegitimate to invoke practical 
considerations at this stage of the project, such considerations would seem to give clear 
motivation for why the dynamical antinomies receive a dramatically different, and 
notably positive, resolution.  
But on closer inspection this tempting line of argument breaks down. First, Kant 
acknowledges that there is a practical interest in all four antinomies, for the thesis 
positions ‘are so many cornerstones of morality and religion. The antithesis robs us of 
all these supports, or at least seems to rob us of them’ (A466/B494). I take the practical 
interest of reason in the thesis positions as such to be further evidence that the 
mathematical antinomies can also be resolved the same way as the dynamical ones. Or, 
to the put the point another way, why should the latter two be privileged over the first 
two? We have seen that Kant’s official explanation of two kinds of synthesis does not 
hold up and it seems likely to me, as it has to many others, that what is really motivating 
the mathematical/dynamical split is that the dynamical antinomies have a direct impact 
on the tenability of Kant’s developing conception of morality. Assuming, for the sake of 
argument that we want to throw Kant his bone on this issue, why not extend the appeal 
to practical considerations across the board? After all, as has been pointed out above, we 
can apply the ‘both true’ (or the ‘both false’) resolutions to any of the antinomies by 
making the antithesis true of appearances and the thesis (potentially) true of things in 
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themselves.
322
 Although Kant does not spell out what practical interest reason has in the 
first two theses, it is not hard to surmise what it might be.    
If the world is finite in space and time, then that lends credence to the idea that it 
was created by a creator; if composite substances can be divided to reveal indivisible 
components then, while these simples are not human souls, they are nonetheless simple 
as such and this therefore opens up conceptual space for thinking of the possibility of 
other simples such as immortal souls, in much the same way that affirming that 
transcendental freedom is not impossible opens up conceptual space for practical 
freedom (at least in the Dialectic). The potential appeal to practical considerations to 
justify the ‘both true’ resolution for the dynamical antinomies is undercut by the fact 
that it can be applied equally well to the mathematical antinomies. It could be objected 
that the finitude of the world and indivisible substances are not required as postulates 
for the practical use of reason and that this is why the dynamical antinomies require a 
different resolution; this, however, surely reverses the correct order of the argument. It 
is because the dynamical antinomies can be resolved differently that their corresponding 
ideas can be employed as postulates, not the reverse, which would make the derivation 
of the postulates circular.
323
 In light of this two conclusions follow. First, if we want to 
invoke practical considerations in the resolution of the antinomies – assuming that this 
is not an obvious non-starter – then there is no obvious reason why they should not 
apply to all four antinomies, though it would be illegitimate to presuppose the postulates 
as derived from the conditions of morality to resolve the problems of theoretical reason, 
and then derive the postulates from the successful resolution of these theoretical 
problems. Second, following from the first, given the failure of practical considerations 
to necessitate a different strategy for resolving the dynamical antinomies, I contend that 
our best option is to continue viewing the resolution of all the antinomies through the 
scope-restriction of the principles of the understanding to the objects of possible 
experience, and refrain from treating our epistemological conditions – especially space 
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 Of course, strictly speaking the antithesis is not true of appearances because the antithesis position 
does not appeal to transcendental idealism, whereas Kant does. This means that interpretations, such as 
Strawson’s (1966: 209-210) that equate the antithesis with Kant’s position are wrong. Nonetheless, 
Kant’s claim that the most that can be said of the empirical regress is that it is indefinite is much closer to 
the antithesis than it is to the thesis.   
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 Of course, the postulates actually owe their derivation to the practical employment of the ideas of all 
three areas of specialist metaphysics: the immortality of the soul from the paralogisms, free will from the 
third antinomy, and God from either the fourth antinomy or, in line with Kant’s architectonic, the ideal of 
pure reason.  
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and time – from holding of all things in general. That is, to view the resolution through 
the shift from the theocentric to anthropocentric model of cognition, as I have set it out.   
 
Conclusion: Transcendental Idealism as Empirical Realism  
 
 In this thesis I have argued that Kant’s transcendental idealism deserves to be 
taken seriously as a genuinely robust form of empirical realism. The path to this 
conclusion, however, has been lengthy. I have argued that Kant’s idealism is deployed 
in three main ways. Kant has often been accused of either holding subjectivism about 
appearances – that appearances are only the way reality seems to be because of our 
conditions of experience – and/or that appearances are mental entities in some sense. I 
argued against the idea that appearances are only how things seem to be but accepted 
that, at times, Kant does slip into metaphysical idealism regarding appearances. We saw 
evidence that Kant slips into this kind of reductionism in his resolution to the 
mathematical antinomies, with his frequent identifications of appearances with ‘mere 
representations’ or sums of representations in ways that disallow the acceptable 
interpretation of this claim, namely that it is the way in which objects are represented 
(as spatiotemporal) that is ideal rather than their existence.
324
 This is the first main sense 
of the transcendental distinction. However, I say ‘slips into’ because I do not think that 
Kant meant to hold this position; indeed, the other two senses of the distinction bear out 
this story. I explored these in the Chapters 3 and 4, respectively.  
According to the second sense, the transcendental distinction concerns two ways 
of taking the objects of experience. They can be considered as appearances and as 
things in themselves; however, through an examination of the Amphiboly, I extended 
this epistemological deflationary account to cover not only the mistake of thinking that 
we can cognize things using concepts alone, but also that considering things as objects 
of pure understanding determines what would be true of those objects if (per 
impossibile) pure concepts were enough for cognition. This attempt to do metaphysics 
through pure concepts, according to Kant, leads directly to Leibniz’s doctrines of pre-
established harmony and monadology. I initially explored the Amphiboly to locate a 
version of the transcendental distinction that did not degrade appearances to the status 
of being inferior or second-best. I searched for an account of transcendental idealism 
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that could be maintained alongside Kant’s empirical realism. The account of 
transcendental idealism that emerges from the Amphiboly does not include or require 
subjectivism about appearances; indeed, we saw it suggests that taking the objects of 
our experience to be objects of pure understanding is actually inherently misleading, 
generating an illusory system of cognition. Not only does that ‘intellectual system’ fail 
to apply to reality, it is also demonstrably false, on Kant’s view, because it 
systematically excludes the sensible conditions under which alone our concepts can tell 
us anything at all about reality; for deployed independently of its sensible conditions, 
the very concept of an object in general is actually contradictory (A279-280/B335-336). 
Nonetheless, this account by itself does not tell us what it is that Kant thinks we cannot 
know in not being able to know things in themselves.
325
  
 To draw out the implications of Kantian humility I analysed the Antinomy of 
Pure Reason and argued that there is good evidence to support the view that the notion 
of the unconditioned can be identified with, or taken to be a property of, things in 
themselves. While this account is separate to that found in the Amphiboly, the two 
complement each other well and may even have been intended by Kant to be two sides 
of the same story. The account in the Amphiboly was wholly negative insofar as it set 
out a distinct way of cognizing reality which is not open to us, namely through pure 
concepts or thought alone. The third sense builds on this by showing that the inability of 
pure concepts to cognize reality also extends to the unconditioned. If (per impossibile) it 
was possible to cognize reality through pure thought alone, then the unconditioned 
would be given with the conditioned, as the whole series of conditions would be given, 
but, since such attempts at cognition are inherently illusory by ignoring the sensible 
conditions of space and time under which alone concepts can apply to reality, the 
unconditioned is not given with the conditioned, for the latter is not given in the same 
timeless way that premises are with a conclusion. Indeed, Kant even states that the error 
underlying the antinomies is an ‘amphiboly’ (A484/B512). However, as we saw, Kant 
remained very ambivalent towards the notion of the unconditioned: is it just an illusory 
principle of reason that projects its desire for complete explanation onto reality, so that 
the unconditioned does not exist? Or, does the illusion consist in reason’s inability to 
determine the unconditioned, always either wrongly ignoring the role of sensible 
conditions in cognizing reality (as the thesis does), or projecting those conditions onto 
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 Of course, it tells us that we cannot know things in themselves understood as objects of intellectual 
intuition, but it is hardly a major discovery to learn that we are not gods!  
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all things in general (as the antithesis does)? With respect to the mathematical 
antinomies, Kant took the unconditioned to be non-existent because the sensible world 
is not a thing in itself, but the mere (thought) totality of appearances. In sharp contrast, 
with respect to the dynamical series, Kant took the unconditioned to be a legitimate 
assumption of reason since he maintained that it is not necessary for the conditioned to 
be heterogeneous with its conditions. I have argued against Kant’s ‘both false’ 
resolution of the mathematical antinomies in favour of a ‘both true’ resolution. This is 
necessary because rejecting the idea that there is a fact of the matter at stake in the 
antinomies is to push Kant’s idealism too far, so that it extends not only over the 
spatiotemporal properties of things but over the existence of the things that have those 
properties. This, I argued, is akin to treating transcendental idealism as a form of 
Berkeleyan phenomenalism, which is not what Kant intended.
326
 To this end, I found it 
necessary to reject the letter of the Critique in order to better preserve the spirit of the 
Critical philosophy.  
What emerges, then, is a form of transcendental idealism that is perfectly 
compatible with Kant’s epistemic humility concerning things in themselves, one that 
does not degrade appearances to the status of representations of how things merely seem 
to be to us as opposed to how they really are in themselves. We can say with Kant, that 
what we know of reality is only of appearances in the twofold sense that what we know 
is only what can be given to our forms of intuition (space and time) as spatiotemporal 
appearances, and that, while reason indicates that there could or even must be more to 
reality than we can cognize, it is beyond the possibility of our cognitive capacities to 
cognize putative things that do not conform to our sensible conditions of experience. 
We know things as objects of sensible intuition, as spatiotemporal entities and events, 
not as objects of pure understanding: we cannot individuate through concepts alone; we 
cannot determine the properties of objects, even the most basic ones through reason 
alone. Equally, if there are any ‘things’ or aspects of reality that cannot be given 
through sensible intuition, then necessarily we cannot cognize them. Nonetheless, this 
does not make appearances, or what we learn about reality through experience, 
fraudulent in any sense, but it does show that reality is individuated and spatiotemporal 
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 I readily acknowledge that more needs to be done to show that the ‘both false’ resolution only makes 
sense on an extreme phenomenalist account; it was beyond the scope of this Chapter to do that, since I 
focused on showing that the ‘both false’ resolution does not follow from transcendental idealism 
understood in a broad ‘one world’ sense. My aim was to show that a ‘one world’ account, especially a 
deflationary one, should not accept the ‘both false’ resolution. I have plans to continue this line of 
research as post-doctoral research.  
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only in relation to our forms of intuition and not ‘in itself’. As just seen, what makes 
this combination of (empirical) realism and (transcendental) idealism possible is Kant’s 
turn from a theocentric to an anthropocentric model of cognition.     
According to the theocentric model, space and time could not be said to be 
empirically (or transcendentally) real because things are spatiotemporal only from the 
human standpoint. Accordingly, the most that could be said of space and time is that 
things only seem to be spatiotemporal to us, not that they actually are spatiotemporal; if 
a being with intellectual intuition exists, reality would not appear spatiotemporal to it. 
By remaining within the theocentric model, we must say that appearances are ultimately 
nothing more than sophisticated distortions of reality. It is easy to recognize the 
frequency of this narrative in the literature, and why Kant’s combination of realism and 
idealism has often been dismissed as a sham.
327
 However, if we read Kant’s 
transcendental turn as the assumption that the objects of cognition must conform to our 
conditions of experience and understand the source and standards of human cognition as 
being completely different in kind (not merely in degree) to a putatively divine 
perspective, then space and time, and empirical cognition, can be granted empirical 
reality.  
I have argued that Kant’s empirical realism is grounded in his transcendental 
idealism. Specifically, we have seen that Kant is able to hold empirical realism 
regarding the applicability of space and time, along with the categories, to the objects of 
experience only because of the ideality of the former. It is the ideality of space and time 
that allows him to overcome scepticism about the external world, insofar as space and 
time are taken to be pure intuitions, and not things in themselves, or properties of things 
in themselves, then they are only realized when an external matter provides the means 
for their manifestation as formal intuitions.
328
 They lay waiting in the mind as the forms 
of its intuition, but are not themselves representations until the occurrence of experience 
converts them from forms of intuition into formal intuitions, the forms of appearances. 
In addition, because we have a pure intuition of time, Kant can appeal to the a priori 
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 See especially Guyer (1987: 5), who holds – in direct contrast to Allison – that it is precisely because 
Kant holds that there is a possible divine alternative form of intuition that he degrades appearances to 
mere representations. Guyer suggests that this only partially accounts for Kant’s idealism, arguing that it 
is also the result of misguided assumptions about the necessity involved in representing spatiotemporal 
objects. See also Prichard (1909) and Strawson (1966).    
328
 To be sure, I think Kant argues from realism, not to realism, thus I agree with Amerik’s (2003) 
reading, but the fact remains that his account secures knowledge of the external world through the ideality 
of space.  
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unity of time as a means of proving the objective reality of the (relational) categories. 
This is his argument in the Analogies of Experience. Kant argues that the three 
analogies constitute the rules of transcendental time-determination, detailing the 
conditions under which we can have empirical cognition of a unified time-order and of 
objects in one time. Kant shows, against Hume, that if all we had were a successive 
stream of given singular perceptions then we would never be able to fashion for 
ourselves the representation of an objective time-order, that is, of the relation of 
representations to an object of representation. Nonetheless, Kant’s argument in the 
Analogies is incomplete without an account of how the pure intuition of time comes 
about, as well of what role the categories can have given that they do not pick out 
empirical features of objects. This account is provided in the Transcendental Deduction. 
With respect to the second question, Kant answers this by showing that categories 
constitute the form of the thought of an object in general, and that an objective unity of 
representations just is the representation of an object in a ‘thin’, intentional sense. The 
categories are rules of intellectual synthesis, rules for uniting representations together 
under one consciousness. However, this role of the categories as objectively valid rules 
of thought is not enough to guarantee that for everything that can appear to 
consciousness in intuition that the categories can be applied to it. Kant’s answer is 
developed through the second half of the Deduction, involving the complex notion of 
figurative synthesis. The figurative synthesis connects the intellectual synthesis with our 
forms of intuition. By drawing this connection, Kant demonstrates that since space and 
time as the forms of empirical objects are represented as manifolds, it follows that the 
categories can apply to everything that is intuited, since it is only through them that a 
manifold can be represented as a manifold and thus as an ‘object’ (§26). On my reading, 
if we have only the Transcendental Deduction then the categories have objective 
validity (as forms of thinking an object in general under synthetic unity of apperception) 
but no objective reality, insofar as there is nothing to prevent them from being merely 
subjectively necessary; with the Analogies of Experience, we have objective reality, but 
only under the prior assumption that there is an a priori unity of time, which is itself 
required for a manifold to be thought together under the unity of apperception. Both are 
necessary parts of Kant’s empirical realism, and transcendental idealism, as the thesis of 
the formal ideality of space and time, underlies both.  
In this thesis I have worked to defend a threefold analysis of transcendental 
idealism and to construct a defensible account of how Kant can justifiably claim that his 
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position is a genuine combination of transcendental idealism and empirical realism. I 
have set out an account of transcendental idealism as empirical realism. Due to space 
restraints, I have, however, confined my analysis largely to the first Critique, drawing 
on the other Critiques and texts only when it seemed useful to do so. It remains to be 
seen whether Kant’s careful combination of idealism and realism survives intact in the 
later developments of the Critical philosophy. Again, due to issues of space, I focused 
(like so many) on the Analogies of Experience in explaining Kant’s metaphysics of 
experience. There is also much more to say about how the other principles fit into 
Kant’s demonstration of the legitimacy of a priori concepts. These are all areas on 
which further work could be done, based on the account of Kant’s combination of 
idealism and realism that I have given.  
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Appendix: Transcendental Idealism: A Contested Doctrine 
 
Introduction 
 
 In this Appendix I summarize the main interpretations of transcendental 
idealism. The aim is not to provide a full account of the merits and weaknesses of each 
reading; the volume of literature is simply too vast. Instead, I explore what I consider to 
be the most influential interpretations and examine what grounding they have in terms 
of textual evidence. I demonstrate the main problems that prevent us from taking any 
one of these interpretations to fully capture Kant’s idealism, and to a certain extent, I 
will be playing Devil’s advocate here. Although the utility of using the labels ‘one 
world’ and ‘two world’ to characterize interpretations in the literature has been 
questioned, I use this distinction to frame my discussion in the interests of clarity and 
efficiency.
329
  
 I begin in Section 1 with an account of ‘two world’ readings, or those positions 
that have been commonly characterized as belonging under this label. My use of the 
label is very loose as I include under it any interpretation of transcendental idealism that 
in some sense denies the mind-independent existence of appearances as empirical 
objects. This includes understanding Kant’s idealism to be indistinguishable from 
Berkeley’s,  taking transcendental idealism to involve a strict  ontological separation of 
two kinds of entities, or modelling the ideality of appearances on the notion of 
‘intentional objects’. What is common to all these positions is that they deny that 
appearances (empirical objects) for Kant exist, independently of the mind. They also 
typically (but not always) understand things in themselves to be the ‘real’ things, and 
therefore take Kant to deny that we know (ultimate) reality. I show that there is a lot of 
textual evidence supporting the identification of ‘appearances’ with ‘mere 
representations’, but I also show that there are passages that do not support this 
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 For example, Allais (2004) once labelled her view a ‘one world’ account in direct contrast to the ‘two 
world’ views that she was attacking, but because the label ‘one world’ suggests an overgenerous 
conception of how much commentators under this label agree, along with difficulties with providing 
accurate descriptions of some positions, she now avoids using these labels where possible (2015: 8-9). By 
contrast, Walker suggests that ‘it is not very helpful to ask whether [Kant] believed in one world or two’ 
(2010: 842), while Oberst (2015: esp. 59-60) argues that actually Kant holds both that there are two world 
and two aspects, so that both positions are true when properly understood. ‘Two aspects’ is another term 
for ‘one world’ views. However, Oberst does also consider the possibility his account allows too many 
different interpretations of transcendental idealism left standing (2015: 62).   
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interpretation, and, more importantly, that there are arguments in the Critique that make 
no sense on this interpretation: ‘two world’ readings are textually grounded, but cannot 
be the whole story. I examine ‘one world’ readings in Section 2. I begin by providing 
evidence for the very broad claim that Kant’s distinction between appearances and 
things in themselves should not be primarily understood as an ontological distinction 
between two classes of objects. I then distinguish between interpretations that 
understand the distinction to still be metaphysical and those which do not. In the rest of 
the Section I consider the ‘moderate’ metaphysical interpretations of Allais (2015: 
2007; 2004), Ameriks (2011; 2003) and Langton (1998). My brief discussion focuses on 
the most recent metaphysical interpretation, that of Allais (2015).  In Section 3 I turn to 
the so-called ‘deflationary’ interpretations, which are those that see the distinction 
between appearances and things in themselves as being an epistemological or 
methodological distinction, or as containing no genuine idealism at all. Once again, the 
discussion is of a preliminary nature, particularly with regard to the very influential 
views of Henry Allison. With respect to Allison’s (1983; 2004) account I focus on the 
oft-made criticism that a deflationary account trivializes transcendental idealism by 
making it the harmless and pointless claim that we cannot have knowledge of things 
considered independently of the conditions of knowledge. I show that the criticism is 
unjustified because it fails to take seriously what Allison terms the ‘discursivity thesis’, 
and also ignores the thrust of Kant’s so-called ‘Copernican turn’. I argue that Allison is 
correct to see Kant’s idealism as grounded in the discursivity of human cognition, 
though I understand the relationship between discursivity and idealism in a markedly 
different way to Allison, but unlike Allison, I still take Kant to be making metaphysical 
claims about the nature of reality.  
 
1. Appearance and Reality: Is Kant a Berkeleyan Phenomenalist?  
 
 The ‘two world’ reading has been historically dominant, stretching back to the 
notorious ‘Garve-Feder’ (1781) review of the Critique, and the reading still has many 
advocates today.
330
 The reading has been regarded as ‘textbook’ and ‘standard’ until 
only relatively recently (Robinson 1994, 415). Garve, and particularly Feder, gave a 
scathing review of transcendental idealism, naming it a ‘higher idealism’ that 
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 See Stang (2014), Hogan (2009) and Kohl (2015) for very recent ‘two world’ interpretations. 
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transforms both us and the objects of our ordinary experience into representations, akin 
to Berkeleyan ideas. They took Kant to be saying that the faculty of understanding 
literally makes objects out of sensations (Garve and Feder 2004, 201-207). 
Understandably, Kant was not happy with such a comparison, but despite his 
protestations many have not hesitated in attributing to him a kind of Berkeleyan 
phenomenalism.
331
 I think there are two main reasons for this. The first is that Kant’s 
terminology is highly suggestive of a distinction between how things merely appear to 
be to minds such as ours and how things really are, in just the same way that a stick in 
water appears to be bent, while in fact it is not. Kant consistently claims that we know 
only appearances and have no knowledge of things in themselves; this much is 
uncontroversial. But it is not hard to slide from a distinction between appearances and 
things in themselves, where the latter is construed as indicating some unknown aspect 
of reality, to the quite different claim that we know only appearances and not the things 
(in) themselves. To make matters worse, in his Inaugural Dissertation (1770) Kant used 
the even more suggestive language of ‘things as they appear’ in opposition to ‘things as 
they are’ (ID, 2: 392-393).332 Although the use of ‘as’ may be suggestive of ‘one world’ 
readings, the contrast between ‘as they are’ and ‘as they appear’ strongly suggests an 
appearance/reality distinction.  
 The second reason is Kant’s apparent identification of ‘appearances’ with 
‘representations’, or, worse, ‘mere representations’. Again, once ‘appearances’ taken as 
‘representations’ are distinguished from ‘things in themselves’ it is all too easy to see 
the distinction as being one between our representations of things and the things 
themselves. This is exactly how Guyer understands transcendental idealism. He 
complains that Kant does not need to make things in themselves into ghost-like entities 
that literally exist outside of space and time because ‘he does something just as 
unpleasant – namely, degrade ordinary objects to mere representations of themselves, or 
identify objects possessing spatial and temporal properties with mere mental entities’ 
(1987: 334-335). It is no secret that Kant often speaks of appearances as being 
                                                 
331
 Strawson takes Kant to hold reality to be supersensible and inaccessible to us: Kant on his reading 
thinks that we construct reality for us (appearances) out of the unknowable metaphysical reality of things 
in themselves (1966: 38). Similarly, Prichard thinks that knowledge of appearances is only knowledge of 
how things seem to be (1909: 78-79). Real knowledge is of how things really are and we do not have this 
on Kant’s account. Bennett (1966; 1974) holds a similar view. Giovani claims that for Kant in knowing 
appearances we know the thing insofar as it appears to us, but also that this means we ‘do not know it [the 
thing] at all’ (2000: 6). Wilkerson argues that Kant’s idealism is indistinguishable from Berkeley’s and 
that Kant was well aware of this (1976: 190).  
332
 This language is also occasionally used in the Critique, e.g., A249-250. I discuss this passage below. 
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representations; indeed, even staunch ‘one world’ readers accept that Kant frequently 
equates the two.
333
 The main difficulty that arises from reading Kant this way is that it 
seems to make the unperceived existence of appearances problematic. That is, if Kant’s 
‘appearances’ are the empirical objects of our ordinary experience then the resemblance 
to Berkeley is even more damning: the good bishop could at least rely on God to sustain 
‘objects’ without us perceiving them, but this move is closed to the metaphysically 
austere Kant.  
However, not everyone denigrates Kant for equating ‘appearances’ with 
‘representations’. Robinson (1994) argues that once appearances are modelled as 
‘intentional objects’ then Kant can limit knowledge to the object as it is in the human 
perspective, while denying us access to the object in the divine perspective.
334
 Van 
Cleve  takes Kant to be a phenomenalist in the sense that appearances are ‘virtual 
objects’, insofar as they are logical constructions out of the mental states of perceivers 
(1999: 11). Van Cleve calls his reading a ‘qualified’ version of the ‘two world’ view 
precisely because, as intentionalia, appearances do not form a class of existents on their 
own; only things in themselves exist (1999: 150). If there is a sense in which Van Cleve 
thinks that there is ‘one world’ on Kant’s account, then it is a world ‘whose only 
denizens are things in themselves’ (ibid). By contrast, even though Guyer’s 
interpretation is generally considered to be a ‘two world’ view, insofar as the objects 
that possess spatiotemporal predicates on Kant’s account are to be identified with 
mental entities, he himself denies that he holds a ‘two world’ view. Guyer claims 
instead that his is an ‘alternative’ version of a ‘two aspect’ view insofar as 
representations are, in some sense, supposed to be of things in themselves, albeit while 
having the additional qualities of space and time that have been shifted from the things 
themselves – where they belong for Guyer – to the appearances of things in accordance 
with Kant’s dubious arguments concerning unconditional necessity (2007: 12-13).335 
Leaving aside the question of how to accurately label the positions of Van Cleve and 
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 Allais (2004; 2015) admits that Kant very often identifies appearances with representations, 
committing him to idealism, but she denies that this idealism must be understood as phenomenalism 
where appearances are taken to be mental entities, or constructed out of mental states, or mental activities. 
They are mind-dependent properties of mind-independent things. Allison also admits the problem, but 
dismisses it as ‘a discomforting feature of Kantian analysis’ (2004: 69-70).     
334
 See Chapter 4 for further discussion of this move. Importantly, on Robinson’s account the divine 
perspective emerges from the human one even though our conception of it treats it as a perspective that 
would give us access to complete knowledge of reality. As he puts it: ‘We conceive the divine perspective 
to be independent of human experience. But our conception of it is not’. See Robinson (1994: 428-432).  
335
 See Section 3 of the Introduction to this thesis for further discussion.  
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Guyer, let us examine the evidence for the ‘two world’ reading, as well as for the issue 
of whether the transcendental distinction turns out to be one between appearance and 
reality.
336
 We will start with the latter first since this is the easier of the two problems. 
 
1.1. Why Kant Might Be a Berkeleyan Phenomenalist  
 
  The first example of an appearance/reality distinction can be found in the way 
Kant characterizes the status of cognition given through sensibility in contrast to 
cognition given through the understanding, leading him to posit a distinction between 
‘things as they appear’ and ‘thing as they are’:  
 
For if the senses merely represent something to us as it appears, then this 
something must also be in itself a thing, and an object of a non-sensible 
intuition, i.e., of the understanding, i.e., a cognition must be possible in which no 
sensibility is encountered, and which alone has absolutely objective reality, 
through which, namely, objects are represented to us as they are, in contrast to 
the empirical use of the understanding, in which things are only cognized as 
they appear. (A249-250)  
 
Kant contrasts what it is to know something as it appears (a cognition involving 
sensibility) and what it would be to know something as it is (cognition through the 
understanding alone). I return to this contrast in Chapter 3, but what should capture our 
attention is the highly suggestive way that Kant characterizes the two types of 
cognition: as cognition of objects as they appear and as they are. It is hard not to read 
this second locution as being shorthand for as they really are. Indeed, the passage is 
strongly reminiscent of the Inaugural Dissertation where Kant again claims that 
sensibility only represents things as they appear and not as they (really) are:  
  
In this way, whatever in cognition is sensitive is dependent upon the special 
character of the subject in so far as the subject is capable of this or that 
modification by the presence of objects: these modifications may differ in cases, 
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 Allais argues that the readings of Guyer and Van Cleve still interpret the transcendental distinction 
ontologically insofar as on their reading appearances are not aspects of the things (in themselves) that 
appear to us, even if they stop short of making appearances into a second set of entities (2015: 38). I agree 
and will therefore retain the label ‘two world’ for phenomenalist interpretations.   
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according to the variations in the subjects. But whatever cognition is exempt 
from such subjective conditions relates only to the object. It is thus clear that 
things which are thought sensitively are representations of things as they appear, 
while things which are intellectual are representations of things as they are. (ID, 
2: 392-393) 
 
That in cognition which is exempt from sensibility relates only to the object, which 
means that only cognition that occurs independently of being affected by objects is 
cognition of objects as they are (in themselves). The link between the Dissertation and 
A249 in this respect is striking, but Kant clarifies that the distinction between things as 
they appear and things as they are in the Critique is not the same as in the Dissertation 
by deleting A249 in the B-edition. Curiously, while A249 was removed the next 
passage that deflates A249 is in both editions. Given that the B-edition followed after 
the Garve-Feder review this fact may be indicative of Kant’s attempt to distance himself 
from the charge of holding a Berkeleyan-style ‘higher idealism’.337 Kant says: 
 
If, therefore, we say: The senses represent objects to us as they appear, but the 
understanding, as they are, then the latter is not to be taken in a transcendental 
but in a merely empirical way, signifying, namely, how they must be represented 
as objects of experience, in the thoroughgoing connection of appearances, and 
not how they might be outside of the relation to possible experience and 
consequently to sense in general, thus as objects of pure understanding. For this 
will always remain unknown to us, so that it even remains unknown whether 
such a transcendental (extraordinary) cognition is possible at all, at least one that 
stands under our customary categories. With us understanding and sensibility 
can determine an object only in combination. If we separate them, then we have 
intuitions without concepts, or concepts without intuitions, but in either case 
representations that we cannot relate to any determinate object. (A258/B313-
314)  
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 Interestingly, Walker (2010) maintains that the ‘one world’ reading fits better with the first edition and 
the ‘two world’ reading with the second edition. I confess I think this is highly implausible given Kant’s 
efforts to promote the idea that appearances and things in themselves are the same things in the B-
Preface. See Section 2.  
  
219 
 
This passage explicitly repudiates the view of the Dissertation and shows that Kant 
offers a possibility in A249, which he then completely rejects. That is, Kant’s 
distinction between things as they appear being cognized through sensibility and things 
as they are being cognized through the understanding is not to be understood as saying 
that human knowledge is limited to appearances, where appearances are to be opposed 
to how things really are (as accessible to the understanding alone), or noumena in the 
‘positive’ sense. Instead, sensibility gives intuitions to the understanding and the 
understanding, through applying the categories to those intuitions, represents objects as 
they are ‘as objects of experience, in the thoroughgoing connection of appearances, and 
not how they might be outside of the relation to possible experience’. This is what Kant 
means when he says that the distinction should be understood empirically and not 
transcendentally.
338
 The distinction is between the role of sensibility vis-à-vis the 
understanding with respect to how we cognize objects, rather than as a transcendental 
one claiming that the understanding is able to represent how objects are independently 
of possible experience, for we have no grounds for assuming that that kind of cognition 
is possible at all.
339
 In this first case of an apparent appearance/reality distinction, 
according to which the distinction is between things as they appear and things as they 
are, we have deflated it by showing that the version of the distinction in the Critique 
does not reduce human knowledge to illusion, whereas in the Dissertation it is 
susceptible to this reading. If Kant meant the distinction to be taken transcendentally, 
then this would reflect an appearance/reality distinction, but taking it empirically means 
that he is just comparing the roles of sensibility and understanding in making empirical 
cognition possible; he is explaining that sensibility cannot represent things as objects of 
possible experience without the contribution of understanding.  
Nonetheless, it could be objected that in both passages Kant does hold the 
distinction, ultimately, to be one between appearance and reality precisely because he is 
using the distinction empirically: in the Dissertation Kant argued that the senses give us 
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 Kant’s use of ‘transcendental’ is inconsistent: usually the term refers to what precedes experience and 
makes it possible, but sometimes, as here where it is opposed to ‘empirical’, it actually means using the 
categories to go beyond possible experience. Thus, Kant’s criticism of Garve and Feder for understanding 
‘transcendental’ as being the same as ‘transcendent’ is not entirely fair (Pro, 4: 374n). A particularly lucid 
and helpful explanation of the different ways that Kant refers to a transcendental employment or 
misemployment of the understanding and of the categories is given by Grier (2001: 79-82). Allison 
(2015b) also discusses Kant’s multiple uses of the term ‘transcendental’ as reflecting both his 
predecessor’s concern with ontology and his own meaning as having to do with the conditions of the 
possibility of experience.   
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 At A565-566/B593-594 Kant claims that an intelligible object (thing cognized through concepts alone) 
is a mere ‘thought-entity’ for which we have no grounds for assuming it to be possible.  
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only appearances, and the intellect knowledge of how things really are, in accordance 
with a transcendental use of the distinction.
340
 Similarly, A258/B313-314 could be taken 
as making the same claim, but now with the unwelcome conclusion that not even the 
intellect can cognize reality (in the transcendental sense), instead only serving to help 
the senses provide (misleading) appearances of reality (in the empirical use). I do not 
think this is the case, for two reasons.  
First, as has been well-documented in the literature, Kant explicitly denies that 
by ‘appearances’ he means illusions or how things merely seem to be. In a famous 
addition to the B-Transcendental Aesthetic, Kant claims that he does not say that things 
merely seem to be outside me (in space), when in reality they are not, but that they 
actually are in space and that ‘It would be my own fault if I made that which I should 
count as appearance into mere illusion. But this does not happen according to our 
principle of the ideality of all of sensible intuitions’ (B69-B70). His point is that the 
spatiality of things lies in our kind of intuition (sensible intuition) and is not a property 
of the things (in) themselves. Admittedly, this is a difficult point, for it could be 
objected that for something x to belong only to our way of perceiving and not to the 
objects themselves independently of our perceiving them just is what it means for x to 
be illusory. I analyse the reality and ideality of space and time in detail in Chapter 3. 
Here it must suffice to note that Kant clearly felt that his characterization of empirical 
objects as appearances was ‘poorly understood’ when this was taken to mean that 
appearances are illusory (MFNS, 4: 555). The second reason is that if Kant really held 
that our knowledge of appearances is only knowledge of how things seem to be (and not 
how they really are), then this would make virtually the entire Transcendental Aesthetic 
and Transcendental Analytic – especially the Principles of Understanding – completely 
pointless. Kant takes himself to be giving a logic of truth in the Analytic and a logic of 
deception or illusion in the Transcendental Dialectic (A62-64/B87-88); if the former 
was also just an elaborate way of spelling out the distorted principles that we take to 
hold of reality (as knowledge of appearances) then this distinction between the Analytic 
and Dialectic would make no sense. It seems clear, then, that Allison is right to claim 
that the distinction between appearances and things in themselves – whatever it may be 
– cannot be a distinction between how things merely seem to be and how they really 
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 However, Grier argues that already in the Dissertation Kant holds that the intellect does not have 
access to things in themselves (2001: 52-57).  
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are. Or at least, not in any crude or straightforward sense, as it is often portrayed as 
being.  
This only gets us so far though, for it is possible to deny that Kant’s distinction 
is one between appearance and reality while still arguing that he holds an ‘ontological 
phenomenalism’ or idealism of the Berkeleyan variety.341 Unfortunately, this is a much 
harder problem to resolve; my aim is simply to show that Kant does lapse into 
Berkeleyan phenomenalism in places, but that, once again, this cannot be the whole 
story if the overall argument of the Critique is to make sense, nor indeed does Kant 
intend for it to be taken this way.
342
 The passages where Kant seems to make non-
innocent identifications of ‘appearances’ and ‘representations’ are many, and I am not 
going to supply an exhaustive list or analysis of them here.
343
 Instead, I will select what 
seem to me the most important of these passages and aim to show that the Berkeleyan 
reduction of objects to representations is not an isolated occurrence in one part of the 
Critique, but is rather prevalent throughout.  
 First, a notorious passage from Kant’s attempt to deal with Cartesian scepticism 
in the Paralogisms that was cut completely from the B-edition, particularly notable 
because it is one of the very few places where Kant ever defines transcendental idealism 
vis-à-vis its rival, transcendental realism:  
 
I understand by the transcendental idealism of all appearances the doctrine that 
they are all together to be regarded as mere representations and not as things in 
themselves, and accordingly that space and time are only sensible forms of our 
intuition, but not determinations given for themselves or conditions of objects as 
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 Van Cleve (1999: 123-124) distinguishes between ‘ontological’ and ‘analytical’ forms of 
phenomenalism; similarly Bennett (1971: 136-137) distinguishes between idealism and phenomenalism. 
Ontological phenomenalism and Bennett’s idealism correspond to Berkeley’s view that there is nothing 
more to empirical objects than the mental representations of perceivers: objects are literally constructed 
out of perceptions. Analytical phenomenalism and Bennett’s phenomenalism is the claim that statements 
or truths about physical objects can be reduced to claims about possible perceptions: objects are logical 
constructions out of perceptions. Van Cleve (ibid) thinks that Kant came close to analytical 
phenomenalism but was never able to fully break away from ontological phenomenalism.  
342
 In this respect, my view is similar to that of Allais (2004; 2015) who argues that there is genuine 
evidence for both ‘one world’ and ‘two world’ interpretations of Kant. However, she takes this to mean 
that a stable interpretation must designate a moderate sense in which appearances are mind-dependent 
properties of mind-independent things that have a way they are in themselves, and that this position can 
be found unambiguously in the Critique. By contrast, I take seriously the passages where Kant does seem 
to espouse phenomenalism – giving a detailed account in Chapter 4 of why in one particular instance he 
does this – but argue that he does not need to reduce objects to representations. As stated in the 
Introduction, I do not think there is an unambiguous account to be found in the Critique, but that is not 
necessarily a problem.  
343
 For a partially complete list and helpful discussion of the relevant passages, see Allais (2015: 19-27).  
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things in themselves. To this idealism is opposed transcendental realism, 
which regards space and time as something given in themselves (independent of 
our sensibility). The transcendental realist therefore represents outer appearances 
(if their reality is conceded) as things in themselves, which would exist 
independently of us and our sensibility and would thus also be outside us 
according to pure concepts of the understanding. It is really this transcendental 
realist who afterwards plays the empirical idealist; and after he has falsely 
presupposed about objects of the senses that if they are to exist they must have 
their existence in themselves even apart from sense, he finds that from this point 
of view all our representations of sense are insufficient to make their reality 
certain. (A369) 
 
Here Kant explicitly identifies appearances with ‘mere representations’. That 
‘appearances’ are the empirical objects themselves is made obvious by how Kant 
describes the fourth paralogism in its minor premise: ‘Now all outer appearances are of 
this kind [have a doubtful existence]: their [i.e., the appearances’) existence cannot be 
immediately perceived, but can be inferred only as the cause of given perceptions’ 
(A367; my emphasis). The first sentence of A369, then, confirms that part of Kant’s 
solution to sceptical idealism is, unfortunately, to make empirical objects into ‘mere 
representations’. Less surprisingly, the second part of the sentence affirms that the 
status of appearances as mere representations extends to the forms of appearances 
(space and time) as well. Next, Kant defines transcendental realism specifically as the 
view that space and time are things in themselves, existing independently of sensibility. 
Given that here the term ‘things in themselves’ is deliberately opposed to appearances 
as ‘mere representations’ there is no other way of reading ‘things in themselves’ except 
as denoting whatever exists independently of the mind in contrast to what exists only in 
the mind. Thus, in the last part of the passage Kant explains that transcendental realism 
is guilty of treating what are ‘mere representations’ as if they are mind-independent 
objects,
344
 but Kant then offers a surprising link between transcendental realism and 
empirical idealism. It is precisely because the transcendental realist treats appearances 
as things in themselves, that is, empirical objects as existing independently of the mind 
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 Notice here that the contrast is between representations construed as if they were entities and not 
aspects or properties of things. In other words, the passage cannot plausibly be read in favour of the 
moderate metaphysical views such as those of Allais, Langton and Ameriks, despite their efforts to do so.  
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that there is a gap between the cause (the empirical object outside us in the 
transcendental sense of mind-independence) and the effect (the perception of an object), 
and hence the existence of mind-independent objects is doubtful for the transcendental 
realist. It is exactly passages like this one that get Kant charged with holding a 
Berkeleyan phenomenalism about appearances – empirical objects just are mental 
representations – along with the postulation of an unknowable ‘real’ world: the things in 
themselves.
345
 Kant even goes so far as to claim that ‘the  transcendental idealist is an 
empirical realist’ because the existence of matter no longer has to be inferred (as it did 
for the Cartesian sceptic), but rather that matter ‘is only a species of representations 
(intuitions)’, ‘nothing but mere representations, i.e., representations in us, of whose 
reality we are immediately conscious’, for ‘in both cases they [inner and outer 
appearances] are nothing but representations, the immediate perception (consciousness) 
of which is at the same time a sufficient proof of their reality’ (A370-372). Lastly, ‘But 
now external objects (bodies) are merely appearances, hence also nothing other than a 
species of my representations, whose objects are something only through these 
representations, but are nothing separated from them’ (A370; my emphasis). It takes an 
extraordinary level of interpretative charity (or just plain stubbornness) to read Kant 
here – I have taken only a small selection of the offending lines – as advocating 
anything other than the Berkeleyan thesis that what we call objects consist of nothing 
more than ideas in the mind, and that this is why their so-called reality, in answer to 
Descartes, cannot be plausibly doubted. If this is what his ‘empirical realism’ really 
consists in then it is neither worth keeping – being a ‘Pyrrhic victory’, as Guyer (1987: 
24) calls it – nor is it inconsistent with transcendental idealism, for it just is this idealism 
taken as a deceptive and ‘lame’ way of maintaining knowledge of the external world 
through reducing external objects to ‘mere representations’ in us (Walsh 1975, 189-
190).
346
 Let us consider an alternative reading of this passage.  
Dietmar Heidemann (2011) takes transcendental idealism to be a genuine 
solution to sceptical idealism, and he focuses his attention on the Paralogisms. 
Following Kant’s lead, Heidemann refers to transcendental idealism and empirical 
realism as ‘empirical dualism’ and argues that it is composed of three features: 
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 Langton describes the position that seems to emerge from the Paralogisms on a phenomenalist 
interpretation as being ‘the worst of all veil of appearance philosophies: Berkeley plus unknowable things 
in themselves’ (1998: 142).  
346
 Similarly, Collins admits that Kant’s rejection of idealism here ‘looks like a bad joke’, but he 
maintains that this not the case (1999: 60-61).  
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ontological independence, epistemic dependence and truth-theoretical coherence (2011: 
203-204). Taken very charitably, I am sympathetic to ascribing these three features to 
Kant’s position in the final analysis, but the problem is that the text of the Paralogisms 
simply does not support such an ascription. This is clear when we compare 
Heidemann’s first feature of empirical dualism with the text: ‘ED-1: External objects 
exist independently of our cognitive capacities as extended bodies in space outside us = 
ontological independence’ (2011: 203). The analysis above shows that external objects 
unequivocally do not exist as extended bodies outside us independently of our cognitive 
capacities.
347
 Quite the reverse is true: objects are only represented as being extended 
and as being in space because they are representations in us, that is, in space as the a 
priori form of outer sense in general (i.e., dependent on our cognitive capacities). Where 
there is ontological independence in Kant’s position is that empirical objects exist as 
things in themselves (though we do not intuit them as they are in themselves). Nowhere 
is this made more obvious than just after the end of the Fourth Paralogism where Kant 
asserts: ‘that if I were to take away the thinking subject, the whole corporeal world 
would have to disappear, as this is nothing but the appearance in the sensibility of our 
subject and one mode of its representations’ (A383).348 The passage is overtly 
phenomenalist and suggests extreme Berkeleyan-style idealism. Of course, it is 
tempered by the assumption of unknowable things in themselves as the ground of 
appearances, which do not vanish along with the appearances (A379-380), but this is 
cold comfort indeed. Ontological independence as Heidemann defines it simply is not 
true of transcendental idealism in the A-edition of the Critique. This misreading of the 
text becomes even more obvious once we take into account that Heidemann is not 
advocating a reduction of external objects to representations (2011: 203), but as we have 
just seen that is exactly what Kant argues: if the external world is to be an object of 
immediate perception (consciousness) then external objects must be reduced to ‘mere 
representations’, an ‘appearance in our sensibility’ that will disappear if the thinking 
subject is removed. Now, to be sure, I do agree that Kant should not, in the final 
analysis, be understood as advocating a version of Berkeleyan-style idealism, but in 
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 Consider also this passage from the Antinomy: ‘all objects of an experience possible for us are nothing 
but appearances, i.e., mere representations, which, as they are represented, as extended beings or series of 
alterations, have outside our thoughts no existence grounded in itself’ (A490-491/B518-519; my 
emphasis). The Prolegomena is even more explicit: ‘the question of whether bodies (as appearances of 
outer sense) exist outside my thought as bodies in nature can without hesitation be answered negatively’ 
(4: 337; Kant’s emphasis).    
348
 Compare this statement with Schopenhauer (1969: §2, 5).  
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order to address that problem we first have to recognize and accept that it is a problem, 
which is something that many ‘one world’ commentators just plainly refuse to do except 
in the most perfunctory of ways.
349
 In fairness to non-phenomenalist interpretations the 
passage was deleted for the B-edition, so let us look now at other offending passages 
that were retained in B-.  
 Consider how Kant first introduces the term ‘appearance’ in the Transcendental 
Aesthetic: ‘The undetermined object of an empirical intuition is called appearance’ 
(A20/B34). This requires no phenomenalism: the object of an empirical intuition that 
has yet to be taken up into synthesis (conceptually determined) is an appearance; in 
other words, an appearance is an empirical object that has not yet been (re)cognized as 
being an object.
350
 But already in the Aesthetic Kant soon seems to reduce appearances 
(empirical objects) to representations: ‘what we call outer objects are nothing other than 
mere representations of our sensibility, whose form is space, but whose true correlate, 
i.e., the thing in itself, is not and cannot be cognized through them, but is also never 
asked after in experience’ (A30/B45). Notice how the thing in itself here is the ‘true 
correlate’ of the appearances: he speaks of one thing in itself being correlated with 
multiple representations, which undermines the ‘one world’ reading. The trend 
continues in the Transcendental Deduction: ‘Appearances are the only objects that can 
be given to us immediately, and that in them which is immediately related to the object 
is called intuition’ (A108-109); there is no implication of idealism so far, but then Kant 
continues: ‘However, these appearances are not things in themselves, but themselves 
only representations, which in turn have their object, which therefore cannot be further 
intuited by us, and that may therefore be called the non-empirical, i.e., transcendental 
object = X’ (A109). This passage is particularly interesting insofar as Kant claims that 
appearances – again notice the use of the plural – have their own object, even taken as 
mere representations, namely the transcendental object and that this is not a 
representation; of course, appearances do not represent things in themselves, because 
things in themselves are not in space and time while appearances are. The last passage I 
will cite for now is from the Analogies of Experience. This is significant for, as shown 
in Chapter 2, the Analogies is arguably where Kant most clearly espouses realism.  
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 For example, consider Allison’s treatment of the subject: ‘[Kant’s slide from talking of appearances to 
talking of representations] is a frequent and at times discomforting feature of Kantian analysis’ (2004: 69-
70).  
350
 Allais also notes how the first use of ‘appearance’ is neutral, suggesting no idealism (2015: 20, n.30).  
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Raising the question of whether a house that is intuited successively also exists 
successively with regards to its perceived parts in the manifold Kant investigates the 
notion of an object of representation:  
 
If appearances were things in themselves, then no human being would be able to 
assess from the succession of representations how the manifold is combined in 
the object. […] Now the question is whether the manifold of this house itself is 
also successive, which certainly no one will concede. Now, however, as soon as 
I raise my concept of an object to transcendental significance, the house is not a 
thing in itself at all but only an appearance, i.e., a representation, the 
transcendental object of which is unknown; therefore what do I understand by 
the question, how the manifold may be combined in the appearance itself (which 
is yet nothing in itself)? Here that which lies in the successive apprehension is 
considered as representation, but the appearance that is given to me, in spite of 
the fact that it is nothing more than a sum of these representations, is considered 
as their object, with which my concept, which I draw from the representations of 
apprehension, is to agree. (A190-191/B235-236)   
 
Here we see Kant’s reductionism on full display.351 His concern is the possibility of 
perceiving objective succession and simultaneity: just because I intuit a house 
successively this does not give me adequate grounds for assuming that the house exists 
successively. Kant suggests that this can only be the case if what we perceive in 
perception are not the things in themselves but the things as appearances. Why is this? 
If what I perceive is the thing in itself then I am left with no choice but to treat the 
house as existing successively rather than its parts existing simultaneously; this is 
because the subjective order of my apprehension (the roof at 𝑡1, the window at 𝑡2, etc.,) 
coincides, or rather just is, the objective order of the states of the object. There is no 
distinction between an objective and subjective order. However, something seems faulty 
with this reasoning. If ‘things in themselves’ are taken to be the objects (considered) as 
they are independently of their relation to human sensibility, that is, (considered) how 
they are mind-independently of appearances (representations) in time, then we have a 
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 Van Cleve  suggests that the Analogies is the closest Kant gets to ‘analytical phenomenalism’, but that 
his way of putting the problem, especially in this passage, expresses ontological phenomenalism (1999: 
123-124).   
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problem: if we were to be given things in themselves directly then surely what would 
follow is that the objective order would just be directly given to us, not misrepresented 
through being conflated with the subjective order of our apprehension (or the objective 
order collapsing into the subjective one).
352
 Kant is begging the question when he 
asserts that if appearances were things in themselves then we would be unable to 
distinguish the objective from the subjective order of apprehension. Nonetheless, there 
is something puzzling here and I contend that in order to solve the puzzle we must 
understand Kant as drawing on two separate notions of ‘things in themselves’ here.353 
 Kant claims that if appearances were things in themselves the problem would be 
unresolvable, but this is different to the concern with how mind-independent objects are 
independently of their relation to sensibility. In other words, when Kant speaks of 
‘things in themselves’ here I do not think he means things as they are independently of 
how they appear (whether this be taken in the sense of things as they really are, 
independently of the mind, or things considered methodologically on the deflationary 
reading, or the inner constitution of things on the moderate metaphysical reading). The 
claim simply makes no sense if this is how it is to be construed: Kant would be 
effectively saying that if in perception we were presented with how things really are 
(independently of how they appear) then we would not be able to know how they really 
are! Rather, Kant’s point is that there is a reification of mental representations into 
ontologically distinct things or pseudo-entities. In other words, if I treat my mental 
representations (the appearances) of the house as themselves existing outside of 
sensibility then Kant is correct in the passage when he claims that the problem cannot 
be resolved.
354
 This is because my mental image is of a certain part of the house at a 
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 Alternatively, it could even be objected that if things in themselves were given to us, the question of 
temporal succession or simultaneity of the manifold would not even arise; this is because space and time 
are features only of appearances and not features of things in themselves, on Kant’s account.  
353
 Although I distinguish two senses of the term operative in this (and many other) passages, the two 
senses themselves fall under the larger sense of a distinction between appearances/representations and 
reality/things themselves. Thus my sub-division here does not conflict with my claim that there are three 
main senses in which Kant holds that we do not know things in themselves since one of these senses is not 
concerned with our knowledge of things in themselves but rather with the ontological status of 
appearances. See Boer (2014: 235-236, 238) for a very different reading of the involvement of the 
transcendental distinction: Boer takes Kant to be denying that the house is a thing in itself in the specific 
sense of it being ‘something the inner characteristics of which can be known.’ As an appearance, the 
‘house’ cannot be known through conceptual analysis (intellectual cognition). I can find no evidence to 
support this reading of the distinction in this passage. The context of the passage makes it clear that ‘thing 
in itself’ here refers to something that is either completely mind-independent or treated as if it were mind-
independent.    
354
 Kant also frequently equivocates on ‘appearance’ as meaning the ‘thing that appears’ and ‘the 
appearance of a thing’ (usually with the implication that the appearance is purely mental), including in 
this passage, especially in the lines I omitted. See also Oberst (2015: 58-60). 
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certain time and if I treat these images as things then the objective order becomes my 
subjective order of apprehension; if, on the other hand, I treat my mental images as 
appearances, or as ‘mere representations’, then I can distinguish the order in which I 
subjectively perceive an object from the objective order of the states or parts of the 
object as an empirical object. We have two meanings for ‘things in themselves’: an 
ontological use and an epistemological use. In the ontological use, the term is shorthand 
for treating something that is not really an object as if it were an object, that is, a mental 
representation or image reified into a thing (in itself). This sense is operative in A190 
above and many other passages.
355
 Kant’s point seems to be that reified appearances 
(representations treated as if they were things in themselves) do not represent things 
considered as they are in themselves (that is, as outside us in the transcendental, and not 
empirical, sense). This is our epistemological sense, then; a concern with how things are 
(or should be considered) independently of their relation to the sensible conditions of 
experience. Now, with this distinction in place we appear to have a way of avoiding 
Berkeleyan-style phenomenalism.  
We can say with Kant that appearances are ‘objects qua sensibly represented’,356 
that is, ‘mere representations’ and thus avoid the mistake of Berkeley who treated these 
representations as things in themselves (in the ontological sense), by distinguishing 
between the representation of a thing (perception of a certain object in a certain state at 
a certain time) from the thing itself which allows us to save an objective order as being 
different from the subjective order of perception, or more simply, to distinguish 
between the mind-independent existence of a thing from the mind-dependent 
representations of the thing.
357
 Therefore Kant does not treat appearances, mental 
representations, as things, at least not here; however, this still leaves us with a major 
problem. Even if we defuse Kant’s apparent Berkeleyan idealism by showing that the 
mistake arises precisely when appearances are taken to be things this very fact seems to 
commit us to the other side of the Berkeleyan coin, i.e., that all we know directly are 
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 Including A490-492/B518-520, analysed in Chapter 4.  
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 The term ‘object qua sensibly represented’ is Allison’s (2004: 70). 
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 Notice the irony here: Kant on the ‘two world’ reading is accused of making representations into 
things, a second set of things distinct from the ordinary objects of our experience stripped of their 
spatiotemporal properties as such, but Kant’s point in the above passage is that it is precisely by reifying 
representations into things that the problem of time-determination becomes unresolvable. However, we 
must keep in mind that (1) those charged with a ‘two world’ reading often deny that they take 
appearances to be a second set of entities and (2) Guyer (1987) and Van Cleve (1999:120, 128) both take 
Kant’s argument in the Analogies to be incompatible with an ontological phenomenalism. For Guyer, the 
Analogies is part of the positive results of the Critique that are separable from transcendental idealism.   
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mental representations and not the things (in) themselves. So, whether appearances are 
treated as things in themselves (ontological sense) or not, they do not represent how 
objects are in the transcendental sense of ‘outside us’ (epistemological sense). In short, 
the passage seems to commit us to an interpretation of Kant that reads him as giving us 
access only to appearances (‘mere representations’), but unlike Berkeley who took ideas 
in the mind to exhaust empirical reality, Kant adds the unwelcome notion of a world 
existing in itself that we have and can have no access to. We have examined some 
passages and considerations that motivate the charge that transcendental idealism is just 
another variant of Berkeleyan phenomenalism; now let us consider the considerations 
that speak against this charge.  
 
1.2. Why Kant Might Not Be a Berkeleyan Phenomenalist  
 
 There are a number of considerations that speak against Kant being a Berkeleyan 
phenomenalist, and these have been helpfully summarized by Allais (2004; 2015: Ch. 
2).
358
 We have already seen above that the objection that transcendental idealism is a 
distinction between appearance and reality is explicitly repudiated by Kant in the second 
edition of the Critique (B69). However, we also saw that it is possible for Kant to 
espouse Berkeleyan-style idealism while holding that we have genuine knowledge on 
his account. I acknowledged the overwhelming textual evidence that Kant does 
mentalize appearances (in some unspecified sense), but now I want to explain what can 
be said against the charge, and suggest that, contrary to the impression given so far, 
transcendental idealism cannot consist of a Berkeleyan phenomenalism if we want to 
take seriously Kant’s claim that his idealism is also an empirical realism. I will begin 
with what seem to me the weaker responses and finish with the stronger ones.  
 (1) ‘Vorstellungen’ can be translated as ‘presentation’ as well as 
‘representation’. ‘Presentation’ does not have the same phenomenalist implications as 
‘representation’. Allais argues that the German can be translated as ‘presentation’ 
(2015: 13). She suggests that this helps support the idea that the kind of idealism Kant is 
arguing for need not be taken as one that limits empirical reality to what exists in the 
mind, but rather as referring to how what is empirically real does not transcend what can 
be given to our forms of consciousness (ibid). This is a good point: the word 
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 In what follows I draw on Allais’ (2015: Ch. 2) excellent discussion, but I do not discuss all seven of 
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‘representation’ does lend itself particularly well to phenomenalist readings or 
interpretations that take appearances to have some kind of (mental) existence 
independently of the things (in) themselves. Adopting ‘presentation’ over 
‘representation’ does help to counter this trend and makes room for the idea that the 
mind is in direct contact with external reality, rather than being presented with an image 
or re-presentation of it. However, there are also passages where adopting ‘presentation’ 
does not help us avoid a phenomenalist reading. We need only look at A190-191/B235-
236 again to see this. The house in Kant’s example is the ‘appearance’ or 
‘representation’. Adopting the change makes the house a ‘presentation’ ‘the 
transcendental object of which is unknown’. The ‘appearance’ is considered the object 
of my successive apprehension despite ‘the fact that it is nothing more than a sum of 
these presentations’. I fail to see how changing ‘representation’ to ‘presentation’ in any 
of its occurrences in this passage avoids the phenomenalist interpretation, for in either 
case the house itself, not merely our perception of it, is said to be nothing more than a 
sum of the representations/presentations that are given to consciousness. The question is 
what it means to say that these representations/presentations have an object given that 
the object itself is nothing outside of representation/presentation, a question that in that 
particular form only makes sense on a phenomenalist reading.
359
 
 (2) The distinction between transcendental and empirical senses of ‘outside 
us’.360 Above I talked about Kant’s distinction between appearances and things in 
themselves in terms of transcendental and empirical senses. Some commentators, 
primarily Allison (2004; 2012; 2015b) and Allais (2015), have seen this distinction as 
important for understanding the non-phenomenalist nature of Kant’s idealism. 
Specifically, Allison concentrates on a crucial passage where Kant disambiguates what 
it means to call an object ‘outside us’ (ausser uns). Allison claims, correctly, that the 
distinction marks a difference between how a thing is said to be outside us. Appearances 
can be said to be ‘outside us’ empirically but ‘in us’ (in uns) transcendentally.361 This 
paradoxical claim makes sense once we take into account Kant’s disambiguation. The 
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 By contrast, the non-phenomenalist question that is Kant’s real concern, and that can also be detected 
in the passage, is how we can know that the manifold of the object exists successively or simultaneously 
if we have only the synthesis of apprehension which is always successive. See Chapter 2.  
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 This is not one of Allais’ seven reasons for why Kant is not a phenomenalist, but it she discuss it as 
part of her third point that empirically real objects exist in a public space: ideas in the mind cannot be 
publicly perceivable (2015: 45-47).  
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 Appearances are also capable of being just objects of inner sense (time), but in the context of the 
passage Kant is considering the reality of outer appearances or external objects.  
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empirical sense marks a difference between whether a thing is in space (outside us) or 
in time (in us); the transcendental sense marks a difference between how things are 
considered in relation to the sensible conditions of human experience. That is, things 
that are considered in this relation are considered ‘in us’ and things as they are 
considered independently of this relation are transcendentally ‘outside us’.362 Allison 
argues that, so construed, Kant’s idealism has a ‘transcendental thrust’ that makes it 
about the way things are considered as objects of discursive cognition (considered in 
relation to the sensible and intellectual conditions of experience), rather than being a 
crude claim that appearances are ‘in us’ in the Berkeleyan sense of literally being ideas 
in the mind (2004: 24-25). As Allais rightly points out, Allison’s conclusion is too quick 
(2015: 22, n.34). While Kant distinguishes between the transcendental and empirical 
senses of ‘outside us’, this does not provide any information about how to elucidate the 
transcendental sense of this distinction. All we are told is that things that are 
transcendentally ‘outside us’ are things that exist distinct from us, which Allison 
interprets as things considered as they are independently of the sensible conditions of 
experience. However, the distinction between a thing existing in space and a thing 
existing distinct from us explains nothing, for it is not obvious why these two senses 
should be pried apart: a thing that exists distinct from us (usually) just is a thing that 
exists in space.
363
 Nonetheless, Allais thinks that the distinction ‘sets some constraints’ 
on how we should interpret transcendental idealism, namely, that the position will make 
more sense on a non-phenomenalist interpretation because, unlike phenomenalism, it 
allows appearances to be both in time and space, as well as only in time. As such, she 
argues that things 'outside us' in the empirical sense cannot literally be in the mind 
(2015: 22-23). However, in my view, this is also premature.
364
 Phenomenalism can still 
make sense of the distinction as marking the fact that objects can be experienced 
phenomenologically or psychologically as being external to me (empirically 'outside 
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 Kant’s exact disambiguation is that something exists ‘outside us’ as a thing in itself, i.e., 
transcendentally, when it is a thing that ‘exists distinct from us’, and a thing is ‘outside us’ empirically 
when it is a thing that is to be encountered in space (A373).  
363
 For example, if I hallucinate and think I see an entity, say a pizza because I am starving, and it turns 
out that when I question other people no one else can see it, and when I approach it the apparition 
vanishes, the ‘pizza’ does not exist in publicly perceivable space. Putting aside transcendental idealism 
temporarily, when an object exists distinct from my perception or consciousness of it, that object is said to 
be publicly perceivable by others, the perceivability of which is normally explained by the fact that the 
thing exists in space, that is, is there to be perceived by other people. Simply drawing a distinction 
between a thing existing distinct from me and a thing being represented in space does not tell us how to 
understand this distinction.  
364
 See also Oberst (2015: 63-64), who recognizes that Kant’s disambiguation does not tell us whether to 
understand the ontological status of appearances as mental or non-mental. 
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us') and their existing 'outside us' transcendentally, that is, that even though they are 
experienced as if they were outside us spatially (as common sense realism suggests), it 
can still be the case that on the transcendental level they are nothing but ‘mere 
representations’. This possibility is even hinted at by Kant in the passage where he 
claims that he is using ‘outside us’ in its empirical sense to designate a thing that is to 
be encountered in space, that is, where ‘it is taken in the proper psychological question 
about the reality of our outer intuition’ (A373; my emphasis). Therefore, while I agree 
that the transcendental/empirical distinction is important for understanding Kant’s 
idealism, I am unconvinced that the distinction either speaks straightforwardly in favour 
of the methodological reading (as Allison claims), or that it makes no sense on a 
phenomenalist interpretation (as Allais claims). Fortunately, there are better reasons for 
construing transcendental idealism as a non-phenomenalist kind of idealism.  
 (3) Kant explicitly rejects the comparison with Berkeley. Kant was incensed by 
the comparison of transcendental idealism with Berkeley’s phenomenalism. While it 
may be true that there is less separating the two than Kant would like to admit, it should 
definitely make us pause that Kant so vehemently denied the claim that his is a ‘higher 
idealism’. Above (at B69) we saw that Kant clarified that his view is not that things 
only seem to be spatial (and temporal), but that they actually are spatial (and temporal). 
His point is that their spatiality (and temporality) consists in relation of the thing to the 
human mind, but that does not render the spatiality (and temporality) of a thing, and 
thus an appearance, illusory. Nonetheless, there are three worries about Kant’s response 
to Berkeley. First, Kant could have just misread Berkeley, and therefore his rejection of 
Berkeley does not constitute a good reason for taking seriously his defence that he is not 
another Berkeley. Second, Kant may not be objecting to Berkeley’s phenomenalism 
itself so much as a lack of detail or sophistication in Berkeley’s account. Third, Kant 
may not be rejecting Berkeley’s phenomenalism so much as the thought that there is 
nothing more to reality than ideas in the (ultimately divine) mind. In short, this is the 
concern that Kant is another Berkeley just with the addition of (unknowable) things in 
themselves.  
 Allais responds to the first possibility that while it is ‘a complex question’ 
whether Kant correctly understood Berkeley, it can be seen that his idealism is different 
to Berkeley’s insofar as he does not demote bodies to illusions. Whether Berkeley 
actually does this is contentious but insofar as he does make appearances into mental 
entities, Kant ‘has a point’ when he claims that appearances are illusions on Berkeley’s 
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account, for if appearances are just mental ideas than their spatiality is illusory (2015: 
53). This is closely related to Kant’s rejection of appearances being how things merely 
seem to be in the sense of illusions and stands or falls along with that claim. However, 
while I agree with Allais’ basic analysis, it seems possible that Kant could reject 
Berkeley for making appearances illusory precisely because he also holds these 
mentalized appearances to be (in a causal affection or grounding sense) of things in 
themselves (though we do not cognize things in themselves through appearances), 
whereas as Berkeley does not.
365
 Regarding the second possibility, Allais concedes that 
not all of Kant’s criticisms of Berkeley can be used to reject a phenomenalist 
interpretation of transcendental idealism (ibid). To answer the third worry, Allais points 
to the Refutation of Idealism. She argues that since the refutation is aimed at proving 
what Descartes doubted, and thus must also reject what Berkeley outright denied, viz., 
the existence of external objects, Kant’s objection to Berkeley is to the mentalization of 
appearances and not just his omission of things in themselves (2015: 54-56). While a 
detailed examination of the argument of the Refutation is beyond my scope, a couple of 
brief points can be made.
366
  
First, it is worth pointing out that Kant draws attention to the fact that his proof 
against Descartes is not to be aimed at Berkeley, for Kant has already ‘undercut’ what 
he takes to motivate Berkeleyan idealism in the Transcendental Aesthetic, namely the 
assumption that space and time are properties of things in themselves (B274). It is 
important to keep separate the problematic idealism of Descartes and the dogmatic 
idealism of Berkeley. This is closely related to the second point, which is that Kant does 
not, on my interpretation, give a strict proof of the existence of external things 
(although he does give this impression when he says that we must prove that ‘we have 
experience and not merely imagination of outer things’); rather, he means to show 
‘that even our inner experience, undoubted by Descartes, is possible only under the 
presupposition of outer experience’ (B275; my emphasis).367 Allais argues that Kant is 
seeking to prove the reality of external objects in space as a condition of the knowledge 
                                                 
365
 This point also applies to Allais’ first objection, namely that for Kant, for there to be appearances there 
must be something that appears, whereas Berkeley’s idealism does not require things that appear, just the 
appearances. See Allais (2015: 43-44).  
366
 See Allison (2004: 285-303) and Guyer (1987: 279-329) for discussions of the argument and its 
relation to transcendental idealism.  
367
 In the language of the contemporary literature, I do not take the refutation, at least as it appears in the 
Critique, to be an ambitious transcendental argument. I read it as a modest argument, aimed at showing 
that the Cartesian sceptic cannot justifiably doubt the existence of an external world if he takes himself to 
have knowledge of his own subjective states.  
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of our own mental states, but I read him as making the modest argument that if one 
thinks that we have direct access to our own mental states then we can only have this 
knowledge based on the assumption that we have experience of things outside us in 
space. In other words, Kant does not give a direct proof of the existence of external 
reality but rather a proof that if one accepts the validity of knowledge of our own states 
then this presupposes a commitment to external reality. This subtle distinction makes 
sense of why Kant separates problematic and dogmatic idealism: the former is already 
half-defeated because it is implicitly committed to the presupposition of outer 
experience, whereas the latter is not committed to even this much, because it does not 
take our own mental states to be in any way reliant on or caused by (a genuinely) 
external reality. Kant thinks that Berkeley denied the mind-independent existence of 
external objects on the grounds that they are represented as being in space and time, and 
that space and time are ‘non-entities’ because they cannot be physically real (B70-71); 
since appearances are dependent on ‘non-entities’ for their existence the existence of 
appearances must also be denied. Since, however, Kant has demonstrated that space and 
time are not things in themselves but rather a priori forms of intuition that condition the 
form but not the actual existence of things as appearances, Berkeleyan idealism is 
indeed ‘undercut’ by the results of the Aesthetic. What the two considerations leave in 
place so far is the possibility that Kant could be Berkeley with the addition of things in 
themselves. That is, the Refutation of Idealism does speak against a purely Berkeleyan 
phenomenalism, but the ‘external’ things required as conditions of time-determination 
could be either things empirically ‘outside us’ (represented as existing in space) or 
transcendentally ‘outside us’ (things existing distinct from us).368  
Nonetheless, Kant asked his readers to substitute the term ‘critical’ or ‘formal’ 
idealism for the (ill-chosen term) ‘transcendental’ idealism, to make it clearer that this 
‘formal’ idealism was opposed to the material idealism that denied or doubted the 
existence of a physically existing, mind-independent reality (Pro, 4: 375; B519).
369
 
However, Kant does not employ the terms ‘formal’ and ‘critical’ idealism very often, 
                                                 
368
 Guyer claims that along with being a return to realism, Kant’s attempts to refute idealism mark a new 
commitment to the idea that the external things required are things in themselves, but that we do not 
cognize them as they are in themselves (1987: esp. 282). He calls this a combination of epistemological 
subjectivism and ontological realism.  
369
 This point is often raised, e.g., Collins (1999: 23-25) and Allison (2004: 35-36). Kant’s request is 
particularly clear in a letter to Beck (4
th
 December, 1792), where Kant explains that his idealism ‘I could 
better call “the principle of the ideality of space and time” [which is] ideality in reference to the form of 
representation’ which is not an ‘ideality of the object and its existence itself’ (Cor, 11: 395).   
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and he continues to speak of appearances as either just being representations or sums of 
representations in B-. This means that the equation of transcendental idealism with a 
merely formal idealism is really the desideratum and not the established position that 
can be unambiguously read off from the text. Finding a way to coherently interpret 
transcendental idealism as a formal idealism is critical to reconciling this idealism with 
the claimed empirical realism. On a related note, Kant’s empirical realism is also 
another reason why phenomenalist interpretations are rejected: if bodies are illusions in 
the sense of only appearing to be mind-independent (while really being nothing more 
than ideas in the mind) then it is difficult to see how such a position can include any 
non-vacuous sense of realism at all (whether empirical or transcendental).
370
 However, 
those who take transcendental idealism to be similar to Berkeley’s simply reject Kant’s 
claim that he is an empirical realist.
371
 This is a very tricky point: paying close attention 
to the text where Kant defines empirical realism does not support the non-
phenomenalist interpretation, for all Kant says is that space is empirically real because it 
is objectively valid ‘in regard to everything that can come before us externally as an 
object’ (A28/B44). In other words, space is empirically real because it is the form of 
outer affection, a form that is in us. This is completely compatible with space 
representing objects as if they were (genuinely) external when in fact they are ‘mere 
representations’ transcendentally ‘in us’.372 Thankfully, the fourth point is stronger and, 
to my mind, succeeds in making us rethink the need to find a non-phenomenalist 
interpretation of Kant’s idealism. This is Kant’s argument in the Analogies of 
Experience.  
                                                 
370
 Schulting levels this criticism against Van Cleve’s phenomenalist interpretation, claiming that he pulls 
Kant ‘much too close’ to Berkeley and also ‘undermines Kant’s emphatic empirical realism about 
objects’ with Van Cleve’s ‘ungainly talk’ of “virtual objects” (Schulting 2011a, 16-19; Van Cleve 1999, 
8).  
371
 The ineffectiveness of appealing to Kant’s claim to be an empirical realist is evident in Gardner’s 
account. Gardner triumphantly claims that Kant cannot be a phenomenalist because if he was ‘then the 
fundamental elements in Kant’s ontology would be objects of a kind ruled out by the theory of experience 
in the Analytic – purely sensible objects given independently of concepts’ (1999: 274). This is true: the 
Kant of the Analytic does not allow us to experience sense data, but only conceptualized intuitions that 
stand under the unity of apperception. But from this it hardly follows that these conceptualized intuitions 
are themselves anything other than mental representations – albeit more sophisticated ones – and even if 
it did, then the phenomenalist readers can simply dig in their heels and maintain that the argument of the 
Analogies is separable from (because incompatible with) transcendental idealism.  
372
 Similarly, Oberst considers whether the idea of an object in space or the empirical reality of space acts 
as a blow against phenomenalist interpretations. He rightly suggests that the answer is negative: all the 
term means is that there are objects in space on Kant’s account, but ‘Whether those objects are in or 
outside the mind is not entailed by that term’ (2015: 65).   
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 (4) Kant’s ontological commitments in the Analogies are plainly inconsistent 
with Berkeleyan phenomenalism.
373
 In my view this is the decisive argument. If it is 
agreed that Kant’s arguments in the Analogies commit him to the existence of 
substance(s) that endure unperceived through empirical alteration (because they can be 
neither destroyed nor created), that the objects of our ordinary experience are in real 
(non-ideal), genuine causal relations with each other, and that all substances are 
reciprocally connected to each other through causal interaction, then Berkeleyan-style 
phenomenalism must be rejected; commitment to any one of the three principles is 
incompatible with that position. If appearances are nothing more than mental entities 
existing in the mind of perceivers then they are not substances (nor grounded in 
substances), are not causally efficacious as causal powers, and are not in reciprocal 
interaction with other. However, it could be argued that Kant affirms these properties of 
things in themselves (as holding of the objects themselves), so that things in themselves 
do have these properties, but our representations of them (appearances) do not. This 
option is closed, however, for Kant repeatedly denies that things in themselves are 
substances, realities, etc., or at least that they should be thought of in these terms 
(A288/B344-B345).
374
 Nonetheless, if (i) appearances are taken to be representations 
(or constructions…, etc.,) and (ii) the three analogies (and the other principles) hold 
only of appearances (as Kant frequently affirms) then this raises a serious question 
about the ultimate status of these synthetic a priori principles. As with the question of 
the reality of space and time, Kant’s commitment to both (i) and (ii) invites the 
question: are things really substances (existing unperceived through alteration), causally 
efficacious, etc., or not?
375
 And if the answer is ‘no’ then why does Kant think that he 
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 Allais rightly takes the Analogies to count very seriously against phenomenalism (2015: 48-50). 
However, I am not in complete agreement with her additional points, such as her claim that Kant never 
says that empirical objects are ‘constructions’ out of representations using these principles, or that he 
never speaks of our perceptions representing objects as if they are in causal connections, are substances, 
etc. Oberst (2015: 65) disputes whether Kant’s claims about appearances interacting and being 
substances, etc., are incompatible with phenomenalism; he suggests that they are not on broadly similar 
lines as to how the transcendental/empirical distinction of ‘outside us’ leaves it undetermined what this 
distinction amounts to, but this is unconvincing: if Kant’s arguments in the Analogies actually entail 
ontological commitments then this is all irrelevant. In Chapter 2 I argue that they do.  
374
 See also B149, B309, A286-287/B242-243, A288-289/B344-345, A358-359 and Pro (4: 312-313). I 
examine the implications of this difficult passage in Chapter 3 for understanding transcendental idealism. 
375
 See Section 3 of the Introduction to the thesis for the ontological status of space and time. Stern notes 
that Kant’s ‘notorious distinction’ between appearances and things in themselves ‘introduces 
complications’ for working out the status of Kant’s anti-sceptical arguments, including in the Analogies 
of Experience (1999a: 4). I am also arguing here for a strong reading of the Analogies, according to 
which Kant’s aim is to provide a strict proof of the reality of natural causality in the empirical world, but 
there are other weaker readings of Kant’s aim. For example Stern (1999b) argues that the Second 
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has successfully demonstrated the truth of the principle: ‘All alterations occur in 
accordance with the law of the connection of cause and effect’ (B232)? I provide a 
detailed answer to this question in Chapters 2 and 3, but for now it is enough to see that 
a phenomenalist account cannot accommodate his arguments in the Analogies of 
Experience in the way that Kant intended.
376
  
 We have seen some reasons why the phenomenalist interpretation of Kant may 
be problematic. I have suggested that only two of the four reasons explored here can 
really stand against counter-objections, but as the rest of my thesis will make clear, I do 
side more against ‘two world’ readings and their phenomenalist variants than I do with 
them.
377
 However, I also take seriously the textual evidence in their favour. It is clear 
that at least some of the time Kant is a phenomenalist, and often his idealism does 
appear to be something like the standard Berkeleyan picture, supplemented with 
unknowable things in themselves. But it is equally clear that Kant’s wider account is 
incompatible with phenomenalism, insofar as he takes knowledge of appearances 
through a priori principles to yield true, genuine knowledge of mind-independent 
reality. That the distinction between appearances and things in themselves is primarily a 
distinction within one world of objects is the main claim of Section 2.  
 
2. Transcendental Idealism in One World 
 
 Just as there is with phenomenalist and ‘two world’ interpretations, there is 
plenty of textual evidence to support the idea that the distinction between appearances 
                                                                                                                                               
Analogy can be read as containing a transcendental argument against the justificatory sceptic, as opposed 
to an epistemic sceptic.   
376
 This is not to deny that phenomenalism is at work in the Analogies, for as we saw above, Kant does 
still make phenomenalist claims (or can be reasonably construed that way); rather, the point is that his 
arguments turn on, or lead to, ontological commitments about reality that are plainly inconsistent with 
phenomenalist accounts.  
377
 One of Allais’ most interesting objections that is not discussed here is that ‘We do not cognize mental 
states as they are in themselves’, by which she means that the phenomenalist reading must take Kant to be 
saying that appearances really are constructions out of a subject’s mental states, while also affirming that 
we cannot know the subject or its states in themselves. She takes this to mean that Kant cannot be a 
phenomenalist (2015: 50-51). This is a very tricky point and I cannot discuss it properly here, but I do not 
think the objection stands. In short, I am not sure we can talk coherently about what mental states are in 
themselves, as this seems to me to be something that we could only ever cognize, for Kant, if we had 
intellectual intuition/the God’s-eye view of reality. As I make clear in Chapter 4, I agree with Allison that 
one of Kant’s aims is to try to dissuade us from thinking that what counts as true or as knowledge is 
dictated by the theocentric model of cognition. Put bluntly, I am not sure that the notion of cognizing 
mental states in themselves is meaningful, so much as a pseudo-notion. However, Allais would reject my 
response because she rejects the idea that transcendental idealism involves a shift from a theocentric to an 
anthropocentric model of cognition (2015: 87-89).  
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and things in themselves is about two points of view on one world, where appearances 
are things as they appear and things in themselves are the same things but as they are in 
themselves. I argue for this claim in Section 2.1. The affirmation of a ‘one world’ 
reading, however, can also be taken in two ways. It can reflect a metaphysical 
distinction between the extrinsic and intrinsic natures of things or it can be taken as a 
distinction between two ways of considering or thinking about things. The former is 
best exhibited in the work of commentators such as Langton (1998), Ameriks (2003; 
2011), Allais (2004; 2007; 2015) and Westphal (2004: 56-61). In Section 2.2 I briefly 
discuss Langton’s view, followed by Allais’. My treatment of Langton is brief because I 
reserve my main criticism for Chapter 3 as it is instrumental for bringing out the second 
sense of the appearances/things in themselves distinction. In Section 3 I will discuss the 
work of those who view the distinction as being non-metaphysical, focusing primarily 
on Allison. Before that, let us quickly survey the evidence in favour of the broad ‘one 
world’ style of interpretation that is common to both metaphysical and non-
metaphysical interpretations.     
  
2.1. Appearances and Things in Themselves as Aspects of One World  
 
While the text by no means presents an unambiguous interpretation of 
transcendental idealism, there are passages that could be taken to exclude ‘two world’ 
readings. For example, Kant claims that ‘even if we cannot cognize these same objects 
as things in themselves, we at least must be able to think them as things in themselves’ 
(Bxxvi). That is completely clear: appearances and things in themselves are the same 
things. He continues:  
 
Now if we were to assume that the distinction between things as objects of 
experience and the very same things as things in themselves, which our critique 
has made necessary, were not made at all, then the principle of causality, and 
hence the mechanism of nature in determining causality, would be valid of all 
things in general as efficient causes. I would not be able to say of one and the 
same thing, e.g., the human soul, that its will is free and yet that it is 
simultaneously subject to natural necessity, i.e., that it is not free, without falling 
into an obvious contradiction; because in both propositions I would have taken 
the soul in just the same meaning, namely as a thing in general (as a thing in 
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itself), and without prior critique, I could not have taken it otherwise. But if the 
critique has not erred in teaching that the object should be taken in a twofold 
meaning, namely as appearance or as thing in itself […] then the same will is 
thought of in the appearance (in visible action) [as not free, while in itself it is 
free] without any contradiction occurring.  (Bxxvii-xxviii) 
 
The passage clearly speaks of things as appearances and things as things in themselves. 
Kant explicitly tells us that the critique teaches us to think of the object in a ‘twofold 
meaning’. However, it could be objected that the passage occurs after the charge of 
Berkeleyan idealism has been made. Yet such statements are to be found in both 
editions. For example, Kant asserts later in the Transcendental Aesthetic that 
appearances:
378
  
 
always [have] two sides, one where the object is considered in itself (without 
regard to the way in which it is to be intuited, the constitution of which however 
must for that very reason always remain problematic), the other where the form 
of the intuition of this object is considered, which must not be sought in the 
object in itself but in the subject to which it appears, but which nevertheless 
really and necessarily pertains to the representation of this object. (A38/B55)  
 
The passage explains that space and time, for Kant, belong to the subject and not to the 
object (in itself), and, due to this, it is necessary to form a consideration of the objects 
independently of space and time, i.e., as they are in themselves. Kant confirms this 
reading a few lines down when he says that time and space ‘apply to objects only so far 
as they are considered as appearances, but do not present things in themselves’ 
(A39/B56). Kant also makes similar statements throughout the Transcendental 
Aesthetic, such as the claim that ‘the things that we intuit are not in themselves what we 
intuit them to be’ (A42/59), etc. Such statements are not unique to the Transcendental 
                                                 
378
 It might seem strange to say that appearances have two sides but the puzzle dissolves once we 
remember that appearances and things in themselves are the very same things on this reading. 
Presumably, Kant says appearances here because the objects as appearances are what he is dealing with 
regards to the validity of space and time as forms of representation. Nonetheless, it would have been 
clearer if Kant had specified that ‘the object itself’ or the ‘thing in general’ or, better still, the 
‘transcendental object’ is the thing that is considered in two ways: as an appearance and as a thing in 
itself. See Allison (2004: 61-62). Though, obviously, this would be just one of the multiple meanings of 
‘transcendent object’.  
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Aesthetic and can be drawn from across the Critique. Later, Kant talks of how the 
human being ‘is in part phenomenon, but in another part, namely in regard to certain 
faculties, he is a merely intelligible object, because the actions of this object cannot at 
all be ascribed to the receptivity of sensibility’ (A546-547/B574-575). Perhaps the 
clearest passage occurs in the Phenomena and Noumena chapter. Given that this is 
where Kant explicitly explains the distinction between appearances and things in 
themselves, along with the related but different distinction between phenomena and 
noumena, I think it is fair to afford it some additional weight in the exegetical dispute:  
  
Nevertheless, if we call certain objects, as appearances, beings of sense 
(phaenomena), because we distinguish the way in which we intuit them from 
their constitution in itself, then it already follows from our concept that to these 
we as it were oppose, as objects thought merely through the understanding, 
either other objects conceived in accordance with the latter constitution,
379
 even 
though we do not intuit it in them, or else other possible things, which are not 
objects of our senses at all, and call these beings of understanding (noumena). 
(B306) 
 
This passage is especially helpful for illustrating the nuances of Kant’s distinction. It 
seems that there may be both two kinds of object and two ways of considering objects at 
issue. In the first case, when we consider objects as appearances we are considering 
them as standing in relation to our faculty of sensibility; that is, that there is a way 
things appear to us in virtue of these faculties and that this way of appearing is to be 
distinguished from the way that the object may be considered or thought as it is in itself, 
i.e., as it is completely independently of this relation. But it seems that Kant also wants 
to leave room for things that are not objects of our senses at all, and thus cannot be 
appearances for us. This obviously includes God, immortal souls, Leibnizian monads, 
etc., noumena in the positive sense.
380
 Primarily, then, when it concerns how we take 
                                                 
379
 Allison (2004: 54) renders this clause as: ‘either the very same objects [eben dieselben] conceived in 
accordance with the latter constitution’ which states explicitly what is merely grammatically implied in 
Guyer and Wood, namely that the contrast is between the objects that are appearances being thought as 
noumena and objects that are not appearances at all being thought as noumena.  
380
 There is a question about whether ‘one world’ readings can really make sense of Kant’s view of 
noumena in the positive sense. Schulting thinks that Allais’ reading actually disallows the existence of 
God and maintains that ‘one world’ readings in general struggle with this problem (2011a: 11). Allais 
claims that Kant denies that we have theoretical cognition of noumena, but allows that we can have some 
cognition of them through practical reason (2015: 15, 61, n.2). This is admittedly very unclear, since 
  
241 
 
the reality of the objects of experience, Kant has the first sense in mind, but the 
limitation of human cognition to objects as they appear is clearly intended to have 
serious implications for the second sense as well, namely that we can have no cognition 
of putative ‘things’ that cannot be appearances for us. There are two types of possible 
noumena: objects of our experience conceived as noumena (through intellectual 
intuition) and putative things, such as God, the soul, etc., that are only noumenal.
381
 Let 
this suffice to show that the general ‘one world’ approach has serious textual support.382 
What the above passages leave unclear, though, is just how the appearances and things 
in themselves distinction should be understood as concerning the same things. Is this a 
metaphysical distinction or a non-metaphysical one? I shall now consider recent 
metaphysical variants of the ‘one world’ reading.  
 
2.2. Extrinsic and Intrinsic Natures of Things: Langton and Allais  
 
 Due to dissatisfaction with both phenomenalist interpretations and ‘deflationary’ 
views there has recently been a surge in metaphysical ‘one world’ views. Perhaps the 
most controversial and scrutinized of these has been Langton’s (1998) interpretation 
that focuses on Kant’s unknowability thesis, that is, his claim that we cannot know 
things as they are in themselves. Langton argues that by ‘things in themselves’ Kant 
should be understood as referring to the intrinsic (non-relational) properties of 
substances, to their intrinsic nature as opposed to their extrinsic nature, where the latter 
is constituted by a substance’s relational properties (1998: 20). Following Langton, 
Allais agrees that the distinction is between extrinsic and intrinsic natures, but argues 
                                                                                                                                               
Allais (2015: Ch. 3) also explicitly wants to deny that Kant is a noumenalist, but surely reading Kant as 
allowing us as having some cognition of noumena through practical reason conflicts with her unflinching 
commitment to denying noumena in the positive sense? She does also later explain that ‘practical 
cognition’ is supposed to give us another way of ‘giving content to the causality of freedom’ rather than 
justifying claims to knowledge (2015: 304, n.6), but this makes Kant’s theory of practical cognition seem 
empty, indeed, even deflationary, which surely means there is an unresolved tension in Allais’ 
‘essentially manifest’ interpretation. Similarly, Allison takes Kant to leave (conceptual) room for things 
that are noumena only, such as God (2004: 51), and deflates Kant’s talk of practical cognition of noumena 
as not involving membership or knowledge of an intelligible world (2004: 48). Perhaps it is possible that 
the non-metaphysical reading that makes the unknowability thesis the consequence of our discursive 
cognition is better equipped to deal with Kant’s commitment to the possible existence of noumena than an 
interpretation that has to take appearances and things in themselves as reflecting extrinsic and intrinsic 
natures of (only) one set of things.  
381
 Walker denies this, claiming that it ‘would be strange indeed to envisage two different kinds of object 
both called “noumena”’ (2010: 829, n.13).   
382
 Other passages that support the broad ‘one world’ approach are: Bxx, A42/B59, B69, B307 and 
A277/B333.  
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that the intrinsic nature is not a separate set of properties, but is rather the ground of the 
extrinsic properties (2004: 677).  To illustrate the general idea she appeals to colour: 
colour can be said to appear to us insofar as things only appear red for subjects 
constituted as we are, but we would not therefore want to say that red things are not red, 
just that redness is mind-dependent in some sense. However, we do not know the 
ground of the redness of the object; this is the intrinsic nature that we are missing in not 
knowing red in itself (2004: 673-674, 679).
383
 By contrast, Langton maintains that the 
intrinsic nature of things takes the form of the intrinsic properties that do not reveal 
themselves through affecting the subject, and she holds these properties to be 
responsible for the real substantiality of things (1998: 49). Both Allais and Langton take 
Kant’s humility to mean that there is something substantial (hence metaphysical) about 
reality that human beings cannot know, and to this extent they have one foot in the ‘two 
world’ readings discussed above. Unlike those readings, however, both commentators 
can attribute genuine realism to Kant, for on both interpretations the appearances are 
things as they appear, that is, real mind-independent objects. What is unknown and 
unknowable is merely an aspect of reality and not the ‘real’ things themselves. From 
this it can easily be seen that metaphysical ‘one world’ readings sit between the two 
extremes of phenomenalist and deflationary accounts.
384
 Since we have already seen the 
considerable textual support that either extreme can appeal to in its defence, occupying 
the middle-ground appears to be an exegetically attractive option and, insofar as Kant 
clearly aimed to do justice to considerations that motivate both idealist and realist 
strands of thought, it is also philosophically attractive.
385
 Unfortunately, it is not so clear 
that these positions do successfully occupy the middle-ground.  
One problem with Langton’s approach is that there does not seem to be any 
(genuine) idealism in the position at all, which seems to conflict with attributing realism 
to a (notorious) idealist. Part of the problem is that both appearances and things in 
themselves have been assigned to the objects themselves as designating two types of 
properties: extrinsic and intrinsic. Yet we have seen abundant evidence that appearances 
are, at the very least, mind-dependent on Kant’s account, even to the point of just being 
                                                 
383
 However, the example of colour is only intended as an analogy. What the intrinsic natures of 
appearances are is unknowable, on Allais’s account. At least this is how I understand her position. See 
Allais (2015: Ch. 10).  
384
 Similarly, Ameriks (2003; 2011; 2015) takes the transcendentally ideal, for Kant to be less real than 
what is transcendentally real, but still non-fraudulent, which leads to what he calls a ‘moderate’ position.  
385
 I therefore agree with Allais’ claim that part of what makes Kant’s position so compelling and 
interesting is precisely his effort to balance realism and idealism (2015: 10-11). 
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representations (or sums of representations) on the phenomenalist reading. Prima facie, 
Langton’s position conflicts with an overwhelming volume of textual evidence that 
makes it hard to see how her account could be accurate.
386
 Related to this is her 
apparent neglect of the arguments that are usually thought to have led Kant to 
transcendental idealism, i.e., his arguments for space and time being a priori forms of 
intuition and his general concern with the a priori conditions of experience.
387
 Next, 
although Langton takes Kantian humility to mean that we cannot know the intrinsic 
nature of things, Kant actually explicitly affirms that we can cognize what is inner in 
things; it is just that what is ‘inner’ can only be comparatively inner, rather than 
‘absolutely inner’. He says that: ‘Observation and analysis of the appearances penetrate 
into what is inner in nature and one cannot know how far this will go in time’ 
(A278/B334).
388
 As Graham Bird rightly points out, Langton falls into the trap of 
repeatedly mistaking passages that express the Leibnizian position that Kant is attacking 
for his own view (2000: 106). My full account of Langton’s view is given in Chapter 3 
where I examine transcendental idealism in the Amphiboly chapter of the Critique; here 
I want to focus on broader criticisms of Langton’s strategy before considering Allais’ 
modification of the strategy.  
Langton argues that on her interpretation ‘an old and ugly problem’ is solved. 
This is the notorious problem of affection that has haunted Kant scholarship from its 
first conception by F. H. Jacobi to the present day. Briefly, the problem is that according 
to Kant, things in themselves affect the mind to give us representations; these 
representations are then synthesized to yield intuitions – singular representations of 
objects – through application of the categories, one of which is the concept of causality. 
According to the limitations set on cognition by Kant, the categories can only be 
legitimately applied to appearances and not to things in themselves, but this raises the 
problem. If things in themselves affect the mind then there must be a causal relation 
                                                 
386
 Langton claims that her interpretation is not supposed to show what Kant meant (but failed) to say or 
even what he ought to have said, but to simply represent what he actually said (1998: 6).  
387
 Although there may be other arguments that can be constructed out of the resources of the Critical 
philosophy, it is undeniable that Kant saw himself as providing only two proofs of transcendental 
idealism. The direct proof given through the arguments that space and time are (only) subjective a priori 
forms of intuition and the notorious ‘indirect’ proof through the resolution of the mathematical 
antinomies (Bxxii, A506-507/B534-535). I examine Kant’s resolution of the antinomies in Chapter 4.  
388
 She also attributes the quote ‘We have no insight whatsoever into the intrinsic nature of things’ to 
Kant in the opening of her book, but in context this is a deliberate misquotation by Kant of a German poet 
, used to illustrate his point that Leibniz’s doctrine of monadology is based on a ‘transcendental 
amphiboly’. The quote is not representative of Kant’s view, but rather is illustrative of what he is 
attacking. See Chapter 3.  
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between things in themselves and the mind, not just appearances and the mind, but this 
violates Kantian humility. Langton sets out the problem by breaking its components 
down into separate claims:  
 
K1 Things in themselves exist.  
 K2 Things in themselves are the causes of phenomenal appearances.  
 K3 We can have no knowledge of things in themselves.  
 
The first two are, according to Langton, metaphysical theses and the third is an 
epistemological one. Taken individually, each thesis is fine, but once they are put 
together two corollaries emerge that threaten the coherence of the whole story:  
 
 C1 We cannot know that things in themselves exist.  
C2 We cannot know that things in themselves are the causes of phenomenal 
appearances.  
 
Langton concludes that, so construed, K1 and K2 cannot be known so Kant’s story has 
made itself untellable (1998: 7-8). She rejects Allison’s ‘deflationary proposal’  (1998: 
7-11) and proffers her own interpretation of the Kantian theses whose conjunction gives 
rise to the problem of affection:  
 
 M1 There exist things in themselves, i.e. things that have intrinsic properties.  
M2 The things that have intrinsic properties also have relational properties: 
causal powers that constitute phenomenal appearances.  
M3 We have no knowledge of the intrinsic properties of things (Langton 1998, 
13).  
 
Langton claims that with her interpretation, ‘the old and ugly problem disappears’ 
(ibid), but this conclusion is premature. While it is true that the triad would be 
consistent if Langton’s interpretation of the Kantian theses is correct, it is not clear that 
the individual theses are philosophically warranted by such an interpretation, especially 
for Kant. By far the most significant problem is Langton’s confidence that Kant can 
assert M1. K1 is not a problem on either the ‘two world’ or deflationary readings since 
in those cases it does follow, as a conceptual truth, that if there are appearances there are 
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things that are doing the appearing (in some sense),
389
 but with Langton’s case this does 
not follow, at least not without additional (and notably, idealist) premises.
390
 On her 
interpretation, Kant would first have to demonstrate that things cannot exist 
independently of us based solely on the extrinsic properties that we experience them as 
having, but how could this be shown?  
First, Kant explicitly claims that we can and do penetrate into the inner reality of 
nature, but that we cannot be sure how far our knowledge will extend in time 
(A278/B334); so, by that logic, we could never be sure that we had found all the 
properties that nature contains and, therefore, the property or properties responsible for 
substantiality. A contemporary analogy might be the Higgs-Boson particle, which some 
scientists hold to be capable of accounting for mass. If true then this particle has long 
eluded scientific investigation and yet it has been a feature or property of nature all 
along. Second, it is unclear what these intrinsic properties would even be, assuming that 
they exist to begin with. Philosophy is no stranger to a distinction between intrinsic and 
extrinsic properties, which famously is exemplified in Locke’s primary and secondary 
property distinction. For Locke, properties such as shape and motion belong to an 
object’s primary properties because the object has these properties regardless of being 
perceived; secondary properties include colour for, as we saw above with Allais, objects 
can only be said to instantiate their colour when perceived (Allais 2004, 673-674). Here 
such a distinction is clearly intelligible, but for Kant, all the properties that Locke 
considered primary are really secondary (belonging to the intuition of the object) (Pro, 
4: 289), so it is very unclear what kind of property or feature could even count as 
intrinsic on Kant’s account. Furthermore, if Kant’s humility consists in denying us 
knowledge of intrinsic properties, why do we find no evidence of what he thinks these 
properties are when he still holds it to be possible to cognize things in themselves? 
Specifically, in the Dissertation Kant is generally thought to hold that the intellect can 
cognize things in themselves, once freed from the contaminating influence of 
                                                 
389
 On the ‘two world’ reading if there is an appearance (e.g., a mental representation) then there is the 
thing (unknown independently of the representation) that is doing the appearing or causes the appearance 
in the subject. On Allison’s reading the thing in itself is the appearance but considered in itself. So, if 
something can be considered as an appearance, as subject to the conditions of experience, it can be 
considered in absence of those conditions as well. For Kant’s talk of appearances presupposing things in 
themselves see Bxxvi-xxvii, A251-252 and Pro (4: 314-315).  
390
 The missing idealist premise is that something can be the case simply because we must think that it is 
the case. See Breitenbach (2004: 141). Or in explicit Kantian terms, that the conditions of experience are 
the conditions of the objects of experience.  
  
246 
 
sensibility.
391
 Despite this, the only information Kant gives us about the intelligible 
world is its form, namely that a collection of substances compose a world only if they 
stand in real casual interactions with each other (ID, 2: 406-410); there is no mention of 
intrinsic properties here.
392
  
On Langton’s interpretation, things in themselves are substances with intrinsic, 
causally inert, properties. She thinks that this follows from the fact that we have the 
unschematized concept of substance. We can know that things in themselves are 
substances, but we cannot cognize their intrinsic properties, but Kant explicitly denies 
that things in themselves should be thought of as substances; moreover, his most 
explicit denial occurs in the very chapter that Langton relies on the most. Kant writes 
that the understanding ‘thinks of an object in itself, but only as a transcendental object, 
which is the cause of appearance (thus not itself appearance), and that cannot be thought 
of either as magnitude or as reality or as substance, etc.’ (A288/B344). I will return to 
this passage in Chapter 3, but for now what is important to note is that Langton seems to 
think that thinking things through the unschematized categories yields a minimal 
amount of information about actual things in themselves. Thinking the objects of our 
experience through the unschematized categories gives us only analytic judgements 
about the logical form of our thinking about objects in general, not synthetic truths 
about actual objects (A147/B186).
393
  
 Additionally, there is a concern about the very intelligibility of the idea of 
things having any truly intrinsic properties on Kant’s account, particularly in the way 
that Langton characterizes them, viz., as non-relational properties that do not affect us 
through sensibility. If things are subject to the human mind, and it is in virtue of that 
relation that they can be said to be in space and time and to be ‘objects’ for us, what 
sense can be imputed to the claim that things have properties considered completely 
                                                 
391
 However, Grier argues that even in the Dissertation there is no straightforward cognition of noumena 
by reason (2001: 64-66), pointing to the ‘principles of harmony’ being subjectively valid principles even 
though they arise from the intellect alone (ID, 2: 217-219). Nonetheless, as cognitions of ‘things as they 
are’ (as opposed to ‘things as they appear’), intellectual cognition is clearly supposed to yield some 
knowledge of noumena in the Dissertation. 
392
 Ameriks makes a similar point regarding how knowledge of the intelligible world is relational and 
concerns things in themselves (2003: 150). .  
393
 Allais also seems to think that we have formal, analytic knowledge of things in themselves through the 
unschematized categories (2015: 68-70). However, we have to be careful not to conflate our concept of 
what things are like in themselves with how they actually are as things in themselves if we are going to 
take a metaphysical conception of the transcendental distinction. Analytic truths only tell us something 
about our concept of things in general (and thus of things in themselves), but they do not tell us anything 
about how things may be in themselves. See Schulting (2011b: esp. 160-161) and Allison (2004: 18). 
Although he also thinks that the categories do not hold of things in themselves, Kohl insists that analytic 
judgements about things in themselves do describe actual things in themselves (2015: 101, n.17).    
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independently of us, on a Kantian account? Objects considered independently of us can 
only be regarded as an unknown ‘something = X’ (A251).394 While Langton’s Kant may 
avoid the thorny problem of violating his own claims to critical modesty through the 
problem of affection, he transgresses those same boundaries by claiming to know that 
‘things’ independently of us have causally inert ‘intrinsic’ properties, etc., but there is 
no possible way for Langton’s Kant to validate this assumption, much less justify any 
sort of claim about the nature of these properties (as non-relational). While the route 
may be different, Langton still leaves us with an inconsistent Kant. However, since she 
rejects the idea that transcendental idealism is about philosophical methodology (and its 
implications) this objection is unlikely to bother her, particularly as the objection is 
inspired by deflationary considerations. Langton takes it as given, as does Allais (2015: 
96-97), that it is a conceptual truth that phenomena qua relational require something 
non-relational,
395
 but disputing the validity and applicability of so-called conceptual 
truths forms part of Kant’s critique of Leibniz in the Amphiboly, and it is reflected in 
the idea of critiquing the use of pure reason more broadly.
396
  
 There is another objection, however, that operates within the terms of Langton’s 
reading rather than questioning her whole line of interpretation. This objection asks 
where freedom is supposed to fit in her account. On a deflationary reading, Kant is not 
claiming that there is a kind of causality different to the natural one that must exist 
alongside natural causality, but on Langton’s metaphysical account, there must be room 
for a genuine, non-phenomenal, spontaneous causality. Causality is obviously a 
relational property, but Kant unequivocally assigns freedom to the noumenal realm; this 
means that things in themselves must have causal, i.e., relational properties, but this 
goes against Langton’s claim that things in themselves are the non-relational, intrinsic 
properties of substances. In short, Langton’s thoroughly metaphysical Kant has no room 
for his most famous metaphysical commitment!
397
  
 Furthermore, it remains unclear what phenomena are on Langton’s 
interpretation. She repeatedly rejects any notion of phenomena being phenomenalistic 
                                                 
394
 Admittedly, this turns on a very idealist conception of the sense in which subjects constitute ‘objects’, 
but at this stage we are not in a place to investigate this conception. See Chapter 1.  
395
 In Langton’s case it is analytically entailed that where there are extrinsic properties there must be 
intrinsic ones, but there is no grounding relation between them. On Allais’ account the intrinsic nature 
grounds the extrinsic nature but we cannot cognize it.  
396
 See Chapter 3.  
397
 Versions of this criticism can be found in Ameriks (2003: 149), Westphal (2004: 56, n.37) and 
Schulting (2011a: 22-23).  
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(1998: 48), but she seems unable to provide a positive account of what they are. Recall 
that for contemporary ‘two world’ readings phenomena are mental representations, 
entities in the mind, or composed out of mental activities that we have access to at the 
cost of not having access to the things in themselves and recall, also, that on ‘two 
aspect’ readings phenomena constitute a way of considering the objects, namely as they 
appear. Langton denies both, claiming that phenomena are constituted out of the 
extrinsic properties of substances or the things in themselves (1998: 13), but in what 
sense can causal properties constitute phenomena? Langton does not want to say that 
the phenomenon is separate from the thing in itself but just is a substance’s extrinsic 
properties, yet this would seem to attribute to Kant the bizarre and incoherent view that 
we are affected by one type of property in things but not another, precisely the type that 
seems to correspond to empirical affection, which is not what needs explaining. Kant 
explicitly states that the cause of our representations is ‘non-sensible’, which 
immediately rules out extrinsic properties (phenomena) as the viable candidate since 
these are always sensible (A494/B522).
398
 Further, one could ask how the extrinsic 
properties affect us in the first place and it is no help to simply characterize them, as 
Langton does, as (causal) relational properties since this does not explain why and how 
they can appear in space and time to us.
399
  
 Nonetheless, insofar as Kant does occasionally talk of intrinsic properties and of 
ascribing distinctive and inner predicates to things in knowing them as things in 
themselves (A277/B333, A565/B593), Langton still seems to have a point. I show in 
Chapter 3 in detail why her argument is premised on a misunderstanding of Kant’s 
critique of Leibniz, and so why she erroneously takes the pure categories to yield even a 
minimal amount of information about actual things in themselves, when Kant is actually 
criticizing just this very move. Where I do agree with Langton is that Kant thinks he is 
telling us that we are missing something substantial in not knowing things in 
themselves; but I disagree that this ‘something’ is best thought of in terms of intrinsic 
properties, or indeed in terms of properties altogether. Let us move to Allais’ 
interpretation.  
                                                 
398
 In principle, we can be affected by the object as an appearance, i.e., after it has been given through 
space and time, but not before. Affection before appearance must necessarily be by things in themselves, 
but we cannot apply the categories here. Doing so is precisely what leads to the errors of metaphysics and 
generates the problem of affection.  
399
 This recalls the puzzle that I set out in Section 3 of the Introduction.  
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 Allais (2004; 2007; 2015) offers a modified version of Langton’s interpretation 
that builds on certain features of Langton’s while attempting to incorporate Kant’s 
idealism, along with his concern with the a priori conditions of experience. Her 
interpretation appeals to a direct realist account of perception to model the status of 
appearances and things in themselves; however, despite the appeal to direct realism, 
many of the criticisms levelled at Langton apply also to Allais. Allais attempts to find 
an interpretation that is asserted unambiguously in the Critique while also showing why 
‘two world’ or phenomenalist readings must be wholly rejected. She speaks against the 
‘trivial sounding claim that in order to be known objects must satisfy certain conditions 
of knowledge’ (2004: 655), which is aimed primarily at Allison. She argues that Allison 
‘practically makes transcendental idealism true by definition’ (2004: 667) because of 
the way he defines both the notion of an ‘epistemic condition’ and the concept of a 
thing in itself.
400
 Allais’ view is that Kant’s distinction is between an extrinsic and 
intrinsic nature of things: the extrinsic nature is the appearance while the intrinsic is the 
thing in itself. By contrast to Langton, however, Allais claims that there are not two 
kinds of properties, so the intrinsic is just the extrinsic considered in itself, i.e., as the 
ground of appearances (2004: 673-674, 679). It is not clear to me, though, how this 
succeeds in being non-trivial. Allais’ problem with Allison’s interpretation is that it 
looks like transcendental idealism simply says that we can have no knowledge of things 
independently of the conditions of knowing things, which is trivially true (2015: 82). 
Yet I think this charge can also be applied to Allais’ account. If an object’s extrinsic 
nature is just the way that it appears to a subject then is it not also the case that the 
secret of its intrinsic nature is hidden from us in an equally trivial way? That is, if the 
extrinsic nature is equated with a thing’s (mind-dependent) way of appearing, and the 
intrinsic nature is just how the thing is in (complete) independence of its relations to 
anything else, including us, then of course the intrinsic nature cannot be known.
401
 
Assuming for now that the attack hits home, it would be problematic if Allais’ reading 
is also vulnerable to the objection. Nonetheless, I think the triviality charge in general 
turns on an uncharitable formulation of what the interpretation in question is attempting 
to say, so I will focus on other problems.  
                                                 
400
 She develops these criticisms in (2015: Ch. 3); I respond to these objections in Section 3.  
401
 Even Langton’s account can be rendered trivial. Intrinsic properties are those that a substance has 
independently of relations to other things, so again, it follows as a matter of definition that we cannot 
know the properties that things have independently of their relation to other things. Indeed, on her 
account ‘in itself’ just means non-relational. See Ameriks (2003: 149).  
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Allais recognizes that transcendental idealism requires that objects be in some 
way mind-dependent (for otherwise the position is not idealist), but that simultaneously 
this ‘idealism’ is not to be taken to undermine Kant’s empirical realism (2004: 665; 
2015). She rightly suggests that Langton’s account fails at meeting this requirement, but 
also attacks epistemological ‘one world’ readings for failing the requirement as well. 
The problem, as Van Cleve remarks, is that ‘one can begin to wonder whether Kant's 
transcendental idealism has anything much to do with Kant's idealism at all’ (1999: 
4).
402
 However, it seems to me that Allais does not successfully find an alternative sense 
of mind-dependence for her own account.  
Although Allais rightly rejects the idea that appearances are illusory for Kant 
(B69), I am unconvinced that she successfully formulates a coherent alternative to the 
phenomenalism that she rejects. To illustrate how appearances can be mind-dependent 
non-mental entities she uses the classic example of the stick that appears bent in water:  
 
First, the bent appearance of the stick is a perfectly public feature of the stick. 
Second, we can easily make sense of saying that the appearance of the stick 
represents the stick as being bent. Third, while it is not a mental entity, mental 
state or mental activity, the bent appearance of the stick is clearly mind-
dependent, as it exists only in our perception of the stick: the bent appearance of 
the stick does not exist apart from our perception of it (Allais 2004, 671-672).
403
  
 
This example seems confused. It is unclear that the appearance is not a mental entity on 
this account. Allais maintains that its mind-dependence consists in the appearance only 
existing in the possible perception of it, but how then do we explain what we actually 
see in this case?
404
 It is no help to claim that the stick is not bent in reality and that it 
only appears that way since this means that there is a mystery concerning exactly what 
it is that we perceive. In her later account, Allais again appeals to the direct realist view 
of perception, this time focusing on the relationality of perception. The basic idea is that 
perception is relational in the sense that there is not just an object and a subject, but also 
a particular context to the perception. In perceiving a bent stick, Allais maintains that it 
                                                 
402
 Which is a fair comment since some commentators set Kant up explicitly as ‘anti-idealist’, e.g., 
Collins (1999: xii, passim). Interestingly, Allais is not sure whether Collins’ account contains no idealism 
at all, suggesting that the difference between them may be merely ‘terminological’ (2015: 16-17, n.25).   
403
 Collins (1999: 36-39) uses a similar example of a bridge that is perceived as partially obscured.  
404
 Allais develops the example further in (2015: 112-114)  
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is still the stick that is directly given to us in perception – the presence of the object 
itself to consciousness is part of what makes the mental state a perceptual state – but 
that the way the stick is seen is mind-dependent, insofar as it is perceived as being 
different from how it is independently of its appearing to consciousness (2015: 112-
114). On this basis she thinks that we can reject phenomenalism: the stick itself is what 
is perceived and not a mental state or image, but at the same time the view allows us to 
make sense of the idea that the stick is perceived as being different to how it is in itself: 
it is perceived as being bent when it is, mind-independently, straight. I am not 
convinced that this account works, either as a philosophical position or as an analogy 
for understanding transcendental idealism.  
 Regarding its coherency as a philosophical position, it is important to note that 
Allais does not mean to defend its plausibility, but only the idea that it is helpful for 
understanding Kant; nonetheless, she is clearly very sympathetic to the view. She also 
claims that she is not claiming that Kant himself is a direct realist (2004: 670; 2015: 16), 
which makes it unclear why we should think that transcendental idealism can be 
illuminated by this account of perception if it is not a position that Kant himself did (or 
would) endorse.
405
 If the position is incoherent I see no good reason to saddle Kant with 
it. My basic issue is that I do not believe it manages to occupy the middle-ground 
between phenomenalism and deflationary readings. Although Allais has attempted to 
expand on the original idea in her most recent account by appealing to relationality it 
still seems to me that to insist that it is the object itself that is presented to us (in non-
veridical) perception is simply to restate the problem. It is no clearer than before (2004; 
2007) how the stick itself can be what is presented to us if our perception presents us 
with qualities (appearing bent) that the stick does not have, independently of its 
appearance to consciousness. There are two ways out of this dilemma, but neither 
option seems very appealing. First, we could bite the bullet and concede that, ‘yes’, 
what we are directly presented with is something that does not have the qualities that we 
wish to attribute to the thing itself, in which case we fall back into either a form of 
phenomenalism, which Allais rejects because that means that we are not directly given 
external objects, or we take the second option, which would mean attributing the 
property of appearing bent to the stick itself when it is immersed in water, which seems 
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 On this point, I agree with Longuenesse that Kant is an indirect realist (1998: 20-21, n.9).  
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to be her preference.
406
 This allows Allais to claim that it is the stick itself that is 
presented to us, avoiding phenomenalism, but then we are faced with the prima facie 
unattractive option of losing the distinction between veridical and non-veridical 
perception altogether. At least, we can no longer make room for purely subjective 
experiences, for now what would be usually classified as non-veridical (perceiving a 
stick as being bent) is now veridical insofar as the stick has the mind-dependent 
property of appearing bent when immersed in water.
407
 Insofar as Kant clearly wants to 
retain a sense in which there can be mere appearances – that is, representations that do 
not relate to an object
408
 – then Allais’ relational account of perception is too strong, 
making purely subjective appearances impossible.  
 Even if the account is philosophically coherent, there are reasons to reject it as 
adequately capturing transcendental idealism.
409
 First, Allais takes the distinction 
between appearances and things in themselves to not be a distinction between how 
reality seems to be and how it ‘really’ is, but this is exactly what the bent stick analogy 
(usually) signifies: the stick merely appears to be bent while it is really straight.
410
 
Second, Allais takes appearances to be mind-dependent aspects of objects rather than 
being themselves representations, but this conflicts with a huge volume of textual 
evidence that suggests, at least some of the time, Kant really did mean to equate the 
objects of our ordinary experience, or the way that they appear, as having an existence 
only ‘as modifications of our sensibility’ (A491/B519) that cannot be attributed to these 
objects themselves, and that these appearances ‘must not be regarded in themselves, in 
the same way, as objects (outside the power of representation)’ (A104).411 My third 
criticism must wait until Chapter 4 where I argue that all non-phenomenalist 
interpretations are unable to successfully account for Kant’s official resolution of the 
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 She suggests that non-veridical features are mind-dependent properties of the objects themselves, but 
she concedes that much work is required to make this relationship comprehensible (2015: 115-116).  
407
 Schulting makes this objection, and he also questions whether Allais has really exorcized the 
phenomenalism from transcendental idealism insofar as she fails to explain the ‘the mentalist language 
that Kant clearly adopts’ (2011a: 10).     
408
 The distinction between appearance and phenomenon captures this. Appearances are indeterminate 
and phenomena are appearances that are ‘thought in accordance with the unity of the categories’ (A248-
249).  
409
 It must be noted that Allais does not intend the bent-stick analogy as an account of the status of 
Kantian appearances, but she does intend it to capture the idea that something can be directly presented to 
consciousness in a way that differs from how it really is (2015: 114). It is precisely this claim that I find 
incomprehensible.  
410
 Notwithstanding the possibility of the bent appearance of the stick being a property of the stick itself, 
in which case there is no longer any distinction between how things merely seem to be and how they 
really are.  
411
 See A190-191/B518-519, discussed in Section 1.  
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mathematical antinomies, revealing that there is a significant gap between what Kant 
asserts concerning the nature of his idealism and how it actually functions. For now, I 
think it is fair to say that Allais’ attempt to understand transcendental idealism through a 
comparison with relational models of perception requires more work before it can avoid 
collapsing back into phenomenalism: she has not properly accounted for the mentalist 
language that Kant deliberately chose, and continued to choose after being charged with 
a ‘higher idealism’. Let us turn to the deflationary ‘one world’ accounts of 
transcendental idealism.  
 
3. Deflationary Accounts of Transcendental Idealism 
 
 In addition to the metaphysical variants just discussed, the ‘one world’ reading 
can also be understood as designating ways of considering things in philosophical 
reflection. Some commentators have wanted to strip any credibility from the idea of a 
‘thing in itself’ altogether, arguing that the very idea of such a thing is incoherent and 
violates the tenets of transcendental idealism. Arthur Melnick argues that a ‘thing in 
itself’ is not a thing at all but rather a very different concept of a thing to that which we 
usually employ. Melnick takes Kant as saying that objects should be treated as 
phenomena because ‘involved in the very concept of an object is that it is a way of 
organizing our experience’ and that once this is recognized it is obvious that Kant’s 
point is that concepts are dependent on the subject’s method of judging (1973: 133-
134). Melnick then explains how the concept of a ‘thing in itself’ is a concept of an 
object that ‘would have sense apart from any reference to how the experience of a 
subject hooks up epistemically to his intellectual (judgmental) structure’ (1973: 152). 
Unfortunately, while this reading may be attractive insofar as it manages to disassociate 
Kant from Berkeley and it rightly emphasizes how the ‘Copernican turn’ necessitates 
seeing that the concept of an object is not independent of the structures of experience, it 
falls afoul of Kant’s firm and explicit claim that we can and must think things in 
themselves (Bxxvi).
412
 What Melnick denies is that there is a legitimate, positive sense 
to considering things in themselves, but this is an aspect of Kant’s account that cannot 
be eliminated and is required to make sense of the ‘Copernican turn’. Melnick’s view of 
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 For very similar views and a discussion of their weaknesses, see Ameriks (2003: 70-72). Ameriks 
(2003: 74-79) then discusses the early works of Allison and those of his chief source of inspiration, 
Gerold Prauss. My discussion of Allison will focus on his more recent work.   
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appearances and things in themselves is clearly too deflationary: the concept of a thing 
in itself for Kant is not incoherent and we are required to think things in themselves as 
the grounds of appearances (A288/B344, A379-380). In this sense ‘thing in itself’ is not 
just a non-epistemic concept of things, but refers to mind-independent reality appearing 
to us through affecting sensibility.
413
  
 By contrast, other ‘one world’ commentators have embraced the sense in which 
‘things in themselves’ is a coherent and necessary concept of the critical philosophy. H. 
E. Matthews argues that to consider things as appearances is just to consider them in 
relation to the subjective conditions of human cognition, i.e., to consider them from the 
human point of view, but to consider things in themselves is to form a real, alternative 
viewpoint on the same things (1969: 208). However, as Ameriks points out, Matthews 
does not explain what would count as another view and so one is left to wonder if any 
other viewpoint counts as considering things in themselves. If this is the case then why 
can we not characterize the human viewpoint as knowing things in themselves? 
Alternatively, if there is some other superior view, does this not threaten the common 
sense (empirical) realism that Matthews takes Kant to put forward? (2003: 73-74) I 
want now to discuss a reading that is hard to categorize in terms of the ‘one world’/’two 
world’ debate. This is Hoke Robinson’s (1994) interpretation that appearances and 
things in themselves are two non-parallel perspectives on things.  
  The reason why Robinson’s view is hard to place is because he presents it as an 
alternative to both Allison’s ‘two aspect’ view and the traditional ‘two world’ view, 
serving as an earlier attempt to occupy the middle-ground. Robinson rejects ‘two world’ 
readings as philosophically implausible and Allison’s view on the grounds of textual 
infidelity. He proffers what he terms a ‘two perspectives’ view, which sounds similar to 
a ‘two aspect’ reading but it is not. By ‘two perspectives’ Robinson does not mean two 
perspectives on one and the same set of objects, as Allison does. Rather, he means to 
contrast a human perspective with a divine one – an idea that he admits he derives from 
Allison’s work, but nonetheless employs very differently (1994: 428). Appearances are 
things seen from the human perspective, and things in themselves are objects seen from 
a divine perspective (ibid). At the empirical level (the level of ordinary day-to-day, pre-
reflective common sense experience) these two perspectives are considered to coincide: 
when I see a tree, God would also, in my place, (presumably) see a tree. In this sense the 
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distinction would seem to concern the same set of objects, but Robinson continues by 
stating that at the transcendental level I ‘recognize that the tree is an appearance (i.e., an 
object in the human perspective), and that in itself (i.e., from the divine perspective) it 
may be quite different, or not exist at all’ (ibid). Robinson claims that Kant provides 
internal criteria for distinguishing between knowledge and illusion and that this set of 
criteria takes over the role that the object in itself plays in transcendentally realist 
accounts, for that object has been banished to the divine perspective (1994: 429). 
Robinson rejects the ‘two aspect’ reading because it treats the human and divine 
perspectives as parallel. One problem with Robinson’s view is that it is immediately 
suggestive of an appearance/reality distinction in that an object that may (seem to) exist 
in the human perspective might not exist in the divine perspective as a thing in itself, or 
vice versa. This undermines Kant’s realism and his claim that appearances are not 
illusions or only how things seem to be (B69). Robinson could respond by insisting that 
the two perspectives are not parallel, and that while we are constrained to think of a 
perspective that is independent of our own, our conception of that alternative is still 
made from within the human perspective and so is derived from (thus not superior to) 
the human perspective (1994: 430-431). Nevertheless, our thought of what it is like to 
occupy the divine perspective still renders knowledge claims made from within the 
human perspective potentially invalid simply because they are made from within that 
(limited) perspective, so accordingly, it is hard to see how Robinson’s view can allow 
for the robust kind of empirical realism that ‘one world’ views aspire to. Robinson 
intends the divine perspective to be one that we assume only when things go wrong in 
our efforts to cognize the world, effectively standing in for ‘what it might be like to 
know all about something once and for all’ (1994: 431), but this is not convincing in 
light of the claim that things in themselves are only contained under the divine 
perspective. It is clear that Robinson takes appearances to designate how we represent 
the world through experience and theorize about it in science, while things in 
themselves stand in for how the world really is, but just this very fact means that the 
interpretation cannot sit in the middle but must collapse either into an appearance/reality 
distinction – knowledge of how things really are is only (conceived to be) available to 
the divine perspective – or it collapses back into dual aspects on one set of things and 
loses its claim to uniqueness.  
 While his focus on ‘perspectives’ suggests some similarity with ‘one world’ 
readings Robinson’s account of appearances pulls him much closer to the ‘two world’ 
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interpretations, for Robinson, like Van Cleve (1999), holds Kant’s appearances to be 
‘intentional objects’. Robinson takes appearances to be generated or ‘projected’ through 
representations; that is, that empirical objects owe their existence to us (1994: 429). 
This cannot be accurate as Kant explicitly states that such a relationship between object 
and representation can hold only for a divine intuition: God in the very representing of 
the object creates it (Cor, 10: 130; B145). Robinson is right that the representation does 
make the object possible in one sense: representations make objects possible if through 
them cognition of things as objects is made possible (A92/B125; MFNS, 4: 476). Thus, 
Robinson’s account is too phenomenalist, ascribing to the view expressed by Garve and 
Feder that transcendental idealism is a theory about how we literally make objects out 
of representations through application of the a priori conditions of experience. 
Notwithstanding that issue, Robinson’s attempt to anchor the transcendental distinction 
in terms of a contrast between human and divine perspectives is too unstable and 
ultimately must collapse back into one of the alternatives he rejects. Now I want to 
provide a summary of what is by far the most significant and influential of the 
deflationary readings, namely the work of Henry Allison. This account is preliminary 
because certain aspects of Allison’s complex view will be examined throughout the 
thesis.   
 Allison argues against Guyer, Strawson and others, that transcendental idealism 
is not the dogmatic metaphysical doctrine that we do not know the world as it is really 
is, and he also argues that, for better or worse, Kant’s philosophical insights cannot be 
separated from his idealism (2004: 4). Central to Allison’s approach is the idea that the 
transcendental distinction does not pick out two ontologically distinct kinds of entity, 
but rather refers to how objects should be considered in philosophical (transcendental) 
reflection. According to Allison, the distinction concerns two ways of considering 
objects. Objects can be considered as appearances and they can be considered as they 
are in themselves (2004:16-17). It is worth being very clear about what the deflationary 
reading claims. Although Allison (1983) has previously presented the idea as being that 
to consider things as appearances is to consider them in relation to conditions of 
experience (epistemic conditions) and to consider them in themselves is to consider 
them independently of these conditions, this is not entirely accurate with respect to his 
later works. The point is rather that when Kant speaks of considering things as they 
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appear this means specifically in relation to sensibility.
414
 Similarly, to consider things 
as they are in themselves means to consider things independently of their relation to 
sensibility (1996: 7-8; 2004: 16-17, 52-53). This is a subtle but crucial difference for it 
makes room for Kant’s claims that we can and must think things in themselves, and it 
also helps to dispel the verdict that Allison’s interpretation is ‘trivial’ and ‘anodyne’. 
The notion of ‘epistemic conditions’ originates with Allison and captures the idea that 
there are subjective conditions of representation that are not ontological, yet are object-
enabling insofar as they make possible the representation of something as an object 
(2004: 11-12; 1983: 10). Importantly, for Allison, these conditions only reflect the 
cognitive structure of the subject and not the structure of things in themselves (1983: 
27). Allison has been heavily criticized for making the unknowability of things in 
themselves a trivial consequence of a definitional strategy, for helping himself 
prematurely to the conclusion that epistemic conditions must be purely subjective in 
virtue of their object-enabling status, and for committing a non-sequitur in asserting 
with Kant the non-spatiotemporality of things in themselves.
415
 First, the triviality 
charge.  
 If by ‘things in themselves’ Kant means nothing more than things considered in 
abstraction from the conditions of knowledge then Kantian humility becomes an 
analytic tautology. To many Kant’s humility is supposed to be, in some sense, a 
‘depressing’ discovery, a cause for lament, as Langton puts it.416 I submit that those who 
find Allison’s deflationary account trivial have misunderstood what the account actually 
claims. However, there have been some interesting defences of his 1983 account, 
ranging from denying that analyticity necessarily implies triviality (Allison 2004, 19; 
Breitenbach 2004, 144-145) to the deflationary view being misrepresented (Bird 2000, 
107). Bird argues that the view is better described as being that ‘we can have no 
knowledge of things in (complete) abstraction from the senses’, which is definitely not 
analytic or, for Kant, trivial. Bird is basically correct. The deflationary view is best 
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expressed as being the view that we can (and must, for Kant) consider the objects in the 
world and ourselves in two ways. We can consider them as appearances by considering 
the way in which they are represented as being in space and time through sensibility, 
and we can consider them as things in themselves, by considering them as things 
independently of their relation to sensibility. It is important to note, however, that some, 
such as Langton, do construe Allison correctly as advocating abstracting from 
sensibility, rather than all epistemic conditions, but still charge the position with being 
trivial. I think this charge has very little force. It is certainly not trivial, for Kant, that we 
can have knowledge or cognition of things only through their appearing through 
sensibility, for this is exactly what rationalist metaphysicians deny. Leibniz and other 
‘dogmatists’ think we can attain knowledge of reality through reflecting on our concepts 
alone; Kant emphatically rejects this. Perhaps to Langton it is trivial that we need 
sensible intuition to have knowledge, but it was not trivial to Leibniz, or the early Kant, 
and if Kant’s complex argument in the Amphiboly is correct, it is all too easy to slide 
into making claims that neglect the (irreducible) role of sensibility. Indeed, Langton’s 
own interpretation of Kant fails to take seriously the necessary contribution of 
sensibility to cognition.
417
  
Second, related to the triviality charge is the question of what point the 
reflection is supposed to have if transcendental idealism is not trivial. This objection is 
raised most forcefully by Guyer (1987: 337-338; 2007: 12), who asks us to imagine a 
case where a woman is considered for a job. When the interviewers are evaluating her 
appropriateness for the job they are asked to abstract her gender, thus forming a 
conception of her that subtracts her gender. Based on this, though, they do not decide 
that she is in fact genderless, which would be an obvious ‘howler’. Yet this is how 
Guyer understands Allison’s position: that things really are spatiotemporal, but that in 
considering them in themselves we abstract their spatiotemporal character and form a 
conception of them to the extent that they are not spatiotemporal, and from this, 
Allison’s Kant concludes that things as they are in themselves are definitely not 
spatiotemporal.
418
 The ‘abstractionist’ reading of Allison misses the point (Allison 
2007, 32-33). Allison’s Kant is still a transcendental idealist and so, based on the 
arguments of the Aesthetic, Allison’s Kant takes space and time to only characterize 
things as they are given to the human mind. Things as they are independently of the 
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human mind are not spatiotemporal, but, and this is crucial, this does not mean that 
things only seem to be spatiotemporal while really they are not (B69).
419
 In this sense, 
expressing the position in terms of considering things is perhaps unhelpful, for it can be 
misleading insofar as it suggests a purely abstractionist picture where we abstract away 
properties from our concept of a thing that the thing really (mind-independently) has. 
The point is actually that we abstract away properties that a thing has only insofar as it 
stands in a certain relation to us, that is, is given to us as an object through sensible 
intuition.
420
 Thus, Kant on the deflationary reading is not asserting a mere tautology, 
making it trivial, or, alternatively, if not trivial, committing the abstractionist ‘howler’ 
that worries Guyer.  
 This may overcome the worry that the idea of considering things 
metaphilosophically or epistemologically is inherently trivial, but it does not explain 
what grounds Kant’s idealism on Allison’s account. For Allison, it is a combination of 
the notion of epistemic conditions and what he calls the ‘discursivity thesis’ that ground 
Kant’s idealism. Again, he has been misunderstood on this point. First, it has been 
argued against Allison by Guyer (1987; 2007) and Allais (2015: 80-83) that the notion 
of an epistemic condition does not entail transcendental idealism: there is nothing 
inherently idealist about the idea that the objects of our knowledge must meet certain 
conditions in order for them to be objects of knowledge for us (ibid). Indeed, there is 
not and Allison is aware of this, for he says that to get the full position we need both the 
notion of epistemic conditions in conjunction with the discursivity thesis. Admittedly, 
he does also say that the concept ‘brings with it an idealistic commitment of at least the 
indeterminate sort […] because it involves the relativization of the concept of an object 
to human cognition and the conditions of its representation of objects’, but all this 
means is that in order for things to be ‘objects’ for us they must meet our epistemic 
conditions (2004: 12). The discursivity thesis is necessary for capturing transcendental 
idealism because it specifies the nature of these conditions. The discursivity thesis is 
essentially the claim that human cognition contains two irreducible components: 
thought and sensible intuition (2004: 12-13). This is expressed in Kant’s famous slogan: 
‘Thoughts without content are empty, intuitions without concepts are blind’ (A51/B76). 
Allison spells out this thesis as the idea that human cognition always requires its object 
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to be given to it from outside (although he thinks that this requirement also holds of 
divine cognition), but that this is insufficient for cognition. He notes in passing that 
Hume and Berkeley appear to take sensible intuition to be enough for cognition with 
their ‘imagistic’ accounts of thought (2004: 14). The key claim is that the sensible data 
that is organized by the understanding into cognition must be presented in such a way 
that it can be ordered.
421
 Allison suggests that this ‘provides the basis for Kant’s 
idealism’ (ibid). Allison takes this to mean that the sensible intuiting of objects must 
already take place under a form contributed by the cognitive subject, namely, the form 
of space and time, and it is the idea that things must be given through these forms (as 
they appear, not as they are in themselves) that grounds everything else that is to follow 
in the Analytic. As I explain in Chapters 1 and 2, I agree with Allison’s argument that 
discursivity does, for Kant, lead to idealism through this notion of ‘original orderability’ 
(2004: 14). For Allison, this is just the notion of an a priori form of intuition, but 
positing an a priori form of intuition is not enough to solve the mystery of ‘original 
orderability’. Solving the mystery requires a detailed examination of Kant’s argument in 
the Transcendental Deduction, especially the controversial and extremely difficult 
notions of ‘figurative synthesis’ and ‘synthesis of apprehension’.422  
 
Summary  
 
 I have surveyed a variety of different interpretations of transcendental idealism. I 
argued that it is undeniable that Kant sometimes espouses a subjective or metaphysical 
idealism, akin to Berkeleyan phenomenalism, supplemented by unknowable ‘real’ 
things in themselves, as the traditional ‘two world’ view generally maintains. I also 
showed that this cannot be the whole story and that Kant does not intend transcendental 
idealism to be taken (in any straightforward sense) as a distinction between appearance 
and reality. On the contrary, we saw that there is overwhelming textual evidence to 
substantiate the claim that transcendental idealism is supposed to include a robust, 
genuine sense of (empirical) realism, notwithstanding the disconcerting lapses back into 
subjective idealism. To this end, I agreed with the ‘one world’ interpreters that the 
distinction between appearances and things in themselves is best understood (both 
charitably and philosophically) as primarily concerning a single world of things 
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considered in two ways: as they appear and as they are in themselves. I agreed with the 
metaphysical interpretations that there is something that Kant thinks we are lacking in 
not knowing things in themselves, but I argued that this ‘something more’ should not be 
construed in terms of additional (intrinsic) properties or natures; it remains to be seen 
what it does consist in. I also argued that Allison’s alternative ‘deflationary’ reading is 
neither trivial nor guilty of a non-sequitur in avoiding triviality. Allison is right to think 
that there is something about discursivity that pulls Kant in the direction of 
transcendental idealism and he is also right that Kant is concerned with identifying 
epistemic conditions of the possibility of experience.  
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